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Abstract 
 
This study identifies the characteristics of seven key principles of good/corporate 
governance at three levels: as notions that originated in business; in their applications to 
sport through systematic review; and in relation to the interpretations given to them in the 
Olympic Movement. The aims of this study are, thus, to establish and utilise the IOC’s 
definitions/interpretations and operationalisations of corporate and/or good governance 
developed in a western framework and apply to a non-western NOC, the Korean Olympic 
Committee (KOC). 
  
This study adopts critical realist assumptions which give rise to the hypothesis that both the 
regularities of the Korean society and its unobservable social structures have an impact on 
the corporate governance of the KOC. It also uses Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to 
examine each interviewee’s discourse in order to identify the knowledge embraced by it and 
to interpret social practice(s) and the exercise of power. CDA is employed in relation to four 
selected events follows: the KOC/KSC merger, budgetary planning, the recruitment of staff in 
terms of gender and disability equity and the processes used for selecting the KOC 
President and the Chef de Mission.   
 
The unobservable deep structure is shown to be real domain in Korean society by the social 
practices exhibited in the four events. The government and, in particular, the State President 
represent the highest and most influential authority in decision-making on Korean sports 
policy. That power relationship coupled with the pre-existing structure of the KOC/KSC’s 
financial dependency on the government has resulted in a situation where the government 
has been able to ‘interfere’ greatly in the KOC/KSC’s overall decision-making on sports 
policy including the election of the President of the KOC. The KOC/KSC President is the 
most influential stakeholder in the decision-making within the organisation including the 
selection of Chef de Mission. As the pre-existing structure of cultural expectations 
determines that women should usually quit their jobs after marriage and that people with 
disabilities are incapable of working, the strongly male with abilities-dominated 
organisational culture has resulted in a social phenomenon whereby few females or people 
with impairments have succeeded in being promoted to senior positions. 
 
From the macro-level perspective, the first KOC/KSC merger accomplished on the orders of 
the State President shows the dominance of economic power as suggested in Marxist 
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influenced forms of analysis. The incumbent KOC President, who is at the pinnacle of the 
business elite, contributed to the KOC/KSC merger, which illustrates the aspect of elitism. In 
connection with the budgetary process, this may be viewed as evidence of the existence of a 
neo-corporatist structure in which the state plays a central role and acts in a unitary way with 
the involvement of a limited number of actors. With respect to the meso-level perspective, 
the aspect of clientelism is exhibited since the government habitually appoints its political 
aides to be the heads of various sporting organisations. Concerning political governance, it 
becomes obvious that the government has direct control over KOC/KSC’s policy. In terms of 
systemic governance, the relations among the domestic stakeholders of the KOC are more 
likely to follow a hierarchical type of governance, as the government has adopted the highest 
position and the National Federations are under the ‘control’ of the KOC/KSC. With 
reference to Lukes (1974)’ second dimension of power this can be evidenced in the context 
of the non-decision making roles of women and the disabled. 
 
The IOC’s interpretations of the key principles of corporate governance in a western 
framework are applied to the KOC. Accountability, responsibility, transparency and 
democracy are established but the KOC’s governance practices are not equivalent, while 
effectiveness and efficiency are interpreted as the same ways of the IOC’s. In general, 
power centralisation is apparent throughout the Korean cultural context. The KOC’s power 
structure and organisational culture is likely to be concentrated to the KOC President within 
the organisation and broadly, the Korean government enjoys its power centralisation 
decision-making in the Korean context which gives rise to a peculiarly Korean way of 
interpreting and applying the principles of corporate governance. In such circumstances, 
nevertheless, where the KOC is making an effort to align its practices with the IOC’s 
recommendations as much as possible, the indication is that the KOC is on course to reflect 
the IOC’s governance practices. 
 
Key words: corporate governance, accountability, responsibility, transparency, democracy, 
equity, efficiency, effectiveness, systematic review, Critical Realism, Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA), political governance, systemic governance, stratified ontology: empirical, 
actual and real reality, organisational values and culture, national culture, leadership, 
Marxism, elitism, neo-corporatism and non-decision making.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
This study explores the rising issue of governance in Olympic circles and focuses on the 
corporate governance of National Olympic Committees (NOCs), in particular, the Korean 
Olympic Committee (KOC). Corporate governance has grown in significance, generally, in 
the management of organisations, and it has become increasingly important, especially, in 
the wake of governance failures experienced by some sporting organisations, for examples, 
NOC’s Afghanistan and Iraq’s NOC. Corporate governance in the Olympic movement has 
not yet been greatly studied since the use of the term ‘governance’ only became current in 
Olympic circles when it was officially introduced with the Olympic Charter in 2004 (IOC 2004, 
Rule 19.3.2. cited in Chappelet, 2006: 1).  
 
Since the occurrence of one of the most high-profile sporting scandals, the Salt Lake City 
Olympic bribery scandal (Jennings and Sambrook, 2000 cited in Henry and Lee, 2004: 26), 
the issue of ethics in the management of the IOC has become prominent. In fact, it was in 
1998 that around 20 IOC members were allegedly involved in the 2002 Olympic Winter 
Games bid scandal and were accused of taking bribes from the Salt Lake Organising 
Committee (SLOC) in United States. The allegations was that the SLOC provided gifts to 
those involved IOC members during the bidding process to secure the games and made its 
successful bid in 1995.  Consequently, at the 108th session of the IOC in March, 1999, 
votes were taken on the expulsion of six IOC members who had been involved, and a new 
bidding process for the 2006 Winter Olympics host city was approved.   
 
In recognition of the need to address such failings in its corporate governance, the IOC 
introduced an independent Ethics Commission and an IOC 2000 Commission in 1999. The 
former was given the task of formulating a set of ethical principles, including a Code of 
Ethics, for IOC members and investigating subsequent complaints of breaches. Meanwhile, 
the latter was asked to examine and make recommendations on the selection process for 
future host cities and to guide the IOC over the structures to be put in place for choosing its 
members and distributing its revenue (Booth, 1999:55). The Report of the IOC 2000 
Commission was released during the 110th IOC session in 1999:.it stated that “the topic of 
transparency, initially under sub-theme 7 ‘Communication’, is presented separately in view of 
its major importance” (IOC 2000 Commission, 1999).  
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In Olympic organisations, Hums and MacLean (2004: 261) outline three levels of Olympic 
organisation (IOC, NOC and OCOG) in terms of the overall structure of the Olympic 
Movement. The Olympics are organised under the jurisdiction of the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) and bids to host the Olympic Games are made by the National Olympic 
Committees (NOC) of interested countries. With a successful bid, the responsibility for 
organising the Olympics falls upon that country’s/city’s Organising Committee for the 
Olympic Games (OCOG). While examining the notions of corporate governance, the 
concern is principally with their application at the level of the NOC and this study attempts to 
determine whether the notions of corporate governance discussed in the business or 
financial sectors can be readily applied to sporting organisations and, in particular, NOCs. In 
addition it will consider whether western notions of governance are entirely transferable to 
non-western sporting contexts such as that of the KOC. 
 
For reference, the governance of the IOC is referred to as the source of a model of 
corporate/good governance that has been recommended for the sporting organisations to 
emulate (see also Chappelet, 2010). After its foundation in 1894, the early IOC was based 
around the figure of Pierre de Coubertin but the size of the IOC was too small, according to 
Zakus (2000: 166), for governance and management, to be divided. During the post-World 
War І period the IOC experienced a size increase, leading to the formation of an Executive 
Board in 1921, which marked a change in the governance of the IOC and resulted in the 
establishment of a permanent Secretariat in Lausanne in 1926. During Berlioux’s 18-year 
tenure from 1967 to 1985, its Secretariat expanded and started to play a central role in the 
management of the IOC. It could be argued that this was the first time that governance and 
management took on significant and separate obligations (Zakus, 2000: 166). During the 
post-Berlioux period the IOC enjoyed its largest physical expansion. The top-down 
hierarchical control of Olympic sport by the IOC (if it was ever truly exercised) has 
subsequently been replaced by a network of interdependencies (see Henry and Lee, 2004) 
 
In order to represent the current governing structure of the IOC, Chappelet (2012) uses 
Pérez (2009)’s work in identifying the organisation’s five successive levels of management 
and governance. 
 
Table 1-1 The five levels of governance of the IOC 
Level Level name IOC structures, external entities and instruments 
1 Management (strategic and IOC President and directors with IOC Administration 
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operational) 
2 Management of 
management (governance) 
IOC Session, Executive Board (since 1921) 
Statutory and Thematic Commissions (since 1968) 
3 Management of governance 
(regulation) 
IOC Nominations Commissions (since 1999) 
Athletes Commission (since 1981) 
Ethics Commission (since 1999) 
4 Governance of governance 
(harmonisation) 
WADA (since 1999) CAS (since 1984)  
National courts 
5 Meta-governance (legal and 
societal framework) 
Swiss legislation 
National constitutions and laws related to sport 
International conventions & treaties concerning sport 
Source: Chappelet (2012: 23) using Pérez’s (2009: 29) model  
 
At level one, the IOC Administration which is made up of paid staff based in Lausanne, 
carries out the IOC’s daily management. The Administration has been restructured into 15 
departments; the management of the IOC’s management is handled by the institutional 
authorities such as the Session, the Executive Board and the IOC President. Of those, the 
Executive Board approves all internal governance regulations relating to its organisation. At 
level three, where the IOC’s regulatory mechanisms are overseen, the work is mainly 
focused on IOC members in association, since 1999, with the IOC Nominations Commission, 
the Athletes Commission (since 1981) and the Ethics Commission (since 1999). In particular, 
the IOC 2000 Commission was formed in 1999 as a consequence of pressure from the 
media.  All IOC members should comply with the Code of Ethics adopted in 1999 and the 
IOC’s Ethics Commission has the right to investigate the members and the background to 
the bids made by individual cities to host major international events.   
 
Unlike levels one, two and three, levels four and five are more associated with other 
organisations that are independent from the IOC. Level four aims at harmonizing the 
regulatory mechanisms. As the Code of Ethics is also widely applied to NOCs, the 
Organisation Committees and the Candidature Committees for the Games may have varying 
interpretations of the regulations. In fact, although the Olympic Charter states that the IOC’s 
decisions are final, several International Federations (IFs) and NOCs also have their own 
Ethics Commissions and codes of Ethics. It is also possible that the IOC’s rules of 
governance may, in certain instances, be contradictory to Swiss law. Accordingly, the World 
Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) was established in 1999 to “harmonise the various sporting 
rules and legislative mechanisms related to doping” (Chappelet, 2012: 18). In a similar vein, 
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) (Rule 15.4) “has incontestably contributed towards 
aligning sport regulations with natural law, and towards a certain degree of harmonization of 
the rules of the Olympic sports organisations” (Chappelet, 2012: 20).   
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Level five relates to the meta-governance of the IOC. To quote Chappelet, “The IOC 
functions within the framework of Swiss legislation as an Association in accordance with 
Articles 60 to 79 of the Swiss Civil Code, or through its foundations and limited companies 
(SA) that are also subject to Swiss law” (Chappelet, 2012: 20). Moreover, ‘The Federal Law 
of the Host State’ in force in 2008, allows the Swiss Government to “grant certain ‘other 
international entities’ privileges, immunities (Article 2.1m of the law) and other special 
waivers of Swiss law” and, thus, this enables the IOC to “avoid any cases being filed against 
itself in Swiss courts” (Chappelet, 2012: 20). Moreover, Rogge (2010) has claimed that it is 
necessary to create “harmonization between sporting rules and laws of the lands where 
sport is practised” (cited in Chappelet, 2012: 21) 
 
Since CAS and WADA are separated from the IOC, both are formally autonomous 
independent global sports organisations. However, the IOC still exercises ‘invisible power’ in 
that its nominees may still be involved in governing those outside bodies (Forster, 2006: 73). 
Regarding CAS, Forster states that some athletes have questioned the impartiality of CAS 
but this has been rejected by the legal system of Switzerland (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 2003). 
Forster comments that this demonstrates “an interesting interplay between private global 
bodies and nation-states” (Forster, 2006: 73). 
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives 
This study identifies the primary ethical principles of corporate governance and evaluates the 
issue of corporate governance in Olympic circles, specifically with regard to their application 
to the NOC. This study, therefore, seeks to address the following questions and objectives: 
 
 What characterises corporate/good governance in the literature and how have the 
principles of good governance been adapted to the specialist sporting context?  
 What principles of good governance (if any) are advocated by the IOC in relation to 
the governance of Olympic organisations and how are these interpreted by the IOC 
body?  
 How is the KOC governed? Does it reflect/respect principles of corporate/good 
governance in general and, specifically, those aspects recommended by the IOC and 
how are these interpreted in the KOC context?  
 To what extent are practices of corporate/good governance developed in a western 
context applicable in a non-western context? 
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The first set of questions is discussed in the Systematic review (see Chapter 3) and the 
second set is covered in a discussion of the commentary and operationalisation of 
governance principles and the appropriate IOC documents (see Chapter 4). With respect to 
the third and the fourth sets of questions, the answers may be found by means of the 
analysis of the KOC events and its corporate governance.  
1.3 A Normative Enquiry 
Henry and Lee (2004: 30) indicate that “corporate or good governance is concerned with 
normative and ethically-informed standards of managerial behaviour”. According to 
Dellaportas et al., (2005: 5),  
 
Ethics is a concept that signifies how we act in order to make the ‘right’ choice, and 
produce ‘good’ behaviour. It encompasses a thorough (and objective) examination of 
principles, values, duties and norms, the consideration of available choices or 
alternatives in order to make the right decision and the strength of character to act in 
accordance with the decision. 
 
“It is often said that ethics is a ‘normative’ enquiry. This means that ethics is about ‘norms’ or 
‘standards’”, as indicated by Chryssides and Kaler (1996: 6). Moreover, Chryssides and 
Kaler (1996: 6) add that regarding the use of the term ‘normative’ – a distinction can be 
drawn between a ‘strong’ and a ‘weak’ sense: “the ‘strong’ sense of ‘normative’ is a 
prescriptive one [advocating norms] and the ‘weak’ sense of ‘normative’ is a descriptive one 
[describing norms].” The former puts an emphasis on urging people to improve their ethics 
and persuading people to mend their ways, while the latter focuses on enabling readers to 
observe and understand the ethical views. In this research, the weak sense of normative is 
adopted along with analysis of corporate and other forms of governance of the KOC. In other 
words, the primary concern is to capture the way that norms have been interpreted in an 
accurate manner.  
1.4 Rationale for selecting seven principles and the KOC as a case study  
This study identifies the most important principles of corporate governance in three main 
areas, namely the business and sporting sectors, and the Olympic Movement. For the 
business sector and the Olympic Movement the literature mainly deals with accountability, 
responsibility, transparency and democracy, whereas these principles do not receive much 
attention in the literature regarding sporting organisations. Unlike those four principles, the 
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concepts of equity and effectiveness have received greater emphasis in studies dedicated to 
the sporting field. Although efficiency is not discussed as much as the other principles in any 
area, it may be the main principle that should be considered in connection with accountability. 
With reference to the auditing of finance reports, it is not only a part of accountability as it 
poses the question ‘To whom is the organisation accountable?’ but it is also intrinsic to the 
enquiry: ‘Does the NOC spend its resources efficiently?’ The question ‘How is the NOC 
accountable?’ is aimed at investigating whether the NOC’s expenditure is in line with its 
resources. This study, therefore, covers seven principles in order to examine the governance 
practices of the NOCs, which are accountability, responsibility, transparency, democracy, 
equity, effectiveness and efficiency. 
 
The Korean Olympic Committee (KOC) is taken as a case study, since the Republic of Korea 
is regarded as one of the world’s sporting powers in terms of the performance of its athletes 
in international events. Its team ranked 7th overall in the medal tables at the 2008 Beijing 
Olympic Games, 5th in the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics, and 5th in the 2012 London 
Olympic Games. It is also located in a non-western context in geographical and cultural if not 
geo-political terms. Therefore, the case of the KOC may be a good subject for a study that 
sets out to identifying the ways in which governance practices developed by the IOC’s 
interpretation of corporate and/or good governance in a western cultural context are 
interpreted and implemented in a non-western cultural milieu and the extent of the 
similarities and differences between them. Thus, the KOC’s organisational culture is 
discussed and, further, national culture of South Korea is analysed and discussed in 
comparison with this study’s and Hofstede (1997)’s findings.  
1.5 Thesis structure 
The introduction sets the background for a discussion of the emerging issue of the quality of 
corporate governance in the Olympic Movement. In addition to giving a brief history of the 
IOC’s governing structure, this chapter explains the current governing structure of the IOC 
and gives evidence of the effort taken to reform the IOC in order to promote corporate 
governance in the Olympic Movement. For the aims of this study, four sets of questions are 
provided and the objectives of each of them are listed in association with this study’s aim of 
achieving a clearer understanding of corporate governance in an NOC.  
 
Prior to undertaking a systematic review, Chapter Two deals with four areas of social 
analysis ranging from governance and stakeholder to state and power theory. Regarding 
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governance this study discusses three types of governance (following Henry and Lee, 2004), 
one of which is corporate governance, which covers the principal elements, namely, 
accountability, responsibility, transparency, democracy, equity, effectiveness and efficiency. 
The other two types of governance, political and systemic governance, are also considered 
in the analysis to understand governance in the Korean context. Stakeholder theory aids our 
recognition of the main stakeholders of the KOC and additionally to discover their inter-
relationships. State theory provides a context in which to identify the governing system of 
Korea and examine how this affects the practices of corporate governance in the KOC. 
Theories of power (which are of course linked to theories of the state) are also beneficial for 
understanding the power relations between the KOC and its stakeholders. By applying the 
concept of three types of power, as introduced by Lukes (1974), one can discover how the 
most influential stakeholders deal with emerging issues and with opposing interests in sports 
policy in Korea.  
 
In Chapter Three, the systematic review is conducted and is divided into two main sections: 
‘what the systematic review is’ and ‘what the emerging themes are’. The first section also 
provides details of each stage of the systematic review for this study. The second section 
includes descriptive and thematic analysis. The descriptive analysis examines the essential 
of corporate governance and how it has been constructed in a western context, while the 
thematic analysis distinguishes the emergent themes of corporate governance in the sport 
sector. 
 
Chapter Four undertakes a process of operationalisation which aims to convert the abstract 
concepts of the seven key principles into observable and identifiable measures. The 
commentary provides a rational account of the interpretations and operationalisation and it is 
developed on the basis of the preceding literature review. Based on the commentary, the 
operationalisation provides an investigatory framework. This is followed by the analysis of 
official documents in connection with the recommendations on corporate/good governance 
published and released by the IOC. It deals with the issue of how the IOC adapts and 
interprets key governance principles and the ways in which the practice may be at variance 
with the commentary. 
 
In Chapter Five, the methodology is discussed. With its adoption of a critical realist approach 
which makes use of realist ontological and interpretivist epistemological assumptions, this 
study develops its own analysis of corporate governance of NOCs by the application of 
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Critical Discourse Analysis. The Korean Olympic Committee is taken as a case study. With 
respect to methods, semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis are applied in 
order to analyse four events and/or processes that have taken place in Korean sport, in the 
KSC and KOC, and to evaluate the corporate governance of the KOC.  
 
Chapter Six identifies the features of the discourse relating to the four events and/or 
processes that took place in the KOC/KSC, which are analysed by applying Critical 
Discourse Analysis. These four events and/or processes are as follows: the merger of the 
KOC/KSC; the annual budget planning; the process of new staff employment; and the 
selection of the KOC president and the Chef de Mission. The analysis of these 
events/processes shows how the practices of corporate governance are discursively 
constructed by comparison with the western discourse and the notions of corporate 
governance constructed by the IOC in a western context. The analysis of a series of 
decision-making and social practices helps to elucidate the power relations existing between 
the KOC and its stakeholders. Particular attention is given to the hierarchical appropriation of 
power over and power of discourse, and to the organisational culture, as evidenced in the 
observations of KOC staff and Board members.    
 
Chapter Seven deepens the investigation of the seven principles of corporate governance of 
the KOC on the basis of the operationalisation and commentary. The approach to analysis is 
illustrated diagrammatically (see Figure 5-4), and similarities and differences in the practices 
of corporate governance between the KOC and the IOC’s recommendations (which are 
taken as a ‘western’ construct) are also discussed in this chapter. The purpose, more 
specifically, is to identify the way in which corporate governance is interpreted in the Korean 
context.    
 
The last chapter concludes with a brief overview of the study and draws together the 
strengths of the analysis. A principal result emerging from this study is that its examination of 
the corporate governance of the KOC reveals that the IOC’s definitions on corporate 
governance principles developed in a western context can be interpreted differently in 
different political, social, economic, historical and/or cultural contexts. Furthermore, the 
concept of the autonomy of sports organisations is reviewed in association with institutional 
isomorphism and the results of this study are explained in connection with national culture. 
The limitations of this research and its implications for future study are also addressed.  
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2 Theoretical grounding 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter employs several theories in order to contribute to an evaluation of corporate 
governance of NOCs separately from a systematic review. It employs a basic understanding 
of governance which, according to Henry and Lee (2004), consists of three approaches: 
political, systemic and corporate governance. Since this study aims to learn about the 
corporate governance of NOCs, it firstly identifies and addresses the principles of corporate 
governance developed in the business and financial sectors, from where corporate 
governance stemmed before examining and their application to sport. Prior to the systematic 
review that examines how corporate governance has been studied in the field of sport, this 
study reviews key principles of corporate governance in the business field and discusses 
how these principles are defined or used in both business and sports sectors.   
 
In addition, this section will deal with a range of theories including stakeholder theory and 
theories of the state and of power, which are closely related to issues of corporate 
governance in the NOCs. Stakeholder theory helps to identify the stakeholders in an NOC 
context. Through a study of theories of the state, an understanding of the governing system 
of the nation to which the NOC belongs can be developed. Theories of power can be applied 
to discover how decision-making in sport policy is conducted in a national or an 
organisational context, and thus they can operate at the meso, as well as the macro level.  
2.2 Governance 
2.2.1 Defining governance 
The term ‘governance’ has in the past been defined by contrasting it with the notion of 
government. Government traditionally connotes a hierarchical system and one-way (top-
down) policy making. It is claimed that traditional government is unlikely to be able to adapt 
to a fast-changing economic, social and cultural environment. Accordingly, a governability 
crisis has arisen in many diverse states and contexts in relation to the growing complexity of 
issues, an increase in the plurality of agents of government and the participation of civil 
society in the policy-making process (Dror, 1994 cited in Kazancigil, 1998: 70). Rhodes 
(1996: 652-3) argues that “governance signifies a change in the meaning of government, 
referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new 
method by which society is governed” (cited in Stoker, 1998: 17).Therefore, due to the 
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governability crisis, ‘governance’ has attracted wider attention, and has become an important 
item on the international agenda since the 1970s.   
 
Governance has a broader meaning than government, in that it covers non-state actors as 
well. According to Stoker (1998: 17), government refers to “the formal institutions of the state 
in which they exercise their monopoly of legitimate coercive power, with its characteristics 
having an ability to make decisions and a capacity to enforce them”. By contrast, 
governance does not need to represent government activity. Thus, Rosenau (1996: 5) 
defines governance in Governance without government as “a set of regulatory mechanisms 
in a sphere of activity, which function effectively even though they are not endowed with 
formal authority” (cited in Smouts, 1998: 81). In addition, Stoker (1998: 17) notes that 
governance refers to “the development of governing styles in which boundaries between and 
within public and private sectors have become blurred”. This means that there is more 
emphasis on the interactions among influential actors. Those actors include mainly local, 
regional, national, and international level governments, as well as organisations in the 
private and voluntary sectors, for instance, non-profit and non-governmental organisations, 
enterprises, and the like. Through their partner organisations they form the networks that are 
able to fulfil their objectives by establishing mutual understanding and developing a shared 
vision.      
 
In governance, moreover, Rhodes and Kooiman emphasise autonomy. Rhodes (1997: 53) 
states that governance refers to “self-organizing, interorganisational networks characterised 
by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game and significant autonomy from 
the state”. Kooiman (1993) also underlines that “the governance model is attractive as it is 
supposed to have a greater capacity to cope with policy-making issues in increasingly 
differentiated modern societies, where the various social sub-systems and networks have 
become more autonomous” (cited in Kazancigil, 1998: 70). 
2.2.2 Differences between Governance and Management 
Governance involves the use of power in developing, controlling and regulating the high-
level issues of strategic directions and activities (Olympic Solidarity, 2007: 23). Accordingly, 
the Cadbury Report (1992: 5) states that “Boards of directors should be responsible for the 
governance of their companies and supervising the management of the business.” Tricker 
(1984: 6-7) adds that they are also responsible for reviewing, monitoring and controlling the 
executive actions of management (Rhodes, 1997: 48). Management, on the other hand, is 
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concerned with daily operations in line with the strategic directions and activities adopted by 
the governing board (Olympic Solidarity, 2007: 23 & 27). Paid staff or volunteers are 
responsible for the day-to-day management of the organisation. Therefore, “all companies 
need governing as well as managing” (Tricker 1984: 6-7 cited in Rhodes, 1997: 48).   
2.2.3 Differences between Good and Corporate Governance 
Rhodes (1997) introduces six separate uses of governance, two of which are good 
governance and corporate governance. Hirst also lists five versions of governance, including 
good governance and corporate governance. By Hirst’s definition, good governance means 
“creating an effective political framework conducive to private economic action” (Hirst, 2000: 
14), while corporate governance is “a watchword of those who wish to improve the 
accountability and transparency of the actions of management” (Roe, 1994 cited in Hirst, 
2000: 17). 
 
To begin with the concept of good governance, Leftwich (1994) outlines two main meanings. 
International financial institutions such as the World Bank use it in managerial and 
administrative terms. In the 1989 World Bank report, the notion of good governance first 
appeared (Leftwich, 1994: 370). When a government is poorly managed, this inevitably has 
as its consequence an economic crisis which usually results in a demand for loans from the 
World Bank (1992b). The Bank’s ideas on this issue are clearly presented in its formal 
statement on Governance and Development (World Bank, 1992b cited in Leftwich, 1994: 
368). The western countries often interpret good governance from a political perspective. 
Those countries in which democracy is well developed are more likely to claim to be in a 
good condition in terms of governance. Thus, along with ‘good’ management, a politically 
stable and democratic system should be taken into consideration as a required context.    
 
The concept of corporate governance is highlighted in the Cadbury Report (1992), formally 
entitled The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, which was published by the 
Cadbury Committee in 1992 in the UK. Rhodes (1997) explains corporate governance, 
which is referred to as “the system by which organisations are directed and controlled” 
(Cadbury Report, 1992: 5). The Report considers the financial aspects and describes a wide 
range of thinking and ways of considering corporate governance issues.   
 
“The Committee’s recommendations are focused on the control of reporting 
functions of boards, and on the role of auditors. This reflects the Committee’s 
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purpose, which was to review those aspects of corporate governance specifically 
related to financial reporting and accountability” (Cadbury Report, 1992: 1) 
 
The narrower concept of good governance has managerial, administrative and political 
applications, while corporate governance is often more concerned with management ethics, 
though the terms overlap. As this study aims to identify the core principles of governance, 
and their ethical implications for NOCs, the notion of corporate governance is adopted. 
Nevertheless, ‘good’ is also just an adjective, qualifying the type of governance, for instance, 
‘good political governance’, or ‘good corporate governance’ where ‘good’ may imply either  
‘effective’ or ‘ethical’ or both. Accordingly, the terms ‘corporate governance’ and ‘good 
governance’ are used interchangeably in this research inasmuch as both terms are able to 
cover the concept of governance in management.   
2.2.4 Types of Governance  
Regarding types of governance, Leftwich (1994: 371) lists three approaches stemming from 
the meaning of good governance: systemic, political and administrative. His typology is 
particularly useful for this study following Leftwich (as do some others, such as Henry & Lee, 
2004) which refers to three types of governance: systemic, political and corporate 
governance. However, it is possible to identify more than one form of typology.  For 
example, Hindley (2002: 4) proposes the three categories of governance as steering, 
networks and good governance. Governance as steering can be taken to relate to political 
governance, governance as networks to systemic governance and good governance to 
corporate governance.  
a) Political governance 
Given that the emphasis on steering suggests a dispersal rather than a concentration of 
power, political governance focuses on the achievement of goals through the employment of 
regulations and inducements. As Pierre (2000: 4) argues, “political institutions no longer 
exercise a monopoly of the orchestration of governance,… but governance is about how to 
maintain the ‘steering’ role of political institutions despite the internal and external challenges 
to the state.” Henry and Lee (2004: 26) support the view that political governance relates to 
the processes by which governments and, in that case, also governing bodies seek to steer 
the sports system to achieve their desired outcomes. Hindley (2002: 15) adds that “greater 
emphasis is, therefore, placed on fostering partnerships and collective decision-making and 
marks a pronounced shift away from top-down, hierarchical authority.”  
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In this study, political governance is mainly discussed in connection with the relations 
between the KOC and the government. As the Korean government is the main stakeholder 
of the KOC in the Korean context, this study attempts to determine whether or not the 
government plays a critical/major role in sports policy making, or whether it exercises an 
absolute power or maintains a steering role as a political stakeholder (see Chapter 6). 
b) Systemic governance 
The second concept is systemic governance. This suggests partnership, cooperation or 
competition, and collaboration between stakeholders as an alternative to the exercise of 
hierarchical authority, which was perhaps the dominant paradigm until the later 1970s. Not 
only do sports organisations belong to networks of stakeholders but also different types of 
stakeholders are related to one another such as satellite broadcasters, players, associations, 
agents and sponsors. More interrelations between those various parties in the network are 
necessary if we are to gain a better understanding of policy change.   
 
Furthermore, Kooiman (1993) develops the notion of social-political governance, which is 
based upon broad and systematic interactions. Social-political governance has the 
characteristics of complexity, dynamics and diversity. Unlike hierarchical governing systems, 
it tends to involve more actors, according to Kooiman (1993: 41), in terms of its complexity, 
the number of structural relations is greater; as regards its dynamics, relations are changing; 
and concerning diversity, different types of relations or mutual interdependencies of social-
political systems are expressed. Thus, this is likely to be a form of ‘co-governing’ in terms of 
the mode of governing, in contrast to the self-governing and hierarchical governing modes. 
Co-governing is a horizontal system of governing where actors co-operate, co-ordinate and 
communicate without requiring a central or dominating governing actor (Kooiman, 1993). 
 
Which actor dominates in a system may vary from one issue to the next, as can be seen in 
the corporate governance of the KOC. In the international context, it reveals whether and for 
which types of issue, for example, the IOC is a dominant actor or is simply a member of the 
KOC’s group of stakeholders in a cooperative, competitive or collaborative relationship. In 
the domestic context, this study seeks to determine under which circumstances, for which 
reasons and for which issues particular groups of actors may be dominant stakeholder(s) in 
decision making (see Chapter 6). 
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c) Corporate governance 
To begin with its historical background, the term ‘corporate governance’ first started to be 
widely used in the business sector. It first became a subject of debate in the eighteenth 
century, according to Mallin (2004:11) who states that “the potential problems of the 
separation of ownership and control were identified in the eighteenth century by Smith 
(1838)”. Mallin (2004: 11) also cites the work of Berle and Means (1932) who drew attention 
to the way in which, “as countries industrialized and developed their markets, the ownership 
and control of corporations became separated”. Since then, many cases of governance 
failure in the business sector have led to a greater emphasis being placed on governance. 
Larson and Clute (1979) claim with relation to the reported corporate failures and crises, that 
the “characteristics shared by failed firms are directly related to personal decision-based 
characteristics of managers” (cited in Mellahi and Wood, 2003: 23). The focus on corporate 
governance has been broadened so as to encompass its invisible as well as its invisible 
factors. Dellaportas et al. (2005: 5) note that corporate governance has traditionally been 
used as  
 
“the way a corporation is directed and controlled to maximise shareholders’ profits, 
however, recent corporate events and the apparent failures of the governance 
system highlight the need to review not only systems and structures, but also 
relationships, cultures, ethics, and leadership within organisations.”  
 
They also, thus, focus on culture and values in an organisation.  
Accountability 
In corporate governance the principle of accountability is particularly concerned with officials’ 
behaviours and ethics, as shown by Chryssides and Kaler (1996: 82), who note that “the 
issue of corporate governance is, in effect, identical to the issue of executive accountability” 
because Executive Committees can control companies in a number of ways. Stakeholder 
theory raises questions about responsibility and accountability (Mellahi & Wood, 2003; see 
also Kitson & Campbell, 1996: 166). “A broader and more inclusive definition” of corporate 
governance “encompasses accountability towards not only shareholders, but also the 
company’s relevant stakeholders” (Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 21). Broadly considered, 
accountability means that a company should pursue the benefit of all stakeholders. Also, “the 
board’s actions are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in general meeting” 
(The Cadbury Committee, 1992: 15). Accountability requires, furthermore, that within an 
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organisation, a member of the Executive Committee should comply with its rules and 
regulations.   
 
In terms of accountability, the responsibility of the internal auditors is “to oversee the firm’s 
financial and operating procedures, to check the accuracy of the financial record-keeping, to 
implement improvements with internal control, to ensure compliance with accounting 
regulations and to detect fraud” (Kim & Nofsinger, 2007: 27). Organisations support their 
own auditing team to enhance their accounting and control internal efficiency. On the other 
hand, external auditors should be independent of the organisation being audited, aiming to 
“review the firm’s financial statements and its procedures for producing them” (Kim & 
Nofsinger, 2007: 28), and to make sure of the fairness of its internal auditing.  
 
Issues of moral responsibility concern first, ‘duty’, which might be general or role-specific, 
and secondly, a ‘causal’ sense that we are responsible for the consequences of our actions. 
The second concern is with causal responsibility which considers moral responsibility in the 
sense of ‘duty owed’ and this is also true of accountability, because what makes us morally 
liable for blame or punishment is also a result of failures to fulfil our duties. Chryssides and 
Kaler (1996: 66) point out that “duty thus sets the parameters within which accountability 
operates”, adding (1996: 69) that, in particular, “the big and possibly only issue of causal 
responsibility is the one of executive accountability”. Therefore, executive accountability is 
likely to overlap with responsibility. 
Responsibility 
According to the OECD (1999), “a corporate governance structure should specify the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such 
as, the board, the managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spell out the rules 
and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs” (cited in Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 
21). Chryssides and Kaler (1996: 82) also state that the chief issue of corporate governance 
is “how companies should be governed”. It concerns the mechanisms for allocating powers 
and responsibilities within companies. The report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects 
of Corporate Governance (1992: 21) argues that in terms of responsibility, “there should be a 
clearly accepted division of responsibilities at the head of a company, which will ensure a 
balance of power and authority, such that no one individual has unfettered powers of 
decision” (Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 27). 
 
 16 
 
Mellahi and Wood (2003: 26) state that responsibility is about “the strategic guidance of the 
organisation and the effective monitoring of management by the board” and how the board 
of directors “balance diverging interests and ensure the long-term viability of the firm” (2003: 
21-2). The Cadbury Report (1992: 2) also claims that all directors are given a monitoring role, 
which endows them with a responsibility for ensuring that all the activities of their companies 
are in place.  
Effectiveness 
The Cadbury Report (1992) highlights its assertion that boards’ responsibilities are directly 
related to effectiveness, and that the unitary board system should be strengthened so as to 
increase its effectiveness. The unitary board system means “a board made up of a 
combination of executive directors, with their intimate knowledge of this business, and of 
outside, non-executive directors, who can bring a broader view to the company’s activities, 
under a chairman who accepts the duties and responsibilities which the post entails” (the 
Cadbury Report, 1992: 10). The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance 
Council (CGC) (2003) also suggests that “organisations should review and actively 
encourage enhanced board and management effectiveness. Organisations can facilitate this 
by providing directors and executives with the information required to assess the company’s 
performance” (cited in Dellaportas et al., 2005: 125). 
 
Boards should provide a high level of quality of information to their directors so as to 
increase effectiveness (the Cadbury Report, 1992: 13). This is associated with both 
accountability and effectiveness, as monitoring is included as an aspect of accountability, 
and in order to realise this aim, the Boards of Directors should be provided with in-depth 
information (the Cadbury Report, 1992: 6). 
 
Moreover, the Board’s assumption of the responsibility for providing a strategic goal is also 
related to effectiveness. According to Slack and Parent (2006: 41), effectiveness is defined 
as “the extent to which an organization achieves its goal or goals” (cf. Pennings & Goodman, 
1977; Sandefur, 1983). In particular, official goals and operational goals are described in the 
following manner: “official goals (an organisation’s reason for existence) help to ensure that 
everyone is working toward a common end” while “operational goals (referring to an 
organisation’s primary tasks) provide a sense of direction and motivation, guidelines for 
decision-making and standards for evaluating performance” (Kerr, 1991: 84). 
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Dellaportas et al., (2005: 125) argue that “key elements of the organisation’s culture and 
values must support good corporate governance principles.” This is also argued by Slack 
and Parent (2006) who state that, in relation to effectiveness, organisational culture is likely 
to have an impact on management in organisations. They maintain (2006: 275) that 
organisational culture is one of the most recent introductions into the field of organisation 
theory, but also add that culture is an important variable in determining the effectiveness of 
an organisation. It is not (as many popular writers have implied) the only variable. Apparently, 
it is important to understand organisational culture as a factor impacting upon corporate 
governance, for example in the NOCs. 
Efficiency 
Efficiency “takes into account the amount of resources used to produce the desired output” 
(cf. Pennings & Goodman, 1977; Sandefur, 1983). Furthermore, Jackson and Carter (2000: 
198) stress that the ability to distinguish between what is structurally relevant to efficiency 
and what is not, is of crucial importance, adding that “efficiency is deeply implicated in 
organizational behaviour” (2000: 197).  
Transparency 
Kitson and Campbell (1996: 115) claim that large companies emphasise the need for 
openness in decision-making and for a clear demonstration that the company is being 
governed in accordance with perceived business virtues. Dellaportas et al. (2005: 125) also 
point out that “organisations should develop written policies and procedures that promote the 
timely and balanced disclosure of all material matters that concern them”, as recommended 
by The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council (CGC) (2003). 
Democracy 
With respect to the integrity of the company’s financial reporting “organisations should 
implement procedures to independently verify and safeguard it” (cited in Dellaportas et al., 
2005: 124).  
Equity 
Unlike the other ethical principles, the notion of equity does not appear much in discussions 
of corporate governance in the business sector, though increasingly it does so in terms of 
gender. Nevertheless, there is an issue over the correct definitions of the terms ‘equity’ and 
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‘equality’. According to UNESCO1 (2000: 5), the ILO (International Labour Organization) 
was quoted as saying that  
 
Equality between men and women entails the concept that all human beings, both 
men and women, are free to develop their personal abilities and make choices 
without the limitations set by stereotypes, rigid gender roles and prejudices. Gender 
equality means that the different behaviour, aspirations and needs of women and 
men are considered, valued and favoured equally. It does not mean that women and 
men have to become the same, but that their rights, responsibilities and 
opportunities will not depend on whether they are born male or female. Gender 
equity means fairness of treatment for women and men, according to their 
respective needs. This may include equal treatment or treatment that is different but 
which is considered equivalent in terms of rights, benefits, obligations and 
opportunities (ABC Of Women Worker’s Rights And Gender Equality, 2000: 48) 
 
This study also distinguishes equity from equality in order to appraise the NOCs practices 
with regard to each of these concepts.  
 
In summary, as far as its core notions are concerned corporate governance in the business 
sector is likely to focus on accountability, responsibility, transparency, democracy and 
effectiveness. On the other hand, the principles of equity and efficiency do not tend to 
appear as frequently in the literature pertaining to the business as they clearly do in 
discussions of the sport sector. Henry and Lee (2004: 30) underline that “the notions of 
organisational governance and business ethics are clearly interrelated” and they refer (2004: 
26) to corporate governance in the sporting context as “the accepted norms or values for the 
just means of allocation of resources, and profits or losses (financial or other) and for the 
conduct of processes involved in the management and direction of organisations in the 
sports business”. The notion of corporate governance will be discussed in connection with 
the sporting field in Chapter Three and with the Olympic Movement in Chapter Four.  
2.3 Stakeholder theory 
Stakeholder theory is a key concept used to understand the relations among any related 
individuals or groups and NOCs and this theory serves the interests of those who are 
identified as ‘stakeholders’ in a company (Evan & Freeman, 1993:255; Cragg, 2002:132-133 
cited in Kaler, 2003: 71). Freeman (1984: 46) defines a stakeholder as “any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives.” 
As Mellahi and Wood (2003: 20-1) mention, “the roots of both corporate governance and the 
                                               
1
 A summary review of UNESCO’s accomplishments since the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing 
1995) released by the Unit for the Promotion of the Status of Women and Gender Equality in May, 2000 
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concept of ‘stakeholder’ are central issues in contemporary debates on business ethics.” In 
addition, the Cadbury Committee (1992), in devoting a great deal of attention to corporate 
governance, also suggests that corporate governance refers to the relationships among 
stakeholders in shaping the direction and performance of companies. 
 
The stakeholders include not only the shareholders, but also non-shareholder groups, such 
as employees, customers, suppliers, communities, et cetera (Kaler, 2003: 71). There are two 
types of stakeholders: one comprises the ‘primary’ and the other the ‘secondary’ 
stakeholders. “Primary stakeholders comprise those who have a formal and official 
relationship with the firm, for instance, suppliers, investors, employees, shareholders, 
managers and so forth” (Carroll, 1993 cited in Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 28) and, furthermore, 
the public stakeholder group is also included, for instance, government and communities 
(Clarkson, 1995; see also Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 28). Others are classified as secondary 
stakeholders (Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 28). In the context of the NOCs, the stakeholders can 
be listed as follows: at the international level, the IOC, the IFs, and/or Olympic Solidarity; at 
the domestic level, the State president, governmental bodies, political groups, business 
sponsors or partners, the NFs, the members of sporting organisations and the staff members 
of the NOC, the media, and the public.  
 
Stakeholder theory is concerned with two aspects: decision-making and ethics. With respect 
to decision-making, a balance among stakeholders does not imply that they all have an 
equal voice or share in the outputs, and thus, having a voice in decision-making and a share 
in the organisational outcomes should be based on their contribution to the organisation. 
Therefore, the more a stakeholder group contributes to the organisation, the greater their 
voice and share of the value created should be (Phillips, 2004: 4). In reality, not all 
stakeholders want a voice in organisational decision-making, but those who do desire a 
voice should have it (Phillips, 2004: 2). Regarding ethics, “stakeholder theory begins with the 
assumption that values are necessarily and explicitly a part of doing business, and rejects 
the separation thesis which assumes that ethics and economics can be neatly and sharply 
separated” (Freeman 1994 cited in Freeman, Wicks, & Parmar, 2004: 364). Thus, ethics 
should be taken into account in business activities, and particularly in stakeholder theory. 
Verdeyen, Put and van Buggenhout (2004: 325) stress that corporate governance was 
traditionally seen as the solution to the disproportional relation between the company’s main 
stakeholders.  
 
 20 
 
Corporate governance in the non-profit sector is viewed as a model of rules governing the 
mechanisms of the decision-making process and the mechanisms of control and liability. 
According to Denef (1998), “these rules (1) have to ensure that the powers and the interests 
of the stakeholders are balanced and (2) have to avoid the influences or considerations 
which may harm the balance in the above-mentioned mechanisms” (cited in Verdeyen et al., 
2004: 327). These rules are closely related with the ethics of corporate governance, and 
accordingly, they should be assessed whenever and wherever power is exercised in the 
organisations.  
 
Furthermore, there is a distinction between descriptive stakeholder theory and a normative 
approach. A descriptive stakeholder theory was developed by Mitchell et al. (1997), the 
central point of which is that “stakeholder salience will be positively related to the cumulative 
number of stakeholder attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency” (Jawahar & McLanghlin, 
2001 cited in Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 30). However, Jawahar and McLanghlin (2001) claim 
that this model is open to criticism due to the fact that it only emphasises “attributes that 
makes a stakeholder salient, but ignores an issue central to stakeholder management: how 
to deal with stakeholders who vary in terms of salience” (Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 30). 
Similarly, Donaldson and Preston (1995) also argue that stakeholder theory is unable to be 
explained along descriptive lines alone, but rather it is essential that a normative approach 
should be used. As Gibson (2000) highlights, they insist that “the descriptive approach looks 
at whether stakeholder interests are taken into account or not…the normative approach is 
concerned with the reasons why corporations ought to consider stakeholder interests even in 
the absence of any apparent benefit” (Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 31). Donaldson and Preston 
(1995: 71) explain that “the normative stakeholder theory is used to interpret the function of 
the corporation, including the identification of moral or philosophical guidelines for the 
operation and management of corporations.”  
2.4 Theories of State  
The theory of state is critical for conceptualising the governing system at the nation-state 
level to which the NOC belong. It is also fundamental to explaining the roles of the 
government oncerned, and the power relations or interactions between different major 
institutional actors in a process of decision-making, such as takes place in the NOC or sports 
organisations and the relevant governmental bodies. Seemingly, the governing system of a 
nation is highly likely to impact on its NOC’s governing system and it is believed to be a 
crucial element for understanding either observable or unobservable social phenomena, 
 21 
 
which may possibly influence the corporate governance of NOCs. The state theory in this 
study covers neo-pluralism and pluralism, neo-elitism and elitism, neo-corporatism and 
corporatism, neo- Marxism and Marxism and clientelism.  
2.4.1 Pluralism and Neo-Pluralism  
As opposed to the absolute, unified and uncontrolled power of the state, pluralism 
emphasises the virtues of diversity in the presence of more than one source of authority in 
political, institutional and social practices. With a representative government, “institutional 
checks and balances” are necessary in association with “the vertical separation like 
executive, legislature and the judiciary, and the horizontal division of sovereignty through 
federalism and provisions for the exercise of vetoes in a western context” (Dunleavy & 
O’Leary, 1987: 14). Pluralism in the social context concludes that various social groups in 
different areas should be included as “non-institutional checks and balances” (Dunleavy & 
O’Leary, 1987: 14-15). The citizens living in a polyarchic culture tend to share certain 
characteristics. People try to take part in decisions affecting them and are willing to examine 
their governments critically. Elections are one of the major ways of their participation in 
policy making and, thus, pluralists agree with the fact that political competition and elections 
are important factors in polyarchies. Although the interest group process has less impact 
than elections, it is nevertheless a crucial aspect of pluralist thought. Therefore, from the 
pluralists perspective, checks and balances should be maintained in a polyarchic system, 
and emphasis should be placed on the importance of elections and competition among 
related groups.   
  
After a period in the 1950s and early 1960s when pluralist thought prevailed, neo-pluralism 
was developed in response to a background of economic growth and the emergence of 
political and social crises in liberal democracy in the late 1960s. Neo-pluralists accept both 
the views of neo-elite theorists and neo-Marxists, while pluralists pay little attention to the 
immediate political influences or the general structural influence of a big business elite. They 
acknowledge that all interest or pressure groups can exert a disproportionate influence on 
policy making, and that the increasing role of business is a prominent factor. At the same 
time, business actors are likely to win a greater advantage by utilising their resources to 
assert their preferences. In addition, Lindblom (1977: 175) observes that “public affairs in 
market oriented systems are in the hands of two group leaders: government and business, 
who must collaborate and that to make the system work government leadership must defer 
to business leadership” (cited in Lee, 2005: 16). In this context, Neo-pluralists recognise that 
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“power can be exercised in an unobservable way through structures, anticipated reaction 
and ideology” (Smith, 1995 cited in Lee, 2005: 16). In particular, corporations deal with their 
governments by using their resources in investments, or in cooperation with government 
policy making and, in return, government officials are likely to defer to business interests. In 
market-oriented systems, government and businesses have a tendency to be closely related 
and be main actors in decision-making.   
2.4.2 Elitism and Neo-Elitism 
In a classical eliteist theory, with a strong idea of oligarchic government, power is given to a 
small number of rulers who thereby justify their rule over the government. Mosca (1939: 50) 
asserts that “two classes of people appear - a class that rules and a class that is ruled” (cited 
in Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 136). The classical elite theorists, Mosca, Pareto and Michels, 
oppose Marxist theory in claiming that a classless society and a liberal democracy 
establishes the possibility for the ascent to power of a new elite group of industrial capitalists. 
However, Mosca in his later life recognised “the virtues of representative politics” (Dunleavy 
& O’Leary, 1987: 140). Given multiple social forces in industrial society, the ruling class 
should be open and competitive and there should be the assimilation of a plurality of 
interests.   
 
Building on Mosca’s thinking with regard to representative politics, Max Weber and Joseph 
Schumpeter developed another approach to elite theory, namely ‘democratic elitism’ which 
partly combines elitism and pluralism. Here the two major elements are “the compatibility of 
bureaucracy and democracy” and “the stress on elite competition” (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 
1987: 141). Using Weber’s new term ‘bureaucracy’ which is defined as “the emergence of a 
dominant system of rational-legal administration inside large-scale businesses and 
government agencies” (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 141), Weber and Schumpeter explain 
that modern bureaucracies have developed with politically democratic tendencies. However, 
political leadership is necessary to supervise the bureaucratic machine. Additionally, Joseph 
Schumpeter states that democracy is a method of elite competition for mass electoral 
endorsement and of refining “political inputs to produce elite pluralism (Aron, 1950) rather 
than mono-elite domination” (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 142-3). Pluralist theory has largely 
been influenced by both sets of ideas, bureaucracy and democracy.  
 
Unlike its course of development at its European origins, elite theory in the United States has 
moved in a radical/left-leaning direction. According to the left-wing view of urban politics 
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adopted by some US sociologists is characterised as pertaining where “only a handful of 
people were influential in setting major decisions” (the Lynds, 1937; Warner, 1943 cited in 
Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 144). C. Wright Mills (1956) developed the concept of a ‘power 
elite’ composed of leadership groups from various areas including business, the military and 
politics, who exercise most control over decision-making in the USA. This power elite 
disregards the possessors of “middle level power” such as the Congress and the state 
governments (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 144). A small number of elites have become the 
core of the decision-making group and, thus, state organisations are likely to respond by 
acting in the interests of those who are able to access the policy decision-making process. 
Given the compatibility of bureaucracy and democracy, and the elite competition for electoral 
endorsement, the power elite is possibly at the core of the decision-making group. 
 
From the elitist perspective, another way in which corporate organisations or individuals may 
weaken the competition from their electoral opponents is by gaining control of the mass 
media. By exercising power over the mass media one can change people’s perceptions of 
the issues or use certain social topics to threaten people. This is especially prevalent, in 
cases where the government owns its media because this is likely to lead to a strong linkage 
between the media and political elites. They are thus enabled to exclude minority views and 
certain issues of political controversy or debate, and their media monopoly also affects the 
choice of politicians. This is termed “mobilisation of bias” by Schattschneider (1960; 
Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 158). The “mobilisation of bias” is defined as a set of 
predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures that operate systematically 
and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others 
(Bachrach & Baratz, 1970: 11). 
 
As a result, elite theorists fail to demonstrate that the system which they advocate can 
defend the interests of the powerless. Consequently, the neo-elitists in the 1960s raised the 
issue of non-decision making over issues, which have never reached the political agenda or 
where the decision makes are prevented from reaching any decision after the emergence of 
such issues. The most obvious instance of this is the process of agenda setting, “whereby 
an issue of importance to B is deliberately left off the agenda by A”(cited in Haugaard, 2002: 
26). 
2.4.3 Corporatism and Neo-Corporatism 
According to Schmitter (1979: 8), corporatism is found in countries with “singular, 
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noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered, sectorally compartmentalised, interest associations 
exercising representational monopolies” (cited in Bergsgard & Rommetvedt, 2006: 9). With 
reference to the example of Germany in the twentieth century, state corporatism is referred 
to by Schmitter (1974) as “dictatorial state rule (which) often uses state-instituted corporate 
bodies as transmission belts of a governing party” (cited in Streeck & Kenworthy, 2005: 441). 
By contrast, neo-corporatism or liberal corporatism, which is synonymous with Schmitter’s 
societal corporatism (Bergsgard & Rommetvedt, 2006: 8), is defined as a “territorial rule 
sharing the public space with social groups organised on a more voluntary basis and entitled 
to various forms of collective participation and self-government, provided they recognised 
the primacy of parliamentary democracy” (Schmitter, 1974; Lehmbruch, 1977 cited in 
Streeck & Kenworthy, 2005: 441). In the circumstances both of liberal parliamentary 
democracy and a market economy, a number of organised groups were integrated in many 
European countries in the 1970s. Neo-corporatist arrangements are believed to be possible 
in societies in which labour and labour unions are well organised. Neo-corporatism is 
expected to “involve a limited number of actors and therefore, the state plays a central role 
and acts in a unitary way” (Enjolras & Waldahl, 2007: 203). Thus, corporatism represents the 
exercise of non-competitive monopoly power in decision-making while neo-corporatism 
integrates liberal parliamentary democracy, market economy, and a number of organised 
groups. 
2.4.4 Marxism and Neo-Marxism 
Marxism undertakes the strongest and the most radical critique of capitalism and liberal 
democracy. Between 1840 and 1880, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels developed the core 
Marxist system of ideas by referring to three principal influential factors in the early 
nineteenth-century: British economics, German philosophy and French revolutionary thinking 
(Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 204). Marxist theory argues that there is a class of the exploiter 
and a class of the exploited within all class-divided societies. “Class is seen as a property of 
social relationships which stems from the basic antagonism between those who own the 
means of material production (capitalists) and those who depend for their livelihood on 
selling labour power” (Cawson, 1986: 50 cited in Lee 2005: 18). Accordingly, the concept of 
the ‘proletariat’, the new working class, is introduced whose mission is considered to be the 
breaking down of capitalism. The proletariat is suited to that task because it is a subordinate 
class in capitalism, without autonomy or any capacity for exercising political power, 
according to Marx and Engels. Thus, Marxism reinforces a view of the importance of class 
interests and the power of capital over decision-making (Lee 2005: 18; see also, Castells, 
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1977; Cockburn, 1977). 
 
Marxists consider the state as an instrument of the dominant class. According to Marsh 
(2002: 154), 
 
The state is an agent of the ruling class. The economy caused or determined how 
the rest of the social system evolved and functioned. So, economic relations 
determined social relations between classes, the form and actions of the state.  
 
The ‘bourgeoisie’, being the capitalist class, possesses economic and political power, 
therefore the modern state is organised so as to manage the affairs of the ruling class, the 
class of capitalists with power, as Marsh explains. By contrast the new ‘proletariat’ class is a 
subordinate class without political power in decision-making.  
 
Furthermore, Marxists give a warning about the dangers resulting from notion of “false 
consciousness”, which is the main concept of the third dimensional power introduced by 
Lukes (1974). They argue that biases are inherited from the past in the form of the structured 
and culturally patterned behaviour of groups (Haugaard, 2002: 38). For these influences 
Lukes introduces the concept of ‘false consciousness’, which encapsulates the view that less 
powerful groups are not aware of their ‘real interests’. He argues that individuals may not 
even recognise that they have interests that need to be represented in the decision-making 
process. He also sees actors as being motivated by their subjective interests, but also as 
having ‘real interests’ of which they may be unaware (Lukes, 1974 cited in Scott, 2001: 60). 
As traditional or structuralist Marxists argue, “individuals in a capitalist society are unlikely to 
be aware of their real interests, a state of affairs which is explained by reference to the 
effects of ideology generating ‘false consciousness’ and therefore they are unable to struggle 
to realize those interests” (Althusser, 1969; Poulantzas, 1973 cited in Henry, 2001: 8).   
2.4.5 Clientelism 
Clientelism is also represented as a system of patron-client relationships, and its form of 
social organisation has been common in many developing regions. Clientelism involves 
“strategies for the acquisition, maintenance and aggrandizement of political power on the 
part of patrons, and strategies for the protection and promotion of their interests on the part 
of the clients” (Piattoni, 2001 cited in Henry, Lee & Nassis, 2007: 82). In political clientelism, 
powerful political groups or leaders use their politically closely-related people to secure their 
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political stance, and in personal clientelism, powerful groups or leaders accept the services 
of those who are in their educational, familial, societal, or ethnic background so as to obtain 
the support of their own people. Under this definition of clientelism, therefore, as a strategy 
for securing his political power, the patron creates clientelist networks of patronage in return 
for his protection and promotion of the clients’ interests.  
2.5 Theories of Power  
Power theory is concerned with the exercises of power in decision-making, with its 
application in this study to sporting organisations, how that occurs and who is responsible for 
it. Lukes (1974), in his work on power, outlines three dimensions of power: power in 
decisions, power in non-decisions, and power in structured interests. ‘Decisions’ are the 
focus of pluralists’ discussions of power (Dahl, 1961). In their account, power is exercised in 
battles over decisions, which is the first dimension of power. Second, along with decision-
making, non-decision making also occurs due to an institutional bias. The third dimension of 
power, Lukes (1974) argues, is reflected in the fact that individuals may not even recognise 
that they have interests that need to be represented in the decision-making process. He also 
sees actors as being motivated by their subjective interests, but as also having ‘real interests’ 
of which they may be unaware.  
 
Firstly, the one-dimensional view of power is concerned with Dahl’s (1961) pluralist view of 
comprehension between groups. Dahl contends that resources, (potential power), may or 
may not be used in decision-making and, consequently, he finds that despite an unequal 
distribution of resources there is no single elite which exercises power. As a plurality of elites 
uses power, Dahl argues that the outcomes of decision making are decided through a 
competition between elites, which is the concept proposed by the pluralists. Here, Lukes 
(1974: 13) points out that the pluralists see their focus on behaviour in the making of 
decisions over key issues, as involving actual, observable conflict. Accordingly, plural 
interest groups struggle openly to gain their desired goal, and the competition to gain power 
is visible in the battle between groups. In addition, building upon Weber’s (1978: 53) 
definition of power “as the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a 
position to carry out his will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this 
probability rests” (cited in Hauggard, 2002:5-6), Dahl has a view of democracy as “a set of 
institutional procedures for ensuring relative equality in decision-making” (Hauggard, 2002: 
6).  
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The second dimension of power is developed by Bachrach and Baratz (1970) as a critique of 
the one-dimensional view introduced by Dahl. According to Lukes’s (1974) explanation, the 
central thrust of Bachrach and Baratz’s critique of the pluralists’ one-dimensional view of 
power is, up to a point, anti-behavioural. They suggest that pluralists put too much emphasis 
on overt/visible behaviour, and this may not be able to account for the fact that power may 
be exercised by confining decision-making to relatively ‘safe’ issues. Their specific critique of 
Dahl is that he fails to account for institutional bias. Bachrach & Baratz (1970) argue that  
 
Not only does A exercise power over B in overt decision-making (as in Dahl) but A 
may equally well exercise power over B by limiting the scope of the political process 
to issues which are relatively innocuous to A. The most obvious instance of this is 
the process of agenda setting whereby an issue of importance to B is deliberately 
left off the agenda by A (cited in Haugaard, 2002: 26).  
 
When the agenda raised by B is omitted on purpose by A whose power is stronger than that 
of B, it is called non-decision making. Accordingly, two-dimensional power involves 
examining aspects both of decision-making and non- decision making. 
 
Moreover, under Dahl’s definition of ‘key political issues’ “a necessary although possibly not 
a sufficient condition of power is that the [key] issue should involve actual disagreement in 
preferences among two or more groups” (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970: 10). The group 
members may agree or disagree with what are important and unimportant issues. This is 
termed as “mobilisation of bias” by Schattschneider, (1960 cited in Dunleavy and O’Leary, 
1987: 158), a concept which is most often used in the argument for the existence of a 
second dimension of power developed by Bachrach and Baratz as a critique of the one-
dimensional view. Their specific critique of Dahl is that he fails to account for institutional 
bias. The ‘mobilisation of bias’ is defined (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970: 11) as “a set of 
predominant values, beliefs, rituals and institutional procedures that operate systematically 
and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others”. 
 
The last concept of power, the third dimension, is introduced by Lukes (1974) following 
criticism that the first and second-dimensional views place too great an emphasis on the 
behavioural focus. He claims that three-dimensional power has two aspects. The one is in 
regard to “the issue of the structural constitution of relations of domination” (Haugaard, 2002: 
38). The other recognises that “the concept of false consciousness concerns the relationship 
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between power and knowledge and, consequently, includes the premise that power distorts 
knowledge” (Haugaard, 2002: 39). Relating to the first aspect, Lukes argues that “biases are 
inherited from the past in the form of structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups”, 
adding that “power relations are shaped by structurally constituted social relations” (cited in 
Haugaard, 2002: 38). With respect to the second aspect, Lukes introduces the concept of 
“false consciousness” which considers that the less powerful are not aware of their ‘real 
interests’. Thus, Lukes argues that without being aware of their real interests, people will not 
attempt to raise them as an issue and, thus, it is not even necessary to exclude them from 
decision-making (Scott, 2001: 60). 
 
Apart from Lukes three dimensions of power, other concepts of power have been proposed 
as consisting in the possession of ‘authority’ and ‘legitimacy’, and of power as ‘discourse’. In 
terms of power as authority, Bachrach and Baratz (1970: 34 & 37) define authority as being 
evidenced by the situation in which “B complies because he recognizes that [A’s] command 
is reasonable in terms of his own values – either because its content is legitimate and 
reasonable or because it has been arrived at through a legitimate and reasonable procedure” 
(Lukes, 1974: 21-2). Handy (1985) also supports the view that the word ‘authority’ is used 
when one wants his power to be seen to be legitimate. Accordingly, authority is different from 
power in terms of the existence of legitimacy, while power without legitimacy can still be 
exercised by A over B. Therefore, authority may be exercised in its legitimised form with 
reference to their collective goals.  
 
‘Hierarchical power’ denotes the system whereby power is exercised by those who occupy a 
high position in an organisation. The power comes from the person because of his/her role 
within the organisation and it is present not only in the relations among people but also 
among departments or subunits. As Perrow (1970: 59) argues, “the preoccupation with 
interpersonal power has led us to neglect one of the most obvious aspects of this subject: in 
complex organisations, where tasks are divided up between a few major departments or 
subunits, and all of these subunits are not likely to be equally powerful” (Pfeffer, 1981: 3). 
However, the power is more likely to reside with the people who wield authority in 
organisations. As Slack and Parent (2006: 199) argue, “authority is in fact one form of 
power”, since those belonging to an organisation should follow and accept those who have 
the authority. It means that subordinates follow the instructions related to their work. In this 
way, Pfeffer (1981: 6) states that power becomes transformed into authority and control can 
be exercised almost regardless of the balance of power possessed by the interacting groups. 
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With respect to legitimacy, Weber (1947) emphasized the critical role of legitimacy in the 
exercise of power (Pfeffer, 1981: 4). Slack and Parent (2006: 199) support the view that 
“authority is only legitimate within the sport organisation that grants the authority”, adding 
that “the power by which managers exercise strategic choice is, in essence, authority-the 
power they derive from the position they hold in the organization”. Therefore, legitimate 
power is considered to be the same as authority. 
 
Regarding the concept of power as discourse, Foucault (1986: 229) argues that in any 
society, “there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterize and constitute 
the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, 
consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and 
functioning of a discourse.” Following Foucault, Hall (1992: 291) observes that “when 
statements about a topic are made within a particular discourse, the discourse makes it 
possible to construct the topic in a certain way. It also limits the other ways in which the topic 
can be constructed.” According to Foucault and Hall, discourse is about the production of 
knowledge that is constructed by language. In other words, discourse can be produced 
differently by individuals in certain settings. This will be a critical point for the analysis of the 
manner in which western notions of corporate governance have been adopted by the KOC, 
or modified to its context. In association with Critical Discourse Analysis, power as discourse 
will be discussed in the context of the KOC.  
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provides the theoretical background that is prerequisite for enhancing the study 
of the corporate governance of the KOC. The review on principles of corporate governance 
in the business sector mainly focuses on internal process, values and tasks. This can be 
explained in a sense of the nature of business in that it should be accountable to its internal 
stakeholders’ interests. As this review is a part of literature review, this study continues to 
review the key principles in the following two chapters, which are in the sport sector and in 
the Olympic Movement.   
 
Apart from the concepts of corporate governance it is necessary to discuss stakeholder 
theory, theories of power and state to identify (and understand) the real or most influential 
stakeholder and understand power relations among the KOC’s possible internal and external 
stakeholders. State theory aids our understanding of the governing system of Korea, which 
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is expected to make a direct impact on the practices of corporate governance of the KOC at 
a macro level. Governance and power theories also identify the governing systems and 
power relations obtaining between stakeholders who are involved in sports policy making at 
a meso level. Consequently, the following analysis of corporate governance of the KOC 
covers both the macro and meso levels. 
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3 Systematic Review 
3.1 Literature review 
The data contained in a literature review are categorised as secondary data as they are not 
collected at first hand but are obtained by searching any forms of resource available for the 
research. Tranfield et al. (2003: 208) say that the aim of conducting a literature review is 
often to enable a researcher to map and assess the existing intellectual territory, and to 
specify a research question to develop the existing body of knowledge further. Torgerson 
(2003: 5) argues that the research literature included in traditional narrative reviews tends to 
be a ‘biased’ sample of the full range of the literature on the subject. Due to the reviewers’ 
different perspectives, each reviewer may gather data from different literature and, even 
though gathering from the same literature, they may interpret them differently in a given field.  
 
The notions of the seven principles of corporate governance identified in the business and 
financial sectors for application in this study to the sports sector are first reviewed in a 
narrative form to map out the original framework. This chapter employs a systematic review 
with the aim of finding all the relevant literature available in the field of sport to learn how the 
notions of the seven principles have been applied to a sports organisation.   
3.2 What is a systematic review? 
A systematic review differs from a traditional narrative review in that its method is explicit and 
open to scrutiny and it seeks to identify all the available evidence with respect to a given 
theme (Torgerson, 2003: 6). Accordingly, the study tends to be replicable and reliable. 
Systematic reviews are traditionally associated with meta-analysis of research based on 
quantitative epistemological traditions and methodologies (Torgerson, 2003: 7; see also 
Badger et al., 2000; Hammersley, 2001). As stated by Tranfield et al (2003: 209), “whereas a 
systematic review identifies key scientific contributions to a field or question, meta-analysis 
offers a statistical procedure for synthesizing findings in order to obtain overall reliability 
unavailable from any single study alone”. A systematic review which produces a summary of 
the results of primary studies without statistically combining results may, thus, be called a 
‘qualitative systematic review’ (Cook, Mulrow & Haynes, 1997). 
3.3 Stages of systematic review 
The two tables shown below demonstrate the stages in the process of conducting a 
systematic review. Table 3-1 outlines the most commonly used systematic review process. 
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Table 3-1 Stages of systematic review 
Stage 1 
Planning the review 
Phase 0 Identification of the need for a review  
Phase 1 Preparation of a proposal for a review 
Phase 2 Development of a review protocol 
Stage 2 
Conducting a review 
Phase 3 Identification of research 
Phase 4 Selection of studies 
Phase 5 Study quality assessment 
Phase 6 Data extraction and monitoring progress 
Phase 7 Data synthesis 
Stage 3 
Reporting and dissemination 
Phase 8 The report and recommendations 
Phase 9 Getting evidence into practice 
Source: Tranfield et al. (2003) 
 
This study follows the sequence of stages set forth in Table 3-2 in which the stages of a 
systematic review are rearranged on the basis of ‘Systematic Reviews’ written by Torgerson 
(2003) and two journal articles by Leseure et al (2004) and Tranfield et al (2003).   
 
Table 3-2 Stages of systematic review 
Stage 1 Forming a review panel 
Stage 2 Scoping study and establishing a protocol of the research 
Stage 3 Commencing the literature search 
Stage 4 Screening the results of the search 
Stage 5 Extracting data & appraising quality 
Stage 6 Conducting double data extraction, if necessary 
Stage 7 Synthesising the extracted data 
Stage 8 Interpreting the synthesized data 
   (adapted from Torgerson (2003), Leseure et al. (2004) and Tranfield et al. (2003) 
Stage 1: Forming a review panel  
As the first stage of conducting a systematic review, a review panel should be established 
that is composed of a wide range of expertises, including review methodology, information 
science and the field that is going to be searched. A practitioner has to work together with 
other researchers and specialists who enable the practitioner to find the appropriate review 
data. On the basis of regular meetings, the practitioner is able to obtain their advice and 
opinions. Throughout the process of systematic review, it is essential that the panel 
members should maintain good communications among themselves. 
For the purposes of this research 
To meet the aims of this study, the panel members were as follows: the supervisor Prof. Ian 
Henry from the School of Sport, Exercise and Health Sciences, the library and information 
scientist specialised in sports science Ms. Louise Fletcher and the researcher Ms. Kyung Su 
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Jung. The panel provided feedback on the research to ensure that main/sub and other field(s) 
within the research area were explored, and, furthermore, that relevant databases were 
accessed. 
Stage 2: The scoping study and establishing the protocol of the research  
The scoping study should be completed before the protocol of the research is established. 
As Tranfield et al. (2003: 214) point out, it is necessary to conduct a scoping study to obtain 
an overview of the literature, to estimate an approximate number of relevant articles 
available and in turn, to delimit the subject area or topic. The scoping study should be done 
on the basis of the existing reviews and primary studies relevant to the review’s objectives.  
 
Prior to conducting a review the panel should develop and approve the protocol. At this 
stage, according to Torgerson (2003: 24), “the protocol should include the theoretical, 
empirical and conceptual background to the review; the research question(s); the objectives; 
the scope of the review and the methods for searching, screening, data extraction, quality 
appraisal and synthesis”. He also adds (2003: 24) that within the protocol a set of 
predetermined written inclusion and exclusion criteria must be specified. If those criteria are 
not defined, the review panel may be exposed to the risk of selection and inclusion bias. In 
order to avoid this problem, the criteria should be clearly set up in accordance with the 
questions to be posed in the review.  
For the purposes of this research 
There are three main categories in the scoping study: ‘corporate governance’, ‘organisation’ 
and ‘power’. The category of corporate governance includes the notions of corporate 
governance in the business and the financial sectors, the seven associated ethical principles: 
accountability, responsibility, transparency, democracy, equity, effectiveness and efficiency. 
The aim is to understand what corporate governance is, how these seven selected key 
principles are defined and how they are recommended in companies. While the first category 
provides a general concept of corporate governance, the other two cover theories which 
form the basis for understanding how organisations function: organisation and power. 
Organisational theory covers the principles of structure, leadership, organisational culture, 
national culture, Mintzberg’s configuration theory and stakeholder theory. Theories of power 
theory mainly deal with issues connected with decision making and non-decision making, as 
proposed by Lukes (1974). 
 
The protocol for this study sets out the following objectives: it aims to explore the rising issue 
 34 
 
of corporate governance in Olympic circles, in particular the NOCs. Firstly, what 
characterises good corporate governance and how have the principles of good governance 
been adapted to the specialist sporting context?; What principles of good governance (if any) 
are advocated by the IOC in relation to the governance of Olympic organisations and how 
are these interpreted by the IOC body?; How is the KOC governed? Does it reflect/respect 
principles of good governance in general and more specifically in those aspects 
recommended by the IOC? How are these principles interpreted in the KOC context?; To 
what extent are the practices of good/corporate governance developed in a western context 
applicable in a non-western context? 
 
Therefore, the objectives are as follows: to identify the key concepts of the seven principles 
of corporate governance, namely accountability, responsibility, transparency, democracy, 
equity, effectiveness and efficiency, as applied in the western context; to compare the key 
concepts constructed on the basis of the literature review with several documents, including 
the Basic Universal Principles issued by the IOC; to analyse four main events that have 
taken place in the KOC in order to discover the power relations between stakeholders and 
furthermore, to exaimine corporate governance in the KOC context; to identify similarities or 
differences with regards to the concept of corporate governance between the western 
context and the Korean political, economic and social context. 
 
The criteria used in the data search are defined below:    
Types of publication: only journal articles published in English were accepted in this review 
and books and symposium documents were eliminated. Of the journal articles, only peer-
reviewed or scholarly reviewed articles were selected in order to use the most qualified 
resources. Systematic reviewing databases were chosen because they contain the full range 
of published materials in a given academic domain. English is a dominant language in major 
international conferences and is, in fact, an official language in most international 
conferences. Irrespective of participants’ nationality, journals are always published in English. 
Thus, although this study accepted only English-written journal articles, it was still possible to 
obtain the latest and largest number of journals which are related to ‘corporate/good 
governance’ in the sport sector. 
 
Books were reviewed at the stage of scoping study which was conducted prior to systematic 
review. The scoping study was conducted over several months to obtain as many sources 
as possible. Most relevant books written in English and Korean were reviewed apart from 
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systematic review. The books written in English were well-reviewed and as a result, the key 
words were identified and selected for systematic review (see Table 3-3). However few 
relevant materials in Korean were identified. 
 
Date range: It is set to be between 1984 and 2008. As the Los Angeles Olympic Games 
were recorded as the first commercially successful Olympic Games with a huge surplus and 
since corporate governance is related with money flow in Olympic circles, 1984 was chosen 
as the starting point for this study and the endpoint was the year 2008 when this review was 
conducted. However, CSA-provided databases such as PsycINFO, Sociological Abstract, 
and ASSIA only covered the period between 1985 and 2008. 
Length of article: Only articles with a length of more than four pages are included.  
Language: Articles written in English are the only ones included. 
Stage 3: Commencing the literature search  
The systematic search begins with the identification of keywords, which are found from the 
results of the scoping study and discussions with the review team, according to Tranfield et 
al., (2003: 215), who recommend that the search strategy should be reported in sufficient 
detail to ensure that the search could be replicated.  
For the purposes of this research 
Keywords: As a principle of the search strategy, main and refining keywords were combined 
together. The main keywords are ‘Sport’ OR ‘Olympic’ OR ‘Organisation’ OR ‘Governance’ 
Or ‘Corporate Governance’. The additional refining keywords are ‘organisational structure’, 
‘leadership’, ‘organisational culture’, ‘national culture’, ‘stakeholder theory’, ‘configuration 
theory’ and ‘Mintzberg’, which were selected from the category of organisational theory. The 
two refining words, ‘power’ and ‘decision-making’, were chosen on the basis of power theory, 
while  ‘ethics’, ‘accountability’, ‘responsibility’, ‘transparency’, ‘democracy’, ‘equity’, 
‘effectiveness’ and ‘efficiency’ were selected as representing corporate governance. The 
refining word ‘Korea’ was chosen by the review panel unanimously as the case study is 
conderned with the Korean Olympic Commttee. As shown in Table 3-3, these main keywords 
are combined with one another as, for example, in the first category, ‘Sport’ and ‘Olympic’ 
are first combined with another keyword, ‘Organisation’, and the refining keywords are then 
introduced in sequence. In relation to the other two categories the same method of 
combining keywords is also followed. 
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Databases: These were originally defined as follows: ‘ANTE’, ‘ASSIA’, ‘PsycInfo’, 
‘Sociological Abstracts’, ‘Article First’, ‘ABI Research’, ‘Emerald’, ‘LA84’, ‘Zetoc’, ‘Web of 
Science’ and ‘SportDiscus’. However, ‘ANTE’, ‘Zetoc’, and ‘Emerald’ were excluded due to 
their lack of both relevance to the subject and accessibility: ‘ANTE’ did not provide 
databases in the area of sport; ‘Zetoc’ seemed less likely to be related to the issue of 
corporate governance; and ‘Emerald’ was mostly relevant to a search of journals devoted to 
business or management subjects.  
 
Following the panel’s suggestion ‘ERIC’ and ‘Leisuretourism.com’ were subsequently added 
after ‘ANTE’, ‘Zetoc’, and ‘Emerald’ had been omitted. Unfortunately, ‘ERIC’ seldom listed 
journals including keywords selected from the scoping study and Leisuretourism.com 
allowed only a few users to access the site. Accordingly, both ‘ERIC’ and 
‘Leisuretourism.com’ were excluded and a total of eight databases were used for this study. 
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Table 3-3 Results of data search  
 
Article ABI ASSIA PsycINFOSportDiscusWeb of LA84 Sociological 
main keywords refining keywords First Research(CSA) Science Abstract
sport+organisation organisational structure 0 15 1 51 38 49 36 20
olympic+organisation organisational structure 0 0 1 14 2 3 0
leadership 1 1 0 7 3 24 0
leadership 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
organisational culture 2 1 0 83 1 23 32
organisational culture 0 0 0 17 0 0 0
national culture 0 0 0 30 0 7 0
national culture 0 0 0 10 0 0 0
stakeholder theory 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
stakeholder theory 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
configuration theory 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
configuration theory 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mintzberg 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Mintzberg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
power 0 0 1 43 14 45 0
power 0 1 0 0 0 9 0
decision making 0 0 0 18 4 0 0
decision making 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
sport+governance 22 17 8 178 35 33 38 104
olympic+governance 6 2 1 29 3 7 31
Korea 0 0 0 9 0 0 8
Korea 0 0 0 5 0 0 5
sport organisation+corporate governance 0 1 0 5 3 1 0
olympic organisation+corporate governance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ethics 0 1 0 15 4 11 1
ethics 0 0 0 1 0 5 0
accountability 0 0 0 3 1 4 1
accountability 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
responsibility 0 1 0 5 0 9 2
responsibility 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
transparency 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
transparency 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
democracy 0 0 0 8 0 1 4
democracy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
equity 1 0 0 11 0 11 2
equity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
effectiveness 0 0 0 32 6 30 4
effectiveness 0 0 0 1 0 2 0
efficiency 0 1 0 6 3 4 1
efficiency 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Stage 4: Screening the results of the search  
This is the stage at which the data were selected, according to whether they should be 
included or excluded on the basis of the selection criteria. With respect to the method used 
for screening the search results, Torgerson (2003: 24) argues that the results of the search 
should then be screened by at least two independent reviewers and he also suggests that 
this should be done in two stages: firstly on the basis of titles and abstracts (first-stage 
screening), and secondly on the basis of full papers (second-stage screening). Furthermore, 
an extraction form should be completed before the data extraction begins.  
For the purposes of this research 
Unlike the other search databases on the Google Search engine ‘LA84’ mainly provide 
papers in relation to Olympic circles, including mega-events such as the summer and winter 
Olympic Games, the Olympic movement and sports organisations like the IOC, IFs or NOCs. 
The search range was, however, intended to be wide, so as to cover a variety of publications 
ranging from periodicals, including peer-reviewed journals, magazines and bulletins, to 
books and official Olympic reports. In the process of searching the data, it was therefore 
difficult to collect only peer-reviewed journals when conducting an advanced search due to 
the different search methods. Consequently, the number of papers indicated in Table 4 
included all types of publications and they were then selected on the basis of the criteria. 
Accordingly, as shown in Table 3-3, unlike the other databases that are divided into three 
categories, ‘LA84’ was divided into two categories. i.e.‘Sport/Olympic’ & ‘Organisation’ and 
‘Sport/Olympic’ & ‘Governance’ or ‘Sport/Olympic & ‘Corporate Governance’.  
Stage 5: Extracting data & Appraising quality  
Since this stage is prone to human error, accuracy and consistency are extremely important.  
In order to avoid error, each reviewer should perform the data extraction independently in 
order to produce the best-quality evidence. Regarding the form of extracting data sheet, 
Tranfield et al (2003: 215) emphasise the importance of documenting the sources included 
and excluded at each stage of the review with the reasons given for each case. Moreover, 
they also add (2003: 217) that data extraction forms should include the details of the 
information source, such as the title of the paper, the author, the journal name, the 
publication details and any other features of the study such as its context and an evaluation 
of the study’s methodological quality. They also recommend that additional notes should be 
included in the data-extraction form. 
 
The studies are also assessed to determine their quality, i.e. a quality appraisal is performed. 
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This is usually based on internal validity, but it also includes some analysis of external 
validity. These identified reviews should be appraised by referring to a checklist which 
focuses on, for example, the review’s objective, the sources used for identifying primary 
studies, the inclusion criteria, the method of application, the means of data extraction and, 
data synthesis, etc. 
For the purposes of this research 
At the data screening stage all the papers derived from the data search were entered into 
the extraction forms because all the papers should be recorded on the forms as evidence 
obtained from the search. After duplicate journals had been discarded, the total number 
remaining was 767 journal papers. At the same time, the papers were first extracted by the 
researcher and then by the supervisor based on their titles and the search criteria, such as 
data range and type of publication. All papers were indicated on the forms, whether they 
were included or excluded, along with the appropriate reasons.  
Stage 6: Conducting double data extraction  
If possible, a second data extraction is strongly recommended. Torgerson (2003: 25) 
mentions that once relevant papers have been identified the data need to be extracted, 
using a standard data extraction sheet, and this again should be done by at least two 
independent researchers. In addition, Leseure et al. (2004: 172) suggest that key references 
which have been missed by the systematic review process may be added at this point. 
For the purposes of this research 
Regardless of the result of the first extraction, those articles over which there was 
uncertainty regarding their inclusion or exclusion were attached with their abstracts. 
Concerning the abstracts, double data extraction was conducted by the researcher and the 
supervisor and therefore in the extraction forms the papers to which abstracts were attached 
underwent double extraction. Unfortunately, some papers that could have been included 
were impossible to collect due to the difficulty of accessing them, but they were also 
indicated as having been ‘extracted’. As a result, 27 journal articles were included in the 
category of ‘Sport/Olympic & Organisation’; 5 journal articles under ‘Sport/Olympic & 
Governance’; and 31 journal articles under the heading of ‘Sport/Olympic organisation & 
Corporate governance’. Please refer to Appendix 1 and Figure 3-1.  
Stage 7: Synthesising the extracted data  
The aim of data synthesis is to collect and integrate the extracted data from the review.  
Mulrow (1994) defines it as “a family of methods for summarising, integrating, and, where 
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possible, cumulating the findings of different studies on a topic or research question” (cited in 
Tranfield et al., 2003: 217). It can be carried out by means of a descriptive or non-
quantitative synthesis, following Torgerson (2003:25) who states that the data synthesis can 
be performed as a ‘qualitative’ overview if the data are not in a form that permits a statistical 
summary. Another type of synthesis used in qualitative research is an analytic synthesis, 
which is a thematic analysis of data extracted from the relevant journals.   
For the purposes of this research 
Descriptive analysis provides new categories. Ultimately, the extracted papers were 
categorised by theme following the refining keywords and emergent themes that arose in the 
process of conducting the review. In the first category, ‘Sport/Olympic & Organisation’, during 
the data search, the sub-keywords were ‘organisational structure’, ‘leadership’, 
‘organisational culture’, ‘national culture’, ‘configuration theory’, ‘Mintzberg’, ‘stakeholder 
theory’ and ‘power’ and ‘decision-making’. However, after the data extraction stage, it was 
found that no papers fell under the sub-keywords ‘configuration theory’ and ‘Mintzberg’. 
Instead, several papers emerged concerning the IOC or the Olympic movement, and 
organisational issues in general, such as organisational values. The second category 
pertains to ‘Sport/Olympic & Governance’ and it contains only five articles connected with 
sports policy at the macro- and/or meso-levels. The system of governance is discussed, 
principally. Although the sub-keyword is ‘Korea’, no article appeared regarding Korea under 
‘Sport/Olympic & Governance’. The last category is ‘Sport/Olympic Organisation & Corporate 
Governance’. This includes papers devoted to the seven principles of corporate governance 
but no articles regarding transparency were found.  
Stage 8: Interpreting the synthesised data  
As the last stage of a systematic review, “the synthesized data will be interpreted within a 
report, which should be exposed to peer-review before publication”, according to Torgerson 
(2003: 25). Writing a report is an integral part of a systematic review and it should meet the 
requirements of the target readers. Tranfield et al., (2003) explain that “linking themes across 
the various core contributions wherever possible and highlighting such links is an important 
part of the reporting process” (Aquilina, 2009: 15). Accordingly, the report should provide a 
full descriptive analysis of the field and the findings of the thematic analysis. A descriptive 
analysis that categorises a simple set of results derived from the data extraction gives a 
broad account of the field of study. It is followed by the thematic analysis which outlines 
themes emerging from the literature. Furthermore, the report enables researchers to use the 
findings from the review as evidence provided by the research for their decisions.  
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For the purposes of this research 
In conjunction with the meta-analysis based on the research themes, as a part of the 
descriptive analysis this study also provides a table of ‘key principles and related elements 
on the basis of target countries studied’. Table 3-4 supplies evidence of when and where the 
principles of corporate governance have mainly been studied, together with the sub-themes, 
target nations studied, authors and the years of publication. This analysis aims to establish 
whether or not corporate governance in sports organisations has mainly been developed 
and produced/reproduced in western countries. It is also critical to determine whether other 
factors affecting an evaluation of the seven principles of sports organisations have also 
mainly been developed in western countries. Thus, Table 3-4 demonstrates that ‘the notions 
of corporate governance have been constructed in a western-context’.  
 
The thematic analysis discusses the existing and emergent themes and lists all the 
emergent themes, as shown in Figure 3-1. Apart from the seven principles, various themes 
were identified and they were interpreted and synthesised into the seven categories on the 
basis of the principles. This analysis matches each principle with the relevant theoretical 
background and links them with the definitions and operationalisations of the seven 
principles of corporate governance, which are discussed in the following chapter. The 
commentary is produced based on the thematic analysis. 
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Figure 3-1 Systematic Review Procedures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emergent themes 
 
 Macro- & meso-level analysis of government system  
- Governing system 
- Governmentality 
 
 Interorganisational relations 
 
 Power 
- Power & organisational change 
       -Structure & leadership in the transition process 
       -Volunteer & professional staff in state or national sport organisations 
       -Types of power and their utilisation within sports organisations 
Total retrieved articles (1357) 
Duplicate & Non-Journal (590) 
First Extraction (767):          Included articles (195)       Excluded articles (572) 
50 of them are excluded as being: 
 
Not relevant to the subject: 30 
Less than four pages: 8 
   Non-English: 2 
   Non-Journal: 3 
      Unobtain: 7 
 
Second Extraction (767):     Included articles (145)     Excluded articles (622) 
Meta-categories 
 
Sport/Olympic & Organisation (27) 
Sport/Olympic & Governance (5) 
Sport/Olympic organisation & Corporate governance (31) 
 
 
Relevant articles (63) 
Articles of little relevance (82) 
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 Corporate governance  
- Reforming the IOC: issues of corporate governance 
- Corporate governance in sports organisations 
- Role of ethics in professionalised sporting organisations  
 
 Accountability  
-Non-profit organisations 
 
 Responsibility  
-Responsibility of the board 
 
 Democracy  
- Autonomy 
 
 Equity  
- Social ideology on gender 
- Issue of gender in the membership of the boards of national sports 
organisations 
- Meanings & practices of equity and organisational culture (masculinities)  
- The process of integrating disabled and able-bodied sports organisations 
- Improvement of equity and sporting culture in UK 
-The fairness of the distribution (or reduction) of resources 
 
 Effectiveness 
- Voluntary boards and effectiveness 
- Organisational values  
- Values and beliefs, and organisational structure 
- Organisational culture 
- Leadership and organisational culture (transformational leadership) 
- Leaders’ perceptions 
- Leadership of the board  
- Managing diversity 
- Measures of effectiveness 
 
 Efficiency 
 - Efficiency gains resulting from government subsidies 
 - Similarity and diversity in non-profit sports organisations  
  (Institutional Isomorphism) 
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Figure 3-2 Systematic Review Analysis Strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research Questions 
*what characterises good/corporate governance and how have the 
principles of good governance been adapted to the specialist sporting 
context?  
 
*What principles of good governance (if any) are advocated by the IOC in relation 
to the governance of Olympic organisations? And how are these interpreted by 
the IOC body?;  
 
*How is the KOC governed? Does it reflect/respect principles of corporate 
governance in general, and, specifically those aspects recommended by the 
IOC? and How are these interpreted in the KOC context?;  
 
*To what extent are practices of good/corporate governance developed in a 
western context applicable in a non-western context? 
 
Descriptive Analysis 
First-Order Themes 
Meta-categories and Key words 
Thematic Analysis 
Second-Order Themes 
Emergent themes 
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3.4 Descriptive analysis 
The descriptive analysis is the first stage in the analysis conducted within a systematic 
review and it aims to outline the three categories drawn up by the research panel. The three 
‘meta-categories’ adopted in this study are as follows: ‘Sport/Olympic & Organisation’; 
‘Sport/Olympic & Governance’; and ‘Sport/Olympic Organisation & Corporate Governance’. 
Each category was cross-searched with a number of other sub-key terms. These sub- 
keywords give an insight into the extent to which principles of corporate governance and/or 
supplementary studies have been investigated in the field of sport. Since the term ‘corporate 
governance’ is derived from the business sector, the number of papers found in searching 
each sub-key word demonstrates the authors’ biases as measured by the popularity or 
frequency of application of the seven principles of corporate governance to the sports area. 
It also indicates whether these principles are conceptualised in the western context and in 
what ways. 
3.4.1 Sport/Olympic & Organisation 
In the category ‘Sport/Olympic & Organisation’, two major groups of papers were revealed. 
In the first group articles were generated concerning ‘corporate governance in the Olympic 
movement’, and in particular, in the IOC: The central themes are transparency and 
democracy in the bidding process (Booth, 1999), democratic accountability and transparency 
(Schineider, 2000), transparency and accountability (Zakus, 2000), and equity and female 
leadership (Rintala & Bischoff, 1997; and Claringbould & Knoppers, 2008).   
 
In the category of ‘organisations in general’ the articles relate mainly to non-profit 
organisations, voluntary boards (Papadimitriou, 1999; Doherty & Carron, 2003), volunteer 
and paid staff (Booth & Hassen, 1990), organisational values (Danisman, Hinings & Slack, 
2006; Fenton & Inglis, 2007; Hinings, Thibault, Slack & Kikulis, 1996; Slack & Thibault, 1988), 
factors perceived as being critical to organisational success (Weinberg & McDermott, 2002) 
and interorganisational relations (Babiak, 2007). A wider range of issues is also discussed, 
including leadership (Rowold, 2006; Hoye, 2006; Kent & Weese, 2000), female leadership 
(Rintala & Bischoff, 1997; Eagly, 2007), structural isomorphism (Leiter, 2005; Augestad, 
Bergsgard & Hansen, 2006), managing organisational culture (Scott, 1997; Colyer, 2000) 
and power and organisational change (Greve & Mitsuhashi, 2007; Hoye & Stewart, 2002; 
Amis, Slack & Hinings, 2004; and Auld & Godbey, 1998).  
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3.4.2 Sport/Olympic & Governance 
The articles relating to governance in the Sport/Olympic category mainly discuss governing 
systems and sports organisations. More specifically, they are concerned with policy making 
(Enjolras & Waldahl, 2007), sports policy and governmentality (Green & Houlihan, 2006; 
Sam, 2005; Sam & Jackson, 2004), and changes in sports policy (Bergsgard & Rommetvedt, 
2006). This category is more likely to relate to the theories of state, on the one hand and 
policy as discourse on the other 
3.4.3 Sport/Olympic Organisation & Corporate Governance 
This category includes the largest number of articles among the three meta-categories. 
Despite the fact that there are seven principles of corporate governance, most articles are 
largely related to equity, covering especially gender, with a further small number of articles 
devoted to equity issues concerning ethnicity (race) and disability. With respect to equity, the 
articles may be classified according to the following themes: gender and leadership (Sartore 
& Cunningham, 2007), diversity in sport (Fink & Pastore, 1999; Spracklen, Hylton & Long, 
2006), racial equality (Long, Robinson & Spracklen, 2005; Cunningham & Sagas, 2005), 
gender and the top management level (White & Kay, 2006; Hovden, 2000; 2000), gender 
equity for athletes (Hoeber, 2008), meaning and practices of gender equity (Hoeber, 2007; 
Knoppers & Anthonissen, 2001), masculinities (Knoppers & Anthonissen, 2005), alternative 
gender equity frame (Shaw & Frisby, 2006), gender representation at board level 
(Claringbould & Knoppers, 2007; 2008), gender diversity (Cunningham, 2008), gender 
structure (Hall, Cullen & Slack, 1989), the marginalisation of women (Whisenant, Pedersen 
& Obenour, 2002; Whisenant, 2003), disability (Sørensen & Kahrs, 2006; Hums, Moorman & 
Wolff, 2003), and the fair allocation of resources (Mahony, Riemer, Breeding & Hums, 2006)  
 
The next major issue is how to measure the effectiveness of sports organisations. Two main 
topics may be distinguished in the two groups of papers dealing with effectiveness. The first 
one is how to identify the relationship between the effectiveness of an organisation and its 
leadership and/or organisational culture and the articles cover subjects such as 
effectiveness and leadership (Kent & Weese, 2000; Rowold, 2006; and Eagly, 2007); and 
effectiveness and organisational culture (Kent & Weese, 2000; Colyer, 2000; Fink & Pastore, 
1999; and Scott, 1997). The other group of papers mainly examines ways of measuring 
organisational effectiveness in sports organisations (Chelladurai & Haggerty, 1991; Shilbury 
& Moore, 2006; Frisby, 1986; and Chelladurai, Szyszlo & Haggerty, 1987). 
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The remaining articles are concerned with accountability and responsibility (Hoye & Inglis, 
2003), the role of ethics (Sherry, Shilbury & Wood, 2007), board assessment (Schaffer, 
2002), ethic audits covering overall corporate governance (McNamee & Fleming, 2007), 
financial dependence in connection with democracy (Riiskjaer & Nielsen, 1987) and 
efficiency (Barros, 2003).  
3.4.4 Are the principles identified conceptualised in a Western frame of 
reference? 
In general, the most significant point is that all the articles regarding the corporate 
governance of sporting organisations have been authored by specialists in western countries, 
for instance, Australia, Canada, the UK, Norway, Greece and the USA. The western 
countries concerned may be divided into two groups according to their location: within 
Europe, for example the UK, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal and Greece or outside of 
Europe such as the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.  
 
When all the journal papers relating to the study had been identified, as shown in Table 3-4, 
they were matched against the seven major principles as listed in the table on the basis of 
those principles’ appearance on the list prepared during the systematic review. It is apparent 
from the Table that certain topics have been chiefly studied in particular countries. For 
example, researchers based in the Netherlands, Norway, the UK and the USA have broadly 
concentrated on topics pertaining to equity issues, ranging from gender to race, while those 
in Canada have tended to focus more on the effectiveness of sporting organisations. They 
have, thus, given their attention to that subject much earlier than their counterparts in any of 
the other nations such as Australia, Greece, and New Zealand where researchers have also 
been interested in studying effectiveness. With respect to the number of findings, both equity 
and effectiveness have often been studied in the sporting field, in 22 and 19 papers 
respectively, while accountability has only one article dedicated to it: responsibility, three; 
democracy, one; and efficiency, three. Transparency is not the subject of any of the articles. 
In terms of the history of research publications concerning the seven principles, all seven 
principles apart from effectiveness have been studied only in recent years since 1999, while 
studies on effectiveness date back to the 1980’s.  
 
When articles concerning gender equity are considered specifically, as shown in Table 3-4, 
they may be divided according to their countries of origin with reference to five main western 
countries: the Netherlands (Claringbould & Knoppers, 2007; 2008; Knoppers & Anthonissen, 
 48 
 
2001; 2005), Canada (Hall, Cullen, & Slack, 1989; Hoeber, 2007; 2008), Norway (Hovden, 
2000; 2000), the UK (White & Kay, 2006) and the USA (Sartore & Cunningham, 2007; Fink & 
Pastore, 1999; Cunningham, 2008; Whisenant, Pedersen & Obenour, 2002; Whisenant, 
2003; Shaw & Frisby, 2006). When racial equality is the keyword, the total number of articles 
studied is three: two in the UK (Long, Robinson & Spracklen, 2005; Spracklen, Hylton & 
Long, 2006) and one in the USA (Cunningham & Sagas, 2005). Of the two articles covering 
both gender and racial equity, one was written in the Netherlands (Knoppers & Anthonissen, 
2001) and one in the USA (Fink & Pastore, 1999). Disability is lightly touched upon under the 
title ‘Diversity in Sport?’ in a paper where the discussion mainly concerns gender and racial 
equity in the USA (Fink & Pastore, 1999). An article based on studies conducted in Norway 
mainly discusses disability (Sørensen & Kahrs, 2006) while another article concerning 
disability is from the USA (Hums, Moorman & Wolff, 2003). 
 
In summary, in terms of the number of articles developed in relation to it, the concept of 
equity has been studied the most and has received greater emphasis than the other 
governance principles in the sports field. Overall, the sub-issues comprise gender equity in 
terms of the treatment of sports participants and the positions occupied by males and 
females within sporting organisations and equity in the treatment of sports participants (and 
employees) with disabilities. In addition, equity with regard to racial origins is also a 
prominent issue of equity in a sporting context. The fair allocation of resources is also 
touched upon.    
 
This demonstrates, therefore, that a variety of issues of organisational governance or 
corporate governance in sport or Olympic organisations have been subjected to frequent 
study in western countries, whereas these issues have not been discussed in non-western 
countries, particularly in Asia (see Table 3-4). There is good cause, therefore, to hypothesise 
that the notions of corporate governance used in the extracted articles are constructed by 
western writers in western contexts. This study discusses whether or not these westernised 
notions can be applied to sporting organisations in a non-western context, such as that of 
Korea. 
 
 
 49 
 
Table 3-4 Key principles and related elements on the basis of target countries studied 
Principles Sub-Issues Target Countries  Authors 
Sport Policy: 
Macro-& meso 
government  
system (5) 
Policy making Norway Enjolras & Waldahl (2007) 
Sports policy changes Norway Bergsgard & Rommetvedt (2006) 
Governmentality The UK, Australia Green & Houlihan (2006) 
New Zealand Sam (2005); Sam & Jackson (2004) 
Inter-organ 
relations (1) 
Democracy/ Efficiency/ 
Effectiveness etc. 
Canada Babiak (2007) 
 
Power (4) 
Organisational (structural) changes Canada Amis, Slack & Hinings (2004); Auld & Godbey (1998); 
N.I. Greve & Mitsuhashi (2007) 
Australia Hoye & Steward (2002) 
 
Corporate 
governance 
(7) 
I 
O 
C 
Accountability/Transparency  Zakus (2000) 
Democratic Accountability 
/ Transparency 
 Schneider (2000) 
Transparency/Democracy  Booth (1999); 
Equity/Female leadership  Rintala & Bischoff (1997); Claringbould & Knoppers (2008) 
Ethic audits  McNamee & Fleming (2007) 
Role of ethics Australia Sherry, Shilbury & Wood (2007) 
Accountability(1) Governance  Australia Hoye & Inglis (2003) 
Responsibility (3) 
 
Governance Australia Hoye & Inglis (2003) 
Board assessment USA Schaffer (2002) 
Volunteer & paid staff Canada Booth & Hassen (1990) 
Transparency (0) N N N 
Democracy (1) Financial dependence  Denmark Riiskjaer & Nielsen (1987) 
 
 
Equity (22) 
 
 
 
 
Gender 
 
Canada Hall, Cullen, & Slack (1989); Hoeber (2007; 2008) 
Netherlands Claringbould & Knoppers, (2007; 2008);  
Knoppers & Anthonissen, (2001; 2005) 
Norway Hovden, (2000; 2000) 
UK White & Kay (2006) 
USA Fink & Pastore (1999);  
Sartore & Cunningham (2007); Cunningham (2008) 
Whisenant, Pedersen & Obenour (2002), Whisenant (2003) 
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Shaw & Frisby (2006) 
 
Race/Ethnicity 
 
UK Long, Robinson & Spracklen,( 2005);  
Spracklen, Hylton & Long, (2006) 
USA Cunningham & Sagas (2005) 
Disability Norway Sørensen & Kahrs (2006) 
USA Hums, Moorman & Wolff (2003) 
Gender & Race/Ethnicity Netherlands Knoppers & Anthonissen (2001) 
USA Fink & Pastore (1999) (disability is a little touched) 
Fair allocation of resources  Mahony, Riemer, Breeding & Hums (2006) 
 
 
Effectiveness 
(19) 
 Australia Shilbury & Moore (2006) 
 Canada 
 
Frisby (1986); Chelladurai, Szyszlo & Haggerty (1987);  
Chelladurai & Haggerty, (1991) 
Leaders’ perceptions USA Weinberg & McDermott (2002) 
Leadership in  
voluntary organisations 
Australia Hoye (2006) 
Leadership & 
Organisational culture 
Canada Kent & Weese, (2000) 
N.I. Rowald (2006); Eagly (2007) 
USA Scott (1997) 
 
Organisation-
al values & 
beliefs 
Cultural framework Canada Danisman, Hinings & Slack (2006) 
Hinings, Thibault, Slack, & Kikulis (1996);  
N.I. Fenton & Inglis (2007); 
Structure Canada Slack & Thibault (1988);  
Hinings, Thibault, Slack, & Kikulis (1996) 
Organisational culture Australia Colyer (2000) 
Voluntary board  Greece Papadimitriou (1999);  
Canada Doherty & Carron (2003); 
Diversity & effectiveness USA Fink & Pastore (1999); Doherty & Chelladurai (1999) 
Efficiency (3) Input and output of resources Portugal  Barros (2003)  
Structural similarity & diversity Norway Augestad, Bergsgard & Hansen (2006) 
Australia Leiter (2005) 
*N.I. non-identified 
The number in brackets after each principle indicates the total number of journals involved (some of the journals cover more than two issues).  
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3.5 Thematic Analysis  
3.5.1 Macro-& meso-level analysis of the government (governing) system 
Governing system 
Enjolras and Waldahl (2007) analyse the way in which public sports policy making is 
effected through interactions between different major institutional actors. Neo-corporatism 
is expected to “involve a limited number of actors and, therefore, the state plays a central 
role and acts in a unitary way” (Enjolras & Waldahl, 2007: 203). These authors (2007) 
explain that, in most European countries, neo-corporatist structures prevailed until the 
1990s when the structure shows evidence of having undergone a transformation to 
competitive pluralism.  
 
Following Heinz et al.(1993), Bergsgard and Rommetvedt (2006: 8) introduce four 
typologies of government systems in terms of the degree of power concentrated in private 
and government hands: corporatism, private government, pluralism and state directed 
systems.  
 
Figure 3-3 Concentrations of Power, Government Systems and the Norwegian 
Development 
 
              Monolithic  Private                                    Corporatism 
           concentration  government  
 
Concentration                                           Neo-corporatism 
  of private  
power                                                                                                                                             
Segmented state 
             Sectorized 
           concentration 
                                     Neo-pluralism   
  
                                                                         State 
             Dispersed  Pluralism                                      directed  
 
                         Dispersed               Sectorized           Monolithic  
                                                concentration       concentration 
 
                                          Concentration of public power 
Source: Bergsgard & Rommetvedt (2006: 9) 
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Figure 3-3 shows that corporatism may be characterised as being a hierarchically ordered 
and monopolistic system, whereas neo-corporatism or societal corporatism, as defined by 
Schmitter (1979), entails relatively autonomous and competitive electoral processes, for 
example, in Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark. The segmented 
state is characterised by “sectorized concentrations of power” (Bergsgard & Rommetvedt, 
2006: 9), with the result that, for example, sports departments which form a segment in 
government with participants coming from a variety of institutions, “share certain basic 
values and perceptions”, according to Christensen and Egeberg (1979: 253 cited in 
Bergsgard & Rommetvedt, 2006: 9). The term ‘neo-pluralism’ is used for the situation in 
which “the state in a modern pluralist welfare state is much stronger and plays a more 
comprehensive role than the traditional and rather weak ‘nightwatchman state’ under 
classic pluralism and liberalism” (Bergsgard & Rommetvedt, 2006: 10). Obviously, 
pluralisation implies dispersion of power.  
 
Based on the theoretical approaches in sports policy discussed above, policy making in 
Norway has traditionally followed neo-corporatism which “entails that the organised 
interests are recognised by the state and are granted a representational monopoly by the 
state” (Enjolras & Waldahl, 2007: 202). According to Bergsgard & Rommetvedt (2006: 10), 
however, Norway has been engaged in a process of pluralisation since the 1980s, whereby 
it has been moving from the neo-corporatism that prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s, by way 
of the segmented state of the 1970s. More precisely, Enjolras & Waldahl, (2007: 202) see 
Norwegian pluralism as embodying a system of competitive pluralism in which “interest 
associations no longer have a monopoly on interest representation and have to compete 
with a wide variety of players of different and uncertain statuses” (see also Streeck, 1991). 
Accordingly, power dispersion has been evident in contemporary Norwegian society and 
politics, which means that the sporting field has become more heterogeneous and more 
conflicts have arisen between its various parts. Apparently, signs of the same development 
have appeared in most European countries and not only in Norway.   
Governmentality 
Green and Houlihan (2006) examine the changing repertoire of techniques adopted by the 
governments in Australia and the United Kingdom (UK) through which they have shaped 
the behaviour of NSOs. Based on neo-Foucauldian analysis of ‘governmentality’, they aim 
to identify the aspects of sport culture and to problematise governmental activities shaping 
and directing the conduct of NSOs. Foucault’s conception of governmentality “promoted not 
simply a change in the substantive focus of academic investigation of the concept of power 
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in the policy process but also, and more fundamentally, an epistemological change” (Green 
& Houlihan, 2006: 48). The epistemological change implies that the government’s former 
concentration on juridical and repressive forms of power has been replaced by forms of 
“shaping, guiding, and directing of the conduct of others by using persuasive processes of 
signification and legitimation to work through their desires, aspirations, interests and 
beliefs”, as explained by Scott (2001: 94 cited in Green & Houlihan, 2006: 48).   
 
The policy analysis that is driven by governmentality is “a different way of conceptualising 
and investigating political power that is not structured so strongly in terms of the hegemonic 
role of the state”(Green & Houlihan, 2006: 48) and, thus, in the ‘advanced liberalist’ (cf. 
Rose, 1999) nations, governments are increasingly networked with a variety of non-state 
and/or quasi-governmental authorities. More specifically, neo-Foucauldian post-
structuralism draws attention to “the kinds of knowledge, and power through which social 
activity is regulated and through which actors -citizens, workers, institutions- are constituted 
as self-disciplining subjects”, according to Newman (2001: 20 cited in Green & Houlihan, 
2006: 48). As Raco and Imrie (2000: 2,191) elaborate, “increasingly, government seeks not 
to govern society per se, but to promote individual and institutional conduct that is 
consistent with government objectives” (cited in Green & Houlihan, 48) 
 
With neo-Foucauldian governmentality aiming to understand aspects of sport culture, 
meso-level anlaysis serves to identify the role of the state and government in relationships 
with NSOs. In the case of New Zealand, Sam (2005: 78) points out that “commissions of 
inquiry, national taskforces, and advisory committees are significant institutional features in 
the development of government sport policy” and he argues that a range of constraints 
such as procedural, organisational, and political considerations may affect their work 
significantly. Sam’s study addresses two main points, that 1) taskforces or inquiries are ad 
hoc organisations in nature and they “play significant roles in defining issues and shaping 
policy agendas” (Sam, 2005: 79, see also Aucoin, 1990; Bradford, 1999; Prasser, 1994); 
and 2) contradictions arising from the use of them are caused by their capacity to 
investigate and the political context in which they conduct their work.   
 
In particular, Sam and Jackson (2004) investigate ‘how a paradigm stressing administrative 
reforms shaped the findings and recommendations of New Zealand’s Ministerial Taskforce’. 
This taskforce’s recommendation of a rationalisation of regional boundaries was seen as “a 
powerful policy paradigm for the Taskforce to consistently apply to all levels of sport, 
including club, regional, school and elite sport”, according to Sam and Jackson (2004: 214). 
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They (2004) also argue that by the 1990s, the neo-liberal ideology had fully trickled down 
into the central sport agency and consequently, the sports policy paradigm shifted to 
rationalisation, centralisation, integration and hierarchical structures. These changes are 
expected to bring about a better and more efficient result, but Sam and Jackson (2004) 
express their concern that fewer voices would be involved in decision making. Thus, the 
rationalisation and centralisation of sporting structures leads to the weakening of support 
for those who “are either involved with minor sports or coming from regions with unique 
economic and political backgrounds (such as rural Maori)” (Sam & Jackson, 2004: 219). 
 
Extending Sam and Jackson (2004)’s work, Green and Houlihan (2006: 49) provide  
 
“a detailed analysis of the ways in which the governments in two countries, the UK 
and Australia, have implemented programs designed (ostensibly) to empower and 
autonomise NSOs on the one hand, while imposing centralised targets, directives 
and, indeed, sanctions on the other”.  
 
As a result, both Neo-liberal governments have increased their influence, by means of 
rationalisation, modernisation and policies which bestow managerial privileges. The authors, 
thus, conclude that the relationships between governments and NSOs in both countries 
have changed from “relative deference to disciplining” (Green & Houlihan, 2006: 55). They 
quote Rose (1999: 22) who stated that “discipline is constitutively linked to the emergence 
of new ways of thinking about the tasks of political rule in terms of the government of the 
conduct of the population” (cited in Green & Houlihan, 2006: 54).   
3.5.2 Interorganisational relations 
Babiak (2007) examines aspects of the determinants and necessities of IORs (inter-
organisational relations). She (2007) adopts Oliver’s (1990) conceptual framework in which 
six determinants of inter organisational relations are outlined: 1) asymmetry where one 
organisation’s desire to exercise power over another organisation or its resources can 
motivate the development of partnerships between, in particular, government and other 
organisations; 2) reciprocity, in which the desire is to pursue common or mutually beneficial 
goals or interests but which might lead to disadvantages such as the loss of autonomy in 
decision making and the cost of managing it; 3) necessity, which suggests that “IORs are 
formed in order to meet the legal or regulatory requirements or mandates from higher 
authorities such as government agencies or legislation” (Babiak, 2007: 341), although an 
individual organisation’s perception may be that the power it may exercise over its 
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environment has been diminished; 4) institutional pressures, where the implication is that 
organisations have pressures imposed on them by their environments to justify their 
activities and/or outputs. “Institutional pressures motivate organisations to increase their 
legitimacy in order to appear congruent with the prevailing norms, rules, beliefs, or 
expectations of external constituents” (Babiak, 2007: 342); 5) efficiency that is more 
focused internally is driven by an attempt to improve ‘the organisation’s internal input-
output ratio’, with partnership leading to a better performance in that IORs increase the 
return on assets or decrease unit costs; and 6) stability, whereby it is suggested that IORs 
can respond to environmental uncertainty caused by a lack of information about the 
environment and resource scarcity. 
 
Sporting organisations interact with a broad spectrum of stakeholders, ranging from their 
government to their partners. Babiak (2007: 338) stresses that organisational strategic 
value and effectiveness are commonly created within networks of all types of organisation 
in a variety of forms of relationship, adding that “in practice, governments are embracing 
public-private partnerships (see Boase, 2000; Coulson, 2005; Grimsey & Lewis, 2004; 
Lehman & Tregoning, 2004), whereas for-profit organisations are creating strategic 
alliances and joint ventures (see Das & Teng, 2002; Spekman, Forbes, Isabella, & MacAvoy, 
1998), and nonprofit organisations are establishing collaborative relationships with non-
traditional partners (Alexander, 2000; Andreasen, 1996; Provan, Veazie, Staten, & Teufel-
Shone, 2005; Roussin Isett & Provan, 2005)”.  
 
When the NOC’s interorganisational relations are viewed in this perspective, as Mills (1998) 
argues, NOCs seem to have to deal with a great number of expectations as regards 
excellent performance and in particular, the need to meet their medal targets at 
international events such as the Olympic Games (Babiak, 2007: 340). Consequently, the 
importance of partnerships in sports organisations has been strongly emphasised and the 
necessity for even stronger partnerships to be built between the various levels of 
organisations (Babiak, 2007: 340) is recognised. 
3.5.3 Power 
Power and organisational change 
Power in organisations is determined by authority relations that are specified by 
organisational rules and hierarchies, the possession of resources that can be used to 
reward others and deference gained through interpersonal hierarchies (Berger et al. 1977; 
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Pfeffer 1981; Fernandez 1991; Brass & Burkhardt 1992; see also Greve & Mitsuhashi, 
2007: 1197). Although Greve and Mitsuhashi (2007) also study the relationship between 
power and organisational change, they focus more on power concentration. With respect to 
organisational structure, a concentrated power structure shows that power is held by a few 
people. By contrast, a dispersed power structure is found when power is spread to various 
subunits. Thus, “power concentration plays a significant role in shaping group dynamics” 
(Mannix 1993 cited in Greve & Mitsuhashi, 2007: 1201). Greve and Mitsuhashi (2007) 
describe the relationship of power concentration and organisational change and Goodstain 
and Boeker (1991) affirm that “there is a broad agreement that power concentration is 
important for understanding rates of organizational change” (cited in Greve & Mitsuhashi, 
2007: 1198). Power concentration enables those who hold power to limit the degree of 
flexibility in the interpretation of organisational goals and external environments (Greve & 
Mitsuhashi, 2007; see also Clark, 2004; Devenport & Leitch 2005). It also allows them to 
develop organisational norms and value systems in order to reflect their own preferences 
and to create greater opportunities for them to lead their organisations towards their 
anticipated goals.   
 
Power concentration also gives rise to an unequal distribution of power in decision-making 
processes, as decision making is highly related to the exercise of power in organisations. 
Whyte and Levi (1994) explain that “less powerful members are prone not to voice their 
concerns or to be ignored if they do, leading to domination by the powerful members” 
(Greve & Mitsuhashi, 2007: 1203). As this is a case of non-decision making, groups who 
are not equally empowered have a tendency to make decisions favourable to the centre of 
power. Accordingly, power concentration leads to potential inequality in the decision-making 
process.  
Structure and leadership in the transition process 
Amis, Slack and Hinings (2004) examine three dynamics, namely interests, power and 
capacity that are inherent to the process of organisational change toward greater 
professionalism and bureaucratisation. Interests are concerned with the allocation of 
resources within sports organisations and the roles of participants in decision making 
processes. The interests of subgroups serve to protect their decision-making authority and, 
thus, individual subunit interests should be taken into consideration in the transition process. 
Power structure also plays a great role in the transition process of organisations, whether 
power is dispersed or concentrated. Capacity refers to the exercise of sufficient 
commitment and skill by individual managers. A transformational leadership is widely 
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recognised as an important factor. These three dynamics can individually affect the change 
process but, on the other hand, these three dynamics can also affect each other in the 
transition process. 
  
Amis, Slack and Hinings (2004) argue that good leadership is essential for managing the 
relationship between power, organisational change and capacity. Due to specialisation 
within organisations, organisations are divided into subunits that are interdependent and 
mutually related. Consequently, their relationships are highly affected by the distribution 
and usage of power which is mainly exercised in decision-making. Power is used to 
“protect valued interests over time by establishing, maintaining, and sometimes 
transforming the rules by which the organisation operates” (DiMagiio, 1988 cited in Amis et 
al, 2004: 160). In particular, as Fligstein (1991) says, organisational change has a tendency 
to occur when newly powerful actors appear or when the interests of powerful actors induce 
changes in the direction of the organisation (Amis et al, 2004: 161). As a result, 
transformation may cause a challenge to the main and dominant power in organisations. 
Here, leadership is an important factor as leadership should possess the ability to steer 
organisations through the transformation process successfully.  
Volunteer and professional staff members in state or national sports organisations 
Auld and Godbey (1998) suggest that increasing managerial professionalism and 
bureaucratisation have changed the nature of sports organisations that used to be 
volunteer staff-oriented. Sports organisations with a mixed nature have emerged in which 
volunteer and professional staff co-exist in managerial roles, such as has been the case 
with national sports organisations in Canada (see also, Schrodt, 1983; Beamish, 1985; 
Frisby, 1986; Macintosh, 1988; MacMillan, 1991; Thibault, Slack, & Hinings, 1991; and 
Kikulis, Slack, & Hinings, 1995). Such a tendency has, however, resulted in a weakening of 
the levels of power and influence in decision-making wielded by volunteer board members.  
Types of power and its utilisation within sports organisations. 
Hoye and Stewart (2002) describe the types of power existing within volunteer sport 
organisations and the ways in which power may be achieved and exploited. The types of 
power that they distinguish are: 1) legitimate power, which is acquired by virtue of one’s 
occupancy of a senior position; 2) reward power, which consists in the granting of privileges 
or the conferring of a prestigious position; 3) coercive power, which involves force and 
compliance; 4) referent power, by means of which the possessor influences others through 
his ability; and 5) expert power, which is derived from a person’s knowledge or skills (Hoye 
& Steward, 2002: 55). As power plays a significant role in achieving a change within 
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volunteer sport organisations, these forms of power can be utilised by individuals or groups.    
 
Hoeber (2007) also follows the exclusionary power theory developed by Rao et al. (1999). 
Exclusionary power refers to the idea that not all organisational members have access to or 
can exercise power, because power relations are determined by gender. The four key ways 
of employing exclusionary power are “positional power, agenda-setting power, hidden 
power and power of dialogue, each of which has an impact on the production of knowledge 
regarding gender equity” (Rao et al., 1999 cited in Hoeber, 2007: 262). Positional power is 
connected with a person’s status and title in an organisation. In a male-dominated 
organisational culture those who are in upper management positions are involved in the 
formal decision-making processes for resources distribution, which enables them to 
influence the policy on gender equity. When agenda-setting power is exercised, the topics 
for discussion are informally selected as being acceptable or unacceptable. For instance, 
male administrators may effectively sideline the issue of gender inequity as a topic of 
discussion so that attention is not paid to it (Hoeber, 2007: 262, see also Hall et al., 1989, 
1990; McKay, 1997; Shaw, 2001). Hidden power “exists when those who are oppressed do 
not recognise their situations and fail to question dominant knowledge and practise, even 
when there are apparent inequities” (Rao et al., 1999 cited in Hoeber, 2007: 262). The last 
form of exclusionary power, the power of dialogue is exerted to determine “whose voices 
are included” and “whose voices are silenced and ignored” in decision-making processes. 
(Rao et al., 1999 cited in Hoeber, 2007: 263).   
3.5.4 Corporate governance 
Reforming the IOC: issues of corporate governance 
In this section, a number of researchers have examined the IOC reforms in terms of the 
principles of corporate governance (Zakus, 2000; Schneider, 2000; Booth, 1999; Rintala & 
Bischoff, 1997; Claringbould & Knoppers, 2008). Owing to the pervasive gift culture in the 
Olympic movement, Booth (2000) points out that more transparency and democracy in the 
bidding process are necessary. However, all theorists concurred with each other in the view 
that gift giving is, fundamentally, a highly complicated process of exchange. As the chief 
executive officer of the Sydney Olympic Bid Committee observes, in order to win the bid the 
Olympic Bid Committee should build really strong bonds with IOC members and he adds 
that “if friends make gifts, gifts make friends” (cited in Booth, 1999: 45). Consequently, the 
initial and the second IOC Ad Hoc Commissions were established in 1998 and 1999 
respectively to investigate allegations regarding the bribery of IOC members. The formation 
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of the Ethics Commission and the IOC 2000 Commission took place in the same context. 
The former was established to devise a set of ethical principles for IOC members and the 
latter mainly examines and recommends the method for conducting the bidding process 
and the structure of the IOC. 
 
The view that greater democracy is needed is also supported by Schneider (2000) who 
also emphasises accountability with regard, in particular, to the issue of reforming the IOC’s 
structure and governance, procedures to deal with doping and bidding cities. With respect 
to democracy, IOC members should represent the IOC to their countries in such a way as 
to guard the independence of the IOC from national politics. Reform of the structure of the 
IOC must guarantee its international independence and also ensure that democratic and 
structural forms of accountability are introduced. As the concept of accountability is closely 
related to stakeholders and openness, the IOC should demonstrate its willingness to be 
accountable for all of its decisions and to open the bidding process to all stakeholders. 
Furthermore, democratic accountability should be introduced in its decision making and 
executed by means of elections. Similarly, the newly created anti-doping agency should be 
given sufficient independence to allow it to perform its role.  
 
Concerning an issue of corporate governance, Zakus (2000: 168) quotes McIntosh et al. 
(1998: 86) who argue that NGB boards should be transparent in their decision-making and 
consider to whom they should be accountable, who they should be working for, what 
competencies the directors should have, whether or not a wider range of stakeholders 
should be involved and how companies hold their employees accountable.   
 
In relation to gender equity, men have traditionally dominated IOC decision-making as well 
as participation in the Olympic Games though broadly equal participation had been 
achieved by London 2012. In fact, “women were not eligible for selection for membership 
on the IOC until a rule change was instituted in 1973… there were still only 9 women on the 
111 member IOC – approximately 8% of the total membership in 1997” (Rintala & Bischoff, 
1997: 2). “By 2012 there were 20 number of women representing 18.8 % of the 106 IOC 
members” (IOC, 2002). Male dominance is also conspicuous in the leadership of the 
National Olympic Committees and the International Sports Federations. Regarding the 
proportion of women among the high ranking officials, Wilson (1996: 186) reveals that “in 
1995, of the 34 International Federations with sports on the Olympic program, only 2 listed 
women as Presidents; 2 other Federations had women as Executive Directors. There were 
5 National Olympic Committees out of 196 which could point to a woman as president, 
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while women served as Secretary General in 12 more” (cited in Rintala & Bischoff, 1997: 2). 
The figures had improved but not dramatically as more recent IOC commissioned research 
has shown (Henry et al., 2004; and Henry & Robinson, 2010)  
 
Accordingly, the International Olympic Committee has shown its concern about the low 
level of female involvement in decision making structures in sports organisations and it has 
strongly urged each country to live up to the IOC requirements that “ensure that the 
benefits of wider involvement in decision making by women are realised” (Women 2004: 4 
cited in Claringbould & Knoppers, 2008: 81). Nevertheless, the IOC has recognised that 
fixing a target percentage for women’s involvement may not be sufficient to increase the 
number of women holding senior positions in sports organisations since affirmative action 
policies “do not directly address the circumstances or attitudes which cause such an 
imbalance in the first place” (Women 2004: 6 cited in Claringbould & Knoppers, 2008: 81).  
 
Rintala and Bischoff (1997: 4) survey the ratio of women performing leadership roles at the 
level of “the Executive Committee members and Presidents of national governing bodies of 
women’s Olympic medal sports.” In terms of the overall percentage of women’s 
involvement, the highest numbers appear in Oceania (Australia and New Zealand). By 
contrast, “the lowest percentage of women Executive Committee members was in Asia and 
the lowest percentages for women in President positions were in Asia (1.1%) and Europe 
(1.3%)2” (Rintala & Bischoff, 1997: 8).  
Corporate Governance in sports organisations 
McNamee and Fleming (2007) provide a conceptual framework for the evaluation of 
corporate governance in public sector sports which also enables us to evaluate the ethical 
dimensions of organisational culture. This ethics audit is likely to be limited to large sports 
organisations which receive public funding, operate in the public sector and are, in turn, 
vulnerable to non-market driven forms of financial, legal and political constraints.  
Regarding audits of corporate governance and ethics, according to McNamee and Fleming 
(2007: 427), “their heterogeneous meanings and uses are themselves the product of a 
range of perceptions about organisational culture and the proper methods for ensuring 
standards of conduct within them”. Hindley (2003) distinguishes three types of governance, 
namely steering, networks and corporate governance, and he categorises the former two 
                                               
2
Asia: Indonesia, Japan, China, South and North Korea.  
Europe: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Holland, Hungary, Italy, 
Liechtenstein, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden and Switzerland 
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as being descriptive and the latter as normative, McNamee and Fleming (2007), on the 
other hand, suggest that corporate governance involves both descriptive and normative 
features.   
 
Sternberg (1994: 241) remarks that the ethics audit is a “key management tool”, arguing 
that it is necessary to evaluate the entire organisational culture and key decision-making 
processes (McNamee & Fleming, 2007: 428). The ethics audit starts from the position that 
“an organisation’s aims and its procedures for achieving them must be open to critique, and 
may be stimulated by a set of drivers” (McNamee & Fleming, 2007: 428). Moreover, for 
establishing a more ethically sound organisational culture, all members of an organisation 
must pledge to engage in the promotion of good corporate governance. This study 
introduces a framework for the ethics audit which is divided into three categories: respect, 
equity and responsibility. Respect relates to the way in which the individual is treated, 
equity covers the social level with respect to social justice, and responsibility is concerned 
with the political dimension of staff members’ organisational roles and conduct. The model 
of three categories covers accountability, responsibility, transparency, equity, effectiveness 
and efficiency. However, democracy is not included  
Role of ethics in professionalised sporting organisations  
Since the relationship between business and sport has intensified dramatically, Sherry, 
Shilbury and Wood (2007) discuss the ways in which such a relationship has increased the 
complexity of ethical issues impacting on sport management. The conceptual discussion of 
the issue of conflict of interest is a main aspect in understanding sports organisations. 
Conflicts of interest can arise in a decision-making process that impacts on diverse groups 
of people, for example, athletes, business people, fans and the media. In the business field, 
the ethics program should address potential conflicts of interest and “business executives 
generally view potential conflicts of interest as ethical issues that firms should address” 
(Felo, 2001 cited in Sherry, Shilbury & Wood, 2007:268)  
  
In Australia, the system for governing and managing sporting organisations has become 
increasingly professionalised and bureaucratised with the result that the links between 
professionalisation and ethical management behaviours have been highlighted. Several 
researchers have noted the connection between professional sport management and ethics 
(cf. Branvold, 1996; Zeigler, 1992). Accordingly, corporate governance has become an 
important element to aid our understanding of conflict of interest situations. Milton-Smith 
(1997) argues that “corporate governance has developed into an expectation of setting 
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higher standards of accountability for decision-makers in response to the public demand for 
greater transparency” (Sherry, Shilbury & Wood, 2007: 269). The Australian Sports 
Commission (1999) demands that “board members of national sport organisations declare 
any kind of conflicts of interest” (Sherry, Shilbury & Wood, 2007: 274). The focus is also 
thereby placed on the balance between the roles and responsibilities of business. As roles 
are professionalised, greater independence and autonomy are apparent in judgments 
made in the decision-making process. This underlines the role of ethics in the governance 
of sporting organisations.  
3.5.5 Accountability 
Non-profit organisations 
Hoye and Inglis (2003) focus on three key governance issues for non-profit leisure 
organisations. Firstly, non-profit organisations should balance the distribution of roles 
between the executive and volunteer board members. Executive members should be 
involved in strategy and policy development whereas volunteer board members should take 
legal and moral responsibility for the governance function. Secondly, the board should 
evaluate individual members and the board as a whole at the same time, including its 
executive members. The last point is that organisation members should be directly and 
openly involved in the governance of their organisations.  
3.5.6 Responsibility 
Responsibility of the board 
Following agency theorists who emphasise the importance of the board’s decision control 
function (Westphal, 1999; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the major responsibilities of the board 
in a broad sense are “to address conflicts of interests between ownership and management 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983) and to make sure that top management is directing the 
organisation in a fashion that is consistent with the established mission and strategic plan” 
(Schaffer, 2002: 96). On top of its control function, “the board is also responsible for 
assuming roles related to service and the attainment of resources” (Schaffer, 2002: 96; see 
also Johnson et al., 1996). In particular, Schaffer (2002) focuses on the board’s duty to 
assess managerial performance. 
  
Schaffer (2002) undertakes to integrate attribution theory and corporate governance. The 
board is likely to fall into one of two groups in terms of its composition depending on the 
proportion of its members who hold positions in the firm, so that the board may be insider-
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dominated or outsider-dominated. In the managerial assessment process initiated by the 
board of directors when the firm is undergoing a period of poor performance, each group 
faces different constraints in assessment. ‘Insider’ directors are subject to social constraints 
such as their desire to maintain their loyalty to the CEO and fears of possible retaliation, 
while ‘outsider’ directors are subject to lack of information and time, and they may not be so 
wholly committed to the organisation. When observing an individual’s behaviour to assess 
managerial performance, according to Schaffer (2002: 103), we apply attribution theory 
which “determines whether the behaviour was internally caused (i.e. by the person), or 
externally caused (by the context or the situation)” (see also Ferris et al., 1995; Markus & 
Zajonc, 1985; Heider, 1958). Obviously, ‘insider’ directors have, to some extent, a tendency 
to make external attributions for poor organisational performance, and ‘outsider’ directors 
tend to make internal attributions.  
 
Booth and Hassen (1990) look at the division of responsibilities between volunteer and paid 
staff in national sports organisations in Canada. Despite episodes of friction and conflict 
between the two groups, their cooperation and reciprocity are essential since their mutual 
responsibilities imply overlapping boundaries.   
3.5.7 Democracy 
Autonomy  
The question of autonomy in national sports organisations is likely to be closely related to 
economic concerns. A non-profit organisation is thought to be strongly dependent on public 
financing (and to some extent on commercial financing), both at the local and at the 
national level, as suggested by Riiskjaer and Nielsen (1987: 193). Consequently, Weisbrod 
(1980) argues that the behaviour of voluntary non-profit organisations is dependent upon 
the structure of its revenues (Riiskjaer & Nielsen 1987: 193). 
3.5.8 Equity 
Social ideology on gender 
A number of researchers apply a symbolic interactionist approach to social ideology, “which 
posits that the multiple identities of an individual are manifested through behavioural, 
cognitive, and emotional responses to patterned societal symbols and language” (Sartore & 
Cunningham, 2007: 245, see also Blumer, 1969; Burke, 1980; 1991; Mead, 1934; Stryker, 
1980). On this basis it is argued that societal symbols and languages through interactions 
are thought to be reproduced in social ideologies and, in particular, sporting ideologies, for 
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instances, gender stereotypes. Issues of power relations are also deeply related with social 
interactions and relations (Sartore & Cunningham, 2007: 246, see also Pastore, Inglis, & 
Danylchuk, 1996; Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, 1999). As noted by Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 
(1999), “societal status and power are possibly gendered, in that men generally occupy 
senior positions and perform the leading roles whereas women are predominantly engaged 
in lower-status and less powerful societal homemaker roles” (Sartore & Cunningham, 2007: 
246). Furthermore, this is also closely related to the gender imbalance seen in the 
leadership of sports organisations. To some extent, societal stereotypes make people 
believe that women are not as competent as men to perform leading roles and this may be 
particularly true of the leadership positions within sports organisations. In fact, as Slack 
(1997: 303) points out, “it is obvious that little attempt has been made to confront such an 
unbalanced situation regarding gender equity in leadership in sport” (Whisenant, Pedersen 
& Obenour, 2002: 487). 
 
Research suggests, according to Sartore and Cunningham (2007: 247), that “one’s 
organisational status and level of associated power are often a reflection of society at large” 
(see also Ely, 1995; Heilman, 2001; Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs, & Tamkins, 2004; Jost & Kay, 
2005; Shaw & Hoeber, 2003; Shaw & Slack, 2002). In particular, male/female stereotypes 
tend to be subsumed within this notion of social ideology and they may play a role in either 
positive or negative ways, so as to undermine perceptions of women’s ability to exercise 
competence and power (Sartore & Cunningham, 2007: 248, see also Eagly & Mladinic, 
1989, 1993; Jost & Kay, 2005).   
 
Such a stereotype is likely to be a mirror reflecting the organisational and national culture in 
question. Stereotypes may be applied at both the individual and social or cultural level and 
their use at the social or cultural level implies some form of agreement or consensus of 
beliefs (Sartore & Cunningham, 2007: 248, see also Ashmore & Del Boca, 1979; Jost & 
Banaji, 1994; Sidanius et al., 2001). The traditional social stereotypes bring into power 
inequalities between men and women, impacting the organisational domain. Sartore and 
Cunningham (2007:247) maintain that “gender stereotypes permeate organisational 
settings and are recreated there through everyday interactions” (see also Davidson & 
Burke, 2000; Ely, 1995; Heilman, 2001; Jost & Kay, 2005; Shaw & Hoeber, 2003).  
Issue of gender in the boards of national sports organisations 
As the centre of power in national sports organisations, the board of directors establishes 
the goals for senior management and draws up organisational policies and conditions. With 
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so much power at stake, “the percentage of women in the board is much lower than that in 
senior management”, according to CDWI (2004 cited in Knoppers & Anthonissen, 2007: 
495). Apparently, through the process of interaction and the creation of meanings, or 
“common sense” (Knoppers & Anthonissen, 2005), male dominance is reinforced, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally, by its very masculinity.   
 
Following Witz’s (1990, 1992) perspective, the possession of or the lack of ‘fitness’ (entitling 
the individual to inclusion or exclusion from the board) is determined by the process of 
negotiation between the dominant (here, male) and subdominant (female) groups. 
Claringbould and Knoppers (2007: 497) explore the ways in which men and women 
negotiate during the selection process. For both groups ‘fitness’ is more important than 
‘gender’ and this results in the male-dominant culture on the board being reproduced 
through male controlling strategies. This conclusion is also supported by Hovden (2000; 
2000) who discusses the gendering of selection processes for positions of leadership (at a 
managerial level) in Norway, indicating that leaders should be fit according to the criteria 
produced by the male-dominant, or “male heavyweight”, group.      
 
Claringbould and Knoppers (2007; 2008) also believe that meanings shape the behaviours 
of the members of an organisation and their expectations for the behaviour of others, 
following the argument proposed by Kanter (1977) that “the gender ratio or composition of 
a group is a structural determinant of (gendered) organisational behaviour…in particular, in 
male dominated contexts” (Claringbould & Knoppers, 2008: 82). In a gender-balanced 
group, the members seem unlikely to police the group boundaries or to use stereotypes.  
However, sense making is a process that takes place continuously whenever individuals 
interact with each other. Accordingly, meanings about gender are continually renegotiated 
on the boards of national sports organisations. 
 
Claringbould and Knoppers (2008: 84) aim to “understand how board members make 
sense of gender composition and how that reflects ways of doing and undoing gender.” On 
gendered boards, the members are not aware of any gender skewedness, whereas the 
balanced board members have a greater awareness of gender composition and behaviours 
and, in turn, they will even notice the outcomes of a shift from a gendered to a balanced 
ratio.  
Meanings and practices of equity and organisational culture (masculinities)  
As Knoppers and Anthonissen (2005:123) point out, most senior managers who, in general, 
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hold a great deal of power over decision-making, impact on organisational culture through 
their practices and discourses which reflect a part of societal discourses. Furthermore, the 
managers’ masculinity may also be influenced by the athletic masculinity which pervades 
sport through their images and discourses. Consequently, the purpose of Knoppers and 
Anthonissen’ research is to discover whether the meanings given to male athletes and 
managers intersect and support each other in terms of their masculinity. The most obvious 
male athletic masculinities are easily accessible on a daily basis because they are shown in 
men’s professional/national sports by means of the worldwide media. Since the early image 
of the sporting manager was associated with masculinities, managerial positions in sport 
are still dominated by men. 
 
Relating the dominant meanings to performance Knoppers and Anthonissen (2001: 302) 
seek to find “how such meanings contribute to organisational process in terms of gender 
and ethnicity”. They argue that the relationship between meanings and performance may 
partly be a reason for the slow increase in the number of women and members of ethnic 
minorities in leadership positions. They (2001: 302) also indicate that since white 
masculinities prevail in organisational culture, women and ethnic minorities have often been 
marginalised or excluded (see also Collinson & Hearn, 1994; Kerfoot & Knights, 1998; 
Lapchick, 1996; Moodley, 1999; Witz & Savage, 1992). However, the meanings given to 
performance in gender and racial/ethnic contexts imply that the processes of gender and 
racial discrimination in sports organisation are fluid and contradictory.  
 
Hoeber (2007; 2008), who also analyses the gaps between meanings and practices of 
gender equity with respect to athletes in a sports organisation following Post-structuralist 
feminism, acknowledges the “gendered nature of knowledge production and the way it 
maintains and reinforces the power relationships between the sexes” (Fletcher, 1999a: 21 
cited in Hoeber, 2007: 260). Importantly, the dominant group holding power is likely to 
impact on organisational culture in such a way that it can define the appropriateness of 
guidelines and boundaries about what is right and normal, or what is expected in the 
organisation. Thus, it is necessarily cautious in the way that it defines and interprets of 
gender equity.  
 
Hall, Cullen and Slack (1989) focus on explanations of the ways in which male dominant 
groups work to retain their power and how female subdominant groups collude in this 
process in terms of gender structure. Apparently, junior positions are much more likely to be 
held by women, who comprise a much smaller proportion of staff in senior positions in an 
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organisational structure. This implies that women are relatively excluded from involvement 
in decision-making. “Organisations are understood and analysed not mainly in economic or 
material terms but in terms of their expressive, ideational, and symbolic aspects” (Smircich, 
1983 cited in Hall, Cullen & Slack, 1989: 34). The suggestion is that each sports 
organisation has its own culture and that, obviously, more male dominant organisational 
cultures have prevailed. This in turn, has resulted in women’s acceptance of male culture 
with respect to its attitudes, interests and goals. 
 
The marginalisation of women’s positioning at the administrative level (Whisenant, 2003; 
Whisenant, Pedersen & Obenour, 2002) seems to have been reinforced in US 
intercollegiate sport, which implies that women may only occupy administrative positions in 
women-related sports. Such practices have resulted in a limited number of jobs being 
available to women which has served to “deny them the power associated with controlling 
the ‘revenue generating’ sports”, according to Whisenant, Pedersen and Obenour (2002: 
489).    
The process of integrating disabled and able-bodied sports organisations 
“In Norway, the Olympic Committee and Confederation of Sports (Norges Iderettsforbund 
og olympiske komite, NIF) made a commitment to integrate disability sport into sport 
federations for the able-bodied in 1996” (NIF, 1996 cited in Sørensen & Kahrs, 2006: 184). 
After the three main bodies for disability sport had been merged into one organisation 
named ‘The Norwegian Sports Organisation for the Disabled (NIF)’, the organisation was 
evaluated in terms of its integration process. The evaluation intentionally included not only 
physical or organisational measures but also social and pedagogical (instructional) 
practices. Through the application of these measures, criteria were developed for 
determining “what an ideal sport organisation that includes disability sports would be like” 
(Sørensen & Kahrs, 2006: 186). 
 
Sørensen and Kahrs (2006: 186) state that all organisational bodies should demonstrate 
their willingness to integrate individual workers with disabilities and an efficient way should 
be established of organising the integration work, the legislation, rules and finance. The 
important point here is that individuals with disabilities should be enabled to participate as 
members of the decision-making bodies. Moreover, the social aspects of the working 
environment also had a crucial role to play in improving that environment for them in terms 
of colleagues’ positive attitudes, acceptance and willingness to prioritise the benefits 
accruing to participants with disabilities. “These criteria were used as indicators for how far 
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in the process the various parts of the organisation had come toward the ideal goal of 
integration” (Sørensen & Kahrs, 2006:186).  
 
The consensus opinion of the evaluation was that although the integration process was 
truly under way in the NIF in a positive direction, it was proceeding at a much slower pace 
than had been expected due to the top-down approach of the power structure. This needed 
to be combined with a bottom-up approach, for example, more activities for individuals with 
disabilities, or enhancing the development of competence on disability issues in the 
organisation. 
 
Hums, Moorman and Wolff (2003) also study the integration process among disability and 
able-bodied sports organisations and they state (2003: 262) that “the governance of sport 
for people with disabilities in the United States has come to the forefront of amateur sport 
with the 1998 passage of the Stevens Amendment to the Amateur Sports Act of 1978. This 
amendment resulted in a new name (The Olympic and Amateur Sport Act)… and the term 
‘Paralympic’ is included.” Beaver (1998) claims that the Act has promoted equal status for 
athletes with disabilities, since the Paralympics is mandated under the USOC (Hums, 
Moorman & Wolff, 2003: 264). However, the law does not specify that its implementation is 
obligatory or that there should be a change in the governance structure of the USOC 
(United States Olympic Committee). Thus, although the USOC and NGBs appear to be 
involved in the integration process, DSOs (Disabled Sports Organisations) are 
unfortunately excluded from participation in the determination process and from the 
exercise of power. The challenges that have arisen for the USOC consist in 1) the lack of 
compatibility between the integration process and USOC governance structures and 2) the 
absence of a relevant financial resource allocation. Consequently, in April, 2000, the USOC 
decided to help to establish a separate Paralympic organisation (USPSC, United States 
Paralympic Sports Corporation) (Hums, Moorman & Wolff , 2003: 267).  
Improvement of equity and sporting culture in the UK 
White and Kay (2006) have developed the research findings from the study conducted by 
White and Brackenridge (1985) regarding the changes in women’s involvement in power 
positions in sports organisations in three areas: national pan-sport organisations; the 
professional fields of administration, management and coaching; and the governing bodies 
of individual sports. White and Brackenridge (1985: 105) assert that for the preceding 20 
years power positions had been “firmly in the hands of men” (White & Kay, 2006: 472). 
Fortunately, in overall terms, women’s representation in sports organisations has positively 
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increased in UK sport organisations. This finding is supported by the Chartered 
Management Institute which released statistics showing that “the proportion of female 
managers had risen from under two percent in 1975 to 22 percent in 2000, and to 31 
percent in 2004” (cited in White & Kay, 2006: 472).  . 
 
Long, Robinson and Spracklen (2005) report on the achievement of racial equity following 
the promotion of racial equity in governing bodies and national sports organisations in the 
UK. Since the inception of the UK’s ‘Sport for All’ policy in the early 1970s, the issue of 
racial equity has emerged more clearly. When the structure and culture of sports 
organisations in the UK are examined, it becomes apparent that most organisations are 
small and possess limited resources and that the majority of their staff are volunteers. With 
respect to sporting cultures in the UK, according to Spracklen (1996), a racist hegemony 
has given rise to a stereotyping of racial qualities and, in turn, the underrepresentation and 
lack of involvement of ethnic minority representatives in positions of power has become a 
part of the culture of sports. Therefore, progress towards greater racial equity has been 
slow since the launch in December, 2000 of ‘Achieving Racial Equality: A Standard for 
Sport (Commission for Racial Equality, 2000)’ (Long, Robinson & Spracklen, 2005: 45). In 
fact, Spracklen, Hylton and Long (2006: 300) reveal that although the Racial Equality 
Standard was rapidly embedded within the list of preliminary-level policy objectives by 
sports managers and policy makers because of their fears over a possible loss of funding, it 
was not generally put into practice.  
The fairness of the distribution (or reduction) of resources 
Mahony, Riemer, Breeding and Hums (2006) survey the fairness of resource distribution 
from college athletes and other college students’ perspectives. Distributive justice refers to 
“the fairness, or justice, of the distribution of resources to participants” (Hums & Chelladurai, 
1994b cited in Mahony et al., 2006: 160) and is categorised into three sub-divisions: 1) 
equity (more resources go to those who contribute more); 2) equality (an equal share to 
everyone); and 3) need (more resources go to those who have less). As a result, women 
tend to give strong support to its equal distribution or reductions in resources, while men 
tend to be in favour of basing decisions regarding resource distribution or reduction on 
need or on rewarding contributions to the program. 
3.5.9 Effectiveness  
Voluntary boards and effectiveness 
Papadimitriou (1999) develops normative standards to evaluate the effectiveness of 
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voluntary boards of directors in Greece. From for the normative perspective, suitable 
qualifications and competency are prerequisites of board membership in addition to 
commitment and motivation for performing their responsibilities. Effectiveness is closely 
related to decision making outputs for the achievement of the interests of national sports 
organisations. The board members should also be able to attract financial resources for 
their operation. The last of the normative standards identified by Papadimitriou concerns 
the organisation’s external relations and the extent to which they can be monitored so that 
appropriate action can be taken to adapt the organisation to its environment. In order to 
make an improvement in decision-making, the decentralisation of authority to paid 
members of staff is another option for delegating the power of voluntary board members.  
  
Regarding the Executive Committee’s effective performance, Doherty and Carron (2003) 
support Papadimitrious’s (1999) finding that various members of national sports 
organisations believe that “well-integrated and coherent boards” are an essential factor for 
achieving successful performance. They emphasise, in particular, that success is closely 
related with effective decision making (Doherty & Carron, 2003: 117-8). The Ontario 
Ministry of Tourism and Recreation (1990) points out that volunteer sports executives 
identified team building as a necessary factor for committee effectiveness (Doherty & 
Carron, 2003: 118). Moreover, Doherty and Carron (2003: 118) state that research has 
shown that cohesive groups are better able to perform more effectively than less cohesive 
groups (e.g., Carron, Colman, Stevens &Wheeler, in press; Mullen & Copper, 1994). 
Organisational values  
Organisational values are likely to be sensitive to cultural differences (Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 
335) and Martin (2002) considers that “culture is a lens to examine organisational values” 
(cited in Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 337). Thus, McShane (2004) points out that when an 
organisation clearly expresses its values, the values are used as “standards to guide 
decisions and actions in order to increase productivity, improve efficiencies and to meet its 
social responsibility” (cited in Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 335). 
 
Following Martin’s cultural framework (2002) that is inclusive of an integration perspective, 
a differentiation perspective and a fragmentation perspective, Hoeber and Frisby (2001) 
develop a way of understanding the values held by individual members through the 
interpretations of the meanings of values (Fenton & Inglis, 2007). Fenton and Inglis (2007) 
use a matrix framework which integrates the three perspectives mentioned above to 
summarise the results of research and the underlying patterns of interpretation found in the 
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data. Each of the three perspectives has its own characteristics which are shown in terms 
of three core values, namely accessibility, innovation and responsible relationships. From 
the integrative viewpoint, consistency, consensus and clarity are the features that stand out. 
By contrast, the differentiation perspective exposes inconsistencies and fractures in the 
consensus. Lastly, the essential feature of the fragmentation perspective is that it shows a 
variety of different perspectives, a degree of uncertainty and ambiguity. 
 
Hinings, Thibault, Slack and Kikulis (1996) and Danisman, Hinings and Slack (2006) 
conclude that due to organisational homogenisation, integrated perceptions of institutional 
values and norms are held by individuals in the organisation. At the same time, however, 
each subgroup also retains differentiated sets of values and norms based on their own 
understandings and cognitions. The important conclusion to draw from this is that 
“organisational values and norms are not adopted by organisational actors collectively in 
the same way” (Danisman et al., 2006: 313). 
 
Scott (2001: 55) claims that individual roles can affect institutional value differentiation 
(Danisman et al., 2006: 303). Trice and Beyer (1993) and Cox (1993) argue that 
“demographic groupings based on age (‘old-timers’ and ‘new comers’) and gender are likely 
to be pervasive sources of cultural differentiation” (Danisman et al, 2006: 304). This is a 
general cultural differentiation but it tends to arise strongly. Therefore, in operationalisation 
it will identify whether or not there is a cultural differentiation between old-timers and new 
comers, and male and female staff members. In addition, according to Danisman et al. 
(2006: 304), the differences in the value orientation of volunteers and professional paid staff 
are also prominent (see also Macintosh & Whitson, 1990; Slack & Hinings, 1992). 
Values and beliefs and organisational structure 
The increase in government involvement has led to an increased level of bureaucratisation 
and professionalisation in organisations and, in turn, these aspects of structural change 
have given rise to specialisation and standardisation in organisations. According to 
Greenwood and Hinings (1988), “organisational structures…are reflexive expressions of 
intentions, aspirations, and meanings that are embodied in the dominant values and beliefs 
found in an organisation” (cited in Slack & Thibault, 1988: 141). Basically, organisational 
changes occur through a process of changes in a set of values and beliefs, and structures. 
As Ranson, Hinings, Greenwood and Walsh (1980: 218) conclude, “organisational 
members embody their frameworks of values and beliefs in the structural arrangements 
and policy processes of the organisations in which they work” (cited in Slack & Thibault, 
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1988: 149). Therefore, the structure is more likely to reflect and represent the values and 
beliefs which prevail in the organisation and is adopted in accordance with them (see also 
Hinings, Thibault, Slack & Kikulis, 1996). 
 
The theme of values and beliefs can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the NOCs 
and culture is also an important element to take into account in such an evaluation as each 
NOC needs to be viewed through the lens of its own particular culture. This helps to 
determine whether or not the members of the organisation share similar or different values 
and beliefs. 
Organisational culture 
Organisational culture is also strongly believed to affect organisational effectiveness (Kent 
& Weese, 2000; see also Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Frost et al., 1985; Schein, 1985). Schein 
(1985), especially, notes that the leader of an organisation should set the priority of 
managing and embracing a designed organisational culture (cited in Kent & Weese, 2000: 
5). As Colyer (2000: 321) says, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that 
organisational culture affects an organisation’s performance and that culture contributes in 
an important way to organisational effectiveness (see also Cameron & Freeman, 1991; 
Deal & Kennedy, 1988; Denison & Spreitzer, 1991; Smircich, 1983).  
 
Scott (1997) connects the concept of organisational culture to the management of sport 
organisations. He defines cultural strength as the existence of a strong positive culture that 
is unlikely to be suppressive, controlling or authoritarian and which discovers its key role in 
promoting organisational effectiveness. Schein (1993: 51) defines a strong culture as one 
that is characterised by “the homogeneity and stability of group membership and the length 
and intensity of shared experiences of the group”, adding that a strong culture thus 
possesses a high degree of agreement among its members about “what the organisation 
stands for” (cited in Scott, 1997: 407). Scott (1997) views organisational culture in relation 
to transformational leadership, thereby following Weese (1995: 130) who states that “a 
transformational leader….helps influence a culture that perpetuates and reinforces a 
philosophy of excellence and continual improvement” (cited in Scott, 1997: 408). 
Organisations with highly transformational leaders are seen to possess significantly 
stronger cultures than those with leaders whose transformational abilities are relatively low-
level. Furthermore, some researchers also note that the concept of organisational culture is 
rooted primarily in a corporate philosophy that is characterised by authoritarian control and 
an absence of workplace democracy. Institutional sports organisations are said to exhibit 
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characteristics of this type of organisational structure and leadership (see also Eitzen, 1996; 
Massengale & Sage, 1995)  
 
Furthermore, the existence of a strong culture plays a crucial role in safeguarding 
organisational effectiveness. In discussing the elements of a strong culture that are 
important for organisational effectiveness, O’Reilly (1989) states that “it is only when there 
exist both intensity and consensus that strong cultures exist: intensity was related to the 
amount of approval of the cultural norms and consensus was related to the degree of 
consistency with which a norm is shared” (cited in Scott, 1997: 410). 
 
Colyer (2000) uses the study of organisational culture developed by Quinn and Spreitzer 
(1991) following Quinn and Rohrbaugh whose competing values framework reveals 
differences in the values of the fundamental factors of organisational behaviours. Colyer 
points out that the analysis of organisational culture can make a useful contribution to 
organisational effectiveness and performance (see also Cameron & Freeman, 1991; 
Cameron & Quinn, 1999; Denison & Spreitzer, 1991). If there are subcultures, or counter 
cultures, in an organisation they may generate conflict due to the competing values within 
the organisation and, in turn, reduce its effectiveness in achieving its desired outcomes.    
Leadership and organisational culture 
The quality of an organisation’s leadership is more likely to be related to its effectiveness 
and in this study two major types of leadership have emerged: transactional and 
transformational leadership. In particular, transformational leadership is conducive to a 
good organisational culture which, in turn, benefits the effectiveness of the organisation.  
 
Kent and Weese (2000) hypothesise that leadership and organisational culture play 
important roles in establishing an effective organisation. With regards to the two types of 
leadership, transactional and transformational, the former focuses on reciprocal 
relationships and the latter is based on the leader-follower relationship (a leader puts more 
emphasis on the follower’s motivation) which is thought to be more effective. Rowold (2006) 
discusses transformational and transactional leadership in respect of martial arts. Bass 
(1997) claims that, unlike transactional leadership, transformational leadership has been 
proven to have a positive impact on organisational performance and subordinates’ 
satisfaction levels, and this has been demonstrated in a wide range of different 
organisations (Rowold, 2006: 314), for instance, in sports management (see Davis, 2002; 
Ristow, Amos & Staude, 1999). As Eagly (2007:2) also comments, the fact that 
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transformational leadership is highly likely to be associated with greater effectiveness is 
demonstrated in “87 studies of meta-analysis on testing the relationships between 
leadership styles and measures of leaders’ effectiveness” (see also Judge & Piccolo, 2004; 
Lowe, Kroeck & Sivasubramaniam, 1996).   
 
Moreover, with respect to any possible differentiation in styles of leadership in terms of 
gender, researchers argue that men and women should essentially behave in the same 
ways while fulfilling similar roles since particular leadership tasks demand certain types of 
leadership (e.g., Kanter, 1977; Nieva & Gutek, 1981; van Engen, van der Leeden & 
Willemsen, 2001). Following this argument, Eagly (2007: 4) affirms the validity of this claim 
because, irrespective of gender, one has to meet similar requirements to gain a leadership 
role in the first place. Also, the expectations held for leaders shape their behaviour in 
particular directions, which results in the existence of relatively small differences in 
leadership style among men and women. As a style of leadership, thus, transformational is 
found to be more effective than transactional leadership according to measures used for 
leaders’ effectiveness (see also Judge & Piccolo, 2004; Lowe, Kroeck & Sivasubramaniam, 
1996). Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt and Engen (2003) discover gender differences, 
however, in terms of leadership styles in that female leaders are likely to be more 
transformational than male leaders while still exhibiting more contingent reward behaviours, 
which is a feature of transactional leadership, while male leaders show a strong tendency 
to employ transactional and laissez-faire styles of leadership (Eagly, 2007). This also 
reflects an organisational culture that is in the process of being transformed from a highly 
authoritative to a motivation-driven culture. However, Eagly finds that transactional 
leadership may be almost as effective as transformational leadership, owing to its 
‘contingent reward’ component, which grants recognition to subordinates for their 
appropriate behaviour. 
Leaders’ perceptions 
Weinberg and McDermott (2002: 282) investigate leaders’ perceptions of organisational 
effectiveness in the area of group dynamics including (a) leadership, (b) group cohesion, 
and (c) communication. In terms of leadership, specifically, three aspects are identified as 
being critical to organisational effectiveness. First of all, the leader should display the 
characteristics of honesty, consistency, decisiveness and good organisation. Secondly, the 
leader should possess good interpersonal skills and notably the ability to focus on 
interacting with a variety of people, listening to people and trusting others’ abilities. The 
third aspect is the style of leadership, whether it is a democratic, interactional or autocratic 
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style. Essentially, effective leadership should involve every single member of the 
organisation in that the leader should be good at listening to their opinions and receiving 
their inputs into decision making (Weinberg & McDermott, 2002: 291). However, the 
leadership style is likely to be dependent on the circumstances that the leader faces and, 
consequently, a different style may be preferable in individual situations. Along with 
leadership, the authors also touch upon group cohesion and communication as factors 
determining organisational effectiveness. With respect to group cohesion, it is highly likely 
to be related to the organisation’s productivity. Regarding communication, top executives 
should emphasise clear lines of communication and open-door policies, according to 
Waterman (1994 cited in Weinberg & McDermott, 2002: 285).  
Leadership of the board  
Hoye (2006) focuses on leadership within the boards of voluntary sports organisation in 
Australia. He defines the leaders as the board chairs and executives and the followers as 
the board members. In applying Leader and Member Exchange Theory to this case, Hoye 
(2006: 299) suggests that “effective leadership processes occur when leaders and 
followers are able to develop mature leadership relationships”, and his study reveals that 
the relationships between paid executives, board chairs and board members impact directly 
on board performance. In order to establish a mature relationship and become a high 
performing board, mutual respect and trust are the prerequisites.  
Managing diversity 
Researchers argue that “the best way to engender an organisational commitment to valuing 
diversity is to connect employee diversity, and the successful management of it, to 
improvement in organisational effectiveness” (Cox & Beale, 1997; Johnson, 1992; 
Robinson & Dechant, 1997; Thomas, 1991 cited in Fink & Pastore, 1999: 314). Robinson 
and Dechant (1997) state that a company which lacks diversity management will face more 
difficulty in attracting, retaining, and utilising the best employees (cited in Fink & Pastore, 
1999: 315). The explanation for this is that successful diversity management is also likely to 
engender greater employee creativity (Joplin & Daus, 1997 cited in Fink & Pastore, 1999: 
315) and, perhaps more importantly it may lead to an increase in organisational productivity 
(Fink & Pastore, 1999: 315). 
 
At the level of leadership positions in US Intercollegiate athletics it is claimed that prejudice 
and discrimination have been manifested with respect to gender, race, disability and sexual 
orientation and that little changes has been seen as such attitudes, values and leadership 
priorities have continued to be propagated (Fink & Pastore, 1999; see also Cunningham & 
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Sagas, 2005; Boutlier & San Giovanni, 1994; Uhlir, 1987). Accordingly, Fink and Pastore 
(1999) utilise business literature to obtain a perspective concerning the lack of diversity in 
Division IA intercollegiate athletic organisations. Their conclusion is that organisation where 
the management of diversity is embedded within the organisational culture can achieve 
high levels of effectiveness, productivity and creativity. An interesting finding reported by 
Cunningham and Sagas (2005) is that it is a common practice for members of the same 
racial group to be selected for employment. Their study provides a possible explanation of 
our finding that the personnel selection process within a sporting context is often influenced 
by whom you know. Rintala and Bischoff (1997: 19) also apply the term ‘homologous 
reproduction’ to be tendency for people in decision-making positions to select/elect persons 
for inclusion in their leadership domains who hold similar points of view. 
 
Doherty and Chelladurai (1999) focus on the implications of demographic and cultural 
diversity. “Cultural diversity is felt in the organisation as a result of individual members who 
identify with a cultural group(s) based on sharing some personal characteristics with others” 
(Doherty & Chelladurai, 1999: 283). Adler (1991: 15) states that “individuals express 
personal culture and its normative qualities through the values that they hold about life and 
the world around them” and he notes that “these values in turn affect their attitudes about 
the form of behaviour considered more appropriate and effective in any given situation” 
(cited in Doherty & Chelladurai, 1999: 283-4). They influence both their behaviour within 
their cultural group(s) and in society at large (Doherty & Chelladurai, 1999: 284). 
Consequently, Doherty and Chelladurai (1999: 284) assert that “personal culture can 
manifest itself in an organisation through symbolic behaviours (e.g., clothing, language, 
foods, life-style preferences) and substantive behaviours (e.g., value-laden perceptions and 
reactions about organizational phenomena such as decision making, power relations, and 
social networks)”. 
 
The effective management of cultural diversity depends on “whether there is an 
organisational culture of diversity” (Loden & Rosener, 1991; Doherty & Chelladurai, 1999). 
Organisational cultures of similarity and diversity should be distinguished from one another. 
An organisational culture of similarity is fostered by dominant groups who compel 
individuals to submit to their main culture for the organisation. It has the aim of reducing 
ambiguity and ensuring that organisationally ‘fit’ individuals gain promotion. By contrast, an 
organisational culture of diversity may stem from “a social responsibility to treat all 
organisational members fairly” (Doherty & Chelladurai, 1999: 288). Its characteristics that it 
is people-oriented, flexible and two-way communicable. Doherty and Chelladurai (1999: 
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288) insist that although the organisational culture of diversity is more effective, sports 
organisations have typically exhibited an organisational culture of similarity by which its 
members are expected to follow the culture of heterosexual, able-bodied, white males. 
Measures of effectiveness 
Several articles mainly deal with how to measure the effectiveness of sporting 
organisations: Frisby (1986), Chelladurai and Haggerty (1991), Chelladurai, Szyszlo and 
Haggerty (1987) and Shilbury and Moore (2006). Two major models of organisational 
effectiveness are the ‘goal’ and ‘systems’ models with the former placing the emphasis on 
“the ability to achieve desired objectives” and the latter concentrating on “the ability to 
acquire scarce resources” (Frisby, 1986: 95). Chelladurai and Haggerty (1991) and 
Chelladurai et al. (1987) also make use of goal and systems models but they include one 
further type of model entitled the ‘process model’ which “focuses on the internal 
organisational processes that enable the conversion of the inputs into desired outputs” 
(Pfeffer, 1977; Steers, 1977 cited in Chelladurai & Haggerty, 1991: 127). Nevertheless, they 
also stress the importance of a multiple constituency approach. The multiple constituents 
may be providers, recipients or members who are engaged in the three models and, thus, 
the focus is on “who should evaluate rather than on what should be evaluated” in this 
approach, which “subsumes all other models of effectiveness” (Chelladurai, 1985: 181 cited 
in Chelladurai & Haggerty, 1991: 127). By contrast, Shilbury and Moore (2006) apply the 
competing values approach (CVA) which is proposed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981; 
1983). This approach takes into account human relations, open systems, internal process 
and rational-goal models. However, Slack (1997: 34) notes that “the biggest problem with 
the CVA is determining which constituents are important to an organisation, and then 
measuring the criteria they value and use in determining the effectiveness of their 
organisation” (Shilbury and Moore, 2006: 13).   
3.5.10 Efficiency 
Efficiency resulting from government subsidies 
Barros (2003: 33) investigates whether government subsidies lead to an increase in “the 
technical efficiency and allocative efficiency” of the training activities of sporting 
organisations in Portugal. “Technical efficiency refers to the ability of a federation to obtain 
maximum output from a given set of inputs using efficient production techniques, and 
allocative efficiency refers to the ability of a federation to use inputs and outputs in optimal 
proportions, given their relative prices” (2003: 38). In Portugal, the organisational structure 
is vertical, and the government at the top level executes its sports policy by applying laws 
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and subsidies to the sport federations. Incentive regulation, which is defined as “the 
implementation of rules that encourage a regulated federation to achieve desired goals by 
granting some, but not complete, discretion to the federations” (Barros, 2003: 33) is an 
important regulatory issue in sports activities. The result of a non-parametric approach 
empirical work shows that technical efficiency and allocative efficiency are highly correlated.   
 
Furthermore, the managerial implications for the Portuguese government are that it needs 
to: 1) change its follow-up inspection procedures of federations’ training activities and 
thereby provide explicitly binding incentives for increasing productive efficiency; 2) include 
contextual factors beyond managerial control; 3) publish the data gathered to establish 
transparency; and 4) conduct a benchmark analysis for poorly performing federations. 
(Barros, 2003: 47). 
Similarity and diversity in non-profit sports organisations (Institutional Isomorphism) 
Augestad, Bergsgard and Hansen (2006: 294) attempt to analyse the structure and 
organisation of “the Olympiatoppen”, which is “a central coordinating organisation for the 
development of elite sport in Norway”, in relation to the international trend “towards an 
increased focus on the organisation and arrangement of elite sport”. Oakley and Green 
(2001), who analyse the similarities and/or local diversities among elite sport systems in 
several Western countries, also argue that similarities emerge among all the countries in 
their move towards the adoption of ‘a single uniform model’ for sport associations dealing 
with elite sports in spite of local differences in cultural and political traditions. Neo-
institutional approaches to organisational theory focus on the organisation’s “rational 
appearance with respect to the institutional environment” (Augestad, Bergsgard & Hansen 
2006: 296), whereas traditional organisational theory puts an emphasis on the 
organisation’s efficiency in terms of resource input and output. Thus, Augestad, Bergsgard 
and Hansen (2006: 296) explain that “theorists of the neo-institutional school concentrate 
on how and to what degree organisations adapt to both formal and informal expectations in 
the institutional environment.”   
 
With respect to similarities, according to DiMaggio and Powell (1991), “mimetic 
isomorphism implies that organisations during a period of change (technological/economic) 
and uncertainty imitate what seems to be the most successful and/or legitimate 
organisations” (cited in Augestad, Bergsgard & Hansen, 2006: 296), Olympiatoppen 
became a stronger and more centralised sports organisation in order to win more medals 
by following a model that had succeeded elsewhere. Following Green and Oakley (2001), 
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Augestad, Bergsgard and Hansen (2006) explain that Olympiatoppen in Norway has been 
termed “DDR-light referring to the centralised and highly scientific and systematic elite sport 
regime of the former German Democratic Republic”. In terms of Norwegian government 
involvement, although it wishes to promote elite sports development, its direct involvement 
is still more limited than that of many other Western countries. Accordingly, Olympiatoppen 
appears to be autonomous despite its close ties with its government.     
 
Local factors in Norway, of course, ensure that it differs from international trends in elite 
sport development systems. First of all, “sport for children is meant to stimulate the child’s 
physical and psychological and social development” (Augestad, Bergsgard & Hansen, 2006: 
306). All children should be included in sporting activities regardless of each one’s level of 
skill and this seems to have resulted from the traditional idea that “children’s sport should 
first and foremost be play-oriented” (2006: 306). Secondly, the Norwegian sporting system 
has such strong democratic tendencies that sports organisations do not exercise power 
over the elite sport development system. Evidence of this situation is given by the fact that, 
according to Augestad, Bergsgard and Hansen (2006: 307), “the use of high altitude 
chambers should be prohibited by the General Assembly of the NIF in 2003”. Consequently, 
such a “self-imposed norm” (2006: 307) could result in Norwegian athletes having less 
chance of winning medals in international sports competitions.  
 
Anheier (2003) suggests that “the non-profit sector have five criteria for the organisations in 
it: at least somewhat institutionalised; separate from government; self-governing; not profit 
distributing; and including voluntary participation” (cited in Leiter, 2005: 4). Furthermore, 
similarities are apparent among non-profit organisations since they are subject to coercive, 
mimetic, and normative isomorphic forces, according to Leiter (2005: 5). Each force is 
explained in the following terms: ‘coercive’ means that the organisation is expected to be 
highly dependent on financial sources; ‘mimetic’ indicates that the non-profit mission is 
often unclear and the methods for its pursuit are unsettled and there is therefore a 
tendency for such organisations to learn by copying structures and approaches from others 
in the same field i.e. sport; and ‘normative’ means that different types of organisation 
provide expert advice and professionally trained managers are on the increase. This is 
particularly the case in governance, where normative recommendation has proliferated in 
recent years.  
3.6 Conclusion 
The systematic review witnesses how the notions of corporate governance that are 
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stemmed from the western business and finance sectors have been applied to sporting 
organisations for more than two decades. Unlike the notions of corporate governance in 
business and finance sectors, ‘equity’ and ‘effectiveness’ are mainly studied in sporting 
organisations, while ‘accountability’, ‘responsibility’, ‘transparency’, ‘democracy’ and 
‘efficiency’ are rarely touched upon. The result of systematic review shows that business 
and sport sectors are likely to have interests towards different key principles. Also, there 
are several journals which focus on reforming the IOC in terms of corporate governance. 
The review will be discussed in comparison with the documents published and released by 
the IOC in the following chapter. Moreover, the review will be the basis of operationalisation 
of seven principles of corporate governance, which transforms invisible notions of corporate 
governance to measurable or visible ways and enables to evaluate corporate governance 
of the KOC. 
 
Systematic review reveals that power relations, government system and organisational 
values and culture are also importantly discussed. However, although ‘national culture’ was 
included as a key word, few materials were found in relation to the key principles of 
corporate governance. As this study aims to identify the ways in which governance 
practices developed by the IOC’s interpretation of corporate and/or good governance in a 
western cultural context, are interpreted and implemented in a non-western cultural context, 
this study deals with national culture developed by Hofstede (1997) in association with 
operationalisations to be provided. The analysis of governance practices in the Korean 
context in Chapter Six and Seven enables discovery of ‘national culture’ of Korea and, 
further, it also discusses a difference between the KOCs case and the Hofstede’s findings, 
if any, in Conclusion. 
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4 Findings of key principles of corporate governance 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the characteristics of the key principles of good/corporate 
governance presented predominantly in the western literature and in the Olympic Movement 
providing a commentary including explanations of the definitions and operationalisations of 
the key principles within the ‘meaning frames’ of the Olympic Movement in a western 
framework. The commentary refers to the key principles of corporate governance in both the 
business and sport sectors on the basis of a literature review and the IOC’s official 
documents. Its aim is to investigate the ways in which these key principles are defined and 
how they are implemented in practice so as to turn the abstract concepts of the principles 
into operational entities. In addition, features of these key principles in the Olympic 
Movement are also identified.  
 
This study analyses the selected IOC main documents in chronological order as follows: a 
Preliminary Document entitled the Basic Universal Principles released on 1 February 2008; 
the documents released at the XIII Olympic Congress Copenhagen 2009 including Congress 
Contributions; the Olympic Movement in Society that was released in Copenhagen on 5 
October, 2009; and the IOC Code of Ethics adopted by the IOC Executive Board on 26 
October 2010 in Acapulco. In addition to these, the Olympic Charter in force as from 11 
February 2010 is discussed below. The features of each document are as follows: 
The Olympic Charter in force as from 11 February 2010 
The Olympic Charter provides broad regulations and recommendations to direct or guide the 
sporting organisations in the Olympic Movement. As the Charter (2010: 9) states:  
 
The Olympic Charter (OC) is the codification of the Fundamental Principles of 
Olympism, Rules and Bye-Laws adopted by the IOC. It governs the organisation, 
action and operation of the Olympic Movement and sets forth the conditions for the 
celebration of the Olympic Games.  
 
The Olympic Charter is regarded as outlining the main directions or directives with which the 
constituents should comply and thus, is intended to function as a set of statutes for the IOC. 
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Preliminary Document: Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and 
Sports Movement (hereinafter BUPs) 
The document (2008: 1) claims that “all members of the Olympic Movement should adopt, as 
their minimum standard, the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic 
Movement, as proposed by the IOC”, which is the Extract of the Olympic and Sport 
Movement Congress Recommendation 41. This is divided into seven categories to promote 
the IOC’s policy on good governance practices in detail.  
The Olympic Movement in Society 
This document was released on 5 October, 2009 on the final day of the XIII Olympic 
Congress.. The document (2009: 12) claims that “the Olympic Movement is founded on the 
concept of autonomy and good governance of sports” and focuses on the understanding of 
the global nature of sport, which constructs the future structure of the Olympic Movement, 
and in turn, leads to “successful development strategies and educational initiatives within its 
core activities” (2009: 12). The selected themes, which are discussed in this study, are as 
follows: ‘the Athlete’, ‘the Olympic Games’, ‘Structure of the Olympic Movement’, ‘Olympism 
and Youth’, and ‘the Digital Revolution’. In particular, theme 3 entitled ‘the Structure of the 
Olympic Movement’ contains a section on ‘Good governance and ethics’ which is a main 
focus of the commentary and operationalisations below.  
The XIII Olympic Congress in Copenhagen 2009 Contributions (hereinafter Copenhagen 
Congress Contributions) 
Along with the Olympic Movement in Society, the XIII Olympic Congress in Copenhagen 
2009 introduced contribution articles, covering a wide range of topics associated with ethics 
of good governance, written by various figures in the Olympic Movement (i.e., Bach and 
Baumann). In comparison with the other IOC official documents analysed above, this paper 
contains a much wider range of ethical principles. In fact, the aspects of equity, effectiveness 
and efficiency are much more prevalent in these papers.  
‘The IOC Code of Ethics adopted by the IOC Executive Board on 26 October 2010 in 
Acapulco’ (hereinafter The IOC Code of Ethics) 
This document contains seven categories of corporate governance, which are: ‘Dignity’; 
‘Integrity’; ‘Good governance and resources’; ‘Candidatures’; ‘Relations with states’; 
‘Confidentiality’; and ‘Implementation’. The IOC Code of Ethics (2010: 1) encourages all 
sporting organisations in the Olympic Movement to “undertake to respect and ensure respect 
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of the present Code”. 
4.2 Commentary and operationalisations on the key principles 
4.2.1 Accountability 
The discussion of accountability in the literature is particularly concerned with ‘high’ officials’ 
behaviour and ethics and thus, within an organisation, a member of the Executive 
Committee should comply with the rules and regulations. With respect to auditing, internal 
auditors should “oversee the firm’s financial and operating procedures, to check the 
accuracy of the financial record-keeping, to implement improvements with internal control, to 
ensure compliance with accounting regulations and to detect fraud” (Kim & Nofsinger, 207: 
27). On the other hand, external auditors are supposed to be independent of the 
organisation that is being audited, as they aim to “review the firm’s financial statements and 
its procedures for producing them” (Kim & Nofsinger, 2007: 28) and to make sure that the 
internal audit has been conducted fairly. Thus, three definitions of accountability are 
identified, namely: (1) ‘a member of the Executive Committee should comply with the 
rules and regulations as well as its stakeholders’ needs’; (2) ‘a group of auditors 
should be independent and scrutinise the behaviour of the Executive Committee’; and 
(3) ‘the organisation should provide accurate financial statements to audit.’ 
Accountability in the Olympic Movement 
The features of some recommendations contained in IOC documents show a mixture of 
accountability and other principles. The Olympic Charter (2010: 66) introduces the 
operationalisation of accountability broadly as below: 
 
Bye-law to Rules 28 and 29,  
1-4. Each NOC shall hold a General Assembly of its members at least once a year, 
in accordance with the NOC’s statutes. NOCs shall, in particular, include on the 
agenda of their General Assemblies the presentation of annual reports and audited 
financial statements and, as the case may be, the election of officers and members 
of the executive body.  
 
In these terms, accountability relates to the need for an organisation to be accountable to its 
stakeholders. The General Assembly should be held at least once a year and the NOC 
should provide all relevant documents to its stakeholders, including annual reports and 
audited financial statements. Releasing annual and financial reports can help to satisfy the 
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requirement for transparency but this study regards both accountability and transparency as 
being closely connected. Opening annual and financial reports to the public can be closely 
regarded as being conducive to transparency, while presenting them to the General 
Assembly can be closely seen to promote accountability.  
  
The Olympic Movement in Society (2009) also contains a mixture of principles. Article 44 
(2009: 15) indicates that the provisions to be made in their statutes would introduce rules 
and regulations with which the Executive Committee should comply and it emphasises the 
importance of holding regular general meetings and democratic elections for the sake of 
accountability. 
 
44. All constituents of the Olympic Movement should further develop and embrace 
democratic and representative structures and procedures, making provisions in their 
statutes for the holding of regular general meetings and democratic elections for 
specified terms of office. 
 
Although Article 44 includes a mixture of two principles, namely accountability and 
democracy, it is more likely to focus on accountability, which requires high-level officers to 
provide written rules and regulations in order to achieve democratic elections for specified 
terms of office. More examples in which the need to comply with the rules and regulations in 
association with democracy is underlined are given in Articles 37 and 38 in the Olympic 
Movement in Society: 
 
37. In accordance with the principles and values of Olympism, the practice of sport 
must be run by independent, autonomous sport organisations, which are in full 
compliance with applicable laws. Co-operation between governments and 
institutions of the Olympic Movement in every area where it may be mutually 
beneficial should underlie the relationship between sport and state bodies, so that 
the autonomy of the Olympic Movement is fully respected by governments (2009: 
13-4) 
 
38. The relationships between the Olympic Movement, public bodies and 
governments, as well as those between all national organisations belonging to the 
Olympic Movement and their respective governments, should be based on the 
principle of respect for applicable law by all constituents of the Olympic Movement, 
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while at the same time seeking to influence public policy makers wherever possible 
to ensure that national and supra-national laws and regulations are consistent with 
the fundamental principles of Olympism. (2009: 14) 
 
While Article 37 underlines the independence of NOCs from their governments, Article 38 
puts more emphasis on the relationship between the NOCs and their governments when it 
enjoins them to follow the applicable law of the Olympic Movement. Accountability in the 
interpretation that is suggested by the Olympic Movement is, thus, likely to focus on the 
compliance with laws, rules and regulations provided by the IOC. Accountability is also 
recommended in Article 42 in the Olympic Movement in Society (2009: 14): 
 
42. All members of the Olympic Movement should keep annual accounts in 
accordance with acknowledged standards of accounting; ensure they have an 
independent audit or verification of their accounts; adopt rules, norms and practices 
under which those who cannot comply with good governance may lose financial 
support or be sanctioned; adopt and implement a code of ethics based on the 
principles and rules of the IOC Code of Ethics; and always seek to protect and 
promote the interests of the athletes they represent.  
 
This Article contains references to various aspects of accountability as described in the 
literature, with four major points being made: compliance with rules and regulations is a pre-
requisite for living up to the IOC’s standards; a general meeting of stakeholders must be held; 
an independent audit must be conducted; and the interests of the stakeholders should be 
promoted and in particular attitudes. More specifically, the role of an independent and 
qualified audit committee inside the organisation is given particular prominence. 
 
The purpose of the BUPs is to provide clearer, more detailed recommendations about what 
good governance is and how to implement it. While BUPs category 2 that puts a greater 
emphasis on the importance of compliance with rules and regulations and attention to 
stakeholders’ needs, category 4 is concerned more specifically with the auditing system of 
the organisation.  
 
Table 4-1 BUPs Category 2 regarding accountability 
2. Structures, Regulations and Democratic Process 
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Theme Elements to be considered 
2.1 Structures  *All sports organisations in the Olympic and Sports Movement 
should be based on the concept of membership within entities 
established in accordance with applicable laws 
*The sports organisations should include as members legal or 
physical persons who constitute the organisation and contribute 
to form the will of the organisation 
*The stakeholders of the organisation encompass all members 
who make up the organisation as well as all external entities 
who are involved and have a link, relation with or interest in the 
organisation 
2.2 Clear regulations *Clear regulations allow understanding, predictability and 
facilitate good governance 
2.4 Representative 
governing bodies 
*Members of the organisation should be represented within the 
governing bodies 
*Special care should be taken for protection and representation 
of minority groups 
2.7 Decision-making *Members shall have the right to vote and be able to exercise 
that right in appropriate form as defined in the regulations of the 
governing body 
*Decision-making bodies should be fully aware of all relevant 
information before taking a decision 
*Bodies of the organisation should meet on a regular basis 
taking into consideration their specific duties and obligations 
(e.g. the holding of an annual General Assembly is 
recommended where possible) 
2.8 Conflicts of 
interests 
*Adequate procedures should be established in order to avoid 
any conflicts of interests 
(The IOC, 2008: 3-4) 
 
Table 4-2 BUPs Category 4 regarding accountability 
4.Accountability, Transparency and Control 
 
Theme Elements to be considered 
4.1 Accountability *All bodies, whether elected or appointed, shall be accountable 
to the members of the organisation and, in certain cases, to their 
stakeholders 
*In particular, the executive body shall be accountable to the 
General Assembly of the organisation 
*Management shall be accountable to the executive body 
*All employees shall be accountable to management 
4.4 Financial matters – 
applicable laws, 
rules, procedures 
and standards 
*For all organisations, annual financial statements are to be 
audited by independent and qualified auditors 
*Accountability and financial reports should be produced on a 
regular basis  
*Accounts should be established in accordance with the 
applicable laws and “True and fair view” principle 
*The application of internationally recognised standards should 
be strongly encouraged in all sports organisations, where 
possible, and required for an international body 
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*Information about remuneration and financial arrangements of 
the governing bodies’ members should be part of the annual 
accounts 
4.5 Internal Control 
system 
*Audit committees should be appointed for large sports 
organisations 
(The IOC, 2008: 7-8) 
 
2.1 and 2.4 state that the organisation should embrace all stakeholders, while 4.1 maintains 
that the organisation should be accountable to its stakeholders, [which is one of the 
operationalisations examined in this study]. On the other hand, 2.2, the first clauses of 2.7 
and 2.8 depend for their implementation on the provision of written documents on 
regulations and adequate procedures. 2.7 indicates that a pre-condition for decision-making 
should be that all relevant information is provided and that meetings are held on a regular 
basis. The clauses in 4.4 and 4.5 clearly state that the organisation should be audited by 
proper independent and qualified auditors on a regular basis and stress the importance of 
appointing an audit committee in sporting organisations. 
 
The IOC Code of Ethics (2010: 2-3) also states: 
 
4. The Olympic parties recognise the significant contribution that broadcasters, 
sponsors, partners and other supporters of sports events make to the development 
and prestige of the Olympic Games throughout the world. However, such support 
must be in a form consistent with the rules of sport and the principles defined in the 
Olympic Charter and the present Code. They must not interfere in the running of 
sports institutions. The organisation and staging of sports competitions are the 
exclusive responsibility of the independent sports organisations recognised by the 
IOC. 
 
Paragraph 4 is mainly concerned with the aspects of responsibility and accountability, in that 
the Olympic parties should take the relationships with their stakeholders into consideration. 
Sporting organisations’ determination to be accountable is also in compliance with the laws 
and rules defined in the Olympic Charter and the present code. The statement that “they 
must not interfere in the running of sports institutions” is linked both to their advocacy of 
democracy and to the pursuit of independent decision-making.  
 
The analysis of the major documents containing the IOC’s recommendations and the 
literature review conducted in this study reveal that two main definitions of ‘accountability’ 
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are clearly specified. The first is that ‘a member of an Executive Committee should comply 
with its rules and regulations as well as its stakeholders’ needs’ and the second determines 
that ‘a group of auditors should be independent and scrutinise the behaviour of the 
Executive Committee and an organisation should provide accurate financial statements to 
audit’. In association with those documents, financial reports should be provided to the audit 
committee on a regular basis. This specifies not only how accountability is to be 
accomplished but also accountability for what, to whom and how this takes place. The case 
of accountability ‘for what’ and ‘how’ are connected with effectiveness and efficiency and, 
thus, these points will be explained in the sections of effectiveness and efficiency. 
 
From this it can also be understood that the purposes for which finance has been used 
should be clearly demonstrated in the accounts and an auditing committee should secure 
the correct usage of finance. These prescriptions are clearly expressed in the IOC Code of 
Ethics (2010: 2) with regard to accountability:   
 
3.1. The income and expenditure of the Olympic parties shall be recorded in   
accounting principles. An independent auditor will check these accounts 
3.2. In cases where the IOC gives financial support to Olympic parties: 
a) the use of these Olympic resources for Olympic purposes must be clearly 
demonstrated in the accounts; 
b) the accounts of the Olympic parties may be subjected to auditing by an expert 
designated by the IOC Executive Board  
 
Therefore, the definitions and operationalisations of accountability in this study can be 
arranged as below: 
 
Table 4-3 Accountability: definitions/interpretations and operationalisations 
Principles Definitions/interpretations Operationalisation 
Accountability 
 
A member of the Executive 
Committee should comply with 
rules and regulations as well as 
its stakeholders’ needs 
 
 
-To whom is the NOC accountable? 
- To what extent are stakeholders 
included in the decision-making?  
- Does the NOC indicate rules and 
regulations that an Executive Committee 
member should comply with? 
- How often is the General Assembly 
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meeting held? 
- Is an annual report open to scrutiny by 
the General Assembly? 
- Is the election of officers & members 
presented to the General Assembly?  
A group of auditors should be 
independent and scrutinise the 
behaviour of the Executive 
Committee 
- Is there an independent audit? how 
often is an audit held? 
- Does the NOC have an effective 
programme for managing the auditing? 
- How often is an audit held? 
An organisation should provide 
accurate financial statements to 
audit. 
-Does the NOC produce and provide 
enough references which encompass all 
of the financial statements? 
4.2.2 Responsibility 
According to the OECD (1999), “the corporate governance structure should specify the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such 
as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spell out the rules and 
procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs” (cited in Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 21). 
Chryssides and Kaler (1996: 82) also state that the issue of corporate governance is centred 
upon “how companies should be governed”, which concerns the mechanisms for allocating 
powers and responsibilities within companies. The Cadbury Report (1992) also proposes 
that, in terms of responsibility, the head of a firm has to ensure a balance of power and 
authority (cited in Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 27). Thus, one definition/interpretation of 
responsibility would be that (1) ‘the Executive Committee should balance diverging 
interests, power and authority.  
 
Moreover, Mellahi and Wood (2003: 26) state that it is the head of the firm’s responsibility to 
safeguard “the strategic guidance of the organisation, and the effective monitoring of 
management by the board” and that the board of directors should “balance diverging 
interests and ensure the long-term viability of the firm” (2003: 21-2). Accordingly, 
responsibility is defined as follows: (2) ‘the Executive Committee should provide the 
strategic guidance of the organisation to ensure the long-term viability of the 
organisation’; and (3) ‘the Executive Committee should provide the effective 
monitoring of management’.  
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Responsibility in the Olympic Movement 
Whereas statements concerning responsibility are hardly present in the Olympic Charter, the 
BUPs’ first category entitled ‘Vision, Mission and Strategy’ is much more likely to be related 
to responsibility. 
 
Table 4-4 BUPs Category 1 regarding responsibility 
1. Vision, Mission and Strategy 
 
Theme Elements to be considered 
1.1 Vision *The vision and overall goals of the organisations have to be 
clearly defined and communicated. 
1.2 Mission *The mission should include 
- Development and promotion of sport through non-profit 
organisations 
- Promotion of the values of sport 
- Organisation of competitions 
- Ensuring a fair sporting contest at all times 
- Protection of the members and particularly the athletes 
- Solidarity 
- Respect for the environment 
1.3 Strategy *The strategy is to be aligned with the vision and regularly 
adapted to the environment 
*The strategy of sporting organisations should be elaborated at 
the highest level of the organisation. 
(The IOC, 2008: 2) 
 
In keeping with the definition given above, that ‘the Executive Committee should provide the 
strategic guidance of the organisation and ensure the long-term viability of the organisation’, 
category 1 of the BUPs suggests that the vision and overall goals should be clearly provided 
in the context of the long term viability of the organisation. This view is also well explained in 
item 2.3 under the category 2 heading ‘Structures, Regulations and Democratic Process’. 
The tasks of the Executive Committee should be defined in the applicable regulations.  
 
Table 4-5 BUPs Category 2 regarding responsibility 
2. Structures, Regulations and Democratic Process 
 
Theme Elements to be considered 
2.3 Governing bodies *The tasks and responsibilities of the governing bodies should 
be clearly defined in the applicable regulations and should be 
adapted and reviewed as necessary 
*Governing bodies should be entitled to create standing or ad 
hoc committees with specific responsibilities, in order to help 
them in their tasks 
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2.6 Attributions of the 
respective bodies 
*A clear allocation of responsibilities between the different 
bodies such as general assembly, executive body, committees 
or disciplinary bodies, should be determined 
*There should be a balance of power between the bodies 
responsible for the management, supervision and control of the 
sports organisations 
*Principle of checks and balances 
2.7 Decision-making *All members of the sports organisations shall have the right to 
express their opinion on the issues on the agenda through 
appropriate channels 
2.8 Conflicts of 
interests 
*No-one with a personal or business interest in the issue under 
discussion should be involved in the decision 
(The IOC, 2008: 3-4) 
 
In particular, 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 related to the definition of responsibility whereby ‘the Executive 
Committee should balance diverging interests, power and authority’. More specifically, 2.7 
regarding ‘Decision-making’ advises that all members of sports organisations should have 
opportunities to express their opinions. The process of decision-making, thus, enables us to 
understand the method by which divergent power, interests and authority may be balanced. 
3.2 below also pertains to responsibility in that it says that adequate rules need to be 
monitored at the highest level. It is thus related to the third definition of responsibility given 
above according to which ‘the Executive Committee should provide the effective monitoring 
of management’, and is also coherent with the clause stating that ‘the processes of decision 
making should be open to scrutiny in order to avoid the imbalanced exercise of power’. As 
one of important roles of the Executive Committee’s important functions is to be in charge of 
the effective monitoring of management, the BUPs encourage the Executive Committee to 
perform a proper financial monitoring role as stated in 3.2.  
 
Table 4-6 BUPs Category 3 regarding responsibility 
3. Highest Level of Competence, Integrity and Ethical Standards 
 
Theme Elements to be considered 
3.2 Power of signature *Good governance implies proper financial monitoring 
*In order to avoid any abuse of powers of representation (in 
particular signing), adequate rules should be set up, approved 
and monitored at the highest level 
*Precise, clear and transparent regulations should be established 
and applied, and effective controlling systems and checks and 
balances should be put in place 
3.6 Code of Ethics and 
ethical issues 
*Develop, adapt and implement ethical principles and rules 
*Ethical rules should refer to and be inspired by the IOC Code of 
Ethics 
*Monitor the implementation of ethical principles and rules 
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(The IOC, 2008: 5-6) 
 
In addition, 3.6 suggests that the Executive Committee should also perform the effective 
monitoring of management based on an ethical code of conduct. In order to achieve this, 4.2 
and 4.4 mainly point out that ‘clear adequate rules and regulations should be established 
and applied’. 
  
Table 4-7 BUPs Category 4 regarding responsibility 
4. Accountability, Transparency and Control  
 
Theme Elements to be considered 
4.2 Processes and 
mechanisms 
*Adequate standards and processes for accountability should be 
in place and available to all organisations, and consistently 
applied and monitored 
* Clear and measurable objectives and targets must be set for 
the organisation, its boards, management and staff, including 
also appropriate tools for assessment 
4.4 Financial matters – 
applicable laws, 
rules, procedures 
and standards 
*Clear rules regarding remuneration of the members of governing 
bodies and managers should be enforced 
*Remuneration procedures should be transparent and 
predictable 
4.5 Internal Control 
system 
 
*Internal control of the financial processes and operations should 
be established within the sports organisations 
*The adoption of a compliance system, document retention 
system and information security system should be encouraged 
*The structure of the internal control system should depend on 
the size and importance of the organisation 
(The IOC, 2008: 7-8) 
 
In the Olympic Movement in Society, it can be observed that several clauses encourage the 
Olympic Movement to adopt the BUPs as their minimum standard for achieving the 
legitimacy and autonomy of the Olympic Movement, which depends on the fulfilment of the 
highest standards of ethical behaviour and good governance. The IOC seeks to lay down 
clear, adequate rules and regulations including a code of conduct in which significant 
indications are given of ways to achieve responsibility. In particular, clause 41 (2009: 14) 
states that the BUPs can be a good source of rules and regulations that have been framed 
and recommended by the IOC in order to promote greater responsibility.  
  
41. The legitimacy and autonomy of the Olympic Movement depends on upholding 
the highest standards of ethical behaviour and good governance. All members of the 
Olympic Movement should adopt, as their minimum standard, the Basic Universal 
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Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic Movement, as proposed by the IOC. 
All members of the Olympic Movement must always demonstrate integrity, 
accountability and transparency, as well as the highest level of management skills; 
and they must ensure that at all times their legal status is both fully consistent with 
their activities and responsibilities and wholly compliant with the laws of the land 
(applicable laws).  
 
In summary, responsibility can be defined and operationalised as below:  
 
Table 4-8 Responsibility: definitions/interpretations and operationalisations 
Principle Definitions/Interpretations Operationalisations 
Responsibility 
 
 
 
 
 
The Executive Committee 
members should also balance 
diverging interests, power and 
authority.  
-Does the organisation justify its 
behaviours/actions by reference to 
ensuring an appropriate balance of 
power? 
 
The Executive Committee should 
provide the strategic guidance of 
the organisation to ensure the 
long-term viability of the 
organisation. 
- Does the Executive Committee clearly 
provide the vision and overall goals in 
the context of the long term viability of 
the organisation? 
The Executive Committee should 
provide the effective monitoring of 
management.  
- Does it establish and evaluate the 
execution of clear, adequate rules and 
regulations by which management 
should conduct its activities? 
- Does it monitor a code of conduct and 
finance within the organisation?  
4.2.3 Transparency 
Reporting procedures are key to any claims of transparency. The Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) Corporate Governance Council (CGC) (2003) points out that “organisations should 
develop written policies and procedures that promote the timely and balanced disclosure of 
all material matters that concern them” (cited in Dellaportas et al., 2005: 125). In addition, 
Oliver (2004) states that transparency places power in the hands of the stakeholders in that 
the information required should be made available to them. Accordingly, transparency may 
be defined as the product of those actions, i.e. (1) ‘organisations should develop and 
provide written policies and procedures that promote the timely and balanced 
disclosure of all material matters that concern them.’ This includes not only what should 
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be done (written policies and procedures) but also what may been done (reporting of 
performance). 
 
Kitson and Campbell (1996) claim that large companies emphasise the need for openness in 
decision-making and for a clear demonstration that the company is being governed in 
accordance with perceived business virtues. Consequently, the second step towards 
achieving transparency would involve the stakeholders, i.e. (2) ‘organisations should open 
the process of decision making to all stakeholders’. 
Transparency in the Olympic Movement 
As the Olympic Charter (2010: 66) indicates below:  
 
Bye-law to Rules 28 and 29 of the Olympic Charter,  
1-4. Each NOC shall hold a General Assembly of its members at least once a year, 
in accordance with the NOC’s statutes. NOCs shall, in particular, include on the 
agenda of their General Assemblies the presentation of annual reports and audited 
financial statements and, as the case may be, the election of officers and members 
of the executive body.  
 
In relation to accountability, NOCs should hold a General Assembly at least once a year to 
give an opportunity for their stakeholders to listen to the presentation of annual reports and 
audited financial statements, an action which is clearly recommended by the IOC in order to 
secure transparency in the Olympic Movement. Thus, at this point transparency can be said 
to overlap with accountability. The disclosure of annual reports and audited financial 
statements to the stakeholder can be regarded as being essential both for accountability and 
transparency, while the public may perceive it mainly as an aid to transparency. The BUPs 
also recommend that the financial information should be made public. 
 
Table 4-9 BUPs Category 4 regarding transparency 
4.Accountability, Transparency and Control 
 
Theme Elements to be considered 
4.3 Transparency and 
communication 
*Financial information should be disclosed gradually and in 
appropriate form to members, stakeholders and the public 
*Disclosure of financial information should be done on an annual 
basis 
*The financial statements of sports organisations should be 
presented in a consistent way in order to be easily understood 
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(The IOC, 2008: 7) 
 
This view leads to operationalisation in terms of ‘whether or not a financial report is open to 
the public/stakeholders’, as the IOC also gives importance to the disclosure of financial 
information on the basis of 4.3. Moreover, the BUPs suggest that regulations should be 
transparent and published openly. 
 
Table 4-10 BUPS Category 2 regarding transparency 
2. Structures, Regulations and Democratic Process 
 
Theme Elements to be considered 
2.2 Clear regulations *All regulations of each organisation and governing body, 
including but not limited to, statues/constitutions and other 
procedural regulations, should be clear, transparent, disclosed, 
publicised and made readily available 
*The procedure to modify or amend the regulations should also 
be clear and transparent 
(The IOC, 2008: 3) 
 
Table 4-11 BUPs Category 2 regarding transparency 
2.Structures, Regulations and Democratic Process 
 
Theme Elements to be considered 
2.6 Attributions of the 
respective bodies 
*A clear allocation of responsibilities between the different 
bodies such as general assembly, executive body, committees 
or disciplinary bodies, should be determined 
*There should be a balance of power between the bodies 
responsible for the management, supervision and control of the 
sports organisations 
*Principle of checks and balances 
2.7 Decision-making *All members of the sports organisations shall have the right to 
express their opinion on the issues on the agenda through 
appropriate channels 
(The IOC, 2008: 4) 
 
Moreover, the transparency mentioned in the Olympic Movement in Society (2009: 15) can 
be discussed as a part of the transparent regulations.  
 
43. Transparent and enhanced dispute resolution mechanisms must be in place in 
all sports organisations, at all levels. All disputes which cannot be settled amicably 
or through local arbitration or mediation should be submitted to the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (CAS). While fully respecting the sovereignty and independence 
 96 
 
of the CAS, the constituents of the Olympic Movement may submit to the CAS 
proposals or contributions so that litigation may be simplified, accelerated and legal 
costs reduced. 
 
The category entitled ‘Confidentiality’ in the IOC Code of Ethics (2010: 3) also mainly 
discusses the aspect of transparency. At the same time, it also takes confidentiality into 
account in connection with transparency for the protection of information shared 
confidentially. This may cause a difficulty if information is provided as confidential but which 
is clearly against the interests of the spirit of Olympic. 
 
The Olympic parties shall not disclose information entrusted to them in confidence. 
The principle of confidentiality shall be strictly respected by the IOC Ethics 
Commission in all its activities. Disclosure of other information shall not be for 
personal gain or benefit, nor be undertaken maliciously to damage the reputation of 
any person or organisation. 
 
In connection with responsibility, as discussed earlier, ‘the Executive Committee should 
balance diverging interests, power and authority with individuals’ unfettered power of 
decision-making’, 2.6 and 2.7 of the BUPs above, in particular, are closely related to 
responsibility. In specific, 2.7 regarding ‘decision-making’ declares that all members of sports 
organisations should have an opportunity to express their opinion. This element can be 
explained in accordance with the second definition of transparency, which is that, in order to 
be transparent, ‘an organisation should open the process of decision-making to all 
stakeholders’. One of the ways, therefore, in which operationalisation can occur is to put into 
action the statement that ‘the process of decision-making should be opened’, as the extent 
to which transparency has truly been attained can be monitored when the question as to 
whether or not all members have been involved in decision-making is answered. The 
process of decision-making enables us to understand the degree in which power, interests 
and authority can be said to be in balance. Moreover, the BUPs 3.2 below is a mixture of 
several principles, for instance, accountability, responsibility and transparency. 3.2 states 
that adequate rules need to be monitored by means of effective controlling systems at the 
highest level, which is also related to the proposal that ‘the process of decision-making 
should be opened or monitored’ in order to avoid the imbalanced exercise of power. 
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Table 4-12 BUPs Category 3 regarding transparency 
3. Highest Level of Competence, Integrity and Ethical Standards 
 
Theme Elements to be considered 
3.2 Power of signature *Good governance implies proper financial monitoring 
*In order to avoid any abuse of powers of representation (in 
particular signing), adequate rules should be set up, approved 
and monitored at the highest level 
*Precise, clear and transparent regulations should be established 
and applied, and effective controlling systems and checks and 
balances should be put in place 
(The IOC, 2008: 5) 
 
Therefore, definitions and operationalisations regarding transparency are as below: 
 
Table 4-13 Transparency: definitions/interpretations and operationalisations 
Principles Definitions/interpretations Operationalisations 
Transparency 
 
Organisations should develop and 
provide written policies and 
procedures that promote the timely 
and balanced disclosure of all 
material matters that concern them. 
- Is an organisational progress report 
annually released? 
  (If not, how often is it released?) 
- Are there clear rules and procedures 
on how to get ‘material matters’ which 
are of concern on to the organisation’s 
agenda? 
- Is any information including all 
regulations required open to the 
public/stakeholders? 
- Is a financial report open to the public/ 
stakeholders? 
Organisations should open the 
process of decision making to all 
stakeholder 
- Is the process of decision making 
open or monitored? 
  (If so, by whom and for what 
purposes?) 
4.2.4 Democracy 
Pluralism emphasises the importance of diversity in pursuit of more than one source of 
authority in political, institutional and social practices. With a representative government, 
“institutional checks and balances” are necessary in association with “the vertical separation 
of the powers of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, and the horizontal division of 
sovereignty through federalism, and provisions for the exercise of vetoes” (Dunleavy & 
O’Leary, 1987: 14). Pluralism is exemplified in a social context when various social groups in 
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different areas are included as “non-institutional checks and balances” (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 
1987: 14-15). It is characteristic of the citizens in a polyarchic culture that they try to take 
part in decisions affecting them and are willing to examine their governments. Elections are 
one of the major ways of participating in policy making and, thus, pluralists agree with the 
view that political competition and elections are important factors in polyarchies. Thus, a first 
definition of democracy is driven by the pluralist’s perspective, according to which (1) ‘a 
democratic system should be maintaining checks and balances by means of elections 
of high officials.’ 
 
In addition, a range of political elites are externally controlled by business and social elites, 
which allows diverse elite interests to be integrated. Therefore, “in Western Europe sub-
national governments are tied to national elites by networks of patronage, clientelism, and 
control over public expenditure” (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 179). Since centralisation and 
bureaucratisation are deemed to be inevitable and desirable features of the modern state, 
democratic elitists emphasise the correlation of centralised resource distribution and policy 
control with the continuing role of policy implementation performed by sub-national 
governments. In contrast, modern organisation theory focuses on the decentralisation of 
policy implementation into sub-organisations, which enables those sub-organisations to 
employ their own operating procedures and problem solving methods. Thus, another 
definition is that (2) ‘high officials in the organisation including President and Executive 
Committee members should maintain their independence from internal/external 
interests within the organisation’. This can be operationalised to identify whether or not 
the General Assembly elects Executive Committee members and the President and if there 
is an auditing system to ensure that independent judgement is guaranteed. In this latter 
respect there is an overlap with accountability and responsibility.  
 
Considering democracy, the second definition is based on Hindley (2002: 21), who says that 
“in common with democracy, good governance promotes the decentralisation of decision-
making, implementation and monitoring.” This may not be a ‘requirement’ of democracy, 
however, since we can still vote for centralised systems. All pluralists regard decentralisation 
as the best form of governance in all cases, as decentralisation is believed to preserve 
democracy against the emergence of democratic tyranny. In contrast, although a 
decentralised system may exist, elitists are more concerned that the real power should be 
concentrated in the hands of a small number of political leaders and radical elites advocate 
the “de facto centralisation of ‘real’ decision-making power in the hands of a core executive”, 
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a situation which is associated with power elites (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 166). The 
definition of democracy is thus based on the principle that (3) ‘no matter what structure the 
NOC follows, either centralisation or decentralisation, it should be actually 
decentralised in decision-making.’ 
Democracy in the Olympic Movement 
In general, the Olympic Charter (2010: 62) emphasises the importance of the NOCs’ 
autonomy in the interests of achieving harmonious relations and cooperation with their 
governments and it makes the following recommendation: 
 
Rules 28-5. In order to fulfil their mission, the NOCs may cooperate with 
governmental bodies, with which they shall achieve harmonious relations.  
However, they shall not associate themselves with any activity which would be in 
contradiction with the Olympic Charter. The NOCs may also cooperate with non-
governmental bodies.  
 
This is also clearly notified in the BUPs and in the IOC Code of Ethics. The relevant BUPs 
(2008: 12) are quoted below: 
 
Table 4-14 BUPs Category 7 regarding democracy 
7. Harmonious Relations with Governments while Preserving Autonomy 
 
Theme Elements to be considered 
7.1 Cooperation, 
coordination and 
consultation 
*Sporting organisations should coordinate their actions with 
governments 
*Cooperation with governments is an essential element in the 
framework of sporting activities 
*Cooperation, coordination and consultation are the best way for 
sporting organisations to preserve their autonomy 
7.3 Maintain and 
preserve the 
autonomy of sport 
*The right balance between governments, the Olympic 
Movement and sporting organisations should be ensured 
(The IOC, 2008: 12) 
 
The theme regarding ‘Relations with States’ in the IOC Code of Ethics (2010: 3) also states 
that:  
 
1.The Olympic parties shall work to maintain harmonious relations with state 
authorities, in accordance with the principle of universality and political neutrality of 
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the Olympic Movement.  
 
2.The Olympic parties are free to play a role in the public life of the states to which 
they belong. They may not, however, engage in any activity or follow any ideology 
inconsistent with the principles and rules defined in the Olympic Charter and set out 
in the present Code. 
 
The IOC encourages the NOCs to maintain their independent status in relationship with the 
government in keeping with the principle of universality and political neutrality of the Olympic 
Movement, as stated in the second article of the theme ‘Relations with States’. This spirit in 
the Olympic Movement is closely related to the definition of the NOC’s autonomy, under 
which ‘high officials in NOCs should be independent of its higher level organisation’. In this 
way the IOC still places an emphasis on the need for compliance with the applicable laws in 
the Olympic Movement, which implies that sporting organisations should safeguard their 
independence.  
 
In broader terms, it is not only the government but also various stakeholders with which the 
NOCs are urged to uphold harmonious relationships. The Olympic Charter (2010: 62) states 
it thus: 
 
Rules 28-6. The NOCs must preserve their autonomy and resist all pressures of any 
kind, including but not limited to political, legal, religious or economic pressures 
which may prevent them from complying with the Olympic Charter.  
 
This message is also clearly delivered in the wording of the other written documents 
released by the IOC, such as the IOC Code of Ethics (2010: 2-3) below:  
 
4. The Olympic parties recognise the significant contribution that broadcasters, 
sponsors, partners and other supporters of sports events make to the development 
and prestige of the Olympic Games throughout the world. However, such support 
must be in a form consistent with the rules of sport and the principles defined in the 
Olympic Charter and the present Code. They must not interfere in the running of 
sports institutions. The organisation and staging of sports competitions are the 
exclusive responsibility of the independent sports organisations recognised by the 
IOC. 
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Article 4 mainly refers to the aspect of compliance with rules and regulations and a balanced 
relationship with various stakeholders. This implies that the Olympic parties should take the 
relationships with its stakeholders into consideration to maintain their harmonious 
cooperation. However, the precautionary statement that ‘they must not interfere in the 
running of sports institutions’ is more likely to be linked with its dedication to democracy than 
the pursuit of independent decision-making. Article 37, which highlights the autonomy of 
NOCs as proposed in the Olympic Movement in Society (2009: 13-4) also takes account of 
both issues: 
 
37. In accordance with the principles and values of Olympism, the practice of sport 
must be run by independent, autonomous sport organisations, which are in full 
compliance with applicable laws. Co-operation between governments and 
institutions of the Olympic Movement in every area where it may be mutually 
beneficial should underlie the relationship between sport and state bodies, so that 
the autonomy of the Olympic Movement is fully respected by governments. 
 
Article 37 underlines the independence of NOCs from their governments, while emphasising 
the need for the relationship between the NOCs and their government to conform to the 
applicable law of the Olympic Movement. In association with these issues so far, two 
operationalisations of democracy are considered: ‘What kind of system exists for elections to 
the Executive Committee and the Presidency?’; and ‘who nominates candidates for the 
Presidency and the Executive Committee?’. The IOC recommends that the electoral system 
should be established in order to maintain checks and balances. The Olympic Charter (2010: 
65) clearly declares that the government’s direct involvement in the selection of NOC 
officials should be avoided and that an independent electoral system is preferable.    
 
Rules 29-4. Governments or other public authorities shall not designate any 
members of an NOC. However, an NOC may decide, at its discretion, to elect as 
members representatives of such authorities. 
 
In accordance with Rules 29-4, the Bye-law to Rules 28 and 29 in the Olympic Charter (2010: 
66) also mention the election system. 
 
1-4. Each NOC shall hold a General Assembly of its members at least once a year, 
in accordance with the NOC’s statutes. NOCs shall, in particular, include on the 
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agenda of their General Assemblies the presentation of annual reports and audited 
financial statements and, as the case may be, the election of officers and members 
of the executive body.  
 
1-5. The officers and members of the executive body of an NOC shall be elected in 
accordance with the NOC’s statutes, for a term of office not exceeding four years; 
they may be eligible for re-election.  
 
The definitions of democracy, which are that ‘the NOCs should maintain checks and 
balances in their procedures for the election of high officials’ and ‘high officials in the 
organisation including President and Executive Committee members should keep its 
autonomy from its higher organisations through electoral procedures’ coheres with these 
IOC recommendations. More specifically, the IOC suggests that clear rules and regulations 
on electoral system should be established in the NOC’s Statutes through the BUPs (2008: 3-
4), which can be one of the operationalisations, to meet the requirement for the NOC to, 
‘provide clear criteria on the electoral system?’ 
 
Table 4-15 BUPs Category 2 regarding democracy 
2.Structures, Regulations and Democratic Process 
 
Theme Elements to be considered 
2.3 Governing bodies *The organisation should set out and adopt reliable and 
appropriate criteria for the election or appointment of members of 
the governing bodies so as to ensure a high level of competence, 
quality and good governance  
2.5 Democratic 
processes 
Democratic processes, such as elections, should be governed by 
clear, transparent and fair rules 
2.8 Conflicts of 
interests 
*As a general principle, members of any decision-making body 
should be independent in their decisions 
2.9 Election or renewal 
of office-bearers on 
a regular 
Basis 
*The duration of the terms of office should be pre-determined in 
order to allow election / renewal of office-bearers on a regular 
basis (e.g. every four years) 
*Access for new candidates should be encouraged 
(The IOC, 2008: 3-4) 
 
The category 2 clearly states that the NOC should have regulations or rules for its elections 
in order to practise democratic processes. The Olympic Movement in Society (2009: 15) also 
states this point of view, as below: 
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44. All constituents of the Olympic Movement should further develop and embrace 
democratic and representative structures and procedures, making provisions in their 
statutes for the holding of regular general meetings and democratic elections for 
specified terms of office. 
 
To judge from the analysis of the documents released by the IOC, none of the written 
statements pronounces on the need for decentralisation in decision-making. It seems that 
the concept of democracy in terms of decision making at managerial and departmental 
levels has not been directly raised in the Olympic Movement. The IOC’s recommendations 
are, thus, mostly concerned with the aspect of democracy in terms of its relationship with 
other stakeholders, in particular, the government. As a result, democracy is defined and 
operationalised as below: 
 
Table 4-16 Democracy: definitions/interpretations and operationalisations 
Principle Definitions/interpretations Operationalisatoins 
Democracy 
 
 
 
It should be maintaining checks 
and balances by means of 
elections of high officials. 
High officials in the organisation 
including President and 
Executive Committee members 
should maintain their 
independence from 
internal/external interests within 
the organisation. 
- What kind of system exists for elections to 
the Executive Committee and the 
Presidency? 
  (If not, who nominates candidates for the 
Presidency and the Executive Committee?) 
-Does NOC provide clear criteria on the 
electoral system? 
- Are high officials in NOCs independent from 
internal/external interests? 
No matter what structure the 
NOC follows, either 
centralisation or 
decentralisation, it should be 
actually decentralised in 
decision making. 
- Is power in decision-making decentralised 
or centralised at a managerial level, i.e. an 
Executive Committee? 
- To what extent are all members of each 
department able to be involved in decision-
making process? 
- Are all departments independent in 
decision-making? 
4.2.5 Equity 
Societal symbols and languages through interactions are thought to be reproduced in social 
ideologies such as sporting ideologies, where a gender stereotype is an example. Issues of 
power relations are also deeply related with social interactions and social relations (Sartore 
& Cunningham, 2007: 246; see also Pastore, Inglis & Danylchuk, 1996; Ridgeway & Smith-
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Lovin, 1999), associated with which are the terms ‘meanings’ and ‘practices’. Through the 
process of interaction, ‘meanings’ or ‘common sense’ perceptions (Knoppers & Anthonissen, 
2005) are created and, in consequence, the minority or subordinate groups continue to be 
marginalised. Therefore, ‘meanings’ are produced in ‘the ways in which dominant groups 
produce common understandings through the processes and patterns of interactions’. 
Furthermore, Claringbould and Knoppers (2007; 2008) also believe that ‘meanings’ shape 
the behaviour of the members of an organisation and their expectations of the behaviour of 
others, in accordance with the argument proposed by Kanter (1977) that “gender ratio or 
composition of group is a structural determinant of (gendered) organisational behaviour, in 
particular, in male-dominated contexts” (Claringbould & Knoppers, 2008). Following Hoeber 
(2007: 271-2), evidence of ‘meanings’ can be found when the existence of gender 
inequalities is denied or a justification is given for them. i.e. the denial of gender inequalities 
may be expressed by claiming that there has been a gradual improvement or that gender 
inequity is not a problem i.e. the presence of gender inequalities may be justified by saying 
that these are inconsequential; or that other organisational values are more important. 
Alternatively, people may exonerate themselves by saying that such inequalities are ‘not 
their responsibility’ and they may be accepted and normalised as being ‘just the way things 
are’.  
 
Additionally, Knoppers and Anthonissen (2005:123) point out that most senior managers who 
hold a great deal of power of over decision-making can make a considerable impact on 
organisational culture through their practices and discourses, which reflect societal 
discourses. Thus, ‘practices’ are understood through ‘obtaining insight into the ways in 
which members of dominant and subordinate groups negotiate meanings when a 
member of the subordinate group attempts to enter the dominant group’. Accordingly, 
this study attempts to identify how dominant groups produce ‘meanings’ and how ‘meanings’ 
shape the behaviour of their members and subsequently how such ‘meanings’ capture or 
define governance practices. In the context of gender equity, it aims to understanding how 
an organisation makes sense of the organisation’s gender composition and how that is 
reflected in the ways of practices of gender policy (Claringbould & Knoppers, 2007).  
 
Moreover, with regard to a wide range of equity issues, Long, Robinson and Spracklen (2005: 
48) also argue that dealing with complaints about discrimination and harassment is an 
important part of any policy implementation (instituting formal written complaints and 
disciplinary procedure). Accordingly, this study takes account of this point of view as 
 105 
 
representing another definition of equity, namely that ‘a sports organisation should 
establish a channel of policy implementation to deal with complaints about 
discrimination and harassment’. Its operationalisation is apparent in the ways in which 
sports organisations deal with discriminatory complaints and harassment. 
Gender equity 
In terms of gender equity, the IOC has traditionally shown a tendency to be male-dominated 
in its decision making and in its participation in the Olympic Games. Nevertheless, the IOC 
has expressed its concern about the low female involvement in decision-making structures in 
sports organisations and has strongly urged each country to live up to the IOC’s 
requirements and “ensure that the benefits of wider involvement in decision making by 
women are realised” (Women 2004: 4 cited in Claringbould & Knoppers, 2008: 81). The IOC 
itself also fixed the number of members at a maximum of 115 and set a target of minimum 
20% female participation in all the decision-making structures of the Olympic Movement 
(Chappelet, 2006: 8) and additionally, “as of June 2012, 20 women are active IOC members 
out of 106 (more than 18.8%)” (The IOC, 2012: 2). It is obvious that gender equality within 
the Olympic Movement should receive serious attention. Thus, with reference to IOC policy, 
this study indicates that, if the NOC fulfils the policy of the IOC, ‘female involvement in 
decision making should reach a minimum of 20 per cent’. Equality in this study also 
relates to the percentage of female employees at a working level.  
Disability equity 
All organisational bodies should demonstrate their determination to integrate individual 
workers with disabilities and this should be realised in an efficient way by establishing 
appropriate legislation, rules, and finance (Sørensen & Kahrs, 2006:186). Consequently, 
disability equity may be promoted by pursuing the ideal that ‘organisations should 
demonstrate their integration of individual workers with a disability through 
legislation, rules and finance.’ Moreover, Hums, Moorman and Wolff (2003: 262), who 
have studied the integration process among disability and able-bodied sports organisations 
in the USA, conclude that, although the USOC and NGBs appear to espouse the integration 
process, DSOs (Disabled Sports Organisation) are unfortunately excluded from participation 
in the decision-making process and from occupying positions of power. The percentage of 
individuals with disabilities who take part in decision making should be taken into account. 
Thus, another definition of equity is that ‘people with impairments should also be 
involved in decision making’. 
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Ethnicity equity 
Long, Robinson and Spracklen (2005) report on the achievement of racial equity following its 
the promotion among the sports governing bodies and national sporting organisations in the 
UK. Since the establishment of Sport for All in the early 1970s, the issue of racial equity has 
emerged. In keeping with the traditional structures and culture of sport in the UK, most 
organisations are small-scale with limited resources and tend to rely significantly on a 
volunteer workforce. With respect to the sporting culture in the UK, according to Spracklen 
(1996), racist hegemony has led to the stereotyping of certain racial qualities and this, in turn, 
has resulted in the under-representation and lack of involvement of ethnic minority members 
in positions of power (Long, Robinson and Spracklen, 2005). On the basis of these studies, 
therefore, ethnicity equity is defined as the situation where ‘irrespective of the ethnicity, 
anyone capable should be involved at the working and managerial levels’. 
Fair allocation of resources and opportunities  
Following the definition given by CAAWS,3 gender equity may be defined as “the principle 
and practice of fair allocation of resources, programs and decision-making to both women 
and men, and includes the redressing of identified imbalances in the benefits available” 
(Kent & Robertson, 1995: 43 cited in Hoeber, 2007: 266). This study defines equity in terms 
of resource allocation with relation to the ‘fair allocation of resources and opportunities 
in terms of the size of organisation, and high- or low- profile athletes or NFs’.  
Equity in the Olympic Movement 
In the Olympic Movement, there is a tendency for the aspect of equity and/or equality to be 
treated in terms of the sense of ‘human dignity’. Article 30 in the Olympic Movement in 
Society (2009: 12-3) deals with the preservation of human dignity by means of the 
harmonious development of men and women, which can be interpreted as being the 
embodiment of equity.   
 
30. The preservation of human dignity is a fundamental tenet of the Olympic 
Movement. All members of the Olympic Movement should work together in pursuit 
of the harmonious development of men and women in order to promote through 
sport a peaceful society based on the most fundamental common principles and 
values inherent in a civilised society. 
 
                                               
3 CAAWS: the Canadian Association for the Advancement of Women and Sport and Physical Activity 
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The IOC Code of Ethics (2010: 1) also alludes to equity under the category of ‘Dignity’. In 
particular, it states that there should be no discrimination in terms of covering various 
aspects of equity.  
 
2. There shall be no discrimination between the participants on the basis of race, 
gender, ethnic origin, religion, philosophical or political opinion, marital status or 
other grounds.   
 
Nevertheless, it excludes the aspect of equity regarding people with disabilities, whereas the 
definition of equity discussed in the literature considers the aspects of gender, race and 
disability.  
 
This study has distinguished between the concepts of equity and equality, as discussed 
earlier (see Chapter 2). These two notions, however, are unlikely to be clearly defined in the 
documents released by the Olympic Movement. Article 29 in the Olympic Movement in 
Society (2009: 12) uses the term ‘equality’. It emphasises the need for the autonomy of 
sports organisations to be protected from the encroachments of any relevant 
intergovernmental or governmental organisations. It is suggested that equality should be 
respected along with ‘fairness’ in sport and sports administration.  
 
29. The relevant intergovernmental organisations and governments should 
acknowledge the necessary and essential autonomy of the Olympic Movement 
including, in particular, respect for and enforcement of the rules of good governance, 
equality and fairness in sport and sport administration, as established by the 
Olympic Movement and set out in the Olympic Charter, to ensure the best and 
fairest possible practice of sport.  
 
The concept of ‘fairness’ may be interpreted as pertaining to the fair allocation of resources 
or opportunities, which is consistent with the element of equity as recommended in the BUPs 
(2008: 9) where equity is mainly discussed in terms of the distribution of resources, as listed 
in 5.1 and 5.2. Gender equity can be identified by looking at types of task which female 
employees are confined to and thus, it focuses on how the gender equity is operationalised 
in terms of giving equal opportunities and treatment. The other concept of ‘fairness’ of 
resources is included in the elements of equity. The second element in 5.2 is not expressed 
clearly but is implicit in the general suggestion that ‘equity in sport should be reinforced’.  
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Table 4-17 BUPs Category 5 regarding equity 
5. Solidarity and Development 
 
Theme Elements to be considered 
5.1 Distribution of 
resources 
*As a principle, financial resources which are proceeds of sport 
should be allocated to sport and in particular to its development 
after covering all necessary sports-related costs 
*Financial revenues should be distributed in a fair and efficient 
manner 
*A fair distribution of the financial revenues contributes to having 
balanced and attractive competitions 
*A clear and transparent policy for the allocation of the financial 
revenues is essential 
5.2 Equity 
 
*Resources should be distributed equitably 
*The equity in sport should be reinforced 
*The right to participate in competitions should be encouraged 
and secured for those at an appropriate level for the athletes 
concerned 
*The opportunity to organise large sports events should be open 
*The criteria for choosing venues for events should be fair and 
transparent 
(The IOC, 2008: 9) 
 
The BUPs 2.4 gives a more general view on equity at a decision-making level. 
 
Table 4-18 BUPs Category 2 regarding equity 
2. Structures, Regulations and Democratic Process 
 
Theme Elements to be considered 
2.4 Representative 
governing bodies 
*Special care should be taken for protection and representation 
of minority groups 
(The IOC, 2008: 3) 
 
In summary, the definitions and operationalisions of equity can be arranged as below: 
 
Table 4-19 Equity: definitions/interpretations and operationalisations 
Principle Definitions/interpretations Operationalisations 
Equity 
 
 
 
In general 
Meanings are produced in the ways in 
which dominant groups produce 
common understandings through the 
processes and patterns of interactions. 
Practices are understood through 
 
-Is there any evidence in the ‘meanings’ 
showing how, in particular, high officials 
make sense of equity? 
 
-Is there any evidence of the 
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Equity 
(continued) 
  
obtaining insight into the ways in 
which members of dominant and 
subordinate groups negotiate 
meanings when a member of the 
subordinate group attempts to enter 
the dominant group. 
Sports organisations should establish 
a channel of policy implementation to 
deal with complaints about 
discrimination and harassment. 
‘practices’? 
 
 
 
-Is there a written policy (laws and 
rules) on gender, disability, ethnicity, 
and resource allocations? (in general) 
-Is there a team or a monitoring system 
handling such matters? 
Gender 
Female involvement in decision 
making should reach a minimum of 20 
per cent at both the managerial and 
non-managerial levels.  
 
 
-What percentage of women is involved 
in decision making? 
-What is the ratio of females at the non-
managerial level?  
-May male and female staff members 
benefit from the same treatment, 
salaries and access to the higher 
positions?  
Disability 
People with impairments should also 
be involved in decision making 
Organisations should demonstrate the 
integration of individual workers with 
disabilities through legislation, rules, 
and finance. 
 
-What percentage of people with 
disabilities take part as members of the 
decision-making bodies and in the non-
decision making positions? 
-Does the NOC provide relevant rules 
and legislation on disability and 
disability sport? 
-Does the NOC provide a better 
working environment for staff members 
with disabilities? 
Ethnicity 
Irrespective of the ethnicity, anyone 
capable should be involved at the 
working and managerial levels 
 
-What percentage of people in different 
ethnic groups participates at both 
managerial and non-managerial levels? 
Fair allocation of resources 
There should be a fair allocation of 
resources, programs and decision 
making in terms of gender, disability, 
the size of the organisation, and high- 
or low- profile athletes or NFs’ 
 
-How are resources to NFs and 
athletes distributed? 
4.2.6 Effectiveness 
Many studies refer to effectiveness as “the extent to which an organization achieves its goal 
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or goals” (Slack, 1997: 23; see also Pennings & Goodman, 1977; Sandefur, 1983).  
Specifically, official goals and operational goals are referred to in the following terms: “official 
goals (an organisation’s reason for existence) help to ensure that everyone is working 
toward a common end” while “operational goals (referring to an organisation’s primary tasks) 
provide a sense of direction and motivation, guidelines for decision-making and standards 
for evaluating performance” (Kerr, 1991: 84, editorial in the Canadian Journal of Sport 
Science). Therefore, effectiveness in this study is defined as ‘the achievement of official 
and operational goals’. This is closely related to accountability in that achievement that is 
in line with the NOC’s aims is that ‘for which the NOC is accountable’. It is also related with 
responsibility in that the governing body within an organisation should clearly indicate the 
vision, mission and goals that it is committed to fulfil. 
a) Leadership 
Leadership is also very likely to be associated with effectiveness (see Kent & Weese, 2000; 
Rowold, 2006; Eagly, 2007; Weinberg & McDermott, 2002). The following discussion focuses 
mainly on the style of leadership in NOCs and two types of leadership in particular, which are 
transactional and transformational leadership. Under a system of transactional leadership, 
the leaders clearly outline the tasks and how they should be performed in exchange for 
commensurate material or psychological compensation (e.g., recognition, awards) (Rowold, 
2006: 313). By contrast, a transformational leader has the ability to inspire his/her 
subordinates to go beyond expected levels of commitment and contribution. This 
inspirational process relies on emphasising task-related values and a strong commitment to 
a mission (Rowold, 2006: 313). Moreover, as stated by Weese (1995: 130), “a 
transformational leader…..helps influence a culture that perpetuates and reinforces a 
philosophy of excellence and continual improvement” (cited in Scott, 1997: 408). In this study, 
transactional leadership is exercised in situations where ‘subordinates perform within 
clearly outlined tasks given to them by their leaders in exchange for commensurate 
material or psychological compensation’ and transformational leadership is associated 
‘with emphasising task-related values and a strong commitment to a mission, where 
leaders inspire their subordinates to reach higher levels of performance in 
commitment and contribution’.  
 
In general, Weinberg and McDermott (2002: 282) investigate leaders’ perceptions of 
organisational effectiveness in the area of group dynamics. Good leaders are characterised 
as exhibiting qualities of consistency, decisiveness, good organisation and the ability to 
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interact with a variety of people. Essentially, leadership should involve every single member  
of the organisation in that a leader should be good at listening to subordinates’ opinions and 
receiving inputs into decision making (Weinberg & McDermott, 2002: 291). However, the 
adoption of a leadership style is likely to be independent of the circumstances that the leader 
faces and consequently, different leadership styles would be preferable according to the 
relevant situation. Thus, a general definition of effective leadership is that ‘a leader should 
be professional, interactional, communicative and capable of dealing with a 
contingency. Therefore, an examination of the operationalisation of a leadership style 
would focus on identifying if a leader carries out effective two-way and horizontal 
communications with his/her subordinates, and is regarded as having inspired colleagues to 
commit to organisational values and their realisation. 
b) Organisational values and culture 
The other factor, along with leadership, which is believed to strongly affect organisational 
effectiveness is the organisational culture (Kent & Weese, 2000; see also Deal & Kennedy, 
1982; Frost et al., 1985; Schein, 1985). Schein (1985), especially, notes that an 
organisational leader should prioritise management and embrace a carefully premeditated 
organisational culture (Kent & Weese, 2000: 5). As Colyer (2000: 321) says, there is growing 
evidence that organisational culture affects an organisation’s performance and that the 
prevailing culture contributes importantly to organisational effectiveness (see also Cameron 
& Freeman, 1991; Deal & Kennedy, 1988; Denison & Spreitzer, 1991; Smircich, 1983).  
Broad concept of culture 
Many researchers agree with the view that values and norms constitute the core elements of 
culture (Danisman et al., 2006: 303, see also Enz, 1986; O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 
1991; Peters & Waterman, 1982; Wiener, 1988). Hofstede (1997) explains it in terms of a 
broad concept of culture which manifests itself in four principal ways: symbols, heroes, 
rituals and values. He likens these to the skins of an onion, as shown in Fig 4-1 below when 
he observes that “symbols, heroes and rituals have been subsumed under the term 
practices. They are visible to an outside observer; their cultural meaning, however, is 
invisible and lies precisely and only in the way these practices are interpreted by the insiders. 
Values are the deepest manifestations of culture…and the core of culture is formed by value” 
(1997: 7-8).  
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Figure 4-1 The 'onion diagram': manifestations of culture at different levels of depth  
 
 
 
                                                                                     
 
 
Source: Hofstede (1997: 9) 
Organisational values and culture 
Organisational values and beliefs are also criteria that are used to evaluate effectiveness. 
Values should be carefully interpreted in distinguishing between the desirable and the 
desired. Hofstede (1997: 10) argues that “what distinguishes the desirable from the desired 
is the nature of the norms involved and norms are the standards for values that exist within a 
group or category of people”. With respect to the desirable, the norm has absolute authority 
and is supposed to be ethically right. On the other hand, the desired is much more practical 
and constitutes the majority’s choice. Schein (1985) conceptualises organisational values as 
“windows into the deep structure of organisations” and Agle and Caldwell (1999) view them 
as being “preferences about desired behaviours (e.g., cooperation, efficiency) or 
organisational outcomes (e.g., profit, success)”. Thus, organisational values are 
considered to serve as ‘windows into the deep structure of an organisation and its 
preferences about desired behaviours or organisational outcomes’.  
 
Organisational values are likely to be sensitive to cultural differences (Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 
335) and Martin (2002) considers that “culture is a lens to examine organisational values” 
(cited in Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 337). There are several definitions of organisational culture 
which may be said to consist in “an underlying system of shared values, beliefs and 
assumptions about how things are done in the organization” (Schein, 1992 cited in Doherty 
& Chelladurai, 1999: 286) and or “deep-rooted beliefs, values, and assumptions widely 
shared by organisational members that powerfully shape the identity and behavioural norms 
for the group” (Wallace & Weese, 1995: 183 cited in Scott, 1997: 404). Accordingly, the 
definition of organisational culture to be used in this study is that it encompasses a set of 
‘deep-rooted and widely shared beliefs, values and assumptions among 
organisational members about how things are done in the organisation’.    
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The conceptualisation of organisational values and beliefs is suggested by Agle and 
Caldwell (1999), following Martin’s (1992; 2002) three-perspective framework: integration, 
differentiation and fragmentation. Within this framework, Martin (2002: 91) distinguishes 
organisational cultures by asking whether “cultural manifestations are consistent or not, 
cultural members appear to agree or not, and interpretations are singular and clear or 
multiple and ambiguous” (cited in Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 338). The integration perspective is 
based on the premise that there should be “an organisation-wide consensus and 
consistency between the intent of organisational values and employee behaviour” (Martin, 
2002; cited in Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 338). Fenton and Inglis (2007: 338) also add that “this 
perspective assumes strong alignment between words and deeds”. Thus, integration is 
defined as a state in which there is ‘a strong alignment between words and deeds, an 
organisation-wide consensus and consistency between organisational values and 
employee behaviour’. By contrast, a differentiation perspective puts the emphasis on 
“inconsistencies and the existence of subcultures that are characterized as different from the 
norm” (Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 338). This perspective is an essential means for understanding 
the power structures in organisations that are characterised by the existence of hierarchies, 
based in, e.g. class or gender. Schmidt and Posner (1992) say that “this perspective 
assumes a contradiction between words and deeds and challenges the espoused beliefs by 
exposing the influence and role that power structures place on organisational behaviour” 
(cited in Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 338). The differentiation perspective may, thus, be defined as 
being relevant to a situation in which there is ‘a contradiction between words and deeds 
and where inconsistencies and subcultures arise due to the power relations’. Finally, 
the fragmentation perspective “brings ambiguity and complexity to the forefront in recognition 
of the multiple perspectives that exist” and it “assumes there is uncertainty and temporality 
between words and deeds” (Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 338). Weick (1985) says that it is suitable 
for figuring out organisational cultures nowadays, at a time of rapid change, technological 
innovation and blurring of the lines of professional practice (Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 338). 
Such an accelerated pace of change creates an environment where an understanding of the 
meaning of absences, gaps and silences is essential and it brings “the hidden dynamics of 
power inequity into focus illuminating why widespread consensus is unlikely” (Martin, 1992: 
151 cited in Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 338). Fragmentation may, thus, be said to occur, in a 
situation of ‘uncertainty and temporality between words and deeds which give rise to 
ambiguity and complexity’. 
 
For the operationalisation of organisational values, it is helpful to identify what kinds of 
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organisational value are available within the organisation, whether those values and 
assumptions are shared by all its members or subgroups, and whether there are different 
ways in which individuals may register their opinions and affect decision making in that 
organisation. In particular, Scott (2001: 55) claims that individual roles can affect institutional 
values manifesting inconsistencies and/or subcultural differences (Danisman et al., 2006: 
303). Trice and Beyer (1993), and Cox (1993) argue that demographic groupings such as 
those based on age (old-timers and new comers) and gender are likely to be pervasive 
sources of cultural differentiation (Danisman et al., 2006: 304). In addition, according to 
Danisman et al. (2006: 304), the differences in the value orientations of voluntary and 
professional paid staff are also appreciable (see also Macintosh & Whitson, 1990; Slack & 
Hinings, 1992). Therefore, it is important to determine whether or not there is a cultural 
differentiation between those groups. 
 
With respect to the operationalisation of organisational culture, Schein (1993: 58) suggests 
that the following steps should be taken when attempting to decipher an organisation’s 
culture: “analyse the process and content of socialisation of new members; analyse 
responses to critical incidents in the organisation’s history; analyse beliefs, values, and 
assumptions of culture creators; and discuss puzzling features of culture with insiders of the 
organisation” (Scott, 1997: 409). Ultimately, Scott (1997) connects the concept of 
organisational culture with the management of sports organisations. Schein (1993: 51) 
states that a strong culture has as its main features “the homogeneity and stability of group 
membership and the length and intensity of shared experiences of the group”, adding that a 
strong culture therefore possesses a high degree of unanimity among its members about 
“what the organisation stands for” (cited in Scott, 1997: 407). Scott (1997), in particular, 
emphasises the importance of organisational culture in relation to transformational 
leadership and Weese (1995) finds that organisations with highly transformational leaders 
exhibit significantly stronger cultures than those whose leaders have low transformational 
ability (Scott, 1997: 408). When organisational values, culture and leadership are considered 
together, it can be inferred from the point of view of effectiveness that ‘clear homogeneity 
of organisational values and highly transformational leaders are conducive to the 
formation of a strong positive organisational culture, which is more effective’.  
 
Extending the concept of organisational values and culture above, Brown (1998: 42) 
suggests the three of the most important elements of organisational culture which identify 
governance practices in a cultural context: 
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1. The societal or national culture within which an organisation is physically situated; 
2. The vision, management style and personality of an organisation’s founder or other 
dominant leader; and 
3. The type of business an organisation conducts and the nature of its business 
environment. 
 
He (1998: 42) points out that “an important point to bear in mind is that all the factors 
described as sources of culture tend to be interrelated in fundamental ways” and, in fact, he 
(1998: 43) adds that “Hofstede (1991) has demonstrated that managers in different countries 
differ in the strength of their attitudes and values regarding various issues”.  
 
As the interpretation of the concept of governance is affected by the cultural context in which 
it is being operationalised, this study discusses how the KOC’s governance practices have 
been affected by the Korean cultural context, although national culture is not directly 
included in the IOC’s interpretations/definitions and operationalisations. Following Brown 
(1998), thus, this study defines and explains the concepts of three sources of organisational 
culture in Chapter 4 and illustrates the significance of the distinctive South Korean culture in 
discussing how governance has been interpreted in relation to the KOC in Chapter 7. The 
second element has been dealt with in terms of leadership and organisational values above 
and, thus, national culture and the nature of the business and the business environment are 
followed. 
c) National Culture 
According to Sartore & Cunningham, (2007: 247), “one’s organisational status and level of 
associated power are often a reflection of society at large” (see also Ely, 1995; Heilman, 
2001; Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs, & Tamkins, 2004; Jost & Kay, 2005; Shaw & Hoeber, 2003; 
Shaw & Slack, 2002). Stereotypes are subsumed within this notion of social ideology and 
they may play a role in either positive or negative ways to undermine perceptions of 
competence and power, as various authors have suggested (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989, 1993; 
Jost & Kay, 2005 cited in Sartore & Cunningham, 2007: 248). Thus, “stereotypes are also 
suggested to be applied at both the individual and social or cultural level, the latter indicating 
some form of agreement or consensus of beliefs” (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1979; Jost & Banaji, 
1994; Sidanius et al., 2001 cited in Sartore & Cunningham, 2007: 248). For example, 
research suggests that gender stereotypes embrace the traditional social roles, status 
differences, and power inequalities that exist between men and women (Engly & Mladinic, 
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1989; Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, 1999 cited in Sartore & Cunningham, 2007: 247). 
 
Of particular relevance to the current model is the manner in which culturally held gender 
stereotypes have penetrated and impacted on the organisational domain, to such a degree 
that many jobs have become sex-typed (Heilman et al., 2004; Jawahar & Mattsson, 2005; 
Schein, 1973 cited in Sartore & Cunningham, 2007: 248). Thus, national culture is also an 
important factor to be taken into account when one is seeking to comprehend the 
organisational practices or culture of NOCs. Hofstede (1997: 181) argues that there is a 
tendency for values at the deeper, underlying level to be overlooked despite the effect that 
these may have in determining for people the meaning of their practices. The management 
practices of organisations thus reflect the national values.   
 
Five dimensions of national culture 
The five dimensions of national culture that may be drawn from Hofstede’s IBM company 
studies are as follows. First, power distance is defined as “the extent to which the less 
powerful members of organisations within a country expect and accept that power is 
distributed unequally” (Hofstede, 1997: 28). With high-power distance cultures, organisations 
exhibit such features as the prevalence of inequality and an inordinate respect for authority 
with the result that subordinates have less chance of becoming involved in the decision-
making process. In the case of low power distance nations, by contrast, there is a tendency 
for the inequalities among people to be minimal, for activities to be decentralised and for 
subordinates to expect to be consulted by their superiors. The second dimension, 
individualism/collectivism, “pertains to the extent to which individual independence or social 
cohesion dominates” (Brown, 1998: 43). In individualistic societies individuals are likely to 
have looser ties with other people and to take care of themselves. On the contrary, in 
collective societies people live in groups which are strong and cohesive and are protected in 
return for their loyalty. Third, masculinity/femininity refers to “the degree to which social 
gender roles are clearly distinct” (Brown, 1998: 45). In high-masculinity societies, there is a 
very clear distinction between social gender roles: “men are supposed to be assertive, tough 
and focused on material success, while women are supposed to be more modest, tender 
and concerned with the quality of life” (Brown, 1998: 45). In the case of high-femininity 
societies, unlike masculinity societies, “social gender roles overlap” (Brown, 1998: 45) with a 
greater tendency in femininity societies for both men and women to perform similar roles. 
Brown (1998: 45) defines the fourth dimension of national culture, uncertainty avoidance, as 
“the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown 
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situations”. Brown (1998: 46) also explains that “in strong uncertainty avoidance societies 
there is a fear of ambiguous situations and unfamiliar risks, there is a feeling that times is 
money, there is an emotional need to be busy, precision and punctuality come naturally, 
novelty is resisted, and people are motivated by security, and by esteem or belongingness”. 
Finally, Confucian dynamism is referred to as “the degree to which long-termism or short-
termism is the dominant orientation in life”, and is linked to the Confucian conception of 
‘virtue’ which Hofstede (1997) contrasts with a Western preoccupation with ‘truth’” (Brown, 
1998: 46). “Long-term orientation societies stress the adaptation of traditions to a modern 
context, place definite limits on respect for social and status obligations, are sparing with 
resources, stress perseverance, and are concerned with ‘virtue’” (Brown, 1998: 46).  
 
In addition to Hofstede (1997), Brown (1998: 47) also commented the national culture on 
business of the Republic of Korea below:  
 
In South Korea the economy is dominated by enormous family controlled 
conglomerates, or ‘chaebol’. Korean chaebol are vertically integrated and centrally 
control a variety of functions and activities: that is, they are far less specialised than 
their Japanese and Chinese counterparts. Research suggests that they have 
successfully diversified into heavy industry, as well as newer industries such as 
construction and financial services. Although they appear disinclined to interconnect 
for economic reasons, they are liable to co-ordination by state agencies and political 
alliances. As with the Chinese managers, Korean bosses are highly directive, 
making little attempt to explain their decisions or justify their actions to their 
employees. Interestingly, there is a much higher labour turnover in Korean 
companies than in Japan or Taiwan, and loyalties here are much less emotional and 
intense than in Japan.   
Criticism 
Tayeb (1988: 39-40), however, argues that despite Hofstede’s remarkable contribution to the 
study of organisations in the cultural context, his investigation was not empirical and “the 
relationships between the four dimensions…and the structures of the organisations…are 
conceptual and speculative”. Tayeb (1988: 64) also remarks that “although they are meant to 
measure power distance and uncertainty avoidance as cultural dimensions, they [the five 
dimensions] are heavily influenced by non-cultural factors common to all modern civilised 
cultures, such as level of education, occupation, age and sex. Moreover, the effects of these 
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non-cultural factors on the scales are not, at least as far as the findings of the present 
research demonstrate, consistent”. In addition, the present study has been conducted since 
2008 which means that approximately four decades have passed since the index was first 
studied. Hofstede (1997) carried out his original study between 1967 and 1973 in two survey 
rounds and in the 1980s a new cross-national study led to the addition of a fifth dimension. 
Since the Republic of Korea has been passing through a phase of accelerated economic 
development, the society has also changed rapidly. 
d) The nature of the business and the business environment 
Deal and Kennedy (1982: 13) argue that “the business environment is the single greatest 
influence in shaping a corporate culture” (cited in Brown, 1998: 48). Brown (1998: 48) also 
adds that “organisations in the public sector tend to develop in markedly different ways from 
those in the private sector”. Following Gordon (1985) Brown (1998: 48) discusses slow-
changing environment and highly competitive and changeable environment: 
 
Utilities (such as electricity, gas and telephone companies) which have evolved in a 
relatively slow-changing environment tend to develop cultures which value stability, 
integration, clear communication, support from senior managers, fair compensation 
and opportunities for employees to grow. In contrast, dynamic-marketplace 
companies formed in highly competitive and changeable environments generally 
develop cultures which set ambitious goals and value innovative behaviour and 
individual initiative 
 
As this study identifies the governance practices of the KOC, which is a non-profit 
organisation, slow-changing environment is expected to be presented during the analysis. 
 
In addition, the most significant source of understanding of the business environment of an 
organisational culture is stakeholders, which includes customers, the Government, the public 
and shareholders. Customers are regarded as an important stakeholder, however, are not 
dealt with in this study as the KOC is a non-profit organisation. The government and the 
public are greatly concerned in this study. The Government holds considerable power to 
influence the organisational culture within its territory and might regulates a non-profit 
organisation by the Government policy. As the KOC is a governmental umbrella body, the 
Government is expected to be an important stakeholder. With respect to the public, the 
strong public opinion worldwide or nationwide leads a company to attempt to follow it. 
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“Shareholders have little influence on the cultural development of an organisation” (Brown, 
1998: 50). 
e) Typologies of organisational cultures 
Typology of organisational culture enables understanding broad overviews of “the sorts of 
variations that exist between cultures” (Brown, 1998: 65). Following Harrison (1972) who 
suggests the four cultures, “called power, role, task and person” (Brown: 1998: 66) Handy 
(1978) modifies them into the simple classification scheme as shown Figure 4-2 below. 
 
Figure 4-2 Handy's four organisational culture 
 
Source: Brown (1998: 66) adapted from Handy (1985) 
 
- The power culture 
The characteristic of power culture is that “a power culture has a single source of power from 
which rays of influence spread throughout the organisation…the structure of a power culture 
may thus be pictured as a web” (Brown, 1998: 66). Thus, individuals are encouraged to 
follow what their leaders say with few questions “though important decisions are likely to be 
made as a result of political manoeuvring…employees who are naturally political animals 
confident about the use of power, and unconcerned about taking risks or issues of job 
security will thrive in this environment” (Brown, 1998: 67). 
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- The role culture 
This is more or less bureaucracy and thus, it focuses on logic and rationality. The functions 
or specialities are important in this culture. “Rules, procedures and job descriptions dominate 
the internal environment of a role culture, and promotion is based on the satisfactory 
performance of individuals in their jobs” (Brown, 1998: 67). The role culture is “pictured as a 
Greek temple” (Brown, 1998: 67). 
 
- The task culture 
This culture appears in an organisation which puts an emphasis on specific jobs or projects 
and accordingly, power is somewhat diffuse based on expertise rather than power. 
“Structurally, the task culture may be thought of as a net or matrix…Flexibility, adaptability, 
individual autonomy and mutual respect based on ability rather than age or status are the 
most important organising principles here” (Brown, 1998: 67-7).  
 
- The person culture 
The individuals comprising an organisation tend organise on a collective basis in their own 
interests. For example, specialists such as doctors and architects band together in order to 
share the costs of utilities. “The individuals themselves decide on their own work allocation, 
with rules and co-ordinative mechanisms of minimal significance…the individual has almost 
complete autonomy, influence is shared, and if power is to be exercised it is usually on the 
basis of expertise” (Brown, 1998: 69). 
 
The typology of organisational culture introduced above is applied to the case of KOC and 
the analysis of the KOC’s governance practices in the Korean cultural context is 
characterised and pictured as one of them in Chapter 7.    
Effectiveness in the Olympic Movement 
The requirement for effectiveness in the Olympic Movement is mainly indicated in the BUPs 
below: 
 
Table 4-20 BUPs Category 7 regarding effectiveness 
7. Harmonious Relations with Governments while Preserving Autonomy 
 
Theme Elements to be considered 
7.2 Complementary 
missions  
*Governments, constituents of the Olympic Movement, other 
sports organisations and stakeholders have a complementary 
mission and should work together towards the same goals 
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(The IOC, 2008: 12) 
 
7.2 above indicates that it is necessary for NOCs to cultivate harmonious relationships with 
their governments to work together towards the same goals. As one aspect of the definition 
of effectiveness concerns ‘the achievement of official goals and operational goals’, 7.2 can 
be categorised as a summons to effectiveness in the collaboration of the NOCs and their 
higher organisations in order to achieve their common goals by fostering harmonious 
relations. Differences may occur however when NOCs disagree with their governments’ 
actions or politics in relation to sport-related themes.    
 
Table 4-21 BUPs Category 3 regarding effectiveness 
3. Highest Level of Competence, Integrity and Ethical Standards 
 
Theme Elements to be considered 
3.3 Internal 
Management, 
communication and 
coordination 
*Good internal communication reinforces the efficiency of 
sporting organisations 
*Good information flow inside sporting organisations ensures 
good understanding by membership of activities undertaken and 
allows managers to make timely and informed decisions 
*Good working conditions and atmosphere as well as motivation 
and incentive policies are essential for the smooth functioning of 
the organisation 
3.5 Appointment of the 
members of the 
management 
*Leadership is above management  
*The majority of the members of management should be 
professional 
*Candidates should have professional competency and an 
impeccable professional history 
*The selection process should be based on objective criteria and 
should be set out clearly 
(The IOC, 2008: 5) 
 
Elements discussed in Category 3 above are clearly dependent on good leadership which is 
described in the literature as being a supplementary factor to effectiveness, along with 
organisational culture, indeed, 3.5 alludes directly to the term ‘leadership’. Moreover, 3.3 
states that good internal communication can positively affect the efficiency of an organisation. 
‘A good internal communication’ is considered as an aspect of effectiveness in the literature 
and it seems that effectiveness and efficiency are used interchangeably in some elements of 
the Olympic literature. In addition, motivation and incentive policies are likely to be 
implemented by transformational and transactional leaders, respectively. As outlined above, 
leaders should have professional competency and good interactional communication skills, 
which are considered as factors that are beneficial when operationalised.   
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Table 4-22 BUPs Category 4 regarding effectiveness 
4. Accountability, Transparency and Control 
 
Theme Elements to be considered 
4.6 Education and 
Training 
*There should be an induction programme for all new members 
of staff, volunteer officers and all board members 
*Ongoing education and training of executives, volunteers and 
employees should be integral to operations 
*The promotion of self-education and regular training within the 
sport organisations should be encouraged 
(The IOC, 2008: 8) 
 
Theme 4.6 can be categorised as pertaining to organisational culture in that the induction 
programme for new members of staff is considered as an important element for increasing 
the integration of organisational values in that they indicate the aims that the organisation 
seeks to promote and pursue. The IOC Code of Ethics (2010: 1) encourages the Olympic 
Movement to live up to “the Olympic Charter and, in particular, its Fundamental Principles”, 
but this document mainly deals with a wider range of ethics than those introduced above. In 
terms of the ethics of corporate governance it identifies seven categories of ethical concern, 
which are Dignity; Integrity; Good governance and resources; Candidatures; Relations with 
states; Confidentiality; and Implementation.  
 
Article 48 from the Olympic Movement in Society (2009: 15) can be interpreted as relating to 
aspects of effectiveness to be delivered by enhancing human capital.  
 
48. In order to improve the quality and levels of services, all constituents of the 
Olympic Movement should unite in their efforts to place a higher priority on 
supporting programmes for the training of sport administrators, coaches and 
entourage. 
 
In the case of article 49, another example is presented of the interchangeable use of the 
terms effectiveness and efficiency in the Olympic Movement. In the literature, it is stated that 
the revenue distribution should provide a measure of efficiency in sporting organisations and, 
therefore, this topic will be examined in the section on efficiency. 
 
49. The Olympic Movement should look at ways to broaden the effectiveness of its 
revenue distribution models. 
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Although effectiveness is discussed in the Olympic Movement, the operationalisation of this 
concept is mainly constructed on the basis of the literature: 
 
Table 4-23 Effectiveness: definitions/interpretations and operationalisations 
Principle Definitions/Interpretations Operationalisations 
Effectiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The achievement of official goals and 
operational goals. 
 
-What are the official goals of the 
NOC? 
-What are its operational 
goals?(objectives whose attainment 
is desired) 
-Does the organisation clearly set 
forth the organisation’s goals? 
-To what degree are the official and 
operational goals achieved? 
Organisational Culture 
Clear homogeneity of organisational values and highly 
transformational leaders are conducive to the formation of a strong, 
positive organisational culture, which is more effective. 
1. Organisational Values 
Integration: with a strong alignment 
between words and deeds, an 
organisation-wide consensus and 
consistency between organisational 
values and employee behaviour may 
be achieved. 
Differentiation: when there is a 
contradiction between words and 
deeds, inconsistencies and 
subcultures may arise due to 
unbalanced the power relations  
Fragmentation: if uncertainty and 
temporality exist between words and 
deeds, ambiguity and complexity are 
the consequences 
 
-Do staff members clearly 
understand and share the 
organisation’s official and 
operational goals? 
-Are organisational values shared by 
all members? 
-Is there a sub-culture within the 
NOC? 
-Are organisational values 
differentiated along these lines: 
individual roles; age and gender; 
volunteer and professional paid 
staff?. 
-Is there an activity like an induction, 
or a social engagement to help staff 
to identify with the organisation?   
2. Leadership 
Transactional leadership: 
subordinates perform within a clearly 
outlined framework as tasked by 
their leaders in exchange for 
commensurate material or 
psychological compensation  
 
-Does a leader elicit respect and 
from his/her subordinates and 
stimulate their sense of pride? 
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Effectiveness 
(continued) 
Transformational leadership: leaders  
emphasise task-related values and a 
strong commitment to a mission, and 
inspire their subordinates to reach 
higher levels of performance in their 
commitment and contribution  
Leaders should be professional, 
interactional and communicative in 
their conduct, and/or capable of 
dealing with a contingency 
-Does a leader carry out effective 
two-way and horizontal 
communications and interactions 
with his/her subordinates? 
 
 
-Does a leader clearly communicate 
organisational values, purpose and 
mission? 
 
4.2.7 Efficiency 
This section deals with traditional perspectives on efficiency. Considering the definition of 
efficiency from the perspective of traditional organisational theory, Slack (1997: 23) defines it 
by saying that “it takes into account the amount of resources used to produce the desired 
output” (see also Pennings & Goodman, 1977; Sandefur, 1983). Efficiency may also be 
measured by comparing the results from using the same amount of funds in different 
categories (Elster, 1992: 180-1), a calculation that is driven by an organisation’s attempt to 
improve its internal input-output ratio (Babiak, 2007: 342). Thus, in traditional organisational 
theory, efficiency is referred to as ‘the amount of resources or funds (the input) used to 
improve or produce the desired output’ (This is closely related to accountability in that 
expenditure that is in line with the NOC’s aims is that ‘how the NOC is accountable’). 
 
The Northern Ireland Assembly (2010) conveys that how problematic the measurement of 
the outcomes of public-spending programmes can be, adding a list of budgeting methods as 
follows:  
 
 Incremental (Historic) budgeting is defined as “the previous year’s budget for a 
department or division is carried forward for the next annual budget” (2010: 5). This is 
carried out on the basis of the previous financial year’s allocation.  
 Zero-based budgeting starts “from the basis that no budget lines should be carried 
forward from one period to the next simply because they occurred previously, instead, 
everything that is included in the budget must be considered and justified (2010: 7). 
 Priority-based budgeting “focuses on corporate priorities and allocates growth and 
savings in budgets accordingly” (2010: 13). 
 Performance-based budgeting, the aim of which “is to connect performance 
information with the allocation and management of resources” (2010: 15). 
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 Fixed budgeting means that “the level of resources often determines the level of 
activity and service provision and these resource levels are usually established in 
advance of the financial year (2010: 24). 
a) Institutional Isomorphism 
As discussed earlier in Chapter three, Neo-institutional approaches to organisational theory 
focus on the organisation’s “rational appearance with respect to the institutional environment” 
(Augestad, Bergsgard & Hansen 2006: 296), whereas traditional organisational theory puts 
an emphasis on the organisation’s efficiency in terms of resource input and output. Thus, 
Augestad, Bergsgard and Hansen (2006: 296) explain that “theorists of the neo-institutional 
school concentrate on how and to what degree organisations adapt to both formal and 
informal expectations in the institutional environment.”   
 
Similarities are apparent among non-profit organisations since they are subject to coercive, 
mimetic, and normative isomorphic forces, according to Leiter (2005: 5). Each force is 
explained in the following terms: ‘coercive’ means that the organisation is expected to be 
highly dependent on financial sources; ‘mimetic’ indicates that the non-profit mission is often 
unclear and the methods for its pursuit are unsettled and there is therefore a tendency for 
such organisations to learn by copying structures and approaches from others in the same 
field i.e. sport; and ‘normative’ means that different types of organisation provide expert 
advice and professionally trained managers are on the increase. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) 
address that “mimetic isomorphism implies that organisations during a period of change 
(technological/economic) and uncertainty imitate what seems to be the most successful 
and/or legitimate organisations” (cited in Augestad, Bergsgard & Hansen, 2006: 296).  
Efficiency in the Olympic Movement 
For the operationalisation, this study identifies how the budget allocations are decided by 
applying the five types of budgeting methods above to its subject, a sporting organisation. 
For instance, it poses the question: ‘Are resources allocated to a sporting organisation in 
terms of cost per medal, per coach or participant?’ The best practice of resource allocation in 
a NOC should take into account the most efficient way that permits it to economise.  
 
Table 4-24 Efficiency: definitions/interpretations and operationalisations 
Principle Definitions/Interpretations Operationalisations 
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Efficiency 
 
The amount of resources or funds (the 
input) to be used to improve or produce 
the desired output: 
Historic budgeting: budgeting on the 
basis of the previous financial year’s 
allocation 
Zero-based budgeting: no budget lines 
should be carried forward from one 
period to the next 
Priority-based budgeting: budgeting on 
the basis of priorities 
Performance-based budgeting: 
budgeting on the basis of performance 
Fixed budgeting: budgeting on the basis 
of the level of activity and service 
provision 
-How are the budget allocations 
decided?  
 
4.3 Features of key principles in the Olympic Movement 
Following the commentary on key principles, this section explores how those principles are 
characterised by the IOC body. The same IOC documents are discussed to identify any 
similarity or difference between them.   
4.3.1 Encouraging compliance with rules and regulations of the IOC 
The IOC Code of Ethics and the Olympic Movement in Society indicate one similarity in that 
the two documents strongly encourage sporting organisations in the Olympic Movement to 
live up to the rules and regulations which receive the strongest emphasis in the Olympic 
Charter and the BUPs. The section regarding ‘Good Governance and Resources’ in the IOC 
Code of Ethics indicates (2010: 2-3) that: 
 
4. The Olympic parties recognise the significant contribution that broadcasters, 
sponsors, partners and other supporters of sports events make to the development 
and prestige of the Olympic Games throughout the world. However, such support 
must be in a form consistent with the rules of sport and the principles defined 
in the Olympic Charter and the present Code. They must not interfere in the 
running of sports institutions. The organisation and staging of sports competitions 
are the exclusive responsibility of the independent sports organisations recognised 
by the IOC. 
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In addition, the section concerning ‘Relations with States’ also emphasises that sporting 
organisations in the Olympic Movement should be in compliance with the principles 
established by the Olympic Movement.  
 
1.The Olympic parties shall work to maintain harmonious relations with state 
authorities, in accordance with the principle of universality and political 
neutrality of the Olympic Movement (the IOC Code of Ethics, 2010: 3). 
 
2.The Olympic parties are free to play a role in the public life of the states to which 
they belong. They may not, however, engage in any activity or follow any ideology 
inconsistent with the principles and rules defined in the Olympic Charter and 
set out in the present Code (the IOC Code of Ethics, 2010: 3). 
 
Along with the IOC Code of Ethics, clauses 29, 37, 38 and 42 of the Olympic Movement in 
Society also contain recommendations for compliance to be observed with the rules and 
regulations of the Olympic Movement.  
 
29. The relevant intergovernmental organisations and governments should 
acknowledge the necessary and essential autonomy of the Olympic Movement 
including, in particular, respect for and enforcement of the rules of good 
governance, equality and fairness in sport and sport administration, as 
established by the Olympic Movement and set out in the Olympic Charter, to 
ensure the best and fairest possible practice of sport (2009: 12). 
 
37. In accordance with the principles and values of Olympism, the practice of sport 
must be run by independent, autonomous sport organisations, which are in 
full compliance with applicable laws. Co-operation between governments and 
institutions of the Olympic Movement in every area where it may be mutually 
beneficial should underlie the relationship between sport and state bodies, so that 
the autonomy of the Olympic Movement is fully respected by governments (2009: 
13-4). 
 
38. The relationships between the Olympic Movement, public bodies and 
governments, as well as those between all national organisations belonging to the 
Olympic Movement and their respective governments, should be based on the 
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principle of respect for applicable law by all constituents of the Olympic 
Movement, while at the same time seeking to influence public policy makers 
wherever possible to ensure that national and supra-national laws and 
regulations are consistent with the fundamental principles of Olympism (2009: 
14). 
 
42. All members of the Olympic Movement should keep annual accounts in 
accordance with acknowledged standards of accounting; ensure they have an 
independent audit or verification of their accounts; adopt rules, norms  and 
practices under which those who cannot comply with good governance may lose 
financial support or be sanctioned; adopt and implement a code of ethics based 
on the principles and rules of the IOC Code of Ethics; and always seek to 
protect and promote the interests of the athletes they represent (2009: 14). 
 
These clauses all underline the importance of accomplishing the applicable laws and rules of 
the Olympic Movement. As can be seen above, the IOC Code of Ethics and the Olympic 
Movement in Society recommend above all that the sporting organisations in the Olympic 
Movement should perform in accordance with the principles and rules defined by that 
Movement. 
4.3.2 Highlighting accountability, responsibility, transparency & democracy 
Another feature shared by the IOC Code of Ethics and the Olympic Movement in Society is 
that both documents focus on accountability, responsibility and transparency. In the case of 
the IOC Code of Ethics (2010: 2), the third category entitled ‘Good Governance and 
Resources’ deals with those three principles. In fact, while introducing an overall view of 
good corporate governance, Article 1 of the category singles out the three principles for 
special mention:  
 
1. The basic universal principles of good governance of the Olympic and sports 
movement, in particular transparency, responsibility and accountability, must be 
respected by all Olympic Movement constituents.  
 
The Olympic Movement in Society (2009: 14) also places emphasis on the need for 
accountability, responsibility and transparency in the Olympic Movement. 
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41. The legitimacy and autonomy of the Olympic Movement depends on upholding 
the highest standards of ethical behaviour and good governance. All members of the 
Olympic Movement should adopt, as their minimum standard, the Basic Universal 
Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic Movement, as proposed by the IOC. 
All members of the Olympic Movement must always demonstrate integrity, 
accountability and transparency, as well as the highest level of management skills; 
and they must ensure that at all times their legal status is both fully consistent with 
their activities and responsibilities and wholly compliant with the laws of the land 
(applicable laws).  
 
In the case of the Olympic Charter principles such as accountability, transparency and 
democracy are implied to be the cornerstones of the Movement’s ethical governance. A total 
of six recommendations are selected from the Charter below for discussion in relation to 
corporate governance principles. The first three recommendations bear more closely on 
aspects of democracy, in that they accentuate the NOCs’ independent position in their 
cooperation with their governments or non-governmental bodies. Specifically, Rules 29-4 
indicates explicitly that the president or members of the NOC should not be appointed by the 
government. 
 
Rules 28-5. In order to fulfil their mission, the NOCs may cooperate with 
governmental bodies, with which they shall achieve harmonious relations. However, 
they shall not associate themselves with any activity which would be in contradiction 
with the Olympic Charter. The NOCs may also cooperate with non-governmental 
bodies (2010: 62). 
 
Rules 28-6. The NOCs must preserve their autonomy and resist all pressures of any 
kind, including but not limited to political, legal, religious or economic pressures 
which may prevent them from complying with the Olympic Charter (2010: 62). 
 
Rules 29-4. Governments or other public authorities shall not designate any 
members of an NOC. However, an NOC may decide, at its discretion, to elect as 
members representatives of such authorities (2010: 65). 
 
The following Bye-laws in the IOC Charter, concern transparency and accountability in that 
they state that NOC should release and open any related documents, such as annual 
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reports and audited financial statements, to their stakeholders in order to be accountable to 
them.  
 
Bye-law to Rules 28 and 29,  
1-4. Each NOC shall hold a General Assembly of its members at least once a year, 
in accordance with the NOC’s statutes. NOCs shall, in particular, include on the 
agenda of their General Assemblies the presentation of annual reports and audited 
financial statements and, as the case may be, the election of officers and members 
of the executive body. (2010: 66) 
 
1-5. The officers and members of the executive body of an NOC shall be elected in 
accordance with the NOC’s statutes, for a term of office not exceeding four years; 
they may be eligible for re-election. (2010: 66) 
 
1-4 embodies the principle of accountability following the interpretation of accountability 
under which ‘a member of the Executive Committee should comply with its rules and 
regulations as well as its stakeholders’ need’. It recommends that the NOC should hold a 
General Assembly in order to be more accountable to its stakeholders, as indicated in the 
operationalisation ‘how often is the General Assembly held?’. The second point regarding 
audited financial statements is also important as a means of improving accountability, 
following the guidance whereby ‘an organisation should provide accurate financial 
statements to audit’. In addition, regarding the presentation of annual reports, in the interests 
of greater transparency, the definition states that ‘organisations should develop and provide 
written policies and procedures that promote the timely and balanced disclosure of all 
material matters that concern them’. Moreover, the last part of 1-4 of Bye-law to Rules 28 
and 29 may be said to promote greater democracy in that ‘the NOC should be maintaining 
checks and balances by means of elections of high officials’, which is supported and 
amplified by 1-5. Thus, 1-4 indicates a mixture of three aspects of corporate governance, 
namely accountability, democracy and transparency. Therefore, those documents from the 
Olympic Movement raise accountability, responsibility, transparency and democracy to a 
position of being the most important ethical principles to be considered in sporting 
organisations affiliated to the Olympic Movement. 
4.3.3 Limited inclusion of equity, effectiveness and efficiency 
Whereas equity and/or equality and effectiveness have been studied in depth in the literature 
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in relation to sporting organisations, the IOC’s recommendations make only limited reference 
to them and pay still less attention to efficiency. Regarding equity, in the category of ‘Dignity’ 
in the IOC Code of Ethics, one clause has a bearing on it, where equity may be seen to be 
promoted by the call for eradication of discrimination in terms of race, gender, ethnicity, 
religion, philosophical or political opinion, marital status or other grounds. The definitions of 
equity discussed in this study consider the aspects of gender, race, disability and resource 
allocation, while the IOC Code of Ethics (2010: 1) covers a wider range of aspects of equity 
without, however, including equity for people with disabilities. 
  
2.  There shall be no discrimination between the participants on the basis of race, 
gender, ethnic origin, religion, philosophical or political opinion, marital status or 
other grounds.  
 
The Olympic Movement in Society (2009:12-3) also deals with the preservation of human 
dignity in terms of equitable treatment irrespective of gender:  
 
30. The preservation of human dignity is a fundamental tenet of the Olympic 
Movement. All members of the Olympic Movement should work together in pursuit 
of the harmonious development of men and women in order to promote through 
sport a peaceful society based on the most fundamental common principles and 
values inherent in a civilised society  
 
These clauses show a tendency whereby the issue of equity is mostly handled by the 
Olympic Movement under the aspect of ‘dignity’. The Copenhagen Congress Contributions 
give relatively more attention to the issue of equity than the other documents. In the 
Copenhagen Congress Contributions, with respect to achieving greater gender equality in 
the Olympic Movement, Allen from the IOC (2009: 299) argues that due to the exclusion of 
women from decision-making, the Olympic movement has been responsible for perpetuating 
gender inequality. Accordingly, the IOC should review the representation of women in its 
management structures throughout the Olympic Movement. According to Defrantz from the 
IOC, in 1996 “the IOC aimed to have at least 10% of the policy making positions occupied by 
women by 2001 and increasing to 20% by 2005” (2009: 313). The 2009 Congress highlights 
the importance of women’s participation at all levels of sport. 
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With respect to effectiveness and efficiency, The Copenhagen Congress Contributions make 
recommendations for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of NOCs. In the 
Copenhagen Congress Contributions, Coates (2009: 312) from the Australian Olympic 
Committee proposes a way to achieve increased effectiveness when he states that “NOCs 
should have a board of an effective composition, size and commitment to adequately 
discharge their responsibilities and duties”. McLin (2009: 327) from the Federation Equestre 
Internationale (FEI) notes that “the effectiveness and impact of the Olympic Movement is 
limited by the structure and efficiency of its institutions”. When the best good governance 
structures are applied to these organisations “in order to effectively manage their affairs 
internationally” (McLin, 2009: 327), efficiency and autonomy would be considerably extended, 
and in turn, the Olympic Movement would be greatly empowered. Thus, the NOC should not 
ignore each stakeholder’s interests or needs in its mode of governance and its processes 
should be efficiently managed. In summary, several articles in the Copenhagen Congress 
Contributions raise the importance of principles that have had such a low profile in the 
Olympic Movement.   
4.3.4 The concept of ‘autonomy’ 
Since the term, ‘autonomy’ has often been used in IOC documents, this section discusses 
what principles can be related to achieving ‘autonomy’. ‘The Structure of the Olympic 
Movement’ in the Olympic Movement in Society (2009: 12) begins by citing Article 27 in 
which it is said that “a definition of autonomy of sport reflecting the principles of respect, 
responsibility and reliability should be adopted by all within the Olympic Movement”. As the 
document directly states, autonomy confers on the body concerned a duty of responsibility. 
Another case showing the relation between responsibility and autonomy is discussed in the 
Copenhagen Congress Contributions. According to Al-Hussein (2009: 256) of the Jordanian 
Olympic Committee:  
 
Under the Olympic Charter, each NOC is an autonomous body with clearly defined 
rights, duties, and responsibilities to sport and the Olympic Movement. The Charter 
emphasises the need to maintain positive relationships with government and it is 
clearly not in the interests of NOCs or of sport for these relationships to 
deteriorate…… but the relationship tends to be built on a solid recognition by 
governments of the importance of the role of NOCs and the way that reflects on their 
country.   
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Al-Hussein’s point is that the NOCs should guard their autonomy by observing clearly 
delineated rights and duties in compliance with the IOC’s recommendations. Their autonomy 
should be respected by their governments within the framework of a positive relationship. 
Article 29 in the Olympic Movement in Society (2009: 12) recommends that NOCs should 
comply with the rules and regulations of the Olympic Movement in order to establish their 
autonomy in the same way as the principle of accountability presupposed that ‘a member of 
the Executive Committee should comply with its rules and regulations’. Article 29, therefore, 
indicates that organisations concerned with sport should comply with the rules and 
regulations of the Olympic Movement and thereby acknowledge the Movement’s autonomy. 
 
29. The relevant intergovernmental organisations and governments should 
acknowledge the necessary and essential autonomy of the Olympic Movement 
including, in particular, respect for and enforcement of the rules of good governance, 
equality and fairness in sport and sport administration, as established by the 
Olympic Movement and set out in the Olympic Charter, to ensure the best and 
fairest possible practice of sport.  
 
Article 29 is also relevant to the issue of democracy, as it emphasises the autonomy of 
sporting organisations from any intergovernmental organisations and governments. It also 
states that “equality and fairness” are essential to the autonomy of the Olympic Movement.   
 
Bach (2009: 257), who is the President of the German Olympic Committee, suggests in the 
same document that the autonomy of sporting organisations and the Olympic Movement 
needs to be defined carefully. Bach believes that, in reality, since we need our partners in 
politics, economics and society in order to carry out our mission, it is impossible for us to be 
fully independent. Therefore, in the interests of autonomy, Bach (2009: 257) argues that “we 
(should) respect and abide by our own rules of good governance”. In the opinion of 
Baumann and Bach, accountability is fundamental to autonomy, in that sporting 
organisations should respect and abide by the rules suggested by the IOC.  
 
In addition, Bach (2009: 257) relates three stances of governmental intervention in sports 
organisations. In one case, “a government itself convened a general meeting of the national 
sports organisations”; in another, “a government completely circumnavigated the general 
meeting”; and lastly, a particular government acted unilaterally to “directly appoint the 
members of the executive board of the sports organisation”. In order to avoid this, NOCs 
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should cooperate with their governments and/or governmental bodies but they should take a 
firm stance in that partnership, while the government should respect the autonomy of sport. 
Bach’s argument against direct government’ intervention is related to the principle of 
subsidiarity, as the government should not interfere in the decision-making of sporting 
organisations or in the selection of the Executive Committee where such ‘interference’ is 
unwarranted. The General Assembly and Executive Committee are both the highest 
decision-making units in sporting organisations. This can be directly related to the call for 
democracy on the part of the NOC which ‘should be maintaining checks and balances by 
means of elections of high officials’. 
 
In accordance with that demand, the Olympic Charter (2010: 62) also uses the term 
‘autonomy’, as below: 
 
Rules 28-6. The NOCs must preserve their autonomy and resist all pressures of any 
kind, including but not limited to political, legal, religious or economic pressures 
which may prevent them from complying with the Olympic Charter.  
 
The clause that “the NOCs must preserve their autonomy” can be interpreted as a summons 
to NOCs to safeguard their independence and resist all external pressures by instituting their 
own independent decision-making procedures. In particular, as explained earlier, the five 
related Rules and Bye-laws are mostly concerned with encouraging NOCs to maintain their 
democracy and freedom from government control. Thus, if the principles of good governance 
are not respected, then autonomy may be under threat.  
4.3.5 Considering cultural and historical aspects 
Unlike the other selected documents released by the IOC, the Copenhagen Congress 
Contributions give consideration to the specificity of the cultural and historical aspects of 
each NOC. It argues that the IOC should understand and admit that each nation in which a 
sporting organisation is situated has its own historical, political, economic and cultural 
background, and the relations between a sporting organisation and its government should 
thus be considered in a different way depending on their national context. Baumann (2009) 
argues that it is also necessary to consider the cultural aspects and historical background of 
each organisation. Karfoul (2009: 274) of the Syrian Olympic Committee also says that the 
independence of the NOCs is strongly related to “the level of awareness and management 
culture of the organisation” and furthermore, sport should not be isolated from “the social, 
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economic and political systems of the country” to which they belong. Maglione (2009: 276) of 
the IOC also comments that each nation has developed different social, political, and 
economic systems just as it is characterised by different religions, cultures, and customs. 
These elements should be taken into account if the NOCs’ degree of autonomy from their 
respective governments is to be understood.   
 
The importance of viewing NOCs from this perspective is especially evident when the 
governance practices of NOCs in non-western contexts are being examined as those 
governance practices can be interpreted differently in different political, cultural, social and 
economic contexts. As discussed earlier, while the underlying concepts of corporate 
governance have been developed in a western context, individual NOCs’ different 
understandings of the fundamental ethical principles should be considered to some extent. 
4.4 Conclusion 
On the basis of a review of the literature and the selected IOC documents, it may be 
concluded that there are seven key ethical principles which define the theory and practice of 
good governance in sporting organisations: accountability, responsibility, transparency, 
democracy, equity, effectiveness and efficiency. This examination of the sources indicates 
that those principles such as accountability, responsibility and transparency are identified in 
similar ways in the literature and the byelaws of the Olympic Movement but that some 
principles in the IOC documents are not clear enough to cover all these necessary points. 
Thus, sport/business sections were useful to supplement the lack of definitions. In particular, 
democracy is not addressed by the IOC movement and the main concept of pluralism in the 
theories of states is borrowed as it is relevant to democracy. Equity is turned out to be a 
major principle in the sport sector, while it is much less appearance in the Olympic 
Movement. The concepts of ‘meanings’ and ‘practices’ are borrowed to reinforce the 
definitions of the theme, equity. Effectiveness, which is the other major principle in the sport 
sector, greatly supports the concept of effectiveness. The leadership and organisational 
culture are well explained by the literature review and, thus, this enables to establish the 
operationalisations of effectiveness. In the case of efficiency, the concept of it is clearly 
described in the Olympic Movement but its way of operationalisation is not clearly illustrated. 
Consequently, additional document that is from the Northern Ireland Assembly (2010) 
indicates its operationalisation. 
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There seems no unified ‘western’ conceptualisation of corporate governance. Thus, this 
chapter examines the concepts of corporate governance which were discussed in the three 
main areas: the business and sport sectors and in the Olympic Movement. This is not to say 
that other western based definitions of good or corporate governance do not exist. 
Nevertheless, As this study is regarding a corporate governance of NOCs, the documents in 
the Olympic Movement are regarded as the main and powerful regulations to the NOC. Also, 
the IOC is the headquarters of the Olympic Movement and, thus, the operationalisations are 
much likely to adapt the IOC’s recommendations which are constructed in a western-context.  
 
An interpretation is constructed in English and in a ‘western’ business context – the IOC 
being physically and ‘legally’ located in the west (Switzerland). Further, the cultural aspect 
has been regarded as an important element in order to take a consideration of each NOC 
and, thus, it is essential to identify how NOCs in non-western contexts interpret and practise 
ethical principles constructed in the western-context. Therefore, the following analyses show 
how governance practices have been interpreted in a different national and cultural context. 
The operationalisations are applied to the KOC with taking a cultural aspect of Korea into 
consideration.
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5 Research Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
This study seeks to address four key research questions. In order to justify the choice of 
method in relation to answering these questions, it is necessary to map out the assumptions 
about the nature of the world under investigation (ontological assumptions) and ways in 
which knowledge may be searched (epistemological assumptions). These are 
methodological issues rather than concerns of method ‘per se’, since methodology is about 
the link between theory and method. This chapter, thus, (a) rehearse the research questions, 
(b) highlight and justify the ontological and epistemological assumptions and the 
opportunities and constraints such choices imply, (c) clarify the theoretical position and (d) 
outline practical implications for method. 
5.2 Aims of the research 
Corporate governance, as have already stated, has grown in significance generally in the 
management of organisations, and in particular has become increasingly important as some 
prominent sporting organisations have experienced aspects of governance failure. This 
study therefore seeks to address the following questions and objectives: 
 
 What characterises good/corporate governance in the literature and how have the 
principles of good governance been adapted to the specialist sporting context?  
 What principles of good governance (if any) are advocated by the IOC in relation to 
the governance of Olympic organisations? And how are these interpreted by the IOC 
‘body’?  
 How is the KOC governed? Does it reflect/respect principles of good/corporate 
governance in general, and specifically those aspects recommended by the IOC? 
And how are these interpreted in the KOC context?  
 To what extent are practices of good/corporate governance developed in a western 
context applicable in this non-western sporting context? 
5.3 Philosophical considerations 
Ontology and epistemology involve a wide range of approaches although such approaches 
may not be clearly categorized as either ontology or epistemology due to the points of view 
of different authors. Blaikie (1993: 6) suggests that “ontology refers to the claims or 
assumptions that a particular approach to social enquiry makes about the nature of social 
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reality” and epistemology is “the claims or assumptions made about the ways in which it is 
possible to gain knowledge of this reality, whatever it is understood to be”. Green (2003: 45) 
observes that “ontological assumptions lead to epistemological assumptions which have 
methodological implications for the choices made regarding particular methods or 
techniques of data collection and the interpretation of findings arising from the research” (cf. 
Sparkes, 1992: 14; Grix 2002).  
 
What then are the critical ontological and epistemological questions? In terms of ontological 
questions, Burrell and Morgan (1979: 1) state:  
 
“Whether the ‘reality’ to be investigated is external to the individual or the product of 
individual consciousness; whether ‘reality’ is of an ‘objective nature’, or the product 
of individual cognition; whether ‘reality’ is a given ‘out there’ in the world, or the 
product of one’s mind.”  
 
The epistemological questions are “whether knowledge is something that can be acquired on 
the one hand, or something that has to be personally experienced on the other” (Green, 
2003: 47). Following the questions noted above, major ontological and epistemological 
assumptions are discussed, as noted in Table 5-1, along with the categories of research 
strategies, which might be adopted. 
 
Table 5-1 Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions 
Research 
strategy 
Inductive Deductive Retroductive Abductive 
Ontological 
assumptions: 
 
Realist 
 
Social 
phenomena 
exist 
independently 
of both the 
observer and 
social actors 
Realist 
 
Social 
phenomena 
exist 
independently 
of both the 
observer and 
social actors 
Structuralist 
Contructivist 
 
Social reality is 
viewed as 
social 
arrangements 
that are the 
products of 
material but 
unobservable 
structures of 
social relations 
(Bhaskar 1979) 
Relativist 
Constructivist 
 
Social reality is 
viewed as the 
social 
construction of 
social actors. 
 
Regarded as the 
product of 
processes by 
which social 
actors together 
negotiate the 
meanings for 
actions and 
situations 
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Epistemological 
approach 
 
 
Positivism 
 
Critical 
Rationalism 
 
Transcendental 
Realism & 
Scientific 
Realism 
(Critical 
Realism) 
Realist 
 
Interpretivism 
 
Phenomena 
observation 
Objectivist 
(directly 
observable) 
Objectivist 
(directly 
observable) 
Subjectivist 
(indirectly 
observable) 
Subjectivist 
Hermeneutics 
Phenomenology 
Methods Quantitative 
strategy 
(survey and 
questionnaire) 
Quantitative 
strategy 
(survey and 
questionnaire) 
Quantitative 
and qualitative 
strategy 
(survey, 
interview and 
document 
analysis) 
Qualitative 
strategy 
(interview, 
document 
analysis and 
participant 
observation) 
Adapted from Blaikie (2000) & Green (2003) 
 
To begin with ontological assumption, as one of the core branches of philosophy, there are 
two major ontological assumptions: realism and constructivism. Realism is also equivalent to 
foundationalism or objectivism that “assume that social phenomena exist independently of 
both the observer and social actors” (Blaikie, 2000: 119). The world is seen as external 
reality and thus, the realist starting point is “always a foundational description of what this 
reality out there is, whether in experiential or material terms” (Gergen, 1994: 72 cited in 
Aquilina, 2009). On the contrary, constructivism, which is called anti-foundationalism and 
also anti-positivism, develops the constructivist paradigm which “entails the assumption that 
social reality is produced and reproduced by social actors and it is a pre-interpreted, inter-
subjective world of cultural objects, meanings and social institutions” (Blaikie, 1993: 203).   
 
The other core branch of philosophy is epistemology which, as mentioned earlier, concerns 
the way of gaining knowledge of the reality, and thus, focuses on the knowledge gathering 
process. There are two main approaches: positivism and interpretivism. A positivist approach 
adhering to realist ontological assumption aims to explain observable and measurable social 
phenomena by means of establishing universal generalisations. This position is, however, 
contrasted in an interpretivist approach in association with constructivist ontological 
assumptions. It seeks to explain social phenomena by virtue of social actors’ explanations. 
Blaikie (2000: 115) points out that “interpretivists are concerned with understanding the 
social world people have produced and which they reproduce through their continuing 
activities”. Social reality is constituted by the meanings and interpretations given by social 
actors who nevigate their way around the world and have to interpret their activities together 
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to make sense of it. 
 
With respect to research strategy, it is closely related to a research process and method. As 
induction is the logic of positivism, the inductive strategy follows a process of data collection, 
data analysis, and development of generalisations, while the deductive strategy goes in the 
reverse order (Blaikie 2000: 100) The retroductive strategy is designed to establish an 
existence of “a possible structure or mechanism that could have produced regularity” after 
finding an observed regularity. (Blaikie, 2000: 100).  Thus, the retroductive strategy views 
reality as “social arrangements that are the products of material but unobservable structures 
of social relations” (Bhaskar 1979 cited in Blaikie, 2000: 108).  Following Bhaskar, Sayer 
(1992: 40) argues that the explanation of social phenomena should include critical evaluation 
of “their associated practices and the material structures which they produce and which in 
turn help to sustain those practices” (Green, 2003: 47). The abductive strategy, according to 
Blaikie (2000: 100), “begins by exploring through everyday language the knowledge that 
social actors use in the production, reproduction and interpretation of this everyday account 
into a social scientific account, and, possibly, into a grounded explanation.”  Interpretivism 
focuses on understanding social phenomena, which are constructed/reconstructed by social 
actors through language.  
 
As reflecting the research objectives that include identifying power relations between 
stakeholders of KOC, specifically, the Korean government and the KOC, and to find 
similarities or differences of concept or practices of principles of corporate governance 
between the IOC in western context and the KOC in Korean context, this study adopts 
critical realist assumptions, following retroductive strategy that hypotheses the regularities of 
the Korean society and its unobservable social structures, which impact on the corporate 
governance of the KOC. As critical realism accepts an interpretivist epistemological 
assumption, it also uses critical discourse analysis as following abductive strategy to 
understand how knowledge is socially structured through the members of KOC staff’s 
language. 
5.3.1 Critical Realism 
Critical realism shares a realist ontological position with an interpretivist epistemological 
position. As Blaikie (2000: 108) states, “the aim of realist science is to explain observable 
phenomena with references to underlying structures and mechanisms”. Hollis and Smith add 
(1991: 207), “the role of theory in realism is to contextualize observable behaviour by using 
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theory to infer the underlying structures of a particular social and political situation”. When 
comparing mechanisms in natural and social sciences, the mechanisms in the natural 
sciences are hidden because they reside in the real domain of reality that still has to be 
‘discovered’, while in the social science, mechanisms are regarded as the social 
constructions, and ‘hidden’ mechanisms mean that they are not able to be observed directly, 
and that social actors may not be aware of them. 
 
On top of the aim of realist science, the critical realists’ additional aim is to draw conclusions 
about unobservable structures of social relations. In addition to this, for critical realists, 
“social and political events are generated by a complex causal nexus that involves both the 
efficient causation of actors and the material causation of social structure” (Lewis 2002: 21 
cited in Green, 2003: 47). What should be taken into account here is that the participants’ 
activities do not entirely result in the social conditions in which a social episode occurs, or 
within which any social group or community exists. “This means that social actors may have 
little or no awareness of the mechanisms, and, in particular, the structures, which are 
involved in the production of the regularities in their social activities.” (Blaikie, 2000: 111) 
 
In addition, the ‘stratified ontology’ of critical realism is that “processes/events and structures 
are seen as different strata of social reality with different properties” (Fairclough, 2005: 922).   
 
Table 5-2 Bhaskar's three domains: populating entities 
 Domain of Real Domain of Actual Domain of Empirical 
Mechanisms X   
Events X X  
Experiences X X X 
Source: Bhaskar (1978: 13) 
 
Following Bhaskar’s analysis, Henry (2007: 199) describes these in the following terms:  
 
“the real (mechanisms, powers, tendencies or deep structures which the natural and 
social sciences seek to identify); the actual (sequences of events which may be 
produced under experimental conditions or are in principle observable under certain 
conditions in the social world); and the empirical (observed events)”.  
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Fairclough (2005: 922) also distinguishes between them as: “the real is the domain of 
structures with their associated ‘causal powers’; the actual is the domain of events and 
processes; and the empirical is the part of the real and the actual that is experienced by 
social actors.” 
 
The actual does not reflect the real in a simple or a direct way as “the extent to which and 
ways in which the particular causal powers are activated to affect actual events is contingent 
upon the complex interaction of different structures and causal powers in the causing of 
events”(Fairclough, 2005: 922). Not only do the properties of structures but also social 
agents have the causal powers which affect the actual. Actual reality is, in principle, 
observable, however it is, in practice, unobservable. It implies that we can see that the 
problems and explanations are observable phenomena in principle, however, we cannot see 
the problems because there are intervening elements in the process. The description of the 
process would not incur intervening elements which we cannot see. Thus, there are two 
aspects to take into account: one is to conceptualise observable behaviours; and the other is 
to conceptualise unobservable behaviours. 
 
The actual level includes three sets of questions: first, ontological discussion questions what 
is really happening, or what will result in these factors being realised. Certain principles or 
practices, if respected, will be associated with particular outcomes which are ethically 
desirable; second, a normative account will be following those principles or practices, 
because they are associated with particular (desired) outcomes. A normative or an ethical 
account is regarding what organisations ought to be; and lastly, descriptive factors discuss 
what counts as principles or practices which are operational indicators. The empirical 
research provides basic or confirmatory data and theorises explanatory frameworks to 
“identify real linkages between structures or mechanisms and social phenomena” (Henry, 
2007: 199).  
5.3.2 Structuration Theory 
Along with Critical Realism, an important development has been presented by Pawson and 
Tilley (1997) in the application of the retroductive research strategy to the social sciences 
and their work draws on “Giddens’s (1979; 1984) discussions of the duality of agency and 
structure, [and] they have endeavoured to bring [together] both elements of the structuralist 
and constructivist versions of realism” (Blaikie, 2000: 112), as shown in Figure 5-1. They 
argue that the aim of social inquiry is to explain social regularities which are generated by 
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some underlying mechanism acting in social contexts. Thus, the explanation comprises 
propositions about “how the interplay between structure and agency has constituted the 
regularity” (Pawson and Tilley 1997: 71 cited in Blaikie, 2000: 112). Furthermore, Pawson 
and Tilley argue that “all social regularities are embedded in a wider range of social 
processes, within different layers of social reality.”  
 
Figure 5-1 Structuration theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Blaikie (1993: 96-99), Bryman (2004: 12 & 17) & Giddens (1999: 119) 
 
There are however, some criticisms of Structuration Theory. According to Figure 5-1, 
Structuration Theory does not conform to a predetermined set of epistemological principles 
and, thus, does not assume what forms of knowledge are acceptable (Blaikie 1993: 99).  
Besides, there is another issue of a limitation of usefulness of Structuration Theory in social 
research. Against Giddens’s insistence that Structuration Theory represents a social 
research rather than an ontological framework, Gregson (1989) criticises the relevance of it 
Structuralism 
Ontology: inclines toward objectivism. 
 
Epistemology: strongly emphasizes the pre-
eminence of the social whole over its individual 
parts i.e., its constituent actors, human subjects;  
the language which social scientists use to 
communicate their theoretical ideas and 
research findings to each other; it is the 
language of both abstract theoretical notions as 
well as a means of identifying observable 
phenomena. 
 
 
Structuration Theory 
Ontology: it is recurrent social practices and their transformations; It is 
concerned with the nature of human action, the acting self, social 
institutions and the interrelations between action and institutions - with 
the relationship between agency and structure 
 
Epistemology: structuration theory does not conform to a 
predetermined set of epistemological principles, it nevertheless 
provides the grounds for gaining knowledge of the social world. 
Constructivism 
Ontology: social phenomena and their 
meanings are continually being accomplished 
by social actors.  
 
Epistemology: instead of taking the view that 
order in organisations is a pre-existing 
characteristic, they argue that it is worked at. 
Instead of seeing culture as an external reality 
that acts on and constrains people, it can be 
taken to be an emergent reality in a continuous 
state of construction and reconstruction.  
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to empirical research on two grounds: first, if it is impossible to explain and clarify social life, 
it fails to accomplish the main objective of social science; and second, it must be able to 
relate to what happens ‘out there’ in order to offer a process of social transformation (Blaikie, 
1993: 120). The key questions of empirical research are “which actors, which skills and 
which temporal and spatial structures we choose to investigate; and how we investigate 
them, where and when” (Gregson 1989: 240-1 cited in Blaikie, 1993: 120). Gregson 
concludes, therefore, that Structuration Theory should be regarded as “second-order theory 
(or meta-theory)” as it is concerned with “conceptualising the general constitutents of human 
society” (Blaikie, 1993: 120). 
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Figure 5-2 Structuration Theory 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Blaikie (2000: 132) 
 
Society 
Olympic World 
Global society 
Global institution 
Structure 
Political, Social  
& Economic structure 
 
 
Semantics: 
Shared 
beliefs, 
meanings, and 
languages  
Moral: 
Rules  
Material: 
Human 
financial and 
cultural 
capital/data in 
material form  
Non-material: 
Psychological 
and cultural 
factors, and  
Ideology 
 
Culture 
Shared language, knowledge, 
beliefs and moral rules 
(organisational culture & 
structure) 
Power 
‘Power over’ domination 
based on control of 
resources 
‘Power to’ ability to make 
choices with regard to 
certain outcomes 
 
Rules Resources 
Institutions 
Global Practices (NSOs) 
Social systems 
Olympic movement (KOC) 
Structuration 
Agency 
Individual actors in the KOC 
& IOC-Solidarity performed action in 
relation to governance procedures. 
 
Practical consciousness-how to be 
governed 
Discursive consciousness (knows the 
rules but may break the rules) 
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5.3.3 Similarities and Differences between CR and Structuration Theory 
There are a number of similarities and differences between the assumptions of critical 
realism and Structuration Theory. With respect to the similarities, first, critical realism and 
Structuration Theory both permit realist ontological and interpretivist epistemological 
positions. Second, in methodological terms, these two approaches invite us to use 
quantitative and qualitative approaches to data collection and analysis, as shown in Table 5-
1 above. From his various writings Giddens (1976a; 1991) emphasises the importance of 
empirical work and accepts quantitative and qualitative methods where appropriate. Critical 
realism also adopts both methods. 
 
In addition, they both suggest that structures are produced by human actions or agency and 
are reproduced and/or transformed by such action. As Marsh et al. (1999: 15) suggest, 
agents are “bearers of structural positions”, but are also interpreters of those structures, 
while structures are changeable because of “the strategic decisions of the agents operating 
within the structure” (Green, 2003: 49). This is a dialectical relationship in which structure 
and agency logically involve each other. “Policy outcomes, for example, cannot be explained 
only with reference to structures – elsewhere characterised as the conditions of action within 
which actors operate” (Green, 2003: 49; see also Betts 1986: 39; Sibeon 1999). For 
Structuration Theorists following Giddens (1976a: 1984; 1991) structure and agency cannot 
be separated substantively as they are ‘imminent’, which means that they both occur at the 
same time and cannot exist, one without the other. However, though structure and agency 
are imminent and thus cannot be practically separated, they can be analytically separate 
categories.  
 
The differences between these two approaches are evident in four elements. First, 
concerned with structure and agency, critical realism focuses on the relational and 
transformational view of society and the individual, and neither can be neglected (Bhaskar, 
1979), while Structuration Theory focuses more on social practices “ordered across space 
and time” and their transformations, rather than the individual actor or societal totality 
(Giddens, 1984). The duality of structure suggested by Giddens (1979; 1984) is that “the 
social structure is as the conditions and the consequences of social interaction” (Blaikie, 
1993: 99). Critical realism explores how individuals are influenced by the social context.  
There are two assumptions: one is that individuals have free will to some extent; and the 
other is that individuals are constrained by structures to some extent. Accordingly, both 
assumptions seek to explain “how different individuals are enabled and constrained by the 
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social context in different ways” (Cruickshank, 2003: 2).  
 
Next, critical realism is ‘critical’ in the sense of accepting that the critical role of social theory 
is emancipatory, which is defined as generating knowledge which will provide actors with an 
ability to enhance the social world. As Groff (2004: 19) suggests, following Bhaskar ’s (1976) 
argument, that “knowledge claims are social-historical artifacts; they are produced, … and 
they change over time” and that “knowledge production is best thought of….as a process 
whereby existing ideas are transformed into new ones”. In relation to this claim, critical 
realists view social structures as “emergent properties”, which leads to an argument that 
“structures were created by the actions of individuals in the past, and now have causal 
properties in their own right” (Cruickshank, 2003: 3). Thus, critical realism argues structures 
are pre-existing while Structuration Theory does not (structures can only exist in social 
action).   
 
Thirdly, unlike Structuration Theory, critical realism argues that the real world is explained 
causally. Following the hypothesis of naturalism, which assumes the existence of generative 
structures, “knowable to men, and producing manifest phenomena”, the question “can 
reasons be causes?” is raised: the category of reasons is explanations of human conducts; 
and the category of causes is generative structure (Bhaskar, 1979: 102). Critical realists 
argue that we cannot see facts through variables, but variables are always “conceptual 
interpretations” (Cruickshank, 2003: 2). “Correlations between variables are taken as 
descriptions rather than explanations in themselves, because for critical realists correlations 
between variables are contingent effects of underlying causal processes” (Cruickshank, 
2003: 2). Moreover, Groff (2004: 11) also sees a shift of the ontological focus from entities to 
processes, power and causality itself are key features of critical realism.   
 
The last important element is that critical realism is critical in political and methodological 
issues. It is critical in a political sense as the task of research is to “enable the move from 
facts to values” (Cruickshank, 2003: 3). It explores the inequality, or exploitation created 
through existing political, social and economic relations and develops a normative critique 
about those relations.  With respect to methodology, critical realism is also critical because 
of the concepts which “inform the meta-theory that defines structure and agency can only be 
developed via a critical dialogue with alternative social ontologies” (Cruickshank, 2003: 3).  
Social ontology linking structure and agency is especially important in that many researchers 
have turned to a mixture of methods and theory, or “methodological pluralism” (Cruickshank, 
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2003: 4). However the differences are not so great when one considers that as Giddens 
(1984: 287) argues, “Structuration Theory is intrinsically incomplete if not linked to a 
conception of social science as critical theory” (cited in Blaikie, 1993: 121-2).   
5.3.4 Difficulties of Critical Realism 
In relation to methodological pluralism, “the nature of the critical realist account 
accommodates methodological pluralism” (Henry, 2007: 199). Henry (2007: 200-1) raises 
two main difficulties with critical realism: first, causal necessity in the social world is 
problematic in the discussion of deep structure; and secondly, some phenomena can be 
described differently in different ‘language games,’ thus the notion of ‘facts’ based on 
language is also challengeable. With respect to the first point, society, over an extended 
period of time, has produced “a social practice with its own structures” (Henry 2007: 200). 
Learning these structures or learning how social agency behaves or thinks does not imply 
that structures cause social constituents to behave or think as they do. In terms of the 
second point, the nature and role of language in reaching consensus as demonstrating 
difference is problematic. These points are addressed in order. 
 
Regarding the first problem mentioned above that ‘causal necessity in the social world is 
problematic in the discussion of deep structure’, Structuration Theory is borrowed to discuss 
deep structure. As in the framework of Structuration Theory shown in Figure 5-2 above, 
structure is clarified in details as semantics, moral, material and non-material. Semantics 
and moral display culture and material and non-material present power.  
 
The second problem is that critical realism does not deal with the issue of the fact of 
language: it describes one true explanation and fails to recognise any other explanations. 
However, simply identifying events without discussing language is problematic. Language is 
not theory-neutral and thus, general truth becomes generally accepted rather than universal 
truth (Henry, 2007). The nature of events is produced by language: despite describing the 
‘same’ events, it may interpret them differently. Language is not just showing or reflecting the 
reality but producing/reproducing reality which shows the real structure. 
5.4 Critical Discourse Analysis 
In the methodological aspects of Foucauldian Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) 
suggested by Jäger and Maier (2009: 34) “knowledge refers to all kinds of contents that 
make up a human consciousness, or in other words, all kinds of meanings that people use to 
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interpret and shape their environment”. Thus, knowledge is dependent on the discursive 
surroundings in which people are born, and in which people live. Accordingly, the top priority 
of discourse analysis is to identify the knowledge embraced in discourses. Discourse here is 
defined as “an institutionalised way of talking that regulates and reinforces action and 
thereby exerts power” (Link, 1983: 60 cited in Jäger & Maier, 2009: 35). Discourses express 
the social practice and the exercise of power, and furthermore, they can exercise power in a 
society through the ability to regulate people’s way of thinking, acting and so on.   
 
As Jäger and Maier (2009: 36) suggest, CDA aims at discovering “what is said and can be 
said in a given society at a given time with regard to its qualitative spectrum”. It especially, 
reveals how discourses are used to make particular statements seem rational and 
reasonable although they are limited in certain circumstances. When CDA identifies the way 
of connection between discourse and reality, the connections between power and discourse 
are also likely to be clarified. As discourses are able to shape and to determine social reality 
“via intervening active subjects as co-producers and co-agents of discourses” (Jäger & Maier, 
2009: 37), discourse analysis focuses on not only “the retrospective analysis of allocations of 
meaning, but also the ongoing production of reality through discourses, conveyed by active 
subjects” (Jäger & Maier, 2009: 37). 
 
Jäger and Maier (2009: 37) also underline two types of connection between discourses and 
power: ‘the power of discourse’ and ‘the power over discourse’. The former is about two 
effects of discourse. Individual and collective consciousness which determine his/her and 
their actions are constructed by discourses that transfer knowledge, and in turn, discourses 
instruct the creation of reality of the individual and/or collective, discursive and non-
discursive as well. The latter is concerned about different chances of influences between 
individuals and/or groups. Undoubtedly, some individuals and groups exercise more power 
over discourse using their privilege, authority, and resources. Holzscheiter (2005: 57) puts it 
that power over discourse “refers to means through which various groups of actors are 
denied or granted ‘access to the stage’ through processes of inclusion and exclusion” (Kwon, 
Clarke & Wodak, 2009: 278)  
 
Fairclough (2005: 925) states that texts are contextualised because of their relations to other 
elements of social events, and to social practices. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 21) 
define practices as “habitualised ways, tied to particular times and places, in which people 
apply resources (material or symbolic) to act together in the world”. They are constituted in 
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the domains of the economy and politics, and of culture and “the advantage of focusing upon 
practices is that they constitute a point of connection between abstract structures and their 
mechanisms, and concrete events - between ‘society’ and people living their lives” 
(Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999: 21). “Connections between the use of language and the 
exercise of power are often not clear to people, yet appear on closer examination to be 
vitally important to the working of power” (Fairclough, 1996: 54 cited in Thompson, 2004: 5) 
Accordingly, texts show articulation and tension between two causal forces: social structures 
mediated through social practices; and the agency of the social actors who interpret them. 
 
Following Fairclough (1993; see also Titscher et al., 2000) attributing three dimensions such 
as text, discursive practice and social practice, CDA aims for linking “texts at a micro-level 
(the ‘textual level’) with macro-level power structures (‘sociocultural practice’)… and 
‘discursive practice’ is thus the mediator between the macro- and micro- levels” (Thompson, 
2004: 5).  
 
Figure 5-3 Dimensions of discourse and discourse analysis 
 
Source: adapted from Titscher et al. (2000:?? in Thompson, 2004:6) 
 
As shown in Figure 5-3 above, the textual level discusses content and form of the text. The 
discursive practice level which links between text and social practice analyses “the socio-
cognitive aspects of text production and interpretation” (Titscher et al., 2000: 150). Thus, it 
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includes both an explanation of the ways of interpretation, and the relationship of events and 
orders of discourse. The third dimension of social practice analyses in relation to “the 
situation, the institutional context, the wider group or social context” (Titscher et al., 2000: 
151).  
 
Having identified the broad theoretical context of CDA drawing on Fairclough (2005) and 
Titscher et al. (2000), how does this directly inform the approach to analysing corporate 
governance in the KOC/KSC context? Figure 5-4 illustrates the three phases to identify 
governance issues in the KOC/KSC contexts in relation to the four main events or processes, 
which have taken place in the KOC: the KOC/KSC merger; budget planning; the recruitment 
of new staff (gender and disability equity); and the selection of Chef de Mission and a 
president of the KOC. They are analysed in three phases to identify governance issues in 
the KOC/KSC contexts. In relation to these events one can ask which regularities occur. Can 
these be encapsulated as social practices? What are the implications of these social 
practices? Are these social practices substantially apparent from those in other organisations 
or domains?  
 
The discursive events review (interview and documentary analysis) seek to identify 
‘regularities’. e.g. evidence of how governance activities are undertaken. These regularities 
represent social practices. According to Figure 5-4, Phase 1 deals with a thematic analysis 
which mainly discusses social practices in relation to four events or processes to discovering 
patterns of explanation or description. This illustrates what is actually happening in the 
Korean context. In particular, focus is examination of each interviewee’s discourse to identify 
the knowledge embraced in his/her discourse, and to interpret the nature of particular social 
practices and the execise of power. Power relations between stakeholders in KOC and each 
interviewee’s beliefs representing the culture are revealed. The second phase focuses on 
‘hypothesising’ real structures and mechanisms. In analysing the structures, which underlie 
or are embedded in organisations, this study is drawn to consider the (organisational) 
cultural elements of structures and the power structures bound up in the organisation’s 
structures ‘per se’. Phase 3 identifies how corporate governance is undertaken differently (or 
in the same way) in Korea, for which an explanation is provided to post the existence of 
deep structures which provide the culture and power resources required to sustain a 
different (or similar) approach to the aspect of governance. 
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Figure 5-4 The flow of analysis in associated with CDA 
 
5.5 Methods 
This research entails two main research methods which are document analysis and 
qualitative method, in specific, semi-structured interviews. Although the retroductive research 
strategy can use both qualitative and quantitative methods, this study also takes critical 
discourse analysis as a part of the abductive research strategy. Thus, a qualitative method is 
appropriate for this study. Through document analysis and interviews, the meaning of seven 
principles of corporate governance should be defined, and another aim is to find any 
possibility that the interviewees from the KOC may come to different interpretations 
regarding corporate governance.  
 
Phase 1 
Evaluation of explanations of four key events/processes 
 
Discourse of interviewees and organisational documents 
 
reflect     construct 
organisational realities 
 
How are governance procedures/practices, activities carried out? 
Phase 2 
CDA identifies/underlying structures within the organisation 
 
Explaining why organisational governance activities are carried out this way by 
reference to structures which enable and/or constrain actors 
Phase 3 
Similarities and/or differrences of practices between KOC and western norms, 
and/or IOC governance practices/requirements 
  
How do the governance procedures identified in Phase 1 and explained in Phase 2 
differ from the normative accounts of how governance activities should be undertaken 
in the governance literature, and the IOC principles of good governance? 
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Interviews and document analysis are useful tools used to discover clues regarding social 
practices in the political, economic and social contexts in which the KOC/KSC is situated in 
(cultural) Korea. The analysis is based on various documents published by the IOC, the 
KOC, the Korean Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism and some related governmental 
organisations, along with the interviews with selected members of the KOC and the KSC 
staff. The study of corporate governance of NOCs takes the KOC as its core case study, and 
therefore, the interviewees are all selected from the KOC and the KSC in various categories 
including position, age, gender and length of service. The document and interview analysis 
are divided into four sections, which are shown in Table 5-3 below. 
 
Table 5-3 The four divisions of analysis 
 
IOC / 
a western 
context  
Governmental 
organisations 
(Ministry of Culture, 
Sports and Tourism 
& other relevant 
organisations)  
 
 
NOC 
(KOC/KSC) 
 
 
Interviews  
(KOC/KSC) 
To identify understandings, definitions and applications in relation to seven core principles of 
corporate governance from the management literature (systematic review), IOC official 
documents and the KOC/KSC 
- Possibility of different implications or terms  
- This implies addressing the question of whether or not western notions on corporate 
governance are applied in this non-western context. 
 Documentary analysis of four events & corporate 
governance-related: 
-KOC/KSC merger 
-Budget planning 
-Employment in terms of gender and disability  
-Selections of KOC President & Chef de Mission 
CDA of four events: 
-Identify whether or not 
individual discourse is 
occupied by structural 
positions/ age/ gender/ 
service length of 
interviewees. 
-discover any differences 
between documentary 
and interviews (CDA) 
analysis 
 
The first division is to identify ideal types of each of the core principles of corporate 
governance in the IOC in a western context and provide two main papers: first, the 
operationalisation of each principles and/or related elements providing a way of evaluating 
corporate governance; and second, the commentary addressing the theoretical background 
of definitions of key principles of corporate governance and also accommodating framework 
of a western notion of seven principles of corporate governance.  
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The analysis of the KOC/KSC takes as its starting point the dominant normative elements of 
governance in the Olympic Movement in a western framework and sporting literature. It 
seeks to uncover how the discourse of actors within the system identifies ways in which the 
norms of governance are interpreted and acted upon. Thus it takes as its starting point (for 
example, conducting interviews, selecting events and processes to consider) key normative 
principles identified in the governance literature.  
5.5.1 Documentary Analysis 
As Bryman (2001: 387) states “the question of credibility raises the issue of whether the 
documentary source is biased”. This study aims to identify any evidence of a biased 
perspective by using CDA in terms of governance practices within Korean context. According 
to the Oxford Dictionary, bias is defined as “inclination or prejudice for or against one person 
or group, especially in a way considered to be unfair.” Bias is limitations of individuals’ 
perspective and in particular, claims of bias are a departure from commonly held views, 
norms, or consensus. Also, such limitations are maybe explained by looking at events 
concerning different interests of actors. Thus, CDA aims at identifying interests and different 
perspectives of particular agents, and is also designed to intend to identify particular form of 
discourse and ways in which these forms of discourse promote certain interests implicitly.  
   
Furthermore, documents may be “interesting in bringing out the role and significance of 
subcultures within the organisation” (Bryman, 2001: 388; see also Forster 1994) though 
official documents are likely to promote the dominant culture of the organisation. The main 
purpose is to discover the social practices, which go together to make up or support 
governance activities. Thus, key comparison is between documents from governmental 
organisations, the KOC/KSC and the IOC, as shown Table 5-4. This Table also includes 
additional sporting organisations that are related to analysis of corporate governance of the 
KOC as stakeholders but they are infrequently included in the key comparison: The Korea 
Sports Association for the Disabled/Korean Paralympic Committee (KOSAD/KPC); The 
Korea Sports Promotion Foundation (KSPO); Korea Council for Sport for All (KOCOSA); 
National Federations (NFs); and local Branches. 
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Table 5-4 The list of major document sources/organisations analysed 
Author  Title Descrip- 
tion 
Date of 
publishin
g 
Source 
MCST  
 
Goven 
orgs, 
Sports White Paper Annual 
report 
2008 & 
2009 
Publication & 
www.mcst.go.kr 
 
MOSF 
Alio System :  
Gyeong Young Gong Shi 
  
2009 
www.mosf.go.kr 
 
MOPAS 
Improvement of working 
level public officers’ 
human resources’ 
  www.mopas.go.kr 
 
KISS 
Under 
MCST 
The way of 
strengthening of the 
KOC’ roles for national 
sport promotion 
  
August 
2003 
Publication 
 
 
 
 
KSC 
/ 
KOC 
 
 
 
 
 
Under 
MCST 
 
KOC in fifty years 
A historical 
background 
of the KOC 
& the KSC 
1996 Publication 
Report of business 
outcome 
 
Budget 
planning 
2009  
 
Publication & 
www.sports.or.kr 
List of budget planning 
Report of budget 
outcome 
KOC Statutes Corporate 
governance 
practices of 
the KOC 
Before 
/after June 
2009 
 
www.sports.or.kr 
Code of Conduct for 
Employees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IOC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Int’ 
org 
 
Olympic Charter 
 
 
 
 
The IOC 
recommend-
ations on 
governance 
practices 
in force as 
from 11 
February 
2010, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
www.olympic.org 
XIII Olympic Congress 
Copenhagen 2009 
including ‘Contributions’ 
& ‘The Olympic 
Movement in Society’ 
 
 
2009 
The Basic Universal 
Principles   
1 February 
2009 
‘The IOC Code of Ethics’ 
adopted by the IOC 
Executive Board 
26 October 
2010 in 
Acapulco. 
KOSAD/ 
KPC 
 
 
Under 
MCST 
 
Additional sport orgs: 
 
an overview 
organisational chart  
 
Relations 
with the 
KOC as 
stakeholders 
 
After the 
KOC/KSC 
merger in 
2009 
www.kosad.or.kr 
KSPO www.kspo.or.kr 
KOCOSA www.sportal.or.kr 
NFs www.sports.or.kr 
Local 
Branches 
www.sports.or.kr 
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For the governmental documents, the ‘Sports White Paper’ released by the Ministry of 
Culture Sports & Tourism (MCST)’s is a major source for understanding sport policy from the 
Korean government perspective. Additionally, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) 
operates the Alio System (All Public Information In One) which provides a document titled ‘경
영공시’ or ‘Gyeong Young Gong Shi’ which is a programme releasing a wide range of 
relevant documents concerning all governmental organisations. Since the KOC is regarded 
as a governmental organisation, it is also possible to obtain information with regard to the 
KOC. Moreover, some sport related organisations such as the Korea Institute of Sports 
Science (KISS) also released documents regarding the sport policy of the KOC/KSC and 
these are used as additional information but also reflect the relationship between 
government and the KOC. As another governmental organisation, some supportive 
information is found in the document title ‘the improvement of working level public officers’ 
human resources’ released by the Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MOPAS)  
 
As both the KOC and the KSC had been regarded as the head body of Korean sport until 
2009 when these two sporting organisations merged, their documents or books are analysed 
to identify power relations and organisational cultures in relation with practices of corporate 
governance. Apart from the major documents listed in Table 5-4 the KOC has openly 
released a wide range of documents on its Internet site including its organisational chart, the 
list of KOC/KSC President and the like. 
 
However, some documents that contain sensitive issues such as gender or disability equity, 
and the principles or manual of recruitment of new staff were not found in either the official 
documents or the Internet. In fact, an official recommended percentage of employment of 
people with disabilities could not be found in any documents from the KOC/KSC. One 
interviewee suggested that it would be possible to find the information on this matter on the 
website organised by the Korea Employment Agency for the Disabled (KEAD), 
www.kead.or.kr. This was, thus, an additional analysed document.  
5.5.2 Qualitative methods (semi-structured interview) 
This study aims to collect and evaluate data concerned with agents’ subjective thoughts, 
beliefs and norms within the Korean cultural and social context. This data is discussed to 
identify evidence of different discourses and comparison is also made with the perspectives 
provided by the analysis of documents. In order to facilitate this, the key qualitative method 
is the semi-structured interview based on an interview guide, with open-ended questions.  
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Such interviews lead to interviewees talking freely and facilitate the explanations of agent-
informed interpretations of events/processes, and furthermore, provide clues as to deeper 
social structures, which may enable and constrain corporate governance practices of the 
KOC. Young (1977) uses the term “assumptive worlds” of key actors to indicate their beliefs, 
activities that make up their world view (Green, 2003: 53). The interviews were designed to 
identify the nature of the assumptive worlds of actors in KOC contexts. Using semi-
structured interviews, as Devine suggests, “draws particular attention to contextual issues, 
placing an interviewee’s attitudes and behaviour in the context of her/his individual biography 
and wider social setting” (1995: 138 cited in Green, 2003: 53-4). Figure 5-4 shows the flow of 
selection of interviewees and incurs the reasons of choosing different categories of 
interviewees. 
 
Figure 5-4 The flow of selection of interviewees 
 
 
What are the key social pracitces involved in the governance process? 
1) what do the above reveal about underlying social structures? 
2) These may be organisational cultures/structures/general aspects 
(e.g. gender, age structure etc) 
3) How are these structures related to power relations? 
Questions about (purpose of interviews) 
Governance elements practices Four key events related to governance 
Design of interview approach 
Top down Bottom up 
Selection of interviewees 
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Top down and bottom up approaches 
There are two aspects of the interview data and data analysis, which are critical as shown 
Figure 5-4: One relates to a top down or deductive approach; and the other relates to a 
bottom up or inductive approach. The former analyses responses to directed questioning, 
the latter is a more open ended, an interviewee-driven form of questioning. The interviews 
contain two main elements. One relates to interviewer-determined concepts (features of 
governance). Key concepts of governance are operationalised and interviewees are asked 
about these. To give a simple example, a key operational feature of accountability is the 
reporting process. Interviewees may be asked –‘to whom is the KOC/KSC accountable?’ 
Here is accountability achieved (eg. through formal and informal reporting) etc. 
 
The other relates to the bottom-up approach. Interviewee-led discussion is achieved by 
asking how certain policy actions came about. Thus the interviewer asks ‘how was the 
president elected?’ with the answer reflecting perhaps on level of democracy, or on some 
other unpredicted aspect of organisational behaviour. Thus, this twofold approach identifies 
aspects of the interviewees’ understanding of corporate governance ‘per se’ but also 
indicates whether interviewees share similar or different perspectives on western norms 
including the IOC’s norms as recommendations for governance. 
Selection criteria for Interviews  
The interviews were conducted in the period immediately after the KOC/KSC merger which 
took place on 29 June, 2009. Fifteen former or current employees in both the KOC and the 
KSC were selected for interviews: seven respondents from the KSC; and eight respondents 
from the KOC. According to Figure 5-4, there are two aspects of questions: the first 
regarding elements of governance practice; and the second relating to four key events 
related to practices relevant to governance. This allows ‘uncovering’ of aspects of social 
structures, organisational cultures and power relations. Thus the selection criteria for 
interviewees allows for diverting in terms of position, gender, age and length of service (see 
Table 5-5 below). Interviewing ‘actors’ at various levels within the organisational structure is 
key to identifying similar or different perspectives on power relations and organisational 
culture between the KOC and the KSC, male and female, and senior and junior staff 
members at both meso and micro levels.   
 
The high-ranking officials were approached (four from the KOC and three from the KSC) 
through contacting some other higher positions outside the KOC and the KSC. As it was not 
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possible to approach them directly, the author’s personal network was utilised. Each high-
ranking officer was approached by different connectors (sources). There was only one case 
that one senior officer introduced another senior officer to help obtaining the better 
knowledge on the four events. Otherwise, none of senior-officers who conducted interviews 
introduced some other senior officers for the interview.   
 
The three middle-ranking officers, one from the KOC and two from the KSC, were chosen by 
direct contact. In the case of junior officers, two middle-ranking officers introduced some of 
them. However, this does not mean that one interviewee introduced all of them. Only one 
middle-ranking interviewee introduced the two junior staff, otherwise another middle-ranking 
officer introduced one and the other introduced none. The rest of the junior interviewees 
were directly contacted. Thus, the ‘snowball effect’ was unlikely to be applied to this study 
which aimed at avoiding obtaining the similar opinions from the similar group. 
 
Each interviewee was contacted through either email or phone to negotiate the date and the 
place for interview. Some interviewees preferred conducting interviews in their offices, in 
particular, most high-ranking officers had their own premises. The middle-ranking and junior 
officers preferred conducting interviews outside the building of the KOC and the KSC without 
their work colleagues present. 
 
 Table 5-5 Selection criteria for interviews 
 
No 
 
Position 
KOC 
/ 
KSC 
 
Age 
Length of 
employment / 
service 
Male 
/ 
Female 
1 The former Secretary General  
 
 
 
Decision 
making 
level 
(manager
-ial level) 
KSC 60s Less than 5 yrs M 
2 The former Director General of 
International Affairs 
KOC 50s More than 20 yrs M 
3 Director of Clean Sport KSC 50s More than 20 yrs M 
4 The former Director General of 
International Affairs  
KOC 50s More than 20 yrs M 
5 Director General of International 
Affairs 
KOC 50s More than 20 yrs M 
6 The KSC Board member before & 
after its merger,  
KSC 50s Between 5 & 10 yrs  M 
7 The former Board member KOC 40s Between 5 & 10 yrs M 
8 Assistant Director of Planning & 
Budget Team 
Partly 
involved 
in 
decision 
making 
KSC 30s Between 5 & 10 yrs M 
9 Director of Union KSC 30s Between 5 & 10 yrs M 
10 Staff of Public Relations  KSC 40s More than 20 yrs F 
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11 Manager of International Affairs  
 
Non-
manageri
al level 
KOC 20s Between 5 & 10 yrs F 
12 Staff of Management Strategy 
Team 
KSC 20s Less than 5 yrs M 
13 Staff of International Affairs KOC 20s Less than 5 yrs M 
14 Staff of International Affairs KOC 20s Less than 5 yrs F 
15 Staff of International Affairs KOC 20s Less than 5 yrs F 
*As the interviews were conducted in July 2009 when the KOC and the KSC had just 
merged, those interviewees representing the KOC belong to the Department of International 
Affairs. For reference, after the merger was settled, its title was changed to the Department 
of International Relations (see also Figure 6-2 and Figure 6-3) 
 
The protocol adopted for the conduct of the interview 
With respect to anonymity, names and positions were not disclosed and most interviewees 
were not informed who else were involved in the interviews. According to the policy of the 
KOC and the KSC, personnel positions were changed every certain year and, thus, some 
interviewees did not mind exposing their job titles. In fact, more than half of interviewees 
turned out to be involved in different sections or positions in 2012 in compared to the year 
2009 when the interviewee was conducted. Also, this study avoids attributing statements to 
any individuals. The actual quotations of interviews were all categorised into three: senior, 
middle-ranking and junior staff. However, the former Secretary General, the KSC Board 
member and the former KOC Board member were indicated as their positions possibly 
delivered the fact that they were directly involved in decision-making of the KOC or the KSC. 
 
The questions for the interview were not exposed until the actual conduct of the interview. 
However, they were informed what topic it would be about and approximated time it would 
take when negotiating the interview. All interviews were recorded to MP3 under the 
interviewees’ agreement in order not to miss any single point from the interviewees. Each 
interview took at least 40 minutes and at most one and a half hour. No field notes were kept. 
Transcripts were produced, covering all questions and responds as soon as possible after 
the interviews.   
 
The transcript followed the thematic analysis. As this study aims to obtain two ways of 
knowledge on the KOC’s governance practices, one is interviewer-determined concepts 
regarding governance practices which were conceptualised by the IOC and the other is 
interviewee-led discussion regarding the four events taken place in the KOC. As each 
interviewee was approached by the same questions, the former was used to all but the latter 
showed some limitations to some middle-ranking and junior staff. For instance, the process 
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of selection of the KOC President and the Chef de Mission was likely to be more familiar to 
senior staff who may be involved in the real process or decision-making. Nevertheless the 
views of junior staff are likely to be relevant not necessarily in providing more accurate 
accounts, but in indicating their perspectives on, and beliefs concerning, this critically 
important feature of governance. Of course those directly involved, or with access to 
information about the selection process (six interviewees in senior positions were selected) 
will differ in their perspective from junior staff who clam little or no knowledge of the 
perspective of selection of leaders. However, this ‘discourse of ignorance’ of the junior staff 
revealed something about governance principles in the organisation in so far as it indicates a 
lack of transparency about leadership selection. Similarly in relation to gender equity, it will 
be important to judge whether the perspectives of men and women or of different age groups 
differ. 
5.6 Validity and Reliability 
Qualitative research employing semi-structured interviews may often raise questions of 
validity and reliability. Discourse analysis approaches are not exempt from such criticisms. 
Validity is referred to as “the problem of whether the data collected is a true picture of what is 
being studied” (McNeill 1990: 15). Two aspects of validity are mainly discussed: internal and 
external validity. Internal validity in the case of discourse analysis incorporates those 
questions: (a) are my methods valid? and (b) are my interpretations valid? Establishing the 
internal validity and demonstrating credibility of the findings of discourse analysis are 
regarded as largely a matter of coherence, or ‘warrantability’, which is that “an analysis is 
warrantable to the extent that it is both trustworthy and sound” (Wood & Kroger, 2000: 167). 
This study identifies certain discourses on behaviours of governance practices and formal 
/informal practices related to governance, which lead to revealing the nature of social 
practices involving social structure and power relations.  
 
In terms of external validity the case study approach adapted is one which is driven by 
theoretical generalisation (rather than generalisation from a sample to a population). The 
theoretical generalisation being tested is the claim that (a) governance principles are 
generally derived from western perspectives; but that (b) governance principles are culturally 
relative. In effect, the case study of the KOC/KSC is one of ‘pattern matching’. In other words 
the research question relates to whether or not the governance principles in the discourse in 
the KOC/KSC match the pattern of governance principles prescribed in western accounts, 
indicating the universal principles of governance for international sporting bodies prescribed 
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by the IOC (see Figure 5-5 below) 
 
Perspectives on what actually happens are important but we wish to make reference to real 
structures and real practices. Concerning the four events or processes which have taken 
place in the KOC, there is a possibility that each interviewee delivers in his/her perspective 
and that he/she can fabricate his/her opinion in order not to reveal a sensitive issue in public. 
The CDA enables us to identify different perspectives in governance practices and the 
example we cited above of the ‘discourse of ignorance’ allows us to draw warrantable 
conclusions about a principle of governance i.e. transparency. So we are interested in both 
interviewees’ perspectives and in real structures or processes. 
 
Figure 5-5 Case study method of the study 
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Source: adapted from Yin (1994: 49) 
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Bryman (2008: 149) suggests that “reliability is fundamentally concerned with issues of 
consistency of measures” and thus, Yin (1994: 36) claims that “the goal of reliability is to 
minimise the errors and biases” to obtain the same results by doing the same case over 
again by other investigators. As Figure 5-5 shows, the KOC/KSC has been chosen as a 
single case as this sporting organisation fully meets the conditions for “the critical test” “a 
well-formulated theory”, which is that governance practices are western-constructed and 
culturally relative (Yin, 1994: 38). The KOC/KSC represents a sporting organisation which is 
in a non-western context in which its cultural background is expected to differ from the 
sporting organisations in the west and thus, this allows us to make generalisations about 
ways in which governance practices exercise.  
 
Concerning reliability in discourse analysis, Wood and Kroger (2000: 164) note that concepts 
or meanings can be differently interpreted within a particular context in the social world in 
which “meaning is inseparable from context”. They add that “the repetition of concepts or 
meanings” is thus “something that is negotiated within a particular context”. Therefore, 
reliability in discourse analysis “always involve some sort of inference or theoretical 
interpretation,… in terms of which aspects or features of an event are important” (Wood & 
Kroger, 2000: 165) and “interpretations themselves are always contextualised and 
provisional” (Wood & Kroger, 2000: 165). The concepts or meanings of key principles of 
governance developed and used by the IOC, which are constructed in a western society can 
be different in a particular social world, for example, the KOC in a non-western social milieu. 
Therefore, the meaning of principles of governance in the context of KOC is always likely to 
be in some respects similar (it is part of the wider milieu of sport) and in some respect 
different i.e. in ways specific to the Korean context. In addition, the concepts of governance 
can be newly interpreted over time as the Korean context is always changing.  
5.7 Conclusion 
This study aims to identify governance practices within Korean contexts by means of Critical 
Discourse Analysis from a critical realist perspective, which follows realist ontological and 
interpretivist epistemological assumptions. With two difficulties of critical realism, which are 
that causal necessity in the social world is problematic in the discussion of deep structure 
and that some phenomena can be described differently in different language paradigms, 
Structuration Theory is borrowed to discuss deep structure and the CDA is applied to solve 
those two difficulties respectively.  
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Looking back to issues of social practice in this chapter, we take about terms of social 
practices which are attributes to governance practices in the following chapter. Chouliaraki 
and Fairclough (1999: 21) define practices as “habitualised ways, tied to particular times and 
places, in which people apply resources (material or symbolic) to act together in the world”. 
They are constituted in the domains of the economy and politics, and of culture and “the 
advantage of focusing upon practices is that they constitute a point of connection between 
abstract structures and their mechanisms, and concrete events - between ‘society’ and 
people living their lives” (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999: 21). What we have been identifying 
here is interviewees’ discursive construction of organisational or governance practices, that 
is social practices occurring in or constituting the organisation and the way that it is run. This 
of course is related to the core research question, namely, are these social practices 
different in the Korean context and if so how. 
 
This study aims to identifying any evidence of a biased perspective by using DCA in terms of 
governance practices within the Korean context. Accordingly, documentary analysis and 
qualitative method, in a semi-structured interview, are the two main research methods in this 
study. The top-down and the bottom-up approaches are both applied for this study: the 
former relates to interviewer-determined concepts of governance and the latter relates to 
interviewee-led discussion on the four events of the KOC/KSC.  
 
With normative governance practices recommended by the IOC (see Chapter 4), which are 
constructed in a western context, this study seeks to identify if the KOC/KSC shows similar 
or different approaches to, or understandings of governance practices and, thus, allows us to 
examine the extent to which, and how governance practices are culturally relative. 
Understanding events or processes that took place in the KOC/KSC lead to uncover social 
practices reflecting the deep social structure of Korea which forms part of the context for the 
development of governance practices. Therefore, in the following chapter, the ‘stratified 
ontology’ of critical realism including domains of empirical, actual and real is to be identified 
through analysing the KOC/KSC’s main events.      
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6 Four events/processes analysed in association with CDA   
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter employs Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in relation to four selected events 
that have taken place in the recent history of the Korea Sports Council and/or the Korean 
Olympic Committee in order to understand how the KOC/KSC governs. The four events 
chosen are as follows: the KOC/KSC merger, budget planning, the recruitment of staff in 
terms of gender and disability equity, and the process used for selecting the KOC President 
and the Chef de Mission. By analysing these four main events, first, it permits different or 
similar interpretations of the same terminologies or phenomena by different agents to be 
identified; second, the configuration of social practices on specific social occasions may be 
examined and explained; and third, the deep structure of the organisations can be induced, 
illustrating the underlying power relations and culture, as Figure 5-4 shows in the 
Methodology chapter.  
 
This section also draws upon a range of theories from state and power to governance types, 
which are discussed in Chapter two. State theory is used to provide an overall picture of the 
Korean governing system, which is closely connected to the practices of corporate 
governance implemented by the KOC. Power theory is also applied to explain the power 
relations between the stakeholders of the KSC/KOC, which are evident in the social 
practices adopted in sports governance in the Korean context. In this process, stakeholder 
theory serves to identify the primary stakeholders who are involved in decision-making on 
major issues of sports policy in the Korean context. 
 
As of 29 June 2009, the KOC and the KSC were merged into one organisation, whose title 
became the KOC. Although the interviews were conducted after the merger had taken place, 
the interviewees are categorised into those pertaining to the KSC and the KOC so as to 
explore the aspect of the power relations between both sports organisations. In order to find 
and arrange emerging themes through interviews and published documents, NVivo software 
was used to construct a set of tree node(s) that could be specifically arranged into 
subordinates. Thus, this study focuses on emerging themes to discover as many related 
social practices as possible. 
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6.2 The KOC/KSC Merger 
6.2.1 Introduction 
The merger of the two organisations is seen as an event. Prior to the analysis, the 
discussion focuses on how the term ‘government’ was defined by the interviewees. Most 
respondents’ proposal to the question ‘which stakeholder is the most influential in decision 
making in Korean sports policy?’ was ‘the government’. Interestingly, here under the term 
‘government’, the KOC and KSC respondents indicated that they identified not only 
governmental bodies such as the MCST or the Blue House, which is equivalent to the White 
House in the USA, but also a wide range of policy making individuals from the State 
President to the elected politicians and/or professional administrators (civil servants) 
involved in decision making. These included the Minister, the 1st Vice-Minister, or the 
Director of the MCST. In addition, a political group such as the ruling party was also 
classified as belonging to the government, according to a former KOC board member and a 
middle-ranking staff member of the KSC: 
 
I think that is the government (what do you mean by the government?) The 
government can be the Blue House, it can be a ruling party which produces and 
directs a policy, or the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism  
              (a former KOC Board member) 
 
I can see that is the government. (What does ‘government’ mean?) It doesn’t 
necessarily include the President but it does include the Minister, the 1st vice-
minister, and the Director of the Sport Bureau of the MCST  
           (a middle-ranking staff member of the KSC) 
 
More specifically, most respondents understood by ‘the government’ either the MCST or the 
State President. It was likely that the respondents regarded the government as any types of 
governmental bodies and government-related groups or individuals that were directly 
implicated in decision making on national sporting policy. It seems, moreover, that those 
groups who had been influential in national sport decision making at governmental level 
were also regarded as ‘the government’. In this study, however, the State President, the 
MCST, and the ruling party all tended to be regarded as a single individual stakeholder. The 
answers to the question should, however, be clearly distinguished and, thus, the 
respondents needed to specify which stakeholder they intended to mean. The government 
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and the state are not necessarily a single actor. 
6.2.2 Map of themes 
A total of six tree nodes are constituted in relation to the issue of the KOC/KSC merger, as 
shown in Figure 6-1: The first KOC/KSC merger; the KSC; the KOC; the structure of the 
KOC/KSC before its merger in 2009; the second KOC/KSC merger in 2009; and the Korea 
Council of Sport for All. The emerging themes are categorised as follows: the KSC’s 
dominance in Korean sporting history; the power of the State President; politicians’ misuse 
of power in the organisation of sport; politicians’ involvement in decision making, and 
economic power.  
 
Figure 6-1 The KOC/KSC merger  
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6.2.3 Explanations of social practices 
a) The KSC’s dominance in Korean sport history 
The KOC/KSC merger provides an opportunity to learn about the historical background of 
both organisations, the KOC and the KSC, and, furthermore, to observe the power structure 
that had grown naturally between them. The viewpoints of a middle-ranking official of the 
KSC and of a high-ranking member of the KOC are taken into account first of all: 
 
The KSC was created in 1920 with the name of Chosun Sport Council4… but then, 
the KOC was founded around 30 years after that. Was it in 1946 or 1948?  
Sometime around that… So history and authority are practically more on the side of 
the KSC. So from the time of its establishment, the KSC was already… I mean, the 
reason for creating the KOC was simply to allow participation in the Olympics… 
there’s got to be the NOC in order to participate in the Olympics, right? So this 
additional organisation was created but the actual work of taking human resource 
decisions was all done by the other part of the organisation [the KSC]. Naturally, the 
rules were drawn up in such a way that a president designated by the KSC was also 
automatically the president of the KOC. This resulted in the formation of two 
organisations under one president. 
 (a middle-ranking KSC official) 
 
There was conflict between the KOC and the KSC, … but unlike the US, we 
combined them under a KSC-led structure. The reason for this was that the KSC 
was created in 1920 and in 1946, after the liberation (in 1945), the KOC was 
established under the KSC. So the original organisation was thought to be the KSC, 
which made it natural to proceed on the assumption that things centered around the 
KSC, but when we hosted the Olympics in 1988, the roles of KOC were highlighted.  
(a senior KOC officer) 
 
On the basis of the officials’ discourse where they say “just for participation in the Olympics” 
and “the KOC was established under the KSC”, it is clear that they share the same 
perception of the reason for the KOC’s establishment and the organisational structure within 
                                               
4 Its title was renamed ‘Korea Sports Council’ on 3 September 1948 according to the History of the KOC (2009) 
retrieved June 2, 2011 from http://www.sports.or.kr/ksckoc.sport 
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which the KSC and the KOC collaborated with the KSC ‘on top’. Their same perception can 
be driven by the KOC’s official document, KOC in fifty years 5  relating the historical 
background of the two organisations:  
 
The Chosun (Korea) Sports Council was founded by more than 70 members on 
June 13, 1920 in Seoul. The Sports Council was not exactly a sports organization. 
Rather, it was a national education organization dedicated to developing the 
physical and “spiritual” powers of the entire nation. A considerable number of 
proponents were made up of nationalists and national opinion leaders, with few 
representatives from the sports world. The Chosun Sports Council selected as its 
leader, Tu-Hyon Chang, the President of the Dongyang Trading Company…  
(KOC in Fifty Years, 1997: 32) 
 
The Chosun (Korea) Olympic Committee was created from the Chosun Sports 
Council. Because it was not possible to create a National Olympic Committee (NOC) 
while under Japanese rule, prior to 1945 all matters related to sports were handled 
by the Chosun Sports Council, and all athletes were members of the Council. After 
liberation, the Chosun Sports Council was reorganized and played a key role in 
establishing the Chosun Olympic Committee in preparation for the London Olympic 
Games in 1948.  
(KOC in Fifty Years, 1997: 39) 
 
As the quotation makes clear, the KSC Executive Committee members consisted of a variety 
of socially well-known figures in various fields, therefore, the KSC’s legitimacy was not only 
limited to sport but it played a critical role in fostering the “‘spiritual’ power of the entire 
nation”. The implication of the statement that the KSC played an important role in developing 
the spiritual power of the entire nation is that people not only in sporting but also in other 
circles regarded the KSC as the real centre of all sports organisations in Korea. 
Subsequently, this official publication helped to justify the greater empowerment of the KSC 
and the establishment of the legitimacy of the KSC’s dominant position in Korean society. 
The discourse of the people involved in the KSC and KOC embraced their knowledge of the 
organisations’ wider function in Korean society. 
 
                                               
5 Intended to introduce Korean sporting achievements in an international context, this book was entitled ‘KOC in 
Fifty Years’. 
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The viewpoints of the two interviewees recorded above about the significance of the role of 
the KOC are, however, different. The high-ranking member of KOC staff emphasised the 
function of the KOC in saying that ‘it has been highlighted’ since the Seoul Olympic Games 
were hosted, while the middle-ranking KSC staff member minimized it by saying ‘simply to 
allow participation’ in the Games. This demonstrates the different viewpoints held by staff 
members of the KSC and the KOC.   
 
In addition, in comparing the organisational charts of the KSC and the KOC before and after 
June 2009, as shown in Figures 6-2 and 6-3, one notices that before their complete 
combination, the KSC and the KOC employed a system of having one shared President, two 
Secretaries General responsible for each organisation and two groups of Executive 
Committee members. Under the single president system, the elected president of the KSC 
automatically became responsible for the presidency of the KOC. At a working level, 
although all the employees of the KOC and KSC were working together, they belonged 
either to the staff of the KOC or the KSC depending on their tasks and the departments they 
belonged to. As of 29 June, 2009, the organisation was united into one entity called the KOC 
with a single President, Secretary General and group of Executive Committee members. 
Nevertheless, the same distribution of jobs remained among the employees at the working 
level. This shows that in spite of the slightly different titles given to departments, little change 
to the structure of the KOC had actually been made. It was only the structure of high officials 
and Executive Committee members that became unified.    
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Figure 6-2 Organisational Chart of KOC & KSC before its merger (as of May, 2009) 
 Source: the KOC home page (this organisational chart is no longer available) 
 
Figure 6-3 Organisational Chart of KOC after its merger (as of December, 2011) 
 
Source: The KOC home page  
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In association with the interviews above, as the function of the KOC was limited to managing 
the country’s participation in the Olympic Games, it was expected that the KSC would have 
been responsible for any other tasks as a centre of sports organisation in the Korean 
sporting field. Thus, as demonstrated by the views expressed by the interviewees above, the 
KSC was considered to be the actual decision maker in terms of human resource 
management, with the President of KSC being automatically designated as the President of 
the KOC until the 2009 merger. With respect to human resource management, in particular, 
all members of KSC and KOC staff were internally employed in the same organisation, 
which meant that the same people were designated as belonging to the KSC or the KOC, 
depending on their tasks. In fact, the KOC staff members were those who belonged to the 
Department of International Affairs alone, whereas the remaining departments of General 
Management, Sport Development and Training Centre Operations were all regarded as 
constituents of the KSC, as shown in Figure 6-2 above. Thus, the KSC was even 
responsible for appointing members of the KOC. Consequently, the Department of 
International Affairs was merely a part of the KSC and, thus, the KSC president was 
concurrently the KOC president. The interviewees’ perspectives are drawn from the 
organisational structure that tells us that the KOC was only a part of the KSC.  
 
In addition, another interviewee’s point of view on Executive Committee-level interactions 
between the KSC and the KOC gives insights into their practice as regards decision-making.   
 
Since decision-making was done separately by the KOC and the KSC, a large 
number of people had to gather each time and, although the president/chairperson 
was the same person, the board members were different. Hence, an already-
decided issue had to be reviewed for a second time by the other body while seeking 
to reach an agreement. Of course it was mostly just a matter of formality. When 
something had been decided by the KSC, KOC agreed with it most of the time. Even 
when there were board meetings, for example the General Assembly of 
Representatives took place at 2:00, then the KOC Standing Committee would have 
their meeting at 4:00. If the KSC had their Executive Board meeting at 2:00, then the 
KOC Executive Board meeting would be held at 4:00. Matters [to be dealt with in the 
KOC Standing Committee or Board meeting] had already been approved in the KSC. 
They would even say ‘It’s all been decided prior to our meeting, so what is there left 
to say?’ There were even minutes that recorded these talks. (Laughter) That’s how 
different their status was.  
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(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
This informant’s comment about KOC Executive Committee members saying resignedly that 
“it’s all been decided prior to our meeting, so what is there left to say?”, indicates that KOC 
members who were involved in decision making themselves acknowledged and accepted 
the superiority of the KSC. It also implies that the KOC was regarded as a sort of affiliate 
tasked with accomplishing only international affairs as the Korean NOC.  
 
The officially published KOC history and the interviewees from the KOC/KSC quoted above 
declare unequivocally that power, legitimacy and authority had been granted to the KSC. 
The KSC was established during the Japanese occupation under “the spiritual power of the 
entire nation” (KOC in Fifty Years, 1997: 32) and people regarded the KSC as the real centre 
of all sports organisations in Korea which, in turn, established the legitimacy of the KSC’s 
dominance at home. This is evidence of power over discourse whereby the KSC rather than 
the KOC had preeminent power and more privileged access to decision-making over sports 
policy.   
 
In association with the KSC’s position of dominance in Korean society, the event of the 
KOC/KSC merger highlighted issues about the terms used to describe the process of 
integration. Through the interviews, two terms emerged, in particular: ‘merger’ and 
‘absorption’ 
Tong hap (Merger) or Heup su (Absorption) 
Following the general meaning of ‘통합’, ‘tong hap’, the KOC and the KSC became one 
organisation without the implication of any imbalance of power between them. Of the fifteen 
KOC and KSC respondents all used the term ‘tong hap, or merger’ and none used the term 
‘heup su, or absorption’. No-one disputed the appropriateness of the word ‘tong hap’ unless 
they were asked. All staff in responding to this question regarding the merger used the term 
‘merger’ without expressing any concern about its possibly problematic nature. Thus, by 
asking an additional question as to whether it was really merger or absorption, the focus 
could be placed on how respondents interpreted the term ‘tong hap’ and whether their 
perception was that the tendency for the power relation between the KSC and the KOC to be 
unbalanced had been resolved. This is another example of the way in which knowledge is 
dependent on the discursive surroundings in which people live. 
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Absorption 
Two officers stressed that internally, fundamentally, the KSC had absorbed the KOC in terms 
of the power bias resulting from the previous organisational structure. Reference can be 
made to one KSC senior staff who argued about the use of the term ‘merger’ because of the 
persistent power bias:  
 
(Is it merger or absorption?) Absorption. The reason is that the conditions are 
different. It’s not the integration of two independent bodies. [The KOC] is more 
similar to a dependent sporting organisation, whereas the KSC is [an independent 
body].  
(a senior KSC staff member) 
 
In essence, the KSC was an independent body while the KOC used to belong within the 
KSC as the NOC. This has obviously caused the power bias toward the KSC as the 
acknowledged headquarters of sporting organisations in Korea. Due to its organisational 
structure people naturally accepted the fact that the KSC had absorbed the KOC. This was 
also expressed by the other middle-ranking KSC officer:  
 
(In terms of the way of joining two into one, there are different terms, for example, 
‘merger’, ‘integration’, or ‘absorption’; which would you like to choose?) Absorption. 
Ok, you have to take a closer look at this. The KSC did absorb the KOC, in terms of 
organisational power!   
(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
Merger 
Most interviewees described it as a ‘merger’ and two interviewees above both also ended up 
agreeing with the use of the term ‘merger’. This produces insights to explain how their 
knowledge about the two organisations’ unification was constructed by the discursive 
surroundings to which they belonged. The analysis listed three different interpretations of 
‘merger’ in terms of the three perspectives taken by the KSC staff, the KOC staff and the 
government.  
 
- ‘Merger’ from the KSC perspective 
As mentioned above, although the two KSC staff interviewees admitted above that it had 
been a case of the absorption of the KOC, they ended up arguing that the KSC and the KOC 
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had in fact merged.   
 
The basic purpose of the merger from now on will be NOC-oriented. So it’s all 
centered on the NOC. (what do you mean by that?) The integration is. Germany 
gives another recent example of this. (the NOC in Germany plays a leading role 
but in our case, isn’t the KSC the main organisation?) But from now onwards it 
will be a KOC-focused system.   
(a senior KSC staff member) 
 
According to this account, the merger was ultimately oriented towards empowering the NOC 
rather than the KSC in the short term and, therefore, ‘merger’ should be more appropriate 
than ‘absorption’. It implies that the interpretation would differ depending on where the focus 
mainly lay. In terms of its organisational power, the KSC virtually absorbed the KOC, but in 
terms of the final aim of permitting the KOC to play a leading role in the future, the KSC and 
the KOC had become one by means of a sort of merger. The middle-ranking KSC officer 
who argued above that the KSC had absorbed the KOC in terms of its organisational power 
also supported the view that the President of the joint body was aiming to orientate the 
organisation towards strengthening the NOC.   
 
You have to take a close look at these considerations. The KSC did absorb the KOC, 
in terms of its organisational power! But the potential leverage was set to rest with 
the KOC, at least that’s the policy of our president. So in some sense, you can look 
at it from the opposite side, or inversely, as the KOC being absorbed. The one action 
could differentiate the KOC from the KSC, namely the designation of new people 
onto the board, performed by the president. So it’s sort of ambiguous to say who 
absorbed whom.   
(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
As far as the reality of the situation is concerned, the KSC has absorbed the KOC in terms of 
its organisational structure. However, following the KOC/KSC president’s decision to focus 
policy towards the KOC, the members of both organisations could describe it as a ‘merger’ 
and this shows how discourses are used to make this point appear rational and reasonable. 
As discourse can exercise power in a society, the usage of the term ‘merger’ has the 
capacity of ‘regulating’ people’s way of thinking. This will be further explained in connection 
with power. 
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Additionally, there is another respect in which ‘merger’ could be regarded as a more 
appropriate term than ‘absorption’ since the Executive Committee was completely re-
constituted after the merger. None of the former KSC or KOC Executive Committee 
members except for one member were selected as new Executive Committee members to 
avoid creating the impression that the KSC was ultimately planning to acquire a more 
powerful status than the KOC in decision-making.   
 
Looking at the Committee members before and after the merger, they became totally 
distinct from each other. The number of members used to be 130 people but now it 
was reduced to 20, so their influence is… well… a lot probably happens at random 
but it’s hard to say the KOC did this and the KSC did that.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
As argued by the interviewees hitherto, the merger between the KOC and the KSC gave the 
appearance of being a process of absorption since the KSC was placed in the more powerful 
position in terms of the organisational structure than the KOC, considered superficially. 
Internally, however, the KSC staff believed that the KOC would take the leading position in 
respect of organisational power since the President of the KOC was intent on pursuing an 
NOC-centred policy. Consequently, the term ‘tong hap’ has purposely been used in this 
context rather than any other term implying ‘absorption’.  
 
- ‘Merger’ from the KOC perspective 
While the KSC staff emphasised that the KSC had been the main organisation since the 
KOC was dependent on it, the KOC staff put more focus on the KOC’s independence by 
observing that the KOC had been an independent committee which accomplished its 
international affairs as the NOC.   
 
The KSC was the headquarters for all sports, so it was fair enough to say that the 
KSC led in main-stream Korean sport. Nevertheless, the KOC was an independent 
committee inside the KSC and it could take its own line. Thus, in keeping with the 
status given to it by the IOC charter, the KOC was acting with more independent 
influence on matters pertaining to international relations. 
(the former senior KOC official) 
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This implies that because the KSC and the KOC had been given equal treatment externally 
and internationally, the term ‘merger’ was more appropriate. Owing to the fact that the KOC 
had been representing the Republic of Korea as the NOC for a long time, the senior KOC 
staff member who had been working in International Affairs for many years believed that the 
KOC and the KSC had been regarded equally in terms of their organisational status. 
 
- ‘Merger’ from a government perspective 
Even the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism used the term ‘merger, or combination’ 
rather than ‘absorption’ in its official document, the Sports White Paper (2009) regarding the 
unification of KSC and KOC. The White Paper stated categorically that: 
 
“…With respect to the KSC, in 2009, it became completely integrated with the KOC, 
which would be restructured on the basis of the NOC.…”  
(Sports White Paper, 2009: 475) 
 
The word, ‘통합', ‘tong hap’ in Korean was also adopted with an adverb meaning ‘completely, 
or totally’ and the clause ‘which would be restructured on the basis of the NOC’ added for 
clarification. This implies that the MCST was also prepared to admit that the headquarters of 
Korean sporting organisations was to be restructured on the basis of the NOC. It seems, 
therefore, that the word ‘merger’ or ‘integration’ was used purposely to denote the original 
purpose of the structural change.   
 
As an example of the power of discourse, the use of the word ‘merger’ in the strategic policy 
devised by the incumbent KOC/KSC President in the process of restructuring the KOC/KSC 
serves as good evidence of its power. As the President pursued a KOC-centred policy, and 
agencies at all levels, for instance, the government, the KOC/KSC and other related sporting 
organisations in Korea, all expressed the view that ‘merger’ was the appropriate term, the 
organisational structure was still obviously KSC-centred, so that ‘absorption’ suited the 
situation more accurately. This is obvious evidence of how discourses are used to make 
particular statements seem rational and reasonable and how they are able to shape and 
determine social reality. The ‘power of discourse’ influences individual and collective 
consciousness to such an extent that people’s actions are constructed by discourses that 
transfer knowledge, and in turn, discourses inform the creation of reality at the individual 
and/or collective levels. 
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b) The power of the State President 
As Figure 6-1 illustrates, the KSC and the KOC were integrated for the first time in 1968. 
According to the high-ranking KOC officer, 
 
Due to the conflict between the KOC and the KSC back in the 1960s, President Park 
Jung Hee6 ordered the three organisations to be combined together but, unlike the 
US, we combined them under a KSC-led structure.  
(a senior KOC official) 
 
He also explained that the conflict had arisen between the KOC and the KSC due to their 
different roles. The KSC used to be responsible for finding and fostering new athletes while 
the KOC used to have the right to supervise those athletes during international events. This 
gave rise to the conflict between the two organisations and President Park ordered in 1968 
that the three major sporting organisations in Korea should be formed into one. 
Consequently, the KSC, the KOC and the Korea School Sports Council were combined on 1 
March 1968 (History of KOC, n.d.). The word ‘order’ conveys the absolute power of the State 
President in the 1960s and it is evident, therefore, that the President played a critical role in 
decision-making about the merger of those organisations. This was highlighted in an 
interview with another senior member of the KSC staff, who stated that after the KOC/KSC 
merger he even believed that only the State President could unify the newly-integrated KOC 
and Korea Council of Sport for All (KOCOSA), which was a sign of the [absolute] power of 
the State President in decision-making in sporting circles. From this interviewee’s 
perspective, KOCOSA was also one of the sports organisations affected by the issue of the 
integration. 
 
(What about KOCOSA after the merger of the KOC/KSC then?) That has a lot to do 
with the President’s will. The incumbent President is probably not going to be able to 
solve this but the next president will have his Presidential Preparatory Committee, 
won’t he?  [The merged KOC and KOCOSA] had to be integrated, if this was 
accepted by the new President then they would be unified.  
(a senior member of KSC staff) 
 
 
                                               
6 The 5th -9th President, 1963-1979. 
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In view of his comment that the merger of the two sports organisations, that are the merged 
KOC and KOCOSA, was mainly dependent on the State President’s will, this interviewee 
obviously believed that the President was the most active and powerful agent in policy 
decision making and even that the President wielded exclusive authority in sporting circles. 
The period of President Park’s administration back in 1960s when he ordered that the three 
organisations should be formed into one was close to dictatorship, on the other hand, the 
KOC/KSC merger took place in 2009 when Korea was known as a democracy. Although the 
difference in the political system might affect the extent of the State President’s involvement, 
according to two senior staff members’ opinions no matter what the political system is, the 
State President has constantly been a critical stakeholder in decision-making in the sporting 
field in Korea. As the two senior staff interviewees are over 50 years old and have worked in 
sports organisation for more than 20 years, their perspective on the power of the State 
President might have been fixed by social practices. The first merger that took place in 1968 
demonstrated the power over discourse of the State President who exerted his power in 
combining three sporting organisations, including the KSC, the KOC and the Korea School 
Sports Council. 
 
From the state theory perspective, as stated by the senior KOC official, the first KOC/KSC 
merger was accomplished to follow what the State President had ordered. The President 
Park Jung Hee was one of the most powerful Presidents in Korean political history, since he 
ruled Korea for approximately 20 years. This intimates that Korean society used to have a 
Marxist tendency because, without any grievance from the masses, the ruling class alone, 
here the government, was involved in decision-making and the majority of people, in 
particular, those who were involved in the sporting field, accepted the State President’s 
decision-making without question. This relationship between the state and the people in the 
sporting field reflects Marxism.  
 
Moreover, in terms of systemic governance, thus, the relations between domestic 
stakeholders are more likely to follow a hierarchical type of governance. As the government 
has adopted the highest position in relation to the national sports organisations, it can 
exercise power in such a way as to control national sports organisations directly.  
 
In relation to the first and second KOC/KSC mergers, this study revealed different points of 
view on the organisational structure of the KSC and the KOC. Some interviewees argued 
that the KSC and the KOC had remained a single organisation since 1968 when they were 
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first integrated. In terms of the structure of the KOC and the KSC, some respondents 
regarded it as a divided organisation while some saw it as being one organisation based on 
the previous discussions. The three respondents who argued on the basis of the 
organisations’ structural characteristics were all senior KSC staff members: 
 
The KSC and the KOC haven’t been divided. They were integrated in 1968 and 
were divided in 1972….ehh, integrated again. They had been divided before 1968 
but since then they have remained as one.  
                     (an Executive Committee member before & after the merger) 
 
It wasn’t really divided, it was just formally divided... the members of KOC and the 
KSC staff were all the same with different organisational structures at the top level,   
(a high-ranking KSC officer) 
The KOC’s tasks have been carried out by the Department of International Affairs 
and Relations which belong to the KSC. This enabled the KOC to be shown as an 
independent organisation but, in reality, the two organisations have been operating 
as one organisation.  
(the former KSC Secretary General)  
 
Actually, the KOC President and the KSC Chairman was one and the same person 
and the functions of the NOC were performed by the International Relations 
Department, which used to be one of the departments in the KSC. Externally, the 
KOC was an independent body but internally it was operated as the same 
organisation jointly with the KSC. To put it simply, they were unified into one 
structure. This shows that they were moving in a positive direction.   
(the former KSC Secretary General) 
 
The arguments mainly resulted from the organisational structure in common: the same 
President managed both organisations and the same members of staff were allocated 
different tasks to deal with in each department. The second interview said ‘formally divided’, 
which also indicates that the KOC is the part of the KSC. This implies that the KSC’s senior 
officers believed that the KSC was the main organisation and that the KOC was a dependent 
one. In fact, although International Affairs had played a critical role as representing the basic 
role of the KOC, it belonged to the KSC as one of its departments as shown in the 
organisational chart (see also Figure 6-2 & 6-3).  
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Looking at the two mergers between the KOC and the KSC, these two organisations had 
been totally separated sporting organisations until its first merger in 1968 when the KSC and 
the KOC had systematically formed one organisation, although each one had still been 
called the KOC and the KSC. In fact, the Department of International Affairs had been 
regarded as the KOC, while the remaining departments had been identified as the KSC. This 
organisational structure induced a senior officer to say that they had been ‘formally divided’. 
The second merger of the KOC and the KSC taken place in 2009 was, however, fully 
integrated both organisations into one organisation under the one title of the organisation 
that is the KOC. Therefore, the second merger of the organisation actually formed the unified 
organisation in terms of organisational structure.     
c) Politicians’ misuse of power in sports organisations 
With regard to the power of the State President, a senior member of KSC staff explained the 
background to the establishment of KOCOSA. 
 
After the Seoul Olympics, [was it] in 1991?, Mr Park Cheol On founded KOCOSA 
due to his ambition… for the purpose of running for the presidency… It ended when 
he was jailed. (laughter)  
(a high-ranking KSC officer) 
 
According to what this interviewee said “his ambition…for the purpose of running for the 
presidency”, his opinion is that sports organisations have been utilised to extend politicians’ 
power and to accomplish their political ends and, in turn, the KOCOSA is a typical case. Two 
other senior members of KOC staff also support the point made above about the political 
misuse of sports organisations in relation to the KOCOSA. 
 
A typical instance of that was in 1989 when KOCOSA was established. The Minister 
of Sport was Mr. Park Cheol On. The KSC was against his idea. He was trying to 
use it in his political endeavours. As Korea was under a military government, no one 
seemed to be able to really oppose it on the surface and the organisation grew in 
size over time…   
(a senior KOC officer) 
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Originally, the KSC used to be partially in charge of sport for all. During the sixth 
republic administration7 (Roh Tae Woo’s administration during which the Seoul 
Olympic Games were held)... the politicians in power set up KOCOSA for the 
purpose of expanding their political influence. Rather than for pure purposes… in 
spite of the promotion on the surface of sport for all it was mainly led by people who 
became politically active. Even to this day, in fact, many politicians are involved.  
(the former senior KOC officer) 
 
The three respondents above considered that KOCOSA was established to help a politician 
with his aim to win the presidency. Despite its allowed purpose of promoting sport for all, 
reportedly, it was allegedly used as a source of power to obtain political support. This 
illustrates how sports organisations tended to be used by unscrupulous politicians for 
exercising political power to extend their influence and achieve their political aims. These 
events suggest that a political figure, who was a presidential-hopeful, had been able to gain 
influence by establishing or organising a sports organisation in Korea. For reference, the 
Ministry of Sport was established on 20 March, 1982 in aid of Korea’s success in the 1986 
Seoul Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games (Sports White Paper, 2009: 17). Its 
establishment as an independent Ministry is significant as an indication that sport was 
regarded as an important element in national policy and since 1990, the system has 
expanded and the Ministry of Sport was changed into the Ministry of Youth Sport (Sports 
White Paper, 2009: 27). In addition, as the senior KOC officer says “in 1989…, Korea was 
under a military government”, which means that the political system was still similar to that in 
the period of President Park. Consequently, the President held a strong influence in 
decision-making of Korean sport policy. 
 
Another possible explanation is that the three senior staff members interviewed attributed 
KOCOSA’s existence in the sporting field to unjust causes in order to make the idea of 
integrating the KOC/KSC with KOCOSA legitimate. In particular, one of them also expressed 
the opinion below that the formation of KOCOSA was not even justified by the IOC. As the 
IOC is the top organisation in the Olympic Movement and the IOC Charter is supposed to be 
the most authoritative document internationally, this is a strong argument for regarding 
KOCOSA as unauthorised and irredeemable organisation in the Korean sporting field. 
 
                                               
7 Roh Tae Woo’s administration,( the 13th President) 1988-1993. 
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There is no organization like that. Not anywhere… Even in the charter of the IOC, 
NOC is the head of sport for all and it is allowed to do all kinds of elite sports. It’s just 
awkward in this country.  
(a senior member of KSC staff) 
d) Politicians’ involvement in decision-making 
When questioned about the individuals who were involved in the process of decision making 
about the merger, many interviewees expressed their view about the deep involvement of 
politicians. One senior KOC staff member argued that the government’s insistence on 
maintaining the division between the KOC and the KSC had been the main obstacle to the 
KOC/KSC merger: 
 
It is fair to say that the KOC/KSC themselves led the way in bringing about the 
unification. (Were any other organisations involved?) Other organisations insisted on 
their separation. Our government was holding them in check so… they [the 
government] fundamentally didn’t want us to grow into a large-scale organisation 
after the integration. 
                     (the former high-ranking KOC officer) 
 
The implication here was that the government wanted to keep the KSC and the KOC within 
its boundaries of power. A junior KSC staff member also added that there would be a conflict 
if the ideas of the KOC/KSC differed from those of the government. The KOC and the KSC 
had themselves pushed ahead with their structural rearrangement and the government did 
not agree with the KOC/KSC. 
 
What we wanted was to revise the National Sports Promotion Act in order for a 
complete integration to take place…but the government had stated that this would 
be difficult. Since the government had shown that it wanted to keep us apart, we 
were bound to be in ongoing conflict with the government.  
(A junior KSC staff member) 
 
The government raised the issue of the National Sports Promotion Act, which determined 
that the KSC should be Korea’s only overarching sports organisation. This had prevented 
the KOC/KSC from integrating and, accordingly, the KSC and the KOC had made an effort to 
amend it. However, the government rejected the KSC/KOC’s suggestion. Additionally, as the 
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former KSC senior staff also indicated, the National Assembly was also involved in the 
matter of the KOC/KSC’s association with KOCOSA.   
 
The Integration Bill was already submitted to the National Assembly back then. But 
since the political circles began to insist on separation, it hasn’t been solved up to 
this day and as the issue of KOCOSA was also involved, things have become more 
and more complicated.   
(the former KSC Secretary General) 
 
The issue of political connections was brought up by the former senior member of the KSC:  
 
But in this country, ‘sport for all’ strays beyond the understanding that sports 
specialists have of this term and now there is a political dimension to it. So the 
members of the prefectures gather to form an organisation and by using the power 
of that organisation they try to influence the local politicians and to obtain support 
from them… In this process, as the organisation has degenerated, its scale of 
operation has grown, so that it has become much bigger and stronger and turned 
into a political group.  
(the former KSC Secretary General) 
 
As KOCOSA was established to accomplish political aims, it is possible that many politicians 
would seek to gain political advantage through their activities in relation to sporting affairs 
and this enables KOCOSA to continue its activities and to secure its existence in sporting 
circles. KOCOSA has had a broad base of political support in the local governments of 
counties across Korea and its power has reached the lawmakers in the National Assembly. 
Consequently, KOCOSA has been able to prevent the National Assembly from agreeing to 
the integration of the three sports organizations. As a result, this has impeded the plans of 
the KOC and the KSC to reorganise into a single organisation. It shows how wide the 
involvement of politicians has been in sports policy, ranging from the lawmakers in the 
National Assembly to the government.   
e) Economic power 
Interestingly, all the interviewees believed that the KOC had been the main agent in bringing 
about the merger that took place in 2009 and that it was the main beneficiary of the merger. 
When the responses to the two questions, ‘Who are the most influential stakeholders in 
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Korean sports policy decision-making?’ and ‘who were the most influential stakeholders in 
the decision-making about the merger?’ are compared, they turn out to be different. 
Referring to Figure 6-4, no matter which organisation they belong to, all the interviewees 
indicated that the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism was the most powerful agent in 
decision-making concerning general sports policy in Korea. At the same time, seven 
interviewees added the government and three the Blue House. Figure 6-4 illustrates the fact 
that seven KSC staff members on the left and eight KOC staff at the bottom all referred to 
the governmental body, the MCST, as the most powerful stakeholder in Korean sports 
decision-making. As stated earlier, by the ‘government’, respondents may mean the State 
President or any type of governmental body. In this context, it appears that the State 
President was indicated separately as the MCST had already been rated as the most 
powerful stakeholder by all interviewees. 
 
Meanwhile, only three KSC and four KOC respondents answered that the KOC or the KOC 
President was the most influential agent, according to Figure 6-4. In terms of their positions, 
six of these interviewees held senior or Board-level positions and only one was a junior staff 
member. 
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Figure 6-4 Most influential stakeholders in general decision-making in Korean sports policy.   
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Looking at Figure 6-4, some respondents answered only ‘the government’ or ‘any 
governmental bodies’ while some also added the KSC president as a possible powerful 
stakeholder along with the government or the governmental bodies. Moreover, three KSC 
and four KOC members of staff also added the KOC or the KOC President. Here, the KOC 
President means the KSC President as the KSC President used to be automatically 
designated as the KOC President too. 
 
However, when the question relates to the most influential stakeholder in the decision-
making about the KOC/KSC merger in 2009, 13 out of 15 respondents indicated that ‘the 
KOC President, Park Yong Sung’ was the most influential stakeholder, as shown in Figure 6-
5. This implies that staff members believed that the KOC/KSC merger was led by the 
KOC/KSC staff members and the Executive Committee members, and that the incumbent 
KOC/KSC President Park Yong Sung exercised as strong an influence as the politicians did. 
 
Figure 6-5 The most influential stakeholder in the decision-making about the merger 
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The President of the KOC, Park Yong Sung, was the 27th KOC & the 37th KSC President 
before its merger and became the 1st KOC President after its merger from 19 February 2009 
to the present, according to History of the KOC and KSC President (KOC, n.d.). On the 
strength of his background, the incumbent President occupies a powerful economic position. 
He is a family member of the Doosan group, one of Korea’s Chabeols, or conglomerates, 
and he has played key roles previously and been appointed to high positions with various 
major titles in the industrial context. Furthermore, ‘he has also made outstanding 
contributions to Korea’s Olympic Movement in his capacity as an IOC member (2002-2007) 
as well as the president of the International Judo Federation (1995-2007)’ (the KOC News 
and Events, n.d., 2009). After taking power, he was appointed as a member of the 
International Relations Commission of the IOC in 2010, according to the KOC News and 
Events (n.d., 2010). Consequently, his power is not ignored by people involved in politics. In 
fact, since the KOC President Park Yong Sung had taken up power, he had pushed ahead to 
revise the two bodies’ Constitutions in order to achieve the goal of forming them into one 
organisation.  
 
According to a former KOC Executive Committee member and a junior KSC member of staff, 
they believed strongly in the potential authority of a powerful figure:  
 
Since a major economic figure, the President of the KOC Park Yong Sung, is 
backing us, we have survived…. He said to us, ‘This is my opinion, so trust and 
follow me’. 
 (a former KOC Executive Committee member) 
 
The MCST used to have greater power but it is said that the balance of power has 
shifted slightly towards us since our new President Park Yong Sung took up office. 
    (a junior KOC staff member) 
 
‘A major economic figure’ implies that this informant expressed the concept of economic 
figures who have had as strong power as politicians have had in Korea. The junior staff 
member even said that ‘the balance of power has shifted slightly towards us’. In relation to 
the KOC/KSC merger that took place in 2009, the possession of economic power is an 
essential feature shared by powerful decision makers in sports policy in Korea, as is borne 
out by the interviewees’ accounts. This implies that President Park exercised somewhat 
greater power than any other former Presidents of the KSC and the KOC when pursuing 
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their project of merger. As explained earlier, due to opposition from the government and the 
lawmakers, this project had been dragged out for a decade under two former Presidents’ 
tenure. This situation can be explained in terms of power over discourse in that the 
KSC/KOC’s incumbent President could exert his economic power to push ahead and 
persuade the government and political groups which formerly had a greater chance of 
influencing the KOC/KSC merger. The KOC/KSC decided to revise the Statutes to avoid 
entering into conflict with the government that had insisted on the separation of the 
KSC/KOC. This was successful since the new President Park Yong Sung could take 
advantage of his economic power. The interviewees expressed their view that economic 
power holds sway in Korean society and they believed, thus, that the KOC/KSC could 
accomplish the merger. The interviewees, therefore, all strongly insisted that KOC President 
Park was the most influential stakeholder in the KOC/KSC merger.  
 
The KOC/KSC merger shows the aspect of elitism in Korean society. The economic elite 
represented by the Chabeol, or industrial conglomerates, in the Korean context have 
contributed to the country’s economic development and have also been one of the most 
influential centres of power throughout Korean sporting history. The KOC President Park 
Yong Sung is the economic power as the President of the Doosan conglomerate and at the 
same time, also has considerate social status in sport as a former IOC member. When Park 
Yong Sung was designated as the KOC/KSC President, he secured his stance in the 
process of decision-making over the KOC/KSC merger and the government also accepted it 
despite a history of opposition. His influence reflects the power of the elite in Korean society. 
He uses his economic, social and political resources to overcome government resistance, in 
particular, in the sport field. Such an elite-driven practice may manifest a significant 
difference from a western theory relating to good governance practice since political position 
(reflected in the support by governance) economic and social position appear to have been 
conclusive in achieving his ends.    
6.2.4 One organisation with two different titles at home and abroad 
As discussed previously, although the government and politicians were deeply opposed to 
the KOC/KSC merger project, the incumbent KOC President was a sufficiently major 
economic figure in the national elite to persuade them to accept it. This situation underlies 
the choice of title for the newly-merged KOC. Although the two organisations have been 
integrated into one, their titles have not been unified. The titles ‘KSC’ and ‘KOC’ are still 
variously used domestically and internationally. A ‘schizophrenic’ attitude to the merged 
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organisation’s identity allows it to be referred to within Korea as the KSC with the common 
understanding that this incorporates the KOC. In international discourse the KOC may be 
referred to. Two titles is a discursive trick. Two junior members of KSC staff explained the 
background to the continuing existence of the two titles: 
 
While the KOC President Park Yong Sung managed to integrate them after a great 
struggle, he did it in a more indirect way. In his view, the government didn’t seem to 
be affirmative or positively disposed towards a revision of the Constitutions, and the 
separation itself was opposed by many sports-related people, because it seemed 
problematic and likely to result in inefficiency… Therefore, although the need to 
change the system was recognised, avoiding a confrontation with the government 
was another important issue so the idea was to make a difference while staying 
within the boundaries and not altering the existing system. Domestically the KSC 
would run things and internationally the KOC… 
              (a junior KSC staff member)      
    
In the past, the titles KOC and KSC were [officially] used side by side, but [now] 
KOC [for domestic use] has disappeared from the Korean title. KSC has remained 
as the only title used in the Korean language. As a parallel in the English title KSC is 
no longer in use [internationally] and only the title KOC is current [internationally]. 
Since the integration took place under the title of ‘KSC’… to be in accordance with 
the National Sports Promotion Act, the title ‘KSC’ is the only real one in existence.   
(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
Referring to both interviewees, the title ‘KSC’ is still in use in sporting circles in Korea, 
whereas ‘KOC’ no longer appears in Korean language. Consequently, it is a single 
organisation with two different titles to represent it internally in Korea and externally. An 
analysis of documents based on the ‘Sports White Paper’ published by the MCST and two 
official documents, ‘the Statues’ and ‘KOC in Fifty Years’ written by the KSC/KOC, clearly 
demonstrates that the two titles are used at home and abroad. Originally, the KOC was 
called ‘대한올림픽위원회’, while the KSC was called ‘대한체육회’ in Korean. In the case of 
the Sports White Paper, examples are: 
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The first case: 
  
(before the merger) 
The main tasks of the KOC [대한올림픽위원회] are carried out in connection with 
International Relations and International Games within the KSC [대한체육회]…  
                                          (Sports White Paper, 2008: 461) 
 
(after the merger) 
The tasks in relation to international affairs are carried out in International Relations 
and International Games by the KOC [대한체육회]…  
                                          (Sports White Paper, 2009: 473) 
 
The second case: 
 
(before the merger) 
With respect to the KSC [대한체육회], International organisations and International 
Affairs are the main functions for which the KOC is responsible…  
                                          (Sports White Paper, 2008: 462) 
 
(after the merger) 
With respect to the KOC [대한체육회], in 2009 it was completely integrated with 
the KOC when it was restructured on the basis of the NOC… 
                                          (Sports White Paper, 2009: 475) 
 
With regard especially to the comments published in 2009, the nomenclature in common use 
still focused on ‘KSC’ as the main title of the organisation without any changes being made 
even after its integration. It implies that KSC still continues to be the title used domestically 
even after the integration with the KOC in contrast to the disappearance of ‘KSC’ in an 
international context. It can thus be inferred that the KSC is still a more important entity than 
the KOC in sporting circles in Korea.  
 
Another crucial piece of evidence for this is given in the Statutes of the KSC and the KOC. 
Examples may be found in the latest versions of the Statutes, revised on 29 March 2006, 
which was before the merger:  
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Article 1 (foundation and title) The corporate body was established on the basis of 
article 23 of the National Sports Promotion Act with the title of Korea Sports Council 
and it is called the Korea Sports Council abroad. (revised on 2 April, 1994) 
 
Article 33 (establishment) ① The Korean Olympic Committee (KOC) reserves the 
right to make independent decisions and to implement them with respect to its own 
business 
 
Before the revision of the Statutes for the merger, the title KSC existed and the KOC was 
deemed to be more narrowly responsible for its own matters, which are international 
relations and affairs. In contrast, the fully revised Statutes of 24 June 2009, prepared for the 
merger, says: 
 
Article 1 (foundation and title) The corporate body was established in accordance 
with article 33 of the「National Sports Promotion Act」as the National Olympic 
Committee (NOC) of the Republic of Korea, which is a member of the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC).  Its title [in Korean] is Korea Sports Council (KSC) and 
its title in English is Korean Olympic Committee (KOC) 
 
Article 3 (aims and status) ③ the KOC is a representative of the Republic of Korea 
in international sports organisations including the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC), the Assembly of National Olympic Committees (ANOC), the Olympic Council 
of Asia (henceforth OCA) and so on. 
 
Article ③ has been newly added whereas article 33 regarding the KOC’s roles has been 
deleted from the revised Statutes of 2009. Although the title has officially been changed to 
the KOC, its Korean title of ‘KSC’ is still retained. 
 
Another piece of evidence of power over discourse is that the government has denied the 
decision of the KSC/KOC’s merger by means of giving more legitimacy to the KSC’s 
existence. The KSC is the sole officially constituted sports organisation under the National 
Sports Promotion Act and it continues to be the principal sports organisation domestically in 
Korea. The Sports White Paper published by the MCST represents the KSC as the top 
Korean sports organisation even after its integration with the KOC. In contrast to the KSC’s 
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disappearance from the international scene, it has still retained its title in the domestic 
context. From this it can be inferred that the KSC still remains in a higher or more powerful 
position than the KOC in sporting circles in Korea. In a social context, some interviewees 
claim that the MCST still believes that the KSC’s maintenance of its identity is indispensable 
in sporting circles. This has resulted in the two titles being indicated in the KOC Constitution 
so that its title in Korean is still given as the KSC despite the fact that its international title is 
the KOC.  
6.3 Budget Planning  
6.3.1 Introduction 
As the second event/process to be discussed, the annual budget plan has been chosen. The 
process of budget plan shows a series of decisions to be made that reflect social practices. 
The analysis reveals where the financial resources come from, who exercises the power in 
decision making and how it is done.  
6.3.2 Map of themes 
The themes that emerged from the interview, a government document and various 
documents from the KOC/KSC are arranged by NVIVO in one tree nodes with seven 
subordinate nodes. The three themes to emerge are as follows: Government’s involvement 
in the external process of budget application; KSC’s superior position in the internal process 
of budget application; and the politicians’ involvement in decision-making. Figure 6-6 
illustrates the sources of the majority of the funds and identifies the most influential external 
and internal stakeholders in the decision-making involved in the processes of budget 
planning.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-6 Budget Planning 
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6.3.3 Explanations of social practices 
a) Government’s involvement in the external process of budget applications 
This theme identifies external stakeholders involved in the processes of KOC/KSC budget 
planning and how their roles are ‘produced’ in the discourse. It provides information about 
cases in which particular stakeholders explain sources of finance and their perspectives on 
which organisation(s) is/are the most powerful in decision making. First of all, the member of 
KSC staff who was formally responsible for budget planning explained his view of its external 
processes identifying the external stakeholders. He described them as taking place in four 
stages: 
The budgetary plan for the present year is to be submitted to the Ministry of Culture, 
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Sports and Tourism by May of the previous year. Once delivered, it goes through a 
process of deliberation for about a month. Sports organisations including us and 
their respective departments have to determine each individual budget plan with the 
MCST before submitting it to the Ministry of Strategy and Economy. This usually 
takes a month. 
 (a middle-ranking KSC officer)  
 
From this interviewee’s point of view, the process began with the KOC/KSC submitting its 
budget plan to the MCST which was the first external stakeholder involved in the external 
processes. As he testified, this governmental body examined the size of the total budget 
proposed by the KSC/KOC. This implies that the MCST was directly involved in budget 
planning and that, furthermore, there was a possibility that this governmental body could 
even actually exercise its power in decision making in terms of the size of the KOC/KSC 
budget.  
 
Then at the end of June, the budget plan is submitted to the Ministry of Strategy and 
Economy, which deliberates over and reviews it.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
The Budget Plan should then be delivered to the Ministry of Strategy and Economy which 
was another external stakeholder engaged in the process of the KSC/KOC’s budget 
planning. The interviewee stated that this was also one of the governmental bodies in which 
the budgetary deliberation and review were conducted. It was possible, however, for the 
Ministry of Strategy and Economy to be simply involved as a body in the process of 
approving the whole national budget. In fact, the Ministry of Strategy and Economy did not 
only work at the level of processing the detailed budgets of sports organisations. 
 
In our case, one of the standing committees of the National Assembly in charge of 
culture and sports has to decide where to add to or subtract from the necessary 
budget. The committee on budget planning gives a presentation before the budget 
plan is brought to the regular session as a scheme before it can be approved and 
signed off. 
 (a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
The third external stakeholder was thought to be the National Assembly. In the light of the 
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previous interviewee’s comment that ‘in the third stage it decides where to add to or subtract 
from the necessary budget’, the National Assembly was also involved once more as a 
political group with the function of applying checks and balances to the governmental bodies. 
This was seen as a rubber-stamping process which implies that the National Assembly held 
annual meetings to approve or disapprove the budget plans of a wider range of 
governmental bodies. In a similar way to the Ministry of Strategy and Economy, it was also 
possibly regarded as a body that processed the whole national budget. Apparently, neither 
the Ministry nor the National Assembly exercised direct power over the KOC/KSC in budget 
planning as they were responsible not only for sports organisations but also for the entire 
national budget. This may be inferred from the informant’s following comment: 
 
We can then estimate the scale of our budget as it passes through the MCST and, 
subsequently we plan and organise our business for the coming year until the end of 
December. Based on the budgetary deliberation materials, we announce our next 
year’s business and then the MCST approves our business. Starting from January, 
we request that our budget be granted.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
At the final stage, the KOC/KSC should return to the MCST to acknowledge the total amount 
granted for its budget and to obtain an endorsement of its business plan. The interviewee 
obviously implies that the action on policy taken by the MCST and its decision-making with 
regard to budgetary and business planning merited a more powerful role for it than that of 
any other external stakeholder. 
  
Figure 6-7 The flow of the external process of budget planning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clearly, the KOC/KSC was not an independent body but was subject to control by 
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governmental bodies. Accordingly it did not have the power to determine its budget 
allocation. It could make its budget proposals to the MCST but that Ministry was the key 
determiner of the size of the organisation’s budget. All of the external stakeholders involved 
in budget planning were apparently political organisations: the MCST; the Ministry of 
Strategy and Economy; and the National Assembly, listed in order of their interventions in the 
budget process. In its external processes of budget planning, the social practices inherent in 
the budgetary system thus defined the limits of the KSC/KOC’s budgetary freedom. The 
KOC/KSC was likely to be heavily dependent, financially, on the government and this 
signified that the KOC/KSC was mainly influenced by government policy. 
 
With respect to the most influential stakeholders, some interviewees assumed that the 
MCST was the most influential whereas one interviewee from the KSC argued that it was the 
National Assembly (which is equivalent to Parliament).   
The Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism 
When it comes to judgements about where the actual power lies in decision-making in 
relation to the KOC’s budget planning, most interviewees from the KOC/KSC in fact believed 
that the MCST was the most influential and closely involved stakeholder. One middle-ranking 
officer from the KSC claimed that, 
 
When it comes to the total budget, after all, it is the MCST that decides. Basically it’s 
the MCST that reviews and decides whether to add to or deduct from our initial 
budget plan.  (are there many cases of items being omitted?)  Frequently… in 
most cases. (are there any cases of receiving more than we bid for?) We refer to it 
as the ‘balloon’ [easily inflated and/or deflated] but internally some restructuring has 
to be done.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
The size of the budget was actually controlled by the MCST in that it reviewed the total 
amount of the initial budget suggested by the KSC/KOC. In fact, before the budget plan 
reached the National Assembly for its approval, the MCST usually adjusted its actual size. 
The respondent added another reason for according superiority to the MCST in terms of 
financial decision-making: 
 
I told you about our general accounting and funds, right? We talk about ‘state coffers’ 
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[directly from the government], and ‘funds’ [from KSPO]… Funds are more freely 
disposable but the government has designated the Korea Sports Promotion 
Foundation (KSPO) as an entity that manages this fund under the Financial Act. 
While the KSPO gives us the funds, the MCST finances us directly from the state 
coffers. There is a difference according to whether it’s done on a quarterly or 
monthly basis but we continuously receive money from January onwards.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer)  
 
For reference, the KSPO has its own funds by virtue of the government allowing it to control 
various forms of profitable business such as gambling (horse riding, cycling and lottery) and 
managing various properties (the Olympic Park, Parktel which mainly accommodates sports-
related events and is located inside the Olympic Park, along with the main building of the 
KSPO which the KOC/KSC has been renting). Thus, the KSPO has been generating its own 
funds and the KOC/KSC receives funding direct from the KSPO, apart from the direct funds 
that it receives from the government. 
 
There are thus two providers of finance for the KSC/KOC: one is the KSPO and the other is 
the MCST. However, the KSPO’s impact on its budget plans seems smaller because it is 
also an organisation coming under the MCST. It implies that, in general, sports organisations 
are funded and controlled by the MCST. Accordingly, most staff believed that the MCST had 
been deeply involved in the decision-making at a working level on the KOC’s budgetary 
processes. Another point argued by another KSC staff member below is that even after the 
National Assembly had ratified the size of its budget, the KOC still needed to receive 
approval for its business plans within the agreed budgetary total. Thus, as over the length of 
the whole process, the MCST was seen as the most influential stakeholder: 
 
In our case, one of the standing committees of the National Assembly in charge of 
culture and sport, adds to or subtracts from the proposed budget. The committee on 
budget planning gives a presentation before it is brought to the regular session [of 
the National Assembly] as a scheme. During the regular session, it gets approved 
and signed off. We can then estimate the scale of our budget in discussion with the 
MCST and with that we can plan and organise our business for the coming year until 
the end of December. Based on the budgetary deliberation materials, we announce 
our next year’s business and then the MCST approves our business.  
(a middle- ranking KSC officer)  
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National Assembly 
One interviewee believed that the National Assembly was a more influential stakeholder than 
the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism in the budget planning processes. This senior 
KSC member of staff claimed that 
 
If the National Assembly doesn’t approve any of this, it’s useless… The final 
approval is given by the National Assembly.  
(a senior KSC staff member)  
 
This interviewee contends that all governmental organisations should obtain the approval of 
the National Assembly which functioned as a political group in operating a system of checks 
and balances. Accordingly, the National Assembly was possibly seen as the most influential 
stakeholder in the sense that it would have controlled the final stage in approving the 
KOC/KSC budget, if the process of budget planning is considered in isolation.  
 
The different perspectives of these interviewees should be taken into account when 
considering whether the National Assembly or the MCST was more influential or whether the 
National Assembly and the MCST were both influential in their different ways in the shaping, 
approval and implementation of the budget. The question also arises as to whether the 
National Assembly’s role was merely a formal one or it could really affect decision-making 
during the budget planning process. In terms of the formalities, the National Assembly 
intervened at the last stage of approving the total amount recommended by the MCST, as 
this governmental organisation was the source of financing for all sports organisations. Thus, 
the budgetary responsibilities of the Ministry did not relate only to the KSC/KOC. The KSC 
interviewee argued that the MCST was the most influential stakeholder because, although 
the National Assembly took charge of approving the overall budget, the details were decided 
by the MCST which recommended a reasonable amount for the budget to the National 
Assembly. Consequently, the National Assembly was possibly a less influential stakeholder 
in terms of the real substance of the budget process.  
 
In connection with the budget process, this may be viewed as evidence of the existence of a 
neo-corporatist structure in which the state plays a central role and acts in a unitary way with 
the involvement of a limited number of actors in order to integrate liberal parliamentary 
democracy, the market economy and a number of organised groups. The decision-making 
about the allocation of a budget to the KOC/KSC is mainly dependent on the MCST and not 
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the National Assembly. Nevertheless, the National Assembly still plays a minor ‘rubber 
stamping’ role in investigating the government bodies. The KSPO is also involved in the 
decision-making of the KOC/KSC as a fund supplier but the organisation itself is also 
supervised by the MCST as one of governmental sporting organisations that falls beneath its 
umbrella. The Korean government, thus, plays a central role through the involvement of the 
National Assembly and the KSPO. Accordingly, the KOC has a low degree of autonomy vis-
à-vis the State government.  
 
From the discussion of the KOC/KSC budget planning it becomes obvious that the 
government has direct control of KOC/KSC policy. This ‘direct control’ contrasts markedly 
with political governance in the ‘western’ sense, as rehearsed by Henry and Lee (2004), by 
which governments seek to ‘steer’ policy. The government seeks to exercise its direct control 
by supplying major resources and, in turn, it has become a main stakeholder in sports policy 
making. In connection with the KOC/KSC merger, for example, after the KSC and the KOC 
had been pursuing its merger unsuccessfully for a decade, the government acted as the 
main obstacle in the process.  
b) KSC’s superior position in the internal process of budget applications 
After the endorsement of a total budget amount by the MCST, the KSC/KOC’s budget team 
conducted detailed internal checks to determine where and how the money was to be spent, 
according to a middle-ranking KSC officer who was responsible for budget planning:  
  
Our budget team is responsible for rearranging the budget allocated to each 
department.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
With respect to its position in the KOC/KSC’s internal system, the budget team was 
portrayed as playing a critical role in rearranging the budget allocation. In terms of its power 
relations, it was suggested that the budget team had enjoyed a higher status than other 
teams as a decision maker in terms of budget planning. Furthermore, preceding the 
KOC/KSC merger, the Budget Team had been a department belonging to the KSC, which 
had previously controlled the budgets of both organisations. The interviewee’s implication 
that the budget team had borne the key responsibility suggests that the KOC was hardly 
involved in making budgetary decisions and that the KSC had taken a superior position in 
making decisions on the budget plans. This exposes another element of budgeting as a 
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social practice, namely that the KSC was entirely engaged in the budget planning.     
 
When it came to identifying the ultimate decision-making stakeholder inside the KOC/KSC, a 
senior KSC officer argued as follows:  
 
“(Who would be the final decision maker with regard to the KSC/KOC’s budget?) 
The President had the final say...since it had to be reported to him.  It could have 
been done by the Secretary General, but anyway, it had to be reported to the 
President in the same way as the budgets for all major projects for the coming year 
would have to be, blah blah blah ….  
(a senior KSC officer) 
 
From this informant’s point of view, there were two stakeholders who might be considered as 
being engaged in the final decision-making: the KOC/KSC President and the Secretary 
General. Although the Secretary General was possibly the final decision maker, he/she was 
still required to report to the President. Thus, our interviewee hinted that the President had 
the right to make the final decision in any case. Again, regarding the power relations 
between the KSC and the KOC, the Secretary General also belonged to the KSC and the 
President was usually the head of both organisations. This is further evidence that the KSC 
was centrally involved in decision making on its budget plans and that the KSC had a more 
powerful status than the KOC in terms of deciding on the budget allocation.   
 
Two of the KSC interviewees expressed different opinions as to who the most influential 
stakeholder was inside the organisation. According to the first respondent’s account, the 
budget team exerted a real influence in terms of the informal processes conducted at the 
end of the process. As the team which held the technical responsibility for rearranging the 
budget allocation, it could be maintained that the budget team was the most influential 
stakeholder in the internal processes. In its local context, the budget team was able to assert 
its authority instantly. As this was a relational power following the sequencing of elements of 
social practice in the budget process, the budget team had an opportunity to be influential at 
certain points in the cycle of social practices. The external process of budget planning gave 
the budget team space to exert its power at that point in time. 
 
In contrast, the second respondent indicated that the KOC/KSC President should be 
considered as the most influential internal stakeholder in that he was the final decision 
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maker to approve the budget allocation. However, the President played a formal role in the 
process and it could be argued that, in practical terms, the budget team was a more powerful 
stakeholder than the President since it shaped and presented the options from within which 
the President made his choices.  
 
A senior KSC staff member also explained how the process continued informally at higher 
decision-making levels:      
 
And then the General Assembly of Representatives deliberates on the budget 
settlement…. Budget deliberation… after the project planning has been resolved, 
finally everything is determined. Actually the Chairperson of the General Assembly 
of Representatives is our President so, as for the individual is concerned, we can 
say that it is done by the President but, anyway, it’s decided at the meeting... 
[however] the total amount of the budget has already been decided by the 
government so there is not really any significance to it...  
(a senior KSC officer) 
 
The officer’s explanation of the internal process was that the KOC/KSC should submit its 
proposal and obtain confirmation of the permissible yearly budget amount and the annual 
business plans from the General Assembly of Representatives, which was the highest 
decision-making level in the KSC. It can be noted here that although the KOC’s Standing 
Committee was its highest decision-making body, the KSC was authorised to take the 
highest-level decisions alone. Another social practice may be observed here, namely that the 
KSC alone was involved in the final decisions on budget planning. In the same way as with 
the power relations between the KSC and the KOC, as discussed above, this case again 
implies that the KSC played a superior role to the KOC in decision-making.   
   
In addition, from this respondent’s perspective, the position occupied by the President in the 
General Assembly of Representatives accounts for the extent of his power. Although the 
KSC General Assembly of Representatives seemed to play a critical role in decision-making 
on budget planning, its Chairman was in fact the President of the KSC/KOC. As a senior 
staff member indicated in his discourse when he said that ‘the President had the final say’, 
the KOC/KSC President was expected to have a real impact on decision making in the 
General Assembly of Representatives. This implies that the representatives of the National 
Federations usually follow the KOC/KSC President’s decisions, which illustrates another 
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power relation between the KOC/KSC and the National Federations.     
 
From the respondent’s perspective, two points should be taken into account here. Even 
though the President of the KSC was formally the final internal decision-maker, he was 
unable to be directly involved in decision-making about the size of budget. Secondly, the 
General Assembly of Representatives was considered to perform a ‘token’ role by 
demonstrating that the KOC/KSC was an independent policy maker with a proper process of 
budget planning. It was obvious that the KOC/KSC should be represented as predominating 
over all other sports organisations in Korea and therefore as having its own internal process 
of budget planning but the government was deeply involved in the decision-making on its 
budget plan in respect of the overall size of the budget and specifically in decisions about 
whether new projects should be financed.   
c) Political involvement in decision-making. 
According to the discursive construction represented in interviewees’ accounts cited above, 
the overall processes of budget planning demonstrate that the political authorities were 
directly involved in the decision-making about the KOC/KSC budget. Evidence will now be 
provided of the ways in which this point is discursively constructed by other respondents. In 
particular, in terms of the KOC/KSC’s financial independence, various governmental 
documents and the KOC/KSC expressed different points of view. 
From a Government perspective 
To give a broader context to the discussion of the significance of the discourse in the KISS 
report (KISS 2003), the place of KISS among governmental sporting organisations should be 
explained. Reference should be made to Figure 6-8 displayed below showing the place of 
KISS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-8 The place of KISS 
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KISS has been a part of KSPO, which is one of the governmental sporting organisations. For 
reference it was founded on 29 December 1980 as the Sports Science Research Centre 
within the KSC and it was re-launched as the KISS on 8 July, 1989. As of 1st January 1999, 
the KISS was integrated into the SOSFO which was renamed as the KSPO in April, 2009 
(KISS, n.d.). From the positions reported by KISS and the other related bodies one can 
identify the discursive construction of the role played by KISS as a ‘representative’ of the 
government’s point of view in the sense of providing normative statements constructed by 
government actors declaring the government’s stance as to how these bodies should 
operate. The KISS (2003) account of the management of the KSC budget (also financially 
incorporated within the KOC’s budget) illustrates the government’s concern that sport should 
begin to generate funds to meet its own needs. 
 
The government document published by KISS criticises the lack of effort on the part of the 
KOC/KSC to pursue its financial independence. This document relates to the financial 
position of the KSC/KOC. 
 
(Financial issues) 
Out of the total budget at the disposal of the KSC8, its own revenue generation 
accounted for 7.4% in 2001, 6.4 in 2002, and 6.2% in 2003, which means that it was 
continuously decreasing…. In our estimation, such a tendency results from the 
KSC’s lack of effort in developing its own income or its marketing ability in spite of 
the fact that its total budget has increased each year. (KISS, 2003:39) 
When this Report was published, KISS was already under the authority of the Korea Sports 
                                               
8 As this study was conducted in 2003 before the merger of the KSC and the KOC, the KSC is represented as 
the main sports organisation rather than the KOC 
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Promotion Foundation (KSPO) which was a governmental sports organisation. Owing to its 
close relation with the government, its discourse is favourable to a governmental perspective, 
as may be expected. The report indicates that the KSC had been viewed by the government 
as having been ‘negligent’ in terms of its lack of effort to achieve a measure of financial 
independence.   
From the KOC/KSC perspective 
In contrast, two members of KSC staff argued that, in truth, the government had prevented 
the KOC/KSC from developing its own profitable business. One middle-ranking KSC 
member of staff asserted that, contrary to KISS’s statement, the government had prevented 
the KSC from becoming more financially independent:  
 
We wanted a new Secretary General who would be competent in marketing…. We 
were unable to be independent because 95% of our funds come from the 
government…. So we had to do something about it. To find a capable person…. in 
order to focus on marketing, we asked the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism to 
approve [our new Secretary General] after passing a resolution in the Board [of the 
KSC/KOC], but we failed.  
(a middle-ranking KSC manager) 
 
This interviewee also believed that its reliance on government funding prevented the 
KOC/KSC from becoming an independent policy-making organisation. From his perspective, 
the KOC/KSC had made a significant effort to generate its own funds, so that it was at least 
trying to be independent, however, the Ministry did not give any leeway for this. His example 
of the failure to appoint a Secretary General with commercial expertise illustrates one of the 
ways in which direct political involvement worked. In fact, the government could control the 
KSC/KOC’s policy making in part by either endorsement or failing to endorse new staff.  
 
His additional explanation, given below, indicates that although the KOC/KSC was an 
organisation which was independent according to its own Constitution, its independence was 
limited in real terms.  
 
In our Statutes, we are allowed to do business to make a profit. However, that can 
happen only in those areas which the Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism 
permits…all the profitable business has been allocated to and is managed by the 
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KSPO….. Why do you think the State President appointed his man as Chairman of 
the KSPO? It’s all about money. 9 Lee’s administration has just recently been 
launched, hasn’t it? It means that someone from the administration will be made 
President of the KSPO.  
(a middle-ranking staff member of the KSC) 
 
From this interviewee’s perspective, the MCST has allowed the KSPO to run a profitable 
business and it is evident that the government has generated funds from sporting activities 
through the KSPO. He also pointed out that the Chairman of the KSPO had been directly 
appointed by the state President. Thus the State President has also played a critical role by 
appointing his political aides to the role of President of this important sports organisation. 
This is evidence of the way in which the KSPO, another sports organisation, was indirectly 
controlled by the MCST and the funds generated by the KSPO were also under government 
control. 
 
Apart from the above example of a human resource decision, where the government refused 
to endorse the appointment of a new high-ranking official, the KOC/KSC was similarly reliant 
on the MCST to approve the creation of any new business. According to the excerpt from the 
Statutes below, the government may allow the KOC to establish a profitable business but 
only with its specific approval.  
 
Article 58 (Approval of business, budget, and settlement of accounts) ①  the 
business and budget plans should be drawn up by the KSC President, be endorsed 
by the KSC Executive Board and the General Assembly of Representatives. Then 
they should be approved by the Minister of its related governmental body in each 
fiscal year. 
 
Due to its receipt of governmental funds, the KOC/KSC has been unable to make its own 
independent entrepreneurial decisions, as another junior KSC staff member claims:  
 
Actually, we are also a decision-making organisation as regards policy but that is 
more of a formality and most policy is made by the government, the MCST. They 
exercise something more like a direct control… Even if we promote a certain policy, 
                                               
9 The 17th President of Korea Lee Myung Bak (2008-present) 
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if it stands against the government, it’s not likely to work out. Receiving a 
budget…hmmm, even though we may want to, we can’t do certain things that are 
not desired by the government. There are situations like that.  
(a junior KSC staff member) 
 
Although the KOC/KSC was formally an independent sports organisation, this respondent’s 
explanation that the government’s influence was exercised ‘more like a direct control’ implies 
that the government was deeply involved in the policy making of the KSC/KOC. This was, no 
doubt, the result of the organisation’s heavy financial dependence on the government.  
 
The implication of these two interviewees’ comments is that financial dependency is a good 
vehicle through which the government can intervene in the policy making of the KSC/KOC. 
Given the dependency of the KOC/KSC on the government, the ability of the Ministry to veto 
the appointment of senior officers can be seen to represent a social (and governance) 
practice in which the government (through the Ministry) can exercise its ultimate influence. 
 
In relation to the case of KOC/KSC merger, thus, one junior KSC member of staff explained 
why the KSC and the KOC had not been able to merge without the permission of the 
government:   
 
It’s written in the charter of the IOC that cooperative relations with the government 
must be maintained but subordinating relations must be rejected. Of course, the 
government doesn’t like that. From the government’s point of view, when it’s an 
organisation that they support by paying for up to 96% of its budget, the government 
may acknowledge its independent nature but at the same time the KOC is a public 
organisation and it even receives inspections from the government and the internal 
Board of Audit and Inspection as well. The government interferes, allocates budgets, 
does the accounting… obviously it’s not welcomed by the government that the KOC 
seeks to gain independence.  
(a junior KSC staff member) 
 
In his view, its reliance on the budget allowance from the government has kept the 
KOC/KSC from operating its policy independently and he refers to interference by the 
government. By comparing this situation with the recommendations contained in the IOC 
charter, the interviewee emphasised that what the Korean government had done was not 
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strictly speaking in compliance with the requirements of the Olympic Movement. The 
government sees itself as the financial guarantor. Thus the government opposed the 
KOC/KSC decision to merge initially as it believed that it would lose its control over the joint 
organisation. As a result, it has been impossible for the KOC/KSC to accomplish its ends.  
 
As a major financial supplier, the government has exerted its power over discourse, with the 
result that the KOC/KSC is almost excluded in the decision-making about budget size. 
Governmental bodies such as the MCST and sporting organisations under the control of 
governmental bodies like KSPO have long enjoyed superior positions to the KOC/KSC in 
sports policy decision-making by virtue of their ability to deliver financial resources to the 
KOC. The Statutes of the KOC also indicate that the budget size and business activities 
should be endorsed by the MCST. The KISS also expressed the view that the KOC/KSC had 
shown a lack of effort in generating its own funds and had, in turn, been overreliant on the 
government funding. However, the KOC/KSC staff members interviewed for this study 
claimed that the government had not allowed them to develop a programme to generate 
their own funds, and they believed that the Korean government had tried to restrict the 
KSC/KOC’s independence through its direct involvement in the approval of the KSC/KOC’s 
internal human resources management and business affairs. The result for the organisation 
has been its huge financial dependence on the government and, in turn, the KOC’s lack of 
power. The interviewees even argue that the government has deliberately prevented the 
KOC/KSC from initiating any new business to support themselves so as to be able to control 
the KSC/KOC. Thus, the government’s power to regulate the organisation’s financial 
resources has been a good means for it to handle the KOC/KSC in ways that are preferable 
to the government. Accordingly, since the KOC/KSC lacks any financial independence, they 
assert that it is not able to defend its autonomy in decision-making.  
 
Another external power relation appears between the KOC/KSC and the NFs. Given that the 
President of the KOC/KSC is the Chairman of the General Assembly of Representatives, he 
has been able to exercise his decision-making authority over the representatives of each 
National Federation, although the General Assembly of Representatives is the body which 
approves the final report and settlement, which has been the highest level decision-making 
body in the KSC. This is also a good illustration of opportunities power over discourse in that 
the KOC/KSC President has more chance to influence decision-making than the 
Representatives of the NFs because he can exclude their preferred items from the agenda.  
Budget planning is also influenced by the internal power relations that existed between the 
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KSC and the KOC before their integration. Before their merger, an examination of the 
internal power relations between the KSC and the KOC shows that the KSC used to 
exercise wider power the KOC in that the budget planning was solely managed by the 
budget team, which belonged to the KSC. As the KOC is excluded from the budget planning, 
this is further evidence of the effect of power over discourse.   
 
As in the case of the KOC/KSC merger, the hierarchic systemic governance serves to 
explain the relations among domestic stakeholders. With a financial resource supply, the 
government’s higher position enables it to be deeply involved in decision-making, such that 
the KOC/KSC should follow its orders. The NFs, in their turn, are under the ‘control’ of the 
KSC/KOC, so they exert less power. Their subordinate position is evidence of the hierarchic 
systemic governance.  
6.4 Gender and Disability Equity  
6.4.1 Introduction 
This section mainly deals with the aspects of gender and disability equity in the KSC/KOC.  
In terms of the issue of gender, it takes new staff selection and employment for analysis as a 
continuous event that is revelatory of social practices. Equity for people with disabilities is 
analysed on the basis of the opinions of members of KOC/KSC staff.   
 
The analysis is based on the data from interviews conducted with 11 male and 4 female 
respondents. As Table 6-1 shows, the interviewees can be categorised by means of six 
features, namely-their gender, seniority at work, the organisation they belong to, age, length 
of employment and post. According to their gender, there are eleven men and four women 
among the 15 interviewees. In terms of their working status, all of the interviewees who 
occupy high-ranking positions are male. In fact, nine of them are involved in relatively senior 
decision making roles. In the case of the female interviewees, there is only one middle-
ranking female officer and the other three are junior staff members. Since the interviews 
were carried out only two weeks after the merger of the KOC and the KSC, questions, 
analysis and subsequent of practices were undertaken on the basis of the separate identities 
of the organisations to which each interviewee belonged in order to identify the power 
relations between the two organisations. Seven interviewees were, thus, from the KSC and 
eight from the KOC. Concerning their ages, nine of the male staff were over the age of 30 
whereas only one female staff member was aged over 30. Comparing their length of 
employment, eight male interviewees had served either in the KSC or the KOC for more than 
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10 years while only one female staff member had served for this long. Two different types of 
post in the KSC and the KOC are represented. All the male interviewees serve in 
‘administrative roles’10 (through senior and junior levels) while three of the female staff are 
categorised as occupying ‘administrative roles’ and the other female respondent is 
categorised as working in ‘clerical and technical support roles’11 (These terms are defined 
and explained by the interviewees.)   
 
Table 6-1 A list of interviewees 
No Male / 
Female 
Position KOC 
/ 
KSC 
Age Length of 
employment 
/service 
Post 
(role) 
1 M KSC Board member before & 
after its merger,  
KSC 50s Between  
5 & 10 yrs  
Admin  
2 M Former Board member KOC 40s Between  
5 & 10 yrs 
Admin  
3 M Former Secretary General KSC 60s Less than  
5 yrs 
Admin  
4 M Former Director General of 
International Affairs 
KOC 50s More than  
20 yrs 
Admin  
5 M Director of Clean Sport KSC 50s More than  
20 yrs 
Admin  
6 M Former Director General of 
International Affairs  
KOC 50s More than  
20 yrs 
Admin  
7 M Director General of International 
Affairs 
KOC 50s More than  
20 yrs 
Admin  
8 M Director of Union KSC 30s Between  
5 & 10 yrs 
Admin  
9 M Assistant Director of Planning & 
Budget team 
KSC 30s Between  
5 & 10 yrs 
Admin  
10 M Staff member of Management 
Strategy Team 
KSC 20s Less than  
5 yrs 
Admin  
11 M Staff member of International 
Affairs 
KOC 20s Less than  
5 yrs 
Admin  
12 F Staff member of Public 
Relations 
KSC 40s More than  
20 yrs 
Clerical & 
Technical 
Support  
13 F Manager of International Affairs KOC 20s Between  
5 & 10 yrs 
Admin  
14 F Staff member of International 
Affairs 
KOC 20s Less than  
5 yrs 
Admin  
15 F Staff member of International 
Affairs 
KOC 20s Less than  
5 yrs 
Admin  
In the course of the interviews, an issue arose over defining the terms ‘equity’ and ‘equality’. 
                                               
10 ‘Administrative’ role is responsible for carrying out all major front-line administrative work in all departments 
within the organisation 
11 ‘Clerical and technical support’ role can be equivalent to manual employment in the UK and is only for 
supporting for the administrative posts by performing simple tasks such as typing, or taking care of goods and 
equipment and the like. 
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As noted in Chapter Two, “equality means that the different behaviour, aspirations and needs 
of women and men are considered, valued and favoured equally…equity means fairness of 
treatment for women and men, according to their respective needs” (ABC Of Women 
Worker’s Rights And Gender Equality, 2000: 48). On analysing the interviewees’ responses, 
they were all found to have used a Korean word which incorporates the meanings of both 
‘equity’ and ‘equality’ as defined above, that is ‘평등’, or ‘Pyung Deung’ in the Korean 
language. Accordingly, when the respondents argued about gender equity in terms of the 
percentage of females in employment, this sense of the Korean word is rather close to the 
term ‘equality’. On the other hand, some interviewees raised the issue of creating different 
posts which would only be available to women, which covers the meaning of ‘equity’. In fact, 
the Korean government also used the term ‘Pyung Deung’ in the sense of ‘equality’ in 
relation to this matter in designating the Ministry established for this purpose as the ‘Ministry 
of Gender Equality’.  
 
Themes focussing on issues of equity that emerged from the interviews with the selected 
members of KOC/KSC staff and documents published by the KOC/KSC fall into six 
categories including five of gender and one of disability. This is all developed under one tree 
node, entitled ‘Equity’, with two major subordinate tree nodes under the headings of ‘gender’ 
and ‘disability’: ‘gender’ comprises eight subordinate nodes while ‘disability’ includes two 
subordinate nodes. The issue of equity regarding gender and disability is discussed 
separately. 
6.4.2 Map of themes regarding gender 
According to Figure 6-9, the following subjects may be grouped under the heading of gender 
equity issues: policy changes concerning gender equity; gender equality: redressing 
imbalances at the non-managerial level; male dominance in the KOC/KSC organisational 
structure and culture; relative absence of females at the managerial level; vertical 
segregation: ‘clerical and technical support posts’ as the highest aspiration for female staff; 
vertical segregation: the under-representation of females among decision-making at the 
managerial or Executive Committee level. 
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Figure 6-9 Gender equity 
 
6.4.3 Explanations of social practices 
a) Policy changes concerning gender equity 
One senior male member of KOC staff indicates that a gender equity movement has become 
active in the IOC in an attempt to break its male-dominated atmosphere, which has resulted 
in the more active promotion of female involvement in Olympic circles. From his perspective, 
this has encouraged the KOC to match the targets set by the IOC’s recommendations  
 
There are recommendations for each NOC within the administrative structure of the 
IOC. They have also striven to increase women’s participation. They have tried to 
break through the far too male-dominated organisational culture as well.  We, the 
KOC, have also agreed to that and have actively tried to involve women’s 
participation. (when was it that it actually started?) I would say it started in the early 
1990s.  
(the former Director of International affairs, male) 
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This respondent’s comment indicates three points that are possibly triggers for policy 
changes in the KOC on gender equity: the IOC has striven to increase women’s involvement 
in the Olympic Movement; the Olympic Movement has been very male-dominated; and as an 
NOC, the KOC has followed the suggestions made by the IOC in the international context. In 
reflecting upon the IOC’s policy on gender equity for the past, the IOC has shown its concern 
about the low level of female involvement in the decision-making structures of sports 
organisations and has strongly urged each country to live up to the IOC requirement that 
they should “ensure that the benefits of wider involvement in decision making by women are 
realised” (Women 2004: 4 cited in Claringbould & Knoppers, 2008: 81). The IOC itself also 
fixed the number of members at a maximum of 115 and set a target of 20% participation by 
women in all the decision-making structures of the Olympic Movement (Chappelet, 2006: 8) 
and additionally, “as of June 2012, 20 women are active IOC members out of 106 (more than 
18.8%)” (The IOC, 2012: 2).   
 
Following the IOC policy change a senior interviewee stated that the KOC had made an 
effort to live up to the IOC’s recommendation. In an international context, the IOC has 
encouraged the NOC’s to increase female participation in the Olympic movement. This has 
been likely to have a direct impact on the gender policy of the KOC, as each NOC should 
meet the expectations of the IOC, and as a result, it could be the trigger for the KOC to raise 
women’s involvement to the level recommended by the IOC recommends. This 
demonstrates that the KOC/KSC has been cooperating with international sporting 
organisations, in particular, the IOC in a type of web or network system at an international 
level. The IOC’s recommendation does not force the KOC/KSC to comply but it encourages 
the KOC/KSC to live up to the international standards or policies. Since the IOC has 
promoted gender equity in the ratio of employment, the KOC has claimed to try to meet the 
IOC’s expectations. 
 
The fact, however, that the KOC’s former Director of International Affair comments in the 
interview quoted above on the greater involvement of women in KOC business as having 
started in the early 1990s seems to indicate that it was more closely related to the policy 
change on gender equity in the Korean political context. According to the IOC policy on 
gender discussed above, it appears that in the 1990s, gender equity had yet to be 
developed as a policy goal. Before the IOC encouraged the NOCs to improve their 
performance on gender equity, such a movement and an improvement in the situation for 
women seemed to have appeared in the domestic context too. This interviewee added that: 
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In the case of Korea, female participation has accelerated since the Ministry of 
Gender Equality was established…I would say the rate of women’s participation is 
currently higher, relatively, than in other countries.  
(the former Director of International affairs, male ) 
 
In the Korean political context, the government has begun to put an emphasis on gender 
equity following societal changes that have raised people’s consciousness of the need to 
improve women’s rights. Consequently, the government established the Ministry of Gender 
Equality. In fact, if the history of the Ministry of Gender Equality is examined more closely, 
the Department of Women’s Affairs was newly founded within the Ministry of Political Affairs 
in 198812. This study hypothesises that this might have been an important factor influencing 
the gender policy of the KOC/KSC in the 1990s.  
 
A female member of KSC staff supported the previous interviewee’s comment about the way 
in which the change in people’ attitudes towards women’s participation in society has led to a 
higher employment rate for females in the KSC/KOC. 
. 
The idea was that as the percentage of women workers in society became higher, 
women should be given more responsible roles. Since then, from around 1995, 
when two or three female staff were recruited … women have gained a stronger 
voice now, right? So recently I think the ratio has been half and half.  
(a female KSC staff member) 
 
According to both respondents, it was approximately in the early and/or mid-1990s when the 
tendency regarding recruitment inside the KOC/KSC became more favourable to the 
employment of women, and two or three more female staff are said to have joined the 
organisation in around 1995. This is likely to reflect the linked phenomena of a more 
favourable attitude developing in society towards women’s active participation in society and 
of a change in the political conditions that led to the establishment of a governmental body 
for dealing with women’s affairs. The following interviewees report on the time when the 
increase in women’s participation became noticeable:  
                                               
12 It started under the Ministry of Political Affairs in 1988 and became independent as the Ministry of Gender 
Equality in 2001.  It was then inaugurated as the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family in March, 2010. The 
History of MOGEF (Ministry of Gender Equality and Family). Retrieved June 14, 2011 from 
http://english.mogef.go.kr/sub01/sub01_31.jsp 
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This is a very authoritarian work-place and women were supposed to be nothing but 
assistants…even those women who were employed in administrative posts worked 
like that. (when was it that the atmosphere changed?) probably around 2002. (who 
was the president at that time?) It’s 2009 now, right? Oh.. the President was Kim 
Jeong Gil13… That’s when a lot of women were hired. I guess it started with 
President Kim Yun Yong14… yes, since President Kim Yun Yong…. In 1998, 1999, 
2000? That’s when it changed dramatically.  
(a female KSC staff member) 
 
The ratio was adhered to and this difficult ratio of 30% [sic] of women as 
recommended by the IOC was respected during the hiring of executive members of 
the KOC by President Kim Jeong Gil, who took great efforts to do so. It was 
groundbreaking at that time. We nominated the female head of the training centre, 
and a few more females were appointed to the Board and the vice president… we 
surely satisfied the 30% requirement.  
(the former KSC Secretary General, male) 
 
Many women have been employed.  Especially during President Kim Jeong Gil’s 
period in office.  
(the former senior male KOC staff member) 
 
The three interviewees above claimed that since 2005 when Kim Jeong Gil was elected as 
the 25th KOC President, the rate of female involvement has dramatically increased in 
administrative posts. Looking at the first respondent’s assertion, from the late 1990s or early 
2000s onwards when President Kim Yun Yong took power, women’s involvement actually 
started to increase. As mentioned earlier, female participation accelerated when the Ministry 
of Gender Equality became independent in 2001 and Kim Yun Yong’s tenure was at the time 
when the Ministry gained its independence in the Korean political context. As already 
discussed above, the changing environments in international, political and social contexts 
have led two former presidents of the KOC to try to make an effort to improve gender equity 
in terms of the ratio of female involvement. Thus, it is clearly acknowledged, especially in the 
opinions of female staff members employed since 2005 that gender equity has been 
                                               
13 The 25th KOC President (24.Feb.2005-28.Apr.2008) 
14 The 21st, 22nd , and 23rd KOC President (24.Feb.1993-12.Mar.2002) 
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successfully established in the KSC/KOC.  
 
In relation to policy change on gender equity, it is interesting to discover the way in which 
gender equity is defined by members of the KOC/KSC staff. Different definitions are given by 
some KOC and KSC respondents in terms of the ratios of females to males recruited by the 
organisation. Only one respondent among the other interviewees who agreed with the 
assertion that the KOC had achieved its target for gender equity (for which there is an 
absence of ‘objective’ evidence cited) said that the policy of appointing a certain percentage 
of new female staff had been successfully implemented. On the other hand, five other 
interviewees argued that gender equity should mean that the same ratio was observed 
between male and female and they also expressed their view that the level of gender equity 
had already reached half and half. When the different views of respondents are taken into 
account, it reveals how their different knowledge about gender equity is embraced in the 
discourse. It is noteworthy that none of the interviewees made reference to the types of role 
women played within the organisation. In other words, the problems of vertical and horizontal 
segregation were ‘invisible’ in the discourses.  
The fixed percentage of female recruitment 
A number of interviewees referred to the establishing of a 7:3 target minimum ratio for male 
to female appointments. One middle-ranking female KOC-based staff member concluded 
that the policy on gender equity had been fulfilled because a certain percentage in staff 
recruitment had been allocated to females.  
 
I don’t think there is any unfairness in recruitment. Above all, as far as I am 
concerned, for example, if 10 people are being recruited, a certain percentage of 
them at least ought to be women… as I know.  
(a middle-ranking KOC officer, female) 
 
This interviewee joined the KOC during the tenure of the 25th KOC President Kim Jeong Gil, 
when gender equity was being promoted within the KOC in order to reach the IOC’s 
recommended target ratio. Her view was supported by a senior male staff member of the 
KSC, who pointed out that 
 
The ratio was kept and this difficult ratio of 30% [sic] women as recommended by 
the IOC was respected during the hiring of Executive Committee members of the 
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KOC by President Kim Jeong Gil, who made great efforts to do so. We surely 
satisfied the 30% [sic] requirement.  
(the former Secretary General , male) 
 
It should be noted here that this middle-ranking female officer claimed that when she joined 
the KOC, the organisation promoted gender equity based on the ‘30%’ IOC recommendation. 
Although she is citing an incorrect minimum target level for the IOC, it may be assumed that 
her concept of gender equity is possibly influenced by the discursive surroundings in which 
she was employed, that is working for an Olympic organisation in which there is a 
predisposition to be led by IOC recommendations.   
A larger or equal number of female versus male staff recruited 
Apart from the first interviewee, there are two more junior female members of KOC staff who 
joined during Kim Jeong Gil’s tenure.  
 
I don’t think there is any inequity. I don’t know if that applies to my generation only, or 
it’s just me, but last year the newly recruited members are 8 people and among them 
there are 3 men and 5 women.   
(junior KOC staff member, female) 
 
At the non-managerial level,.. err…I don’t feel that there’s any gender discrimination 
or anything like that.. hmm…there is also a tendency to employ more females or half 
males and half females…hmm…I don’t know.    
(junior KOC staff member, female) 
 
Those two junior staff members expressed their opinions about gender equity at a time when 
the number of female staff was even higher than that of males. They seem simply to have 
noted the fact that a higher percentage of female staff had been employed in the KOC. For 
that reason, they responded that the KOC had achieved its target for gender equity since 
there was a tendency to recruit more female than male staff and their knowledge about 
gender equity is a reflection of the time when they were employed. However, the second 
interviewee quoted above does note that there is a lack of discrimination at non-managerial 
levels. 
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The next interviewee is a female staff member from the KSC:  
 
Of course it’s unfair. Why 7:3? It should be 5:5… Recently, it has been almost half 
and half  
(a female KSC staff member) 
 
She also insisted that gender equity should be considered to have been achieved when 
there was a half and half ratio between male and female employees. Her comment that ‘it 
has been almost half and half’ implies that the application of the policy on gender equity has 
moved towards achieving balanced gender participation in the KSC/KOC, again without 
reference to vertical or horizontal segregation.  
 
The next contribution was made by a junior male member of KOC staff who maintained that 
female involvement was relatively higher than in the past.  
 
Now, it is likely to be equal. (in what aspects?) Looking at the new employees, the 
ratio of females is relatively high. Looking at my colleagues and juniors, some of 
them really are competent.  
(a junior KOC staff member, male) 
 
Unlike the female interviewees cited above, this male interviewee comments on the ratio 
being ‘relatively high’ and this implies that this is, by reference to appointments made, 
though no indication is given of the category of employment, as discussed above. His point 
could simply be that the state of female recruitment had merely improved by comparison 
with the past. This male interviewee was hired after the first middle-ranking female KOC staff 
member and he is also assumed to have been employed in the period of the fixed minimum 
gender ratio.  
 
There are three issues here. One is the use of a target figure of 30% female employment 
rather than the minimum target of 20% for women as the proportion of those in executive 
decision-making roles. The inconsistency between the 30% target of the KOC and the 20% 
minimum target of the IOC is something no action commented on. In addition there were 
comments conceiving the fact that the KOC figures related to all employment while the IOC 
figures related to female recruitment to position of executive authority. It is supposed that the 
members of the KOC/KSC have their own perceptions/interpretations of gender equity 
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requirements in accordance with the policy of the organisation. Finally, having minimum 
targets of percentage of females at all levels relates clearly to gender equality, than to 
gender equity.  
 
This is evidence of the power over discourse that the concept of gender equity (here, the 
term equality is more suitable) is discursively constructed by KOC/KSC by promoting a 
target of 30 per cent for the achievement of gender equity. This reflects the opinion of the 
dominant male decision-making group that such a level of female employment could be said 
to imply that gender equity had been realised, an opinion that the middle-ranking officer 
subscribed to without questioning.  
 
If we consider the nature of the way in which gender equity is treated by the IOC, and the 
way it is dealt with in the discourses of our interviewees, key differences are evident. Taking 
the IOC approach, first the IOC adopted the following policy to gender equality/equity. In 
1997 it adopted a minimum target of 10% of executive decision-making positions an NOC or 
IF Executive Committees to be occupied by women by December, 2001 and 20% by 
December 2005 (Henry et al, 2004; Henry & Robinson, 2010). This adopted measure 
implicitly conveys a number of elements of gender discourse. The first is that the measure 
adopted is a minimum target not a quota, the difference being that a target is simply an 
aspirational goal, whereas the use of the term quota implies a requirement, one for which 
failure implies a sanction.  
 
The second element is that the minimum target is set at a IOC level. Equality would imply 
50:50 ratio or as near as practicable. The third element relates to this in that the concern is 
within equality not equity since the measure simply seeks to locate equal number of women 
at the top of the organisation (in the Executive Committee). The fourth element is that 
vertical segregation is recognised as an issue since the target set relates to senior executive 
decisions. However, the IOC approach ignores issues of horizontal segregation, which are 
evident in NOCs (Henry et al, 2004). In the respondents comments on gender equity in the 
KOC/KSC a somewhat different approach is suggested even though the approach is 
attributed to the IOC, or its inference. 
b) Gender equality: redressing imbalances at the non-managerial level 
Since the comments on gender equality in executive decision making made by the IOC are 
perceived as relating to gender equality in all employment throughout the KOC/KSC as 
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discussed above, there is an evident mis-match between what the IOC is advocating and 
what the KOC/KSC is doing, even though interviewees refer to the KOC/KSC approach as 
reflecting ‘IOC’s requirements’. We should carefully consider whether gender equality has 
been achieved at all levels within the KOC/KSC. In terms of the interviewees’ opinions on 
gender equality at the non-managerial level, all four female interviewees and seven out of 
eleven male interviewees expressed the opinion that gender equality had been achieved at 
the non-managerial level in the KOC/KSC since 2005. As mentioned above, several 
interviewees implied that the middle-ranking female interviewee (there is only one middle-
ranking female interviewee who was employed in 2005 in an administrative role and no 
females in more senior’s positions) was regarded as the first generation who enjoyed gender 
equality, which may also imply that gender equality may be assumed to have been limited to 
date to the non-managerial level.  
 
According to the organisation to which they belonged, either the KSC or the KOC, all KOC 
interviewees considered that gender equity had been achieved at the non-managerial level 
in the KOC, whereas in the KSC only four respondents made such a claim for their 
organisation. The results probably give insights into the respect for seniority at the 
institutional level. Given that the KOC might have perceived the IOC’s recommendations as 
a requirement as the NOC because of the IOC’s stipulation, the KOC has claimed to try to 
live up to the IOC’s target minimum percentage of female employment. However, as the 
KSC seemed to be more related with domestic sport affairs, there was a tendency to show 
less concern the IOC’s wishes. This phenomenon is explained by a KSC middle-ranking 
officer as follows:  
 
You have to take a look at it while distinguishing between KOC and KSC. In the case 
of KOC, it seems like they were abiding by the guidelines.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer, male) 
 
From this interviewee’s perspective, as the KOC has been representing the Republic of 
Korea as an NOC, it is much more likely to be sensitive to the need to follow the IOC’s 
recommendations. Apparently, the KOC seems to have put more emphasis on gender 
equality than the KSC and thus, all respondents from the KOC agreed with the view that 
gender equality had been attained at the non-managerial level.  
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In connection with gender equality, furthermore, one junior male employee even raised the 
issue of the KSC/KOC’s having perhaps taken positive discriminatory action.   
 
During the process of recruitment, I have no idea whether there is any positive 
discrimination on the grounds of gender. Due to sex (gender) discrimination, it would 
be a problem if only one female were hired among ten new employees. However, if 
the nine male candidates were better qualified than the female candidates, yet more 
female candidates were hired to meet the external expectation, it could bring up the 
issue of positive action… I am not sure about that but it is certain that the number of 
female staff has increased.  
(a junior KSC staff member, male) 
 
Only this male interviewee of the KSC gave a ‘negative’ impression about gender equality 
given that the KOC/KSC has recently employed a relatively high ratio of female staff. As he 
expressed a concern on positive action, his implication might be that he did not ensure of the 
competence of the female employees but that gender equality had been achieved within the 
organisation. 
 
However, the former Secretary General’s implication was that positive action is unavoidable 
as an essential pre-requisite for the successful advancement of gender equality and equity. 
 
It will take at least another 5-10 years for the chiefs to have the willingness and the 
sympathy to let women enlarge their role. For women to achieve their potential, the 
willingness of the chief is important since it is still culturally difficult for women to 
compete against men for promotion.  
(the former Secretary General, male) 
 
This interviewee implied that the organisational structure is still in vertical segregation as 
most female employees are in the non-managerial level and are limited in their access to 
important roles. However, it can be inferred that he has been aware of horizontal segregation 
as more roles should be enlarged to female employees in administrative roles and these 
experienced female employees are entitled to go forward to the higher positions.  
c) Male dominance in the KOC/KSC organisational structure and culture 
As a reason for low female participation in the KOC/KSC before 2005, several interviewees 
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mentioned the prevalence of a male-dominated organisational culture in the KOC/KSC. One 
senior male KOC staff member added that this had been the situation for a long time and he 
admitted that there had been discrimination against women in the KOC/KSC.  
 
It has been mainly men who have dominated until now. Since staff recruitment has 
been more open to public scrutiny, although more men have been employed than 
women, nowadays it has been changing.   
(Director General of International Affairs, male) 
 
More particularly, one female KSC staff member argued that:  
 
There was a social atmosphere in which women were expected to quit their jobs 
after marriage, especially given the fact that the KOC/KSC is a conservative and 
authoritarian organisation...   
(a female KSC staff member) 
 
This answer of KSC staff claimed that women in general quit their jobs after marriage in the 
context of traditional Korean accepted social practice and that the approach to gender equity 
issues at the KOC/KSC was unlikely to have become sufficiently mature for women 
employees to be able to continue working after marriage. In relation to this, an interesting 
issue arising in the discourse is whether or not the presence of a male-dominated 
organisational culture has affected the aspect of gender equity in the KSC/KOC.    
The male-dominated organisational culture has affected gender equity. 
Two respondents discussed the KOC/KSC organisational culture that led to female 
employees leaving work after marriage.   
 
In the past, even though female staff were hired, the organisational culture used to 
be such that it was very likely to be male-dominated and this made female staff quit 
after their marriages.  
(a junior KSC staff member, male) 
 
There used to be the assumption in our culture that a woman would quit her job after 
marriage. In cases where a female staff member had still joined the organisation 
after her marriage, there was thought to be a problem in her married life. This is 
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especially the case with the KSC/KOC, which has been conservative and 
authoritarian for a long time. If a woman was pregnant, she had to keep it secret to 
avoid having to quit her job.   
(a KSC staff member, female) 
 
These two interviewees commented that the KOC/KSC staff members tended to believe that 
women should quit their jobs after marriage. Whereas the male junior KSC staff member 
simply conveyed that the organisational culture is male-dominated, the female KSC staff 
member added the detailed cases of gender inequity that had been taken. From the female 
interviewee’s perspective, such a male-dominated organisational culture justified the 
description of the KOC/KSC as being ‘conservative’ and ‘authoritarian’.   
The male-dominated organisational culture does not directly affect gender equity. 
However, the next interviewee, who is a junior male KOC member of staff, believed that no 
pressure had been placed on women to leave but that, in keeping with Korean social 
practice, female staff in general quit their jobs earlier than male staff. His implication that 
social practice was involved shows that he considered it to be a very common aspect of 
Korean society rather than just limited to the KSC/KOC.   
 
As the position in the job hierarchy gets higher there are fewer women… no-one 
asks them to leave but, in any case, women usually quit when they get older…. The 
lower the position the more women there are compared with men. Hmm… I can’t 
really say anything because I don’t really know if that’s because there are fewer 
chances for women or it was always like that.    
(a junior KOC staff member, male) 
 
Comparing his point of view with those of the two previous interviewees, the difference is 
over their opinion as to whether pressure had been placed on female staff to leave their jobs 
after marriage. The two previous male and female interviewees believed that female staff 
had been forced to quit their jobs due to pressure from the organisation. On the other hand, 
the junior male informant expressed the opinion that the KOC/KSC had never compelled 
female staff to leave; it was, rather, a natural occurrence in keeping with social practices in 
Korean society. In any case, although they adopted two different perspectives, all three 
interviewees agreed that, in their experience, female staff commonly quit their jobs after 
marriage. Although both perspectives explain the same phenomena, two different discursive 
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behaviours are exhibited. 
 
At the same time, this phenomenon can be obviously explained with reference to Lukes’ 
(1974) second dimensional power, according to which women are in the non-decision 
making role in this context. Men constituted the power group and women could not access 
this process due to the social phenomenon whereby women should leave their jobs after 
marriage. This phenomenon is also explained as a reason of appearance of vertical 
segregation which shows that female staff usually were not able to be promoted to the 
higher position.    
d) Relative absence of females at the managerial level 
The next issue to be considered is whether the male-dominated organisational culture has 
resulted in the phenomenon of a low level of female participation at the managerial level.  
 
In the past, more men were employed so most of the managerial positions are still 
occupied by men but I think women will take more of these roles in the future. (what 
is the proportion of females in managerial positions?) None [up to the level of 
Director General except for the Executive Committee level]. There are more or less 
20 people in posts as high as Director General or still higher positions [such as 
Secretary General] but no women are there yet. The average age for staff in these 
positions is in the 40s or 50s but there is no woman over the age of 40 at this point.  
(the Director General of International Affairs, male) 
 
There weren’t many opportunities for women to be promoted to higher posts.  
When you take a look at the average age of the women employees right now, or 
their career experience, it’s apparent that it hasn’t been long since they [female 
employees who are in ‘administrative’ roles] joined the KOC. So they aren’t really a 
target for promotion yet. Although they are gradually moving up into the higher 
posts…there aren’t any candidates for higher positions [at the moment]. That’s why 
there are no women in the higher positions.  
(the former Secretary General, male)  
 
It’s only been less than 4 years since women began to be recruited as regular 
employees [in ‘administrative’ posts]. For them to have a chance of reaching the 
managerial level, they [female staff members in ‘administrative’ roles] have to stay 
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for at least 10 to 15 years. They are not at a disadvantage, but they have started 
late. And it’s a recent phenomenon for women to wish to enter the realm of sports as 
part of their dream of being active in sports diplomacy.  
(the former KOC Director General of International Affairs, male) 
 
These three senior respondents thought that the short history of female employment at 
KOC/KSC was the cause of the shortage of female staff who were competent to work at the 
managerial level in terms of their working experience or length of service in the organisation 
and this resulted in gender inequity at that level. In this way, their implications are that the 
culture of male dominance may be said to have directly affected the women’s attainment in 
terms of competency and working experience. The interviewees above expressed an opinion 
in stating female involvement at the decision-making level was not acceptable yet because 
the promotion of gender equity had only been underway for a short time. Within the 
‘administrative’ posts, female officers are limited to being involved in the managerial level at 
this stage which can be viewed as evidence of vertical segregation. 
 
Unlike these three senior interviewees, although the junior and/or middle-ranking KOC staff 
expressed the opinion that they had experienced gender equality at the non-managerial 
level, one of them also carefully pointed out that the existence of gender equity at the 
managerial level was in doubt. A junior female KOC staff member expressed her concern 
about the situation:     
 
hmm… I don’t know... I think there might be gender inequity in terms of promotions 
but there aren’t many women employees who can expect to reach that high position, 
so I don’t know… maybe when that time comes, there can be disadvantages…  
(a junior KOC staff member, female) 
 
This comment implies that a female staff member would have less chance of reaching the 
managerial level irrespective of her competencies. From the interviewee’s perspective, the 
issue of promotion per se might be a cause of gender inequity and her contention that 
‘female staff’s expectations were low’ implies that while the KOC/KSC might redress gender 
imbalances at the non-managerial level the opportunities available to women at higher 
decision-making levels were still inequitable. 
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e) Vertical segregation: clerical & technical support posts as the highest 
aspiration for female staff 
Associated with the issue of women’s low involvement at the managerial level is the claim of 
a lack of fairness of job opportunities, which is evidenced by the scarcity of female 
participation at the managerial and executive decision-making level. A former senior KOC 
staff member put forward another reason for it: 
 
Just one thing, and it’s a chronic problem in Korea, is that within KOC and KSC 
there are no women in high positions.  None at the managerial level….. in the past, 
women were mostly contract workers…which means they cannot reach the 
executive level. It’s only been less than 4 years since women began to be recruited 
as regular employees.  
(the former KOC Director General of International Affairs, male) 
 
One female KSC staff member also testified that members of female staff were not allocated 
to front-line ‘administrative’ roles but to ‘clerical and technical support’ posts alone.  
 
When I joined, there were no administrative positions for women. There were social 
prejudices and so women were hired through an informal recruitment process and 
were given assistant roles … This is a very authoritarian work place and women 
were supposed to be nothing but assistants.  
(a KSC staff member, female) 
 
These respondents implied that in the Korean social context, there was a stereotype of 
women as being incapable of building their careers and of men as being preferable as 
employees. In spite of an increase in women’s participation, they claimed that job 
opportunities were obviously unequal, so female staff used to be hired to fill ‘clerical and 
technical support’ posts by means of an unofficial recruitment process, and most 
‘administrative’ posts were ‘de facto’ allocated only to men. The interviewees pointed out that 
women had been excluded from promotion or they have had less opportunity to reach the 
managerial level not simply in the KOC or KSC but also in Korean society. For instance, one 
interviewee was a female KSC staff member who had worked in a ‘clerical and technical 
support post in the KSC for more than 20 years, yet she had failed to gain promotion. She 
had not enjoyed the same job opportunities or salary as an ‘administrative’ post employee 
and had remained at the lower levels of the organisation. The discourse of the above 
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interviewees contrasts with that of those interviewees who claimed that the gender equality 
or equity situation had improved. Here the discourse is critical of the current situation but 
only for some. Thus different discourses prevail amongst different groups. 
 
More specifically, the long-term prevalence of inequity in job opportunities open to women is 
observable in the discourses of their employment rates in the two different categories of post, 
the so-called ‘administrative’ and ‘clerical and technical support’ posts. In the following 
responses two junior KOC and KSC staff members also explain what the main duties of 
females in ‘clerical and technical support’ posts really are: 
 
Many of the KOC/KSC’s women employees are in ‘clerical and technical support’ 
posts… (what is a ‘clerical and technical support’ post?) Many female staff were 
employed originally to do jobs such as typing or something like that and they are still 
working. Nowadays they’re not responsible for ordinary tasks. (what kinds of thing 
do they do?) There is one in each department (team). They do internal clerical work 
including typing, documentary work, filling and archiving, internal tasks like refilling 
stationary, cups, coffee, tea and so on.  
(a junior KOC staff member, female) 
 
‘Clerical and technical support’ posts are, let’s say, the jobs of drivers or those who 
work in the boiler rooms, elevator girls, and some clerical workers such as typists, 
[or manual workers such as] kitchen workers, and the like…  
(a KSC staff member, female)  
 
For reference, in the Korean social context, for the recruitment of public officers such a 
division (clerical/technical/manual versus front-line administrative roles) has been 
established for a while and, recently, it has become an issue of debate over the situation of 
inequity in terms of salary, promotion opportunities, job opportunities, and so on. For 
example, although the Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MOPAS) has been 
forced by public opinion to abolish this system, unfortunately it still persists. Public posts are 
classified numerically on a scale from 1 to 9 for ‘administrative’ posts, but ‘clerical and 
technical support’ posts used to be categorized from 1 to 10. The Ministry only changed its 
system slightly by reducing the number of categories in the ‘clerical and technical support’ 
roles from 1 to 9 (MOPAS, n.d.). The category 10 for ‘clerical and technical support’ posts 
was lower than category 9 at the bottom of the scale for ‘administrative’ posts. Clearly, 
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‘clerical and technical support’ post holders were endowed with less chance of being 
promoted, smaller salaries, and fewer job opportunities for career development. The division 
of posts for females into the two categories of ‘administrative’ and ‘clerical and technical 
support’ in the Korean social context is shown as a form of vertical segregation. The 
KOC/KSC as an organisation under the umbrella of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and 
Tourism is subject to the same conditions (and gendered outcomes) as other such public 
bodies. 
f) Vertical segregation: the under-representation of females among decision-
making at the managerial or Executive Committee levels 
The middle-ranking KSC officer also made an important point about the issue of women’s 
participation at two levels of decision-making.  
 
As I just mentioned, there aren’t any women in higher posts [at the managerial level 
in ‘administrative’ posts]. They only went up to category 5 [so far]. There was one 
woman who went up higher than category 5, but that’s a recent story… It tells us 
that women are completely excluded from the decision-making process…  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer, male) 
 
There are women [on our newly-formed Executive Committee]. Here, if you look, 
you’ll see that there are women... only two though…it seems likely that they can 
suggest their opinions in decision-making. (female members?) yes.. yes.. however, 
they might think differently… Although those women members may be allowed to 
convey their opinions in decision-making processes it might be a different matter. 
Because they don’t have so much power, those female members, I mean.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer, male) 
 
His implication is that the exclusion of female staff at the managerial level could be related to 
policy making in the organisation. As women are unable to be involved in policy making, 
decision-making would tend to be the exclusive prerogative of male employees even when 
women are members of decision-making bodies. He claimed that the critical issue raised at 
this point centres on the fact that the increase in female participation has not enabled female 
Executive Committee members to have their voice in decision-making. However, the 
following KSC officer’s comment suggests that gender equity should be achieved by the 
same attainment a balanced ratio between female and male staff at the managerial level, 
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which is gender equality.     
 
It might be hard to say that there is e..quali…ty. Equality means that, in the case of 
20 managerial staff, the ratio should be 10 to 10 in order to lead to a change in policy 
making.  
(a middle-ranking staff member of the KSC, male) 
This male staff member argues, thus, that without having the same ratio between male and 
females is a necessary condition of gender equity, and that a situation in which female 
members were able to express their opinions freely and positively would “lead to a change in 
policy making”. These informants conveyed that vertical segregation prevailed at the 
managerial and Executive decision-making level within the organisation. However, the 
interviewee implies that there is still a tendency for the male-dominated status quo to be 
preserved at the decision-making level. 
 
As interviewees indicate, there is a widely held belief among male staff members that 
women are not capable of working as well as men, and the implication that women should 
quit their jobs after marriage, which is a factor that contributes to male dominance in the 
managerial positions. The persistence and widespread nature of this kind of discourse (with 
little evidence but strong assertion) is evidence of the power of the discourse of hegemonic 
masculinity. A further consequence is that clerical and technical support posts are mainly 
allocated to women with limited prospects of promotion and salary differences in the public 
sector that disadvantage female employees. The recent policy change on gender equity, 
however, has brought about greater participation by female staff members at the non-
managerial level. Nevertheless, women are severely under-represented at the managerial 
and Executive Committee levels, which can be seen as limiting their ability to influence 
decision making.  
6.4.4 Map of themes regarding disability and equity 
Disability has two subordinate nodes under one main tree node as examined earlier and two 
main themes are developed, namely the recruitment of people with disabilities, based on the 
Korean government’s suggestion; and the responsibility taken by the Korean Paralympic 
Committee (hereinafter KPC) and Korea Sports Association for the Disabled (hereinafter 
KOSAD) for people with disabilities, as shown Figure 6-10.  
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Figure 6-10 Disability equity 
 
6.4.5 Explanations of social practices 
a) The discourses on recruitment of people with disabilities on the 
recommendation of the Korean Government 
The interviewees all acknowledged that the KOC/KSC had been officially obliged to employ 
a certain percentage of people with physical impairments in order to comply with the Korean 
Government’s recommendations. Regarding the discourse on disability equity, by their 
responses the interviewees fell into two main groups on the subject of the policy for 
employing people with physical impairments. Some interviewees pointed out that the ratio 
had been well maintained and the KOC/KSC had lived up to the government’s 
recommendations while others argued that this had not been the case. A negative or positive 
view was taken concerning the extent to which the KOC/KSC had complied with the 
government-recommended target rate for the employment of people with physical 
impairments.  
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Employment rate of people with disabilities meets the recommendation 
With respect to the employment of people with disabilities there were five respondents who 
considered that the KOC/KSC had complied with the regulations set by the government. 
Among these interviewees, there was the understanding that a certain percentage of the 
total number of employees should comprise people with physical impairments. More 
particularly, the other four respondents answered with certainty while one interviewee from 
the KOC replied affirmatively but without certainty.  
  
The four interviewees all answered by saying that the KOC/KSC had lived up to the 
government’s recommendations.  
      
It’s a certain percentage, in keeping with the government-recommended rate, as far 
as I know. It has been complied with successfully. (Can you tell me the 
recommended rate?)  I have no idea. 
(a junior KOC staff member) 
 
With respect to the recruitment of the disabled, there is a government recommended 
rate. We’ve hired enough disabled people to match that rate  
(a junior KSC staff member) 
 
The next interviewee even commented that the employment of people with disabilities had 
surpassed the target rate, which demonstrated his belief that the organisation has fulfilled its 
obligations satisfactorily.  
  
We comply with the regulations. People with disabilities are hired in accordance with 
the rules. It could be that more disabled people are recruited, but never less.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer)  
 
This senior officer from the KOC below also declared that in his view the KOC/KSC’s policy 
of employing people with physical impairments had been accomplished.  
As far as employing those with disabilities is concerned, we comply with the rules 
and laws. According to the law, there is a certain fixed rate for the number of disabled 
employees. It has been accomplished.  
(a senior KOC officer)  
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Apart from the four respondents above, one of five interviewees who claimed that the 
KOC/KSC had complied with the regulations set by the government expressed her point of 
view with a degree of uncertainty but she still claimed that the KOC/KSC had a system 
whereby preferential treatment was given to people with physical impairments. 
   
I don’t know much about it but there is a system of preferential treatment. (for 
example?) I don’t know it well but there is probably an extra point or an extra 
position of employment  
(a junior KOC staff member) 
 
All of the interviewees concurred in stating that there was a government recommended rate 
for the number of employees with physical impairments, although none of them could 
provide the relevant actual percentage. When asked whether an official document could be 
provided in confirmation of it, they said that they were unaware such official document in use 
in the KOC/KSC. On examining the relationship between the interviewees’ perspectives and 
their seniority, it is seen that only one of those respondents was a senior officer and the 
others were all either middle-ranking or junior staff. This implies that the interviewees felt that 
the organisation had internally promoted its system for discriminating positively in favour of 
people with disabilities without providing any actual data.  
Employment rate of people with disabilities does not meet the recommendation 
While there were respondents who believed that the KOC/KSC had achieved the 
recommended rate based on the law above, two high ranking officers confessed that in 
reality things had been different. They maintained, nevertheless, that there had been a policy 
on disability equity. 
 
Employment is not always accessible to the disabled. Fortunately, the KPC and the 
KOSAD have allocated posts to disabled people. We should also follow a 
recommended ratio for the disabled but we have not complied with it well.   
(the former Director General of International Affairs) 
 
 
We are obliged to employ the disabled. Those who are a bit deaf… but the blind 
would be unable to work here as there are many events that require sighted people. 
Some people are handicapped in their mobility… others are handicapped with their 
hearing… after all, it is not easy to live up to the recommended ratio. (would you 
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please tell me the official recommended rate?) there is….a total of…… 10%?  2 or 
3%? I am not sure.  
(Director of Clean Sport) 
 
From their perspective, as the KOC/KSC has usually been engaged in working in the domain 
of physical activities, it would not be pertinent to hire people with disabilities. This point of 
view was supported by another member of KOC staff. 
 
Employing people with disabilities…. Well…most of the work in this organisation 
involves physical activity, so it wouldn’t be easy for them to work here, and they also 
have the KOSAD and the KPC  
(a middle-ranking KOC officer) 
 
Furthermore, this Executive Committee member of the KOC even claimed that the KOC and 
the KSC did not purposely ignore the disabled.  
 
I don’t see it as inequity.  If we didn’t employ any disabled people who were 
capable of working that would be a problem.  However, we can’t just employ those 
who are unable to accomplish physical activities, can we? Also, there is the KOSAD 
and the KPC… in Korea… we have the KOSAD and the KPC.  
(a KOC Executive Committee member before and after the merger of KOC/KSC) 
 
His comment on the roles of people with physical impairments gives the impression that 
people with disabilities’ fulfil inappropriate roles within the organisation. Especially, in saying 
that ‘I don’t see it as inequity’, compared to the previous respondents’ similarly positive views 
of KOC/KSC compliance, he appears to have been seeking to justify the organisation’s 
negligence in complying with the governmental regulation by denying that equal treatment 
was possible. His approach to this matter was rather to advocate the KOC’s stance, whereas 
the previous interviewees had simply explained its reality. Other interviewees also gave their 
opinion that physical impairment could be an obstacle in preventing disabled people from 
being involved in most activities offered by the KSC/KOC. Most interviewees who gave 
‘negative’ responses also supported the point of view that the KOSAD and the KPC should 
be responsible for absorbing people with disabilities.    
 
In a similar way to those respondents who replied with a positive perspective, all the 
 234 
 
interviewees who replied negatively were unable to confirm the actual percentage of 
disabled people employed. This also indicates that the KOC/KSC had internally promoted its 
compliance with the governmental regulations in a vague manner. With respect to the 
relationship between the interviewees’ perspectives and their seniority, most interviewees 
who voiced negative opinions were high-ranking officers with the exception of one middle-
ranking officer. Again, this may imply that as the organisation had promoted its policy on the 
employment of people with disabilities, junior and some middle-ranking staff had a tendency 
to accept it at face value whereas senior members of the KOC/KSC had more opportunity to 
recognise the reality of its policy on employing people with disabilities. The discourses of the 
‘ethically compliant organisation’ is thus in evidence despite a lack of data to support their 
perspective. 
b) The KPC and KOSAD should be responsible for people with disabilities  
No matter whether the interviewees whose responses have been analysed previously 
agreed or disagreed with the view that the KOC/KSC had complied with the 
recommendations made by the Korean Government, they were united in claiming that the 
KOSAD and/or KPC had accepted the main responsibility for employing people with 
disabilities. 
 
The disabled usually work for the KOSAD and KPC. I don’t see that they have to 
deal with inequity. I’ve never heard of it.. never.. never…   
(the former Director General of International Affairs) 
  
As far as I know, the KOSAD and KPC hire a larger number of disabled than of able-
bodied people.  
(a junior KOC staff member) 
 
Fortunately, the KPC and KOSAD have absorbed disabled workers.  
(the former Director General of International Affairs) 
 
 
There is KOSAD and KPC in Korea…we have the KOSAD and KPC.  
(a KOC Executive Committee member) 
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Although the KOC/KSC has employed people with physical impairments in order to comply 
with the government recommendations, the interviewees below said that the number was not 
likely to be high enough due to its organisational characteristics, which is that as the 
KOC/KSC were so heavily engaged in physical activities, it would not be appropriate to hire 
people with disabilities. This point of view was supported by other members of KOC/KSC 
staff. 
 
Employing people with disabilities…. Well…most of the work in this organisation 
involves physical activity, so it wouldn’t be easy for them to work here  
(a middle-ranking KOC officer) 
 
The blind would be unable to work as there are many events that require sighted 
people. Some people are handicapped in their mobility…  
(Director of Clean Sport) 
 
With respect to the organisation’s policy regarding the employment of people with 
impairments, power of discourse appears in this case, that is a ‘discourse of incapability’ and 
of horizontal segregation in that employment of people with disabilities is treated by some 
respondents as primarily or solely the responsibility of organisations dealing with disability 
sport. With respect to the achievement of equitable employment opportunities for people with 
impairments, most members of KOC/KSC staff claim their belief that people with disabilities 
are employed in sufficient numbers for the organisation to be in compliance with the 
regulations set by the government (though they were unable to say what the proportion 
required by government was). The claim that the KOC/KSC deals with physical activity and 
thus the disabled would not be able to work effectively in such organisations seems irrational 
since the tasks required of administrations do not involve participation in sports per se. the 
decision not to consider people with disabilities for such posts may be considered as an 
example of Lukes’ second dimensional power, that is of non-decision making.   
6.5 Elections of KOC President & Chef de Mission  
6.5.1 Introduction 
The last event to be considered encompasses the election processes for both the 
presidency of the KOC and the post of Chef de Mission. Themes relating to the election of 
the KOC President in interviews are illustrated in Figure 6-11 in which there is one main tree 
node containing seven subordinate nodes, while for the election of the Chef de Mission there 
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is one main tree node including seven subordinate nodes. The analysis takes account of the 
interviewees’ perspectives on the election process and the ways will be identified in which 
social practices and, specifically, those which relate to the Korean political context over a 
certain time period have impacted on the process for electing the President and Chef de 
Mission of the KOC. Regarding the KOC’s presidential election, the middle-ranking and 
senior officers were sufficiently well-informed to express an opinion but regarding the Chef 
de Mission elections it was only the senior officers who felt able to comment on the reality of 
the election process, as only senior staff are entitled to be involved in these elections.   
6.5.2 Map of themes regarding selection of the KOC/KSC President 
Two themes emerge with regard to the presidential election: one is the influence that the 
government exerts by screening the appointees to the headship of sports organisations; the 
other concerns the differences between election practices in reality and the KOC Statutes 
(see Figure 6-11). 
 
Figure 6-11 Election of KOC President 
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6.5.3 Explanations of social practices 
a) The Government uses its influence to appoint its close aides as the heads 
of sports organisations. 
With respect to the election process for the KOC Presidency, the former senior KOC staff 
member illustrated the close connection between the KOC and the government as follows:     
 
This is off the record but a candidate who has been screened and pre-selected by 
the government is encouraged or even urged by them to stand for the presidency. 
As he/she thinks that the government is giving its backing to their candidature, they 
can run for the presidency with confidence. Since the person recommended by the 
government has to be elected, there have been heaps of cases like that.  
(the former Director General of International Affairs) 
 
The implication of his statement is that the government exerts a profound influence on the 
KOC’s presidential election process since it usually makes one of its close aides run for that 
post. He added that even when the candidate has merely been encouraged to stand for 
election by the government, he/she can be confident of winning. His claim that there had 
been ‘heaps of cases like that’ indicates that many KOC Presidents were former close aides 
of the State President. Another female KSC staff member also stated that, in her opinion, the 
government could exercise its direct influence on the election:  
 
(what kind of process does the election of the President follow?) The outcome is not 
actually decided at a higher level – it’s more of a case of pushing the chosen person 
forward. Someone is virtually parachuted into the position. (who do you mean by the 
‘higher level’?) The State President! Government and sports are inseparable.  
(a female KSC staff member) 
 
The inference to be drawn from her account is that the presidential election has been 
conducted as a virtually ‘token’ exercise and that, as a result, an aide of the State President 
is selected as the KOC president. Both respondents above shared the idea that the 
government was the most powerful entity in the selection of the KOC president and the 
government sent a political ally to be a candidate for the presidency and helped him/her to 
win the election. When the former officer said that ‘the person recommended by the 
government has to be elected’, he asserted that the government used its power directly in 
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the election.   
 
The interviewee below pointed out that the presidency of the Korea Sports Promotion 
Foundation (KSPO) is another example of an appointment made at the direction of the 
government. 
 
Now, Lee’s administration has newly been launched, hasn’t it? It means that 
someone from Lee’s government will come here, as the President of the 
KSPO…(what do you mean by ‘here’?) the KSPO.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
As stated earlier, the KSPO is the sporting organisation which is allowed to look after a wide 
range of profitable businesses, from the lottery to horse racing. This informant above implied 
that since it produces a huge amount of funds, the KSPO can be a good financial resource 
for the government and, as a result, its president has always been appointed by the 
government.  
 
The aspect of clientelism also appears in the KOC context since the government habitually 
appoints its political aides to be the heads of various sporting organisations such as the 
KOC/KSC and the KSPO. In the case of the KSPO, it is observable that the chairman of the 
KSPO was directly appointed by the State President. However, the KOC/KSC holds a 
meeting of the General Assembly of Representatives to elect a president and, thus, it seems 
that the government’s power does not affect the presidential election. Nevertheless, 
according to the staff members of the KOC/KSC interviewed, the government does in fact 
impact on the decision-making of the Representatives of NFs and, as a result, the candidate 
who was encouraged by the government has regularly been elected President. This shows 
that the government’s manipulation of the KOC/KSC election is conducted behind the 
scenes, in an indirect and largely ‘unobservable’ way. 
b) Divergence in practice from the Statutes 
One factor that has to be taken into consideration is that the Statutes of KOC tell us a 
different story. Interestingly, under these terms, the election should be carried out by a secret 
ballot of the representatives of the National Federations in the General Assembly of 
Representatives. The KSC staff member below admitted that, although they followed the 
election process as indicated in the Statutes, the fact was that the Constitution was one thing 
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and the reality was something else.    
 
(What you said is a different story from the Constitution?) [This part is in connection 
with the interview by a female KSC staff member above who addressed her opinion 
on the Presidency of KOC] What does it say about it? (the President is elected at 
the General Assembly) Right… that’s correct. But… But it doesn’t work in the way 
it’s written. It may correspond formally with those articles but everything is actually 
worked out beforehand. There is a political logic to it.  
(a female KSC staff member) 
 
According to Article 14 of the Statutes of the KOC, revised on 29.March, 2006 and 
concerning the manner of electing the President: 
 
① Those who wish to be candidates for the presidential election should submit a 
certain type of application form to the administration for its registration and the 
administration should announce the registration of the candidates no later than four 
days before the General Assembly. (fully amended on 16.May.2002) 
② The candidate should be a person who possesses intelligence, virtue, and good 
experience and should either make a contribution or a commitment to domestic 
sports promotion and the Olympic movement. (fully amended on 16 May, 2002) 
③ The president is elected by a secret ballot in the General Assembly of 
Representatives. 
 
According to Article 26 of the Statutes of the KOC ‘the election of the President’, revised on 
29.June, 2009 :  
 
 The President is elected in the General Assembly of Representatives. 
 Those who wish to run for the Presidential election must receive references 
from as many as five representatives 
 The manner of election follows this procedure: 
1. The election of the President follows a secret ballot and the one who wins 
more than half of the votes cast by the representatives attending is elected as 
the president. (101-8) 
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According to the KOC Statutes, there is no provision for governmental involvement and the 
result of the secret ballot is fully dependent on the representatives of NFs. Although the 
formal requirements of the Statutes are adhered to and the formal requirements of 
democracy are achieved, the KOC staff members argued that the State President was the 
one who decided who should be the KOC President. This may tend to indicate that the 
National Federations are also unable to avoid falling under government influence and, as a 
result, this acts presumably as a restriction on their autonomy. The Statutes can be 
described as being an ‘observable phenomenon’ but the underlying power of the 
government is ‘unobserved’. This is evidence once more that, as a social practice, ‘election’ 
to such senior posts tends to be a reflection of the power of the political elite, the State 
President, and that despite appearances voting reflects this.   
 
Two different views are rehearsed of the elections for the KOC Presidency. Some actors 
shall give the ‘formal’ story arguing that the KOC has preserved its democratic processes 
and independence from the government, while others suggest that the government has 
‘interfered’ or intervened unduly in the KOC’s affairs.  
The KOC/KSC is independent from the government 
From one middle-ranking KSC officer’s perspective, the KOC/KSC has maintained the 
democratic status given to it by the Korean Government in that the KOC/KSC President has 
always been elected by the representatives of the National Federations:   
 
The selection of the President follows a process of secret balloting. Our government 
is never involved in it. I would say that we are proud of this. According to the IOC 
amendments, the government should not interfere in the NOC’s business but should 
give freedom to it.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
He affirms his strong belief in the KOC/KSC’s independence. On the grounds that the 
election of the president is conducted in the form of a secret ballot by the Representatives of 
the General Assembly he views this as adherence to democratic processes and reason for 
pride. He also gives the example of the IOC’s recommendations concerning the proper 
relationship between the government and the NOC and he implied that the KOC had 
conformed to the IOC recommendations without any government interference.  
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The KOC/KSC is dependent on the government 
The next interviewee argued that the situation could be different depending on the actual 
selection process:   
 
Some people put more emphasis on the aspect whereby the Representatives of the 
General Assembly select our President, while others focus on the other aspect and 
say that our government is actually involved in controlling the elections. Those who 
say that we are strongly independent from our government care about the image that 
we show to the outside world. As our President is supposedly elected by the 
Representatives of our General Assembly and is endorsed by the government, that 
wouldn’t be a problem. However, the question arises as to whether a candidate who 
doesn’t have the government’s backing can still be elected to the General Assembly 
of Representatives. In fact, there are many representatives of National Federations 
who are under the power of the government.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
This interviewee’s implication is that without ‘government’s backing’ none of the candidates 
should be elected in the General Assembly. He even suggests that ‘caring about the image’ 
was the reason of their insistence on the ‘myth’ of the KOC/KSC’s independence. The 
government has exercised its power over sporting organisations by placing a close aide of 
the State President in the organisations’ presidency. As the interviewee above claimed, in 
this way, the government has been able to secure its power over those organisations.  
6.5.4 Map of themes regarding selection of the Chef de Mission (CDM) 
The second analysis concerns the process for choosing the Chef de Mission, comments 
about which were also provided by, mainly, senior staff in both organisations. Unlike the 
process for electing the president of the KOC where the most influential stakeholder(s) was 
seen to be external to the organisation, in the CDM elections it was internal stakeholder(s) 
who exerted the greatest influence. The emerging theme is the KOC President’s absolute 
power over the process for selecting a CDM, which provides a different perspective on the 
aspect of democracy and transparency, as illustrated in Figure 6-12.   
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Figure 6-12 Selection of the Chef de Mission 
 
6.5.5 Explanations of social practices 
a) KOC President’s absolute power in the selection of CDM 
In the case of the selection of the CDM only senior officers provided detailed answers as 
they were entitled to attend the meeting. In fact, four senior staff had witnessed the internal 
practice involved in the appointment of a Chef de Mission. Their responses were divided into 
two categories in connection with the different perspectives taken on the degree to which the 
CDM’s selection could be said to be democratic and transparent. It transpired from the 
discussion that democracy and transparency are major issues in the selection of a CDM and, 
thus, these respondents are divided into two categories: those who maintained that there 
was neither democracy nor transparency, and those who stated that the process was partly 
democratic and transparent.  
 
The figure 6-12 shows that the CDM is selected at a presidential meeting. The interviewees 
answered that the government did not bring any influence to bear and it was solely the 
KOC/KSC President’s right to manage the process. The two respondents below explained 
the selection process for the CDM.  
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The procedure is based around… a residential meeting, with the Secretary General 
of the KSC and Secretary General of the KOC [before the KOC/KSC merger], 
President of the KOC/KSC holds a breakfast meeting together  
(a senior KSC staff member) 
 
The gathering with the vice-members is called the presidential meeting. The 
Secretary General participates too…During the breakfast meeting [presidential 
meeting] his/her name [of candidate] is mentioned…then they [two Secretary 
Generals before the KOC/KSC merger] naturally agree to it. (do the Director 
Generals attend it too?) They participate but do not really have a say.  
(the former Director General of International Affairs) 
 
As explained by those informants, the presidential meeting usually convened with the 
KOC/KSC President, the Secretary Generals of both the KSC and the KOC and the Director 
Generals of each department present, and it was held as a type of breakfast meeting.   
 
There are the vice-presidents of NFs, who have never attended the Olympic Games. 
For the winter Olympics, the ones from the Federations with winter entries are 
usually present… one of them is internally chosen and is then promoted to Chef de 
Mission by the Executive Committee which approves and announces it.  
(a senior KSC staff member) 
 
By this account, the CDM for the winter Olympic Games was selected from the winter sports’ 
NFs while the CDM for the summer Olympic Games came from the summer sports’ NFs. 
The candidates should not have occupied the post of CDM before. This gives the impression 
that each NF president took it in turn to be the CDM. With regard to the number of people 
involved in the decision making, these interviewees pointed out that only high-ranking 
officers were involved in the presidential meeting.  
 
However, in terms of those senior officials’ involvement in the actual decision-making, the 
responses were divided into two points of view. While one interviewee focused on the 
participation in the presidential meeting, the other interviewees all argued that the meeting 
was a ritual formality. The interviewees agreed that their involvement in decision-making was 
almost none. This was discussed from two perspectives in relation to the aspect of 
democracy and transparency. 
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Partial democracy and transparency 
Those who believed in the senior staff’s involvement in decision-making put the emphasis on 
the process of selection of CDM and observed that only the most senior staff members could 
attend the presidential meeting to convey their opinions to the KOC/KSC president.  
 
The director’s opinion is heard. The opinion of the Secretary General is also 
heeded… but the final decision is made by the president… (is there any case where 
someone else is consulted?) Within the organisation, the president tries to listen to 
various opinions. He speaks with the Secretary General about it, with the advisors 
and so on.  As there is a high level of confidentiality about it…it is possible that 
certain standards and qualifications can cause external pressures too…  
(the former Director General of International Affairs) 
 
His statement indicates that the most senior staff members were able to deliver their 
opinions actively to the president, which implies that the selection of the CDM was carried 
out in compliance with democratic and transparent principles to some extent. As high-
ranking officials are presented in the meeting, this respondent claims that a certain level of 
transparency and democracy is achieved despite its high level of confidentiality in order to 
avoid external pressures.    
Neither democracy nor transparency 
Some senior staff claimed, on the other hand, that their participation in the presidential 
meeting was simply a ‘token’ gesture. From the first interviewee’s point of view, the 
presidential meeting gave the KOC/KSC president the opportunity to secure his own choice 
of CDM instead of having to gather the suggestions of a wider group of advisors.   
 
Director Generals or those departments in charge of international affairs cannot 
contribute their opinions. There’s a presidential meeting. There, we discuss who is to 
become Chef de Mission this time. It’s decided in advance…through the presidential 
meeting…The president is probably able to decide in his own mind who he 
wants…You can’t really say anything in front of the others at the presidential 
meeting…  
(a senior KSC staff member) 
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The next interviewee also asserted that the selection of the CDM was wholly dependent on 
the KOC/KSC President and that none of the participants in the presidential meeting would 
contest the president’s verdict:  
 
Usually they say “we’ll entrust the president with the appointment”…then the 
president says “I think ~~~ will be adequate for this occasion. What do you think?” 
then after answering “Sure” they give a round of applause and the business is over. 
No voting. (anyone against that?) No…(any objections?) Not at all… after all, it’s all 
decided by the president.  
(a senior KSC staff member) 
 
(Who’s the most influential stakeholder in that?) more or less the opinion of the 
president …During the breakfast meeting [presidential meeting] his/her name is 
mentioned…then we naturally agree to it. We participate but do not really have a say.  
(the former Director General of International Affairs) 
 
It can be inferred from these comments that the KOC/KSC senior staff all believed that the 
CDM should be selected by the president as usual and they accepted it as a practice. Other 
respondents also agreed that everything was done ‘according to the scenario’. The previous 
responses claim that the President held the presidential meeting as a ritual only, but that he 
was the actual decision maker. 
 
Usually according to the scenario, if we don’t have anyone specific in mind, then we 
just go with the flow, unless there’s any flaw in the person suggested by the 
President…  
(a senior KSC officer)  
 
Thus, the group of interviewees who claimed a lack of democracy and transparency 
emphasised the fact that the participation of presidential meeting per se should not be seen 
as the aspects of democracy or transparency as it was a ‘token’ practice. An interesting point 
to make might be that one of the interviewees describes the President as asking “what do 
you think?” but this is not a real invitation to respond. 
 
Overall, the process of selection of Chef de Mission is a good illustration of power over 
discourse in that the KOC President existed as the main actor in decision-making of CDM. 
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Even though the Director Generals are invited in the meeting, they are excluded in the actual 
decision-making. The beliefs of the Director Generals are also obvious that the selection of 
CDM is a president’s absolute role and these high-ranking officers do not give rise an 
opposite idea on that.  
6.6 Conclusion from a critical realist’s perspective 
In the overall analysis of the four events it is evident that social events are generated by a 
complex causal nexus that involves both causations by actors and by the social structure. In 
terms of the ‘stratified ontology’ of critical realism, the unobservable deep structure is shown 
to be real in Korean society by the social practices exhibited in the four events as 
summarised in Table 6-2 below: 
 
Table 6-2 The stratified ontology of critical realism in terms of four events 
 Empirical Actual Real 
The 
KOC/KSC 
merger 
The KSC and the 
KOC have merged 
into one sporting 
organisation with 
allegedly equal 
status. 
The KSC’s position is internally 
more secure than that of the 
KOC. 
 
The Korean government 
opposed the merger. 
  
The incumbent President of 
the KSC/KOC, who is an 
economic tycoon, pushed 
ahead his economic power in 
urging for the integration of the 
two organisations.  
 
The joining of KOC/KSC can 
be seen as having taken place 
by a process of absorption.  
The government, in 
particular, the State 
President is the 
highest and most 
influential organisation 
in decision-making in 
Korean sport policy in 
the pre-existing 
structure of the 
KOC/KSC’s financial 
dependency on the 
government has 
resulted in a situation 
where the government 
has been able to 
‘interfere’ greatly in 
the KOC/KSC’s 
business activities and 
its overall decision-
making on sports 
policy.  
 
The economic power 
has also been closely 
associated with 
politics and business 
leaders have been 
able to exercise as 
much power as 
politicians. 
 
Budget 
planning 
The KOC/KSC has a 
structure that 
renders it dependent 
on the government 
in terms of its 
acquisition of 
resources gaining 
and that the General 
Assembly of 
Representatives has 
the right to approve 
the size of the 
budget and its 
business content. 
The governmental body, 
MCST, does not allow the 
KOC/KSC to generate its own 
funding. 
 
The KOC is also structurally 
dependent on the KSC as the 
KSC is the main organisation 
in budget planning. 
  
The General Assembly of 
Representatives is a ‘token’ 
practice in the process of 
budget planning. 
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Election 
of KOC 
President 
Anyone can be run 
for presidency of the 
KOC/KSC and the 
president is selected 
by means of secret 
ballot at the General 
Assembly of 
Representatives. 
The government encourages 
its political allies to run for the 
presidency and most likely, 
those candidates are 
successfully selected through 
the form of election in the 
General Assembly of 
Representatives, which is a 
‘token’ practice. 
 
 
Selection 
of CDM 
The KOC/KSC 
President and high-
ranking officers are 
involved in the 
selection of the CDM 
through a 
presidential meeting. 
The KOC/KSC president is the 
one who decides CDM. 
 
High-ranking officers do not 
have much chance to 
contribute to decision-making. 
The KOC/KSC 
President is the most 
influential stakeholder 
in the decision-making 
within the 
organisation. 
Gender 
equality/ 
equity 
In the past, only a 
few female staff 
members were 
selected. 
 
Since 2005, equality 
of female staff 
employment has 
been improved at 
the non-managerial 
level but not at the 
managerial level. 
 
 
 
The IOC’s gender equality 
policy has triggered the 
KSC/KOC’s policy. 
 
The lack of work experience 
has prevented females from 
having the opportunity to be 
promoted to posts at the 
decision-making level.  
 
The issue of equity relates to 
‘clerical and technical support’ 
and ‘administrative’ roles has 
resulted from the fact that the 
KOC/KSC is one of the 
umbrella organisations.  
As the pre-existing 
structure of cultural 
expectations 
determines that 
women should usually 
quit their jobs after 
marriage, the strong 
male-dominated 
organisational culture 
had resulted in the 
social phenomenon 
that few females 
succeed in being 
promoted to senior 
positions. 
Disability 
equality/ 
equity 
One believes that 
the KOC/KSC has a 
sufficient number of 
employees with 
disabilities on the 
basis of government 
regulation while the 
other group does not 
agree.  
The KOC/KSC probably does 
not employ ‘enough’ people 
with disabilities as the 
KOC/KSC does not provide 
any written policy on the 
employment of people with 
disabilities.  
 
The main responsibility should 
be borne by the KOSAD/KPC  
The social structure is 
not favourable for 
people with disabilities 
and job opportunities 
are not generally open 
to them. 
 
The able-bodied staff 
members’ beliefs 
about the problems 
caused by the 
immobility of people 
with disabilities are 
factors that contribute 
to disability inequity. 
 
Several aspects of the cultural contexts explain the real reality of the four events, which are 
the KOC/KSC merger, the budget planning, the election of KOC President and selection of 
CDM, gender and disability equity. The government is the highest and most influential 
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organisation in decision-making in Korean sport policy in the pre-existing structure of the 
KOC/KSC’s financial dependency on the government has resulted in a situation where the 
government has been able to interfere greatly in the KOC/KSC’s business activities and its 
overall decision-making on sports policy. Thus, the government has much influenced its 
power in choosing its ally in the election of the KOC/KSC President. In addition, the 
economic power has also been closely associated with politics and business leaders have 
been able to exercise as much power as politicians.  
 
Within the KOC/KSC, the KOC/KSC President is the most influential stakeholder within the 
organisation as he/she has the sole power to decide the Chef de Mission and holds greater 
power than the representatives of the NFs. Also, the KSC’s position is internally more secure 
than that of the KOC owing to the KSC’s longer history and stronger authority in Korea. 
  
Female staff were unable to build adequate careers owing to their lack of working 
experience, or service length. This has prevented females from having the opportunity to be 
promoted to posts at the decision-making level. This situation, which has resulted from the 
social structure in Korea, means that, in general, there are ‘clerical and technical support’ 
and ‘administrative’ posts in the public services sector, including the KSC/KOC, which is one 
of the umbrella organisations. From this, the real is that Korean society has placed this 
impediment in the way of women’s career development. Most clerical and technical support 
posts are allocated to women, because women have traditionally been regarded as being 
less capable than men. As the pre-existing structure determines that women should usually 
quit their jobs after marriage, men naturally accept it without question and, in turn, the effect 
of this on the organisational culture of the KOC is to reinforce its highly male-dominated 
culture. 
 
In terms of disability equity, although there is the government regulation that the KOC/KSC 
should employ people with disabilities up to a certain percentage, the able-bodied staff 
members’ beliefs about the problems caused by the immobility of people with disabilities are 
factors that contribute to disability inequity. Coupled with the view that the main responsibility 
should be borne by the KOSAD/KPC, these attitudes are drawn from the domain of the real, 
where the social structure is not favourable for people with disabilities. Job opportunities are 
not generally open to them and they are still ignored by society.   
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Based on the analysis of the KOC/KSC’s four events, seeking to reveal the real social 
structure of Korea, the analysis of corporate governance of the KOC in the next chapter 
mainly focuses on if the KOC’s practices reflect the principles of corporate governance 
recommended by the IOC which are constructed in a western context. Therefore, the 
analysis identifies how the corporate governance of the KOC is interpreted in a cultural 
aspect of Korea which is located in a non-western context.  
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7 Corporate Governance of the KOC 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the corporate governance of the KOC is examined on the basis of the key 
principles and their operationalisation discussed in Chapter Four and also draws upon 
stakeholder theory in relation with accountability. It enquires whether the KOC’s practice can 
be said to reflect/respect the principles of corporate governance recommended by the IOC 
and it evaluates the ways in which these are interpreted in the KOC context. Thus, the main 
purposes of this chapter consist not only in the analysis of the KOC’s corporate governance 
but also an analysis of the ways in which corporate governance is perceived in Korean 
society. In association with the previous chapter where four events/processes of the KOC 
were studied in order to gain an understanding of how that organisation is governed, the 
present chapter takes account of evidence obtained from more detailed interviews and 
documentary analysis in the attempt to reveal similarities and/or differences between the 
KOC and the IOC in their governance practices. Unlike the previous chapter, the title ‘KOC’ 
covers both the KSC and the KOC (since these two organisations were merged) but rather 
the analysis undertaken is between the IOC and the KOC. However, the interviewees are 
still distinguished from these two organisations for a consistency of interviewees’ identity.   
7.2 Accountability 
Nine operationalisations under three definitions of accountability will be examined in this 
section, as Table 7- 1 below.  
 
Table 7-1 Definitions/Interpretations and operationalisations of accountability 
Definitions/interpretations Operationalisations 
A member of the Executive Committee 
should comply with rules and regulations as 
well as its stakeholders’ needs. 
-To whom is the NOC accountable? 
- To what extent are stakeholders included in the 
decision-making?  
- Does the NOC indicate rules and regulations that 
an Executive Committee member should comply 
with? 
- How often is the General Assembly meeting held? 
- Is an annual report open to scrutiny by the General 
Assembly? 
- Is the election of officers & members undertaken by 
the General Assembly?  
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A group of auditors should be independent 
and scrutinise the behaviour of the 
Executive Committee 
- Is there an independent audit? & how often is an 
audit held? 
- Does the NOC have an effective programme for 
managing the auditing? 
An organisation should provide accurate 
financial statements to audit. 
-Does the NOC produce and provide enough 
references which encompass all of the financial 
statements? 
 
Under the first definition by which ‘a member of the Executive Committee should comply with 
rules and regulations as well as stakeholders’ needs’, the first suggested question is ‘To 
whom is the KOC accountable?’ The responds enable identification of the official and 
unofficial stakeholders of the KOC. According to the following four respondents, these 
stakeholders consist of the KOC-related sporting organisations and/or individuals officially 
represented as stakeholders.  
 
There is no doubt that we should be accountable to the NFs and athletes as well.  
(a senior KOC officer)  
 
Local branches, the NFs, and the athletes  
(a junior KOC staff member) 
 
The NFs, Local Branches, which means all sporting organisations in connection with 
the KOC, and the IOC    
(a junior KOC staff member)  
 
The IOC  
(a junior KOC staff member) 
 
The individuals and/or groups of stakeholders recognised by the informants above are the 
KOC-affiliated organisations such as the NFs, the local branches and the athletes 
themselves, which are perceived as the main subjects in Korean sport as shown in Figure 7-
1 below. The IOC is also recognised to be an important stakeholder by the interviewees 
above and the KOC, since it is the headquarters of the Olympic Movement which directly 
influences the KOC’s sport policy and, thus, the KOC staff members said that they should be 
accountable to the IOC. Figure 7-1, which is officially published by the KOC, shows that the 
IOC, ANOC, OCA, FISU, IFs and AFs are the main stakeholders at an international level, 
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while the General Assembly, the Executive Committees, NFs and Local Branch Offices 
perform the leading roles at the domestic level. The stakeholders of KOC/KSC listed below 
are all categorised as forming a group of ‘primary’ stakeholders, where ‘primary’ is used to 
denote a formal and official relationship with the organisation. This implies that the staff 
members of the KOC interviewed for this study are indeed able to recognise their official 
stakeholders as indicated in the statements of the organisation. 
 
Figure 7-1 The KOC organisation 
 
Source: The KOC  
 
Nevertheless, while the next group of interviewees also agreed that the KOC should be 
accountable to the athletes and their affiliated sporting organisations, on the other hand, 
they also expressed the opinion that it should be accountable to the governmental body 
and/or the governmental sporting organisation, the MCST and the KSPO respectively, which 
have been the main financial providers (see also Chapter 6).  
 
Of course, we should be accountable to athletes the most. In reality, however, the 
MCST should not be ignored either.       
(a middle-ranking KOC officer)   
 
The NFs and our local branches are our top priority, and we also have a closer 
relationship with the Korean Government and the KSPO as well.   
                                   (the former senior KOC staff member) 
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We should be accountable to all sporting organisations and athletes. They should 
come in the first place in our consideration. The next should be the Korean people 
and our government     
(the former senior KSC staff member) 
 
Interestingly, these governmental bodies do not appear on the official organisation diagram 
(see Figure 7-1). However, through the analysis of four events of the KOC conducted in the 
previous chapter, it has emerged that governmental bodies are the most powerful 
stakeholders in sport policy in Korea. The list of stakeholders of the KOC which may be 
drawn up on the basis of an analysis of documents and interviews can be markedly different 
from that given in the KOC’s Table (Fig.7-1).  
 
As discussed earlier, stakeholder theory is concerned with two aspects (see Chapter Two): 
decision-making and ethics. The process of decision-making is a source of insights into the 
power relations among stakeholders in order to identify the ethical principles of corporate 
governance. The relations between the MCST as the umbrella organisation and major 
sporting organisations in Korea, which were drawn from the analysis of documents and 
interviewees’ comments earlier, helps to clarity the position of the MCST as the most 
influential and powerful stakeholder. This implies that sports policy in all sporting 
organisations is likely to be influenced by policies driven by the Korean government. Also, as 
the KOC is a national sporting organisation, normative stakeholder theory may be brought to 
bear on it concerning the reasons why the KOC “ought to consider stakeholder interests in 
the absence of any apparent benefit” (Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 31). This is used to interpret 
the function of the KOC and to identify moral or philosophical guidelines for the operation 
and management of organisation. 
 
The second question to be addressed is, ‘To what extent are stakeholders included in the 
decision-making?’ As analysed in the previous chapter, the government-related 
organisations, in particular, the State President and the MCST are deeply involved in 
decision-making. Although the KSPO is another financial resource provider, it is also an 
organisation that falls under the umbrella of the MCST and, in fact, the President of KSPO is 
appointed by the State President. These aspects indicate that the KSPO is also dependant 
on the MCST’s decision-making. Accordingly, it can be said that the KSPO’s influence is 
quite negligible in its effect on the decision-making of the KOC and, therefore, the 
government is the most powerful stakeholder in decision-making. 
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In addition, Article 13 of the Statutes of KOC (2009: 4) regarding ‘General Assembly 
Members’ states that: 
 
(1) General Assembly members are as follows: 
A. IOC members with Korean nationality; 
B. Presidents of the Full Member organizations as set out in Article 10(1) of these 
statutes; and  
C. A representative from the athletes. 
 
There are two groups of stakeholders. The NFs can participate in decision-making by means 
of their right to vote in the General Assembly of Representatives. However, as discussed 
earlier, the KOC President is the Chairman of the General Assembly of Representatives and 
this may limit the extent to which the representatives of the NFs may be involved in decision-
making. In the case of the athletes, their representative is officially included in the highest 
decision-making assembly, but having only a single representative restricts their influence 
greatly. Furthermore, there seems to be no official channel for Local Branches to participate 
in decision-making since their right to do so is not formally confirmed in any of the relevant 
documents. Furthermore, Article 16-5 of the Statutes of KOC (2009: 5) indicates that: 
 
The General Assembly may only vote on agenda that have been notified to its 
members in advance. However, if the entire body of members attending agrees, the 
General Assembly may discuss and vote on other agenda. 
 
The General Assembly can usually deal with agenda which have been confirmed prior to the 
meeting but if all of its members’ are in agreement, an alternative agenda may be discussed 
and voted on. This may restrict the members’ ability to express their opinions candidly, 
because the environment for debate seems to be less open and this seems to constrain a 
free exchange of views. Ironically, although the KOC staff members all recognised the need 
for the KOC to be accountable, as a first priority, to the NFs, the local branches and the 
athletes, the government-related organisations are undeniably the most influential 
stakeholders in the decision-making over sports policy.  
 
This implies that the KOC is ostensibly willing to follow the lead given by the Olympic 
Movement and to be accountable to its major stakeholders, such as the NFs, Local Councils 
and the athletes. Nevertheless, the interviewees and documents above claimed that the 
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KOC shows a tendency to be more strongly accountable to the Korean government, which is 
identified as the most influential stakeholder in decision-making. In particular, although 
stakeholders should not interfere in the management of sporting organisations, the State 
President and the governmental body seem to directly exert their power over decision-
making in sports policy in the Korean context. This difference in the way in which the policy 
of accountability is implemented by comparison with a western context follows to some 
extent the advice of the IOC which encourages the NOCs to keep a harmonious relationship 
with their governments. In summary, therefore, although the KOC’s interpretation of 
accountability is similar to that recommended by the Olympic Movement in respect of the list 
of important stakeholders to whom it should be accountable its implementation is exercised 
in certain aspects that are at variance with IOC recommendations. 
 
Another matter for consideration is ‘whether or not the KOC indicates rules and regulations 
that the Executive Committee members should comply with’. The KOC sets forth the 
relevant rules and regulations in both The Code of Conduct of Employees and The Statutes 
of KOC. With regard to the requirement that ‘the Executive Committee members should 
comply with stakeholders’ needs’, the KOC states it clearly through Articles 11 to 13 of the 
Code of Conduct (2007: 3). Article 11 regarding ‘Respect Stakeholders’ puts it in the 
following terms: 
 
Employees and Executive Board members should be aware of the fact that 
stakeholders are the very reason of KOC existence and that satisfying stakeholders 
is the objective of KOC, therefore employees and Executive Board members should 
respect, think with and prioritise its stakeholders. 
 
Article 12 concerning ‘Stakeholder Satisfaction’ declares that: 
 
1) Employees and Executive Board members should be committed to delivering the 
best performance and service to fully satisfy stakeholders’ needs based on the 
accurate understanding of stakeholders’ demands and expectations. 
2) Employees and Executive Board members should be well prepared to humbly accept 
stakeholders’ proposals by carefully listening to their opinion while swiftly and fairly 
responding to their complaints. 
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Article 13 concerning the ‘Protection of Stakeholder’s Interests’ says that: 
 
1) Employees and Executive Board members should value and protect the assets, 
intellectual property rights, confidential sales information, and personal information of 
stakeholders. Employees and Executive Board members should not undermine 
stakeholder’s interests with their immoral behaviour. 
2) Employees and Executive Board members should swiftly deliver accurate information 
which customers should know or have the right to know.  
 
In the case of compliance with rules and regulations, Article 8 states with regard to 
‘Compliance’ of the Code of Conduct (2007: 3) that: 
 
Employees and the Executive Board members should comply with laws and 
regulations related to their business tasks and work based on their conscience 
pursuing fairness and justice.  
 
As detailed above, the KOC code clearly expresses a determination to ensure that the 
Executive Committee members and employees obey the laws and regulations given to them 
and fulfil the stakeholders’ needs. Thus, the KOC’s specification for the operationalisation of 
accountability is clearly similar to that contained in the Olympic Movement’s core documents. 
 
The fourth question is ‘How often is the General Assembly held?’ Although the Statutes of 
KOC (2009) state that the highest level of decision-making should be the General Assembly 
of Representatives, there is no comment on how frequently meetings of the Assembly should 
be held. According to item (1) of Article 16 which is concerned with the ‘Ordinary General 
Assembly and Extraordinary General Assembly’ (2009: 6), “the President of the KOC shall 
call a General Assembly within two months from the closing of the fiscal year”. This implies 
that the Executive Committee meetings should be held at least once each year and that the 
number of meetings can also be determined by the KOC president.  
 
In response to the question ‘Is an annual report open to scrutiny by the General Assembly?’ 
although none of the interviewees or documents directly raised this issue, the annual report 
is easily found on the KOC website and is, in fact, open to the public. In terms of the history 
and the nature of contents, given that the KOC provides two websites written in both English 
and Korean, a wide range of information on finance, business activities, the budget proposal, 
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business report, business plan, the activities of the Executive Committee have been open to 
public domestically on a regular basis. More specifically, as the KOC is one of governmental 
sporting organisations under the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism, the KOC has been 
obliged to provide the information on The Business Plan, The Business Report and The 
Goals of Management on the ALIO system which is operated by the Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance (MOSF). For reference, the Alio System (All Public Information In One) provides a 
document titled ‘경영공시’ or ‘Gyeong Young Gong Shi’, which is a programme releasing a 
wide range of relevant documents concerning all governmental organisations (see also 
Chapter on Methodology).  
 
On the other hand, an English-written annual report has been officially provided since 2011 
and in fact, only the 2009 and 2010 Annual Reports have been so far available to the public. 
Regarding the Annual Report in English version the contents are follows: mission of KOC, 
financial statement, monthly highlights in 2010, participation in international sports events, 
domestic sports activities, the Olympic Movement, youth exchange programs between 
NOCs, bidding for 2018 Olympic & Paralympic Winter Games, support for National 
Governing Bodies, KOC marketing and National Federations & major sports events. While 
the Korean-written website covers more various official documents such as the results of 
audits on the KOC itself and National Federations, the Korean Customer Satisfaction Index 
on the KOC as a public organisation and the like, the English version is relatively simpler 
without these documents. The implication is here that the Korean site is officially open to 
meet the domestic requirement as a governmental organisation, whereas the English 
version is limited to provide some important elements, i.e. finance report.   
 
However, when it comes to transparency in relation with finance in the Korean website, the 
finance status is likely to be transparent as the resources are mainly given by the Korean 
government and the KOC’s obligation to report to the government. Moreover, most reports 
are simply a description rather than following an evaluation form. The inference is that the 
KOC implements a policy of accountability that was constructed by the IOC in a western 
context as providing a report represents a minimal requirement of the accountability. 
However, the actual information on these main elements should be more evaluated rather 
than just delivering the information ‘per se’.  
 
Another question concerning a point of operationalisation is ‘Is the election of officers and 
members undertaken by the General Assembly?’ As discussed in Chapter 6, regarding the 
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election of the KOC President, the election of the President and Executive Committee 
members should be approved by the General Assembly and in this way too the interpretation 
of accountability is in tune with the western one. However, several KOC officials have 
revealed that in fact the pre-eminent power lies with the Korean government, which 
influences the election of the KOC President. Moreover, Executive Committee members are 
chosen by the KOC President without necessarily obtaining the agreement of the General 
Assembly. Thus, the procedures for the selection of high officials in the KOC are interpreted 
rather differently in the Korean context, where the KOC President holds the overriding power. 
These ‘appointments’ do not appear to be competence-based, since no inference described 
them in these terms. Rather the implication seems to have been that appointments reflected 
political sensitivities.   
 
The second and third definitions of accountability are related to the audit requirement: ‘A 
group of auditors should be independent and scrutinise the behaviour of the Executive 
Committee’; and ‘an organisation should provide accurate financial statements to audit.’ The 
operationalisations of the former definition should answer two sets of questions satisfactorily, 
i.e. ‘Is there an independent audit?’, ‘How often is the audit held?’ and ‘Does the NOC have 
an effective programme for managing the auditing?’ In their responses, two interviewees 
informed us about the frequency of auditing and the position of the auditors with relation to 
the KOC.  
 
There are two auditors within the Executive Committee. When they conduct an audit, 
we support them.                        
(a senior KSC staff member) 
 
We have two auditors on the Executive Committee. They conduct an internal audit 
every year. There is auditing of the financial and administrative aspects. One of 
them is an accountant and the other belongs to one of the NFs... (Do you think that 
the internal audit is conducted properly?) I can’t say that it has been done properly. 
Financial auditing takes quite a long time but administrative auditing takes only a 
few days.  
                                             (a senior KSC staff member) 
 
According to these respondents, two auditors who belong to the Executive Committee 
members are responsible for performing the internal audit which is held once each year. 
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While the two interviewees said that the two auditors belonged to the Executive Committee, 
Article 25 of the Statutes of KOC (2009: 7), which concerns ‘Officers’, lists two auditors and 
separates them out from the Executive Committee:  
 
The KOC Officers consist of the following: 
(1) One President; 
(2) Fifteen or more but not more than twenty, members of the Executive Board with 
no more than five Vice-Presidents included; and 
(3) Two Auditors. 
 
Seemingly, although the two auditors are not included in the Executive Committee, the KOC 
staff members regard them as being on the same level as the Executive Committee 
members. The next respondent explained what constitutes an internal audit:    
 
Our internal auditors usually scrutinise our administrative tasks. For example, as the 
KOC has been a single organisation since 2009, [they consider] whether or not the 
KOC’s business has been carried out properly, or a financial aspect has been well 
executed… like that.                          
                                                            (a KSC staff member) 
 
This interviewee said that the two internal auditors mainly dealt with the KOC’s 
administrative tasks rather than assessing the work of the Executive Committee ‘per se’. 
None of these three informants above said that there are auditors who oversee the 
Executive Committee members’ activities and performance. Article 28-4 concerning ‘Duties’ 
in the Statutes of KOC (2009: 9) states that ‘auditors are responsible for auditing accounting 
records and the conduct of business’. The implication of this account is that the auditors’ power is 
limited to the auditing of the internal business and administration and, thus, audits of the performance 
of the Executive Committee are either not conducted or not a priority. Another respondent also 
claims that there used to be, in addition, an external audit: 
 
We used to be audited annually by the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea. 
However, the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea no longer audits us as we are 
an organisation under the umbrella of the MCST, so it now only audits the MCST. 
When there is something that is related to us, we may need to answer their 
questions but it is not official.   
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                                                      (a senior KSC officer) 
 
None of the KOC’s official documents makes any reference to the conduct of external audits. 
This is further evidence that the KOC has obviously been treated as one of the MCST’s 
dependent sporting organisations for which reason the KOC is not itself subject to an 
external auditing system. Thus, although the KOC recognises that having in place a proper 
auditing system is an essential condition if it is to live up to the IOC’s recommendations, the 
auditing system and its detailed operationalisation within the actual context of the KOC’s 
practice is perhaps less direct and visible than it has been. 
 
Another question posed to the interviewees was ‘Does the NOC produce and provide 
enough references which encompass all of the financial statements?’ A KSC staff member 
insisted that a clear and transparent set of data would invariably provide for the members of 
the audit team: 
 
(To what extent do you provide documents to the auditors?) All documents should 
be opened to the auditors. They should know everything.  
(a female KSC staff member) 
 
This point is reinforced in a KOC document where employees and Executive Committee 
members are required to make financial management documents accessible for scrutiny. 
The KOC foresees this situation in the Code of Conduct (2007: 8) as below: 
 
Article 32 (Transparent accounting management)  
Accounting records or other financial management should be accurately, and 
transparently recorded and managed based on facts, according to the law and to 
generally accepted accounting principles. 
 
Since all relevant documents should be opened to the auditors, this can be also related with 
the aspect of transparency which can be improved by this practice, according to the KOC’s 
own guidance. Nevertheless, although the Code of Conduct requires above that the financial 
statement should be made accessible and should be transparently recorded, none of the 
documents mentions to what extent the financial information was really provided and made 
open to scrutiny.  
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In the IOC’s interpretation developed in a western context, the existence and role of an 
independent and qualified audit committee is seen as an important aspect of accountability, 
as demonstrated in the literature and in major documents in the Olympic Movement. By 
contrast, the KOC is unlikely to have a well-formed internal auditing team. There are only 
two internal auditors whose function is quite limited in the KOC, in comparison with the 
recommendation of the IOC. As the KOC is a governmental sporting organisation, its 
auditing system is also dependent on the government, and as a result, it is unable to use its 
own system. This is also explained by the fact that the government is the principal and most 
influential stakeholder in decision-making in sports policy in Korea. Moreover, the auditing 
serves in practice not to scrutinise the work of the Executive Committee but the 
management of the KOC. Therefore, the audit cannot be said to meet the highest standards. 
7.3 Responsibility 
Responsibility has three definitions and four operationalisations as shown in Table 7-2.  
 
Table 7-2 Definitions/Interpretations and operationalisations of responsibility 
Definitions/interpretations Operationalisations 
The Executive Committee members should 
also balance diverging interests, power and 
authority.  
-Does the organisation justify its behaviours/actions 
by reference to ensuring an appropriate balance of 
power? 
The Executive Committee should provide the 
strategic guidance of the organisation to 
ensure the long-term viability of the 
organisation. 
- Does the Executive Committee clearly provide the 
vision and overall goals in the context of the long 
term viability of the organisation? 
The Executive Committee should provide the 
effective monitoring of management.  
- Does it establish and evaluate the execution of 
clear, adequate rules and regulations by which 
management should conduct its activities? 
- Does it monitor a code of conduct and finance 
within the organisation?  
 
The first interpretation of responsibility is that ‘the Executive Committee members should 
also balance diverging interests, power and authority’ and its operationalisation may be seen 
in answer to the question: ‘Does the organisation justify its behaviours/actions by reference 
to ensuring an appropriate balance of power?’ The KOC and the KSC used to have separate 
high-level decision-making bodies, namely, the Standing Committee and the Executive 
Committee, respectively. Although the interviews were conducted immediately after the 
KOC/KSC merger, this study attempts to discover whether staff members of the two 
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previous organisations held different opinions. The responses from the KOC staff members 
are as below: 
 
I would say that each member exercises power unequally (laughter), invisibly.  
(a former KOC Executive Committee member)  
 
When they suggest a policy, they probably have an equal influence but the 
President of KOC may have more power because he is the President of the 
Executive Board.  
(a former senior KOC staff member) 
 
Well, I can’t see that their power is equal.  
(an incumbent KOC Executive Committee member)  
 
Officially yes, but I suppose that those who have been involved in the Board for a 
longer time than others probably have more power.  
(a junior KOC staff member) 
 
Irrespective of the position of the informants, most KOC staff members shared the common 
viewpoint that there may be an unequal distribution of power between members within the 
Standing Committee of the KOC (which is equivalent to the Executive Committee in the 
KSC). Moreover, the former senior KOC staff member also explained that by becoming the 
chairperson of the Standing Committee, the KOC President may be inferred to have 
acquired a greater degree of empowerment to push through his opinions. Similarly, the five 
KSC staff members in the following extracts from their interviews also agreed that each 
Executive Committee member possessed an unequal share of power on the Committee. 
 
Power sharing is not equal among the members.  
(the former senior KSC staff member) 
 
Of course it is not equal. (laughter)  
(a senior KSC officer) 
 
Each member has the right to speak up, in principle. well… it can’t be helped as 
some are eager to express their ideas while others simply wish to participate in the 
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meeting.  
(a junior KSC staff member) 
 
I won’t say it is equal. 
(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
 It depends on their background, where they are from and what they do….  
(the former Secretary General of the KSC) 
 
The responses obtained from the KSC staff members also conveyed a similar set of views 
on the distribution of ‘de facto’ power within the Executive Committee. Concerning the 
composition of the newly-formed Executive Committee after the KOC/KSC merger, it is 
mostly made up of business figures along with a few sports-related ones. This may imply 
that the emphasis in the new Executive Committee lies more heavily on its ability to wield 
power in economic rather than sporting terms. Another point not to be ignored is that two 
members come from the governmental body and the KSPO, which are the KOC’s main 
sources of financing, as listed below:  
 
Table 7-3 A membership list of the newly-formed Executive Committee, as of 16 July 2009 
Position Name Title 
President Park Yong Sung Chairman of Doosan conglomerate 
Vice-
President 
Kim Jung Haeng 
 
President of Yong In University / Chairman of the Korea 
Judo Association 
Executive 
Board 
Members 
Lee Kun Hee IOC member / Chairman of Samsung conglomerate  
Mun Dae Sung IOC member / the Olympic Taekwondo gold medallist 
Oh Dong Jin President of the Korea Athletics Federation /former 
President of Samsung North America Branch 
Jo Joong Yun President of the Korea Football Association 
Jo Yang Ho President of the Korea Table Tennis Association / CEO of 
Han Jin & Korean Air conglomerate 
Choi Tae Won President of the Korea Handball Federation / Chairman of 
SK conglomerate 
Kim Jae Youl President of the Korea Skating Union / President of 
Samsung Engineering conglomerate 
Byun Tak President of the Korea Ski Association / Vice-President of 
Tae Young company 
Kim Jung President of the Korea Shooting Federation / Hanwha 
Galleria conglomerate 
Lee Yoon Jae President of the Korea Wushu Association  
Kwon Yoon Bang President of the Korean Federation of Dancesport 
You Byong Jin President of the Korea University Sports Board 
Shin Dong Pa Vice-President of the Korea Basketball Association 
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Woo Bang Woo Vice-President of Busan Metropolitan City Sport 
Kim Ki Hong 
 
Director of the Sport Bureau in the Ministry of Culture, 
Sport and Tourism 
Chung Jung Taek Chairman of the Korea Sports Promotion Foundation 
Kim Jong Wook President of Korea National Sport University 
Lee Jong Young President of the Korean Alliance for Health Physical 
Education 
Chung Hyun Suk President of the Women’s Sports Association Korea 
Auditors Lee Kyung Hoon President of the Korea Bobsleigh Skeleton Federation 
Chung Min Keun Vice-President of Ahn Jin Finance and Auditing Services 
 
The middle-ranking KOC officer who contributed to this investigation was convinced that 
power was distributed unequally among the members of the unified Executive Committee in 
the view of the presence there of an officer from the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 
which could be expected to be the most influential stakeholder in decision-making as it is the 
main financial resource provider: 
 
Of course, they don’t share power equally. One of the Executive Committee 
members is the Director of the Sport Bureau of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and 
Tourism in the newly-formed Executive Committee. He seems to express his opinion 
more often and to exercise more power than any of the other members  
(a middle-ranking KOC officer) 
 
As demonstrated above, the findings of this study indicate that although there is a set of 
rules about how the Executive Committee should take decisions, in practice power is exerted 
by a limited member of individuals: all the interviewees’ responses pointed to the issue of an 
unequal power distribution. This may bring about an environment of non-decision making, 
which fails to involve all of the different voices from different backgrounds. In particular, 
athletes or the representatives of sporting organisations share only a limited place within the 
Executive Committee.  
 
Whereas the IOC has encouraged NOCs to apportion power within the Executive Committee 
in an even-handed way as ‘de jure’, the main key persons, i.e. the President, usually hold de 
facto power in decision-making and it has been similarly implemented within the Korean 
context, where the Korean government or leading business figures are permitted to play 
critical roles in decision-making. The unequal power distribution, therefore, probably results 
from the composition of the Committee, whose members are mainly drawn from non-sports 
related organisations. This is also good evidence of the extent to which the government is 
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involved in the formation of national sports policy in Korea. Moreover, the fact that the KOC 
President holds a disproportionate amount of power within the organisation serves to bolster 
his position within the Executive Committee and, thereby, also affects the imbalanced 
distribution of power in the KOC.  
 
The second definition of responsibility identified earlier is that ‘the Executive Committee 
should provide the strategic guidance of the organisation to ensure the long-term viability of 
the organisation’ and its operationalisation is seen in the reply given to the question: ‘Does 
the Executive Committee clearly provide the vision and the overall goals for the organisation 
in the context of the long term viability of the organisation?’ This is well expressed in the 
Statutes of KOC (2009: 1), Article 3 regarding ‘Mission and Role’: 
 
(1) The KOC shall promote public health by encouraging school sports and sport-
for-all and shall contribute to enhance national prestige by supporting the sports 
organisations under the KOC membership and encouraging the development of high 
performance sports. 
(2) The KOC shall have the exclusive authority over all matters pertaining to the 
representation of Korea at the Olympic Games and at the regional, continental or 
world multi-sports competitions patronised by the IOC and contribute to international 
cooperation and world peace by promoting the fundamental principles and values of 
Olympism through the Olympic Movement. 
(3) The KOC shall represent the Republic of Korea in international sports 
organisations such as the IOC, the Association of the National Olympic Committees 
(the “ANOC”), and the Olympic Council of Asia (the “OCA”). 
(4) The KOC shall comply with the civil laws and regulations on pertaining to an 
incorporated body in accordance with Article 33(7) of the National Sports Promotion 
Act. 
 
While Article 3 mainly states the vision for the KOC’s long-term viability, Article 21-2 
concerning ‘Composition and Functions’ of the statutes of KOC (2009: 6-7) enumerates various 
aspects in more detail: 
 
The Board is responsible for discussing and voting on the following agenda: 
A. Business plans and budget; 
B. Reviewing the KOC’s conduct of business and financial accounting; 
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C. Any matters concerning the operation of various commissions under the KOC; 
D. Asset acquisition and disposition; 
E. Approval of the appointment of an Executive Vice-President; 
F. Establishment and amendment of the KOC’s rules and regulations; 
G. Any matters that have been directed by the General Assembly; 
H. General Assembly agenda-setting; and 
I. Other matters of importance. 
 
Article 21-2 sets forth the wide range of responsibilities of the Executive Committee per se. 
Furthermore, the Executive Committee should also be responsible for agenda-setting to the 
General Assembly, as stated in Article 21-2 (H) above, which can be related to the question 
‘does the organisation justify its behaviours/actions by reference to ensuring an appropriate 
balance of power?’ In particular, the fulfilment of item H could give rise to an institutional bias 
if the agenda setting is mainly in the hands of the Executive Committee. 
 
Apart from the Executive Committee, a wide range of Commissions also support the 
development of strategic guidance of the organisation. Article 34 concerning ‘Establishment of 
Commissions’ of the Statutes of KOC (2009: 10-1) lists those bodies below: 
 
(1) In order to conduct its business of the KOC and fulfill its mission, the KOC may establish 
the following commissions as advisory bodies: 
A. School Sport Commission; 
B. Sport-for-All Commission; 
C. International Relations Commission; 
D. National Sports Festival Commission; 
E. Performance Development Commission; 
F. Athletes’ Commission; 
G. Women and Sport Commission; 
H. Culture, Environment, and Education (KOA) Commission; 
I. Medical Commission; 
J. Sport and Law Commission; and 
K. Communications Commission. 
 
The eleven Commissions, which were established after the KOC/KSC merger, are expected to play 
an important role as supplementary advisory bodies in the strategic guidance of the KOC. 
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Subsequently, the Executive Committee and Commissions have indeed accomplished their 
responsibility for advising the merged KOC and providing it with strategic guidance for its activities 
in the long term. 
 
Apparently, some interviewees whose responses are recorded below were involved in, or 
observed, the workings of the Executive Committee of the KOC in providing a range of 
strategic guidance and directions for organisation’s management. 
 
Well, we discuss and direct any business that the KOC is planning to promote and 
we also play a critical role in giving it a better direction.  
(a KOC Executive Committee member) 
 
The Board gives a lead on deicion-making and giving approval about the KOC’s 
overall strategy and business. The KOC president is also a member of the Board.  
(a middle-ranking female KOC staff member) 
 
The role of the Board is mainly to make decisions about the major sports policy 
issues of the KOC. We staff members actually carry out tasks designated by the 
Executive Board.   
(a female KSC staff member) 
 
The Standing Committee of the KOC was equivalent to the Executive Board in the 
KSC, as the KOC and the KSC were separated previously. The function of the 
Standing Committee was to draw up strategic guidance.  
(A senior male KOC official) 
 
In connection with this latter comment, the third definition of responsibility states that ‘the 
Executive Committee should provide the effective monitoring of management’ and this 
should be operationalised in answer to the question: ‘Does the Executive Committee 
establish and evaluate the execution of clear, adequate rules or regulations by which 
management should conduct its activities?’ As demonstrated earlier, the Statutes of KOC 
and a Code of Conduct are well-established to provide clear rules or regulations that the 
staff members should comply with. In particular, Article 21-2 (F) of the Statues of KOC (2009: 
6-7) indicates ‘Establishment and amendment of the KOC rules and regulations’ as a main 
responsibility of the Executive Committee. 
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Nevertheless, Article 3-(1) of the Statutes of KOC (2009: 1) can be discussed in terms of 
evaluating the achievement of the strategic guidance which covers the promotion of high 
performance sport, school sport and sport for all, which may be directly related to the 
monitoring of management. It is evident that the KOC should promote three areas of policy 
evidenced by the list of Commissions which includes the School Sport and the Sport for All 
Commissions in addition to its elite sport activities. Subsequently, three out of the fifteen 
respondents stated that in their opinion the KOC should consider both ‘elite sport’ and ‘sport 
for all’ as important aspects of its vision:  
 
Elite sport and sport for all should both be considered as important.  
(a former senior KOC officer)  
 
The KOC has put more emphasis on elite sport but the Statutes of KOC indicate our 
primary goals as consisting in the development of elite sport, school sport and sport 
for all. The KSC used to place the main emphasis on sport for all.  
(a former KSC & incumbent KOC Executive Board member)  
 
Obviously, elite sport is receiving greater focus as a primary goal but sport for all 
should be given more consideration because elite athletes can be nurtured in the 
well-organised environment created by sport for all.  
(a former KSC senior staff member)  
 
Although they all expressed the opinion that the KOC should promote elite sport and sport 
for all, which are stated as strategic goals in the Statutes of KOC above, they also revealed 
that the KOC had mainly focused on elite sport. Apart from the three respondents above, 
twelve other interviewees all argued that the promotion of elite sport had been the core area 
of the activities of the KOC.  
 
Of course it is elite sport that we’re concerned with and we don’t deal with sport for 
all. 
(a former KOC Board member) 
 
Elite sport has been at the centre of our work. 
(a former senior KOC officer)  
 
 269 
 
I would say elite sport.  
(a middle-ranking KOC officer) 
 
In any case, elite sport is the one. 
(a senior KOC staff member) 
 
As the KOC used to be called the Department of International Affairs, it may be natural for its 
staff members to express the view that elite sport has been the KOC’s main goal. However, 
the KSC staff members also stated that, in their judgement, that elite sport had clearly been 
the main goal of the KSC. 
 
No matter what, we focus on it is elite sport, which bears fruit. What the government 
wants is medals at international sporting events, even though the government also 
talks about sport for all.  
(a junior KSC staff member) 
 
Our goal is to perform in elite sport.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer)  
 
At the moment, elite sport is the core mission. 
(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
Of course, elite sport. The KOC believes that high performance sport brings national 
glory and gives hope to Korean people, unlike sport for all.  
(a KSC staff member) 
 
Before the KOC/KSC merger, the KOC was responsible for international affairs and the KSC 
was expected to play an important role in developing sport for all and school sport. However, 
according to the interviewees from the KSC/KOC, it is obvious that the KOC/KSC before its 
merger had both put much more emphasis on high-performance or elite sport. The 
respondents are clearly in agreement in perceiving that the Executive Committee, along with 
the Commissions, officially provides the vision for promoting elite sport, school sport and 
sport for all in accordance with the Statutes of KOC. Nevertheless, as the government also 
expects some visible results of sports policy, high performance sport has dealt with the most 
important goals at the centre of Korean sport. Moreover, despite the fact that school sport is 
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an area of responsibility on the list, none of the KOC interviewees raised the issue of school 
sport performance. This shows that the actual activities of the KOC may differ from the goals 
provided by the Executive Committee and the Statutes of KOC. 
 
The IOC also considers that the issue of responsibility is an important aspect of the 
functioning of the Executive Committee and the interpretations of responsibility within the 
KOC appear to be quite similar. Specifically, the Executive Committee provides long-term 
strategic guidance for the organisation and, if necessary, the Commissions also help to 
design or provide guidance on the goals that the KOC should achieve. Several documents 
serve to provide clear rules and regulations such as the Statutes of KOC and a Code of 
Conduct. In this sense, the western notion of the concept of responsibility in governance has 
been well interpreted by the KOC. However, the actual activities undertaken by the 
KOC/KSC before merged as replied by interviewees turn out to be far from the mission 
proposed by the high-level decision makers. This raises a question as to whether the 
Executive Committee has directed and led the organisations in terms of the accomplishment 
of the KOC’s vision. 
 
With regard to the last operationalisation, for which the question is: ‘Does the Executive 
Committee monitor a code of conduct and finance within the organisation?’, the Statutes of 
KOC and a Code of Conduct are well-established to provide clear rules or regulations with 
which the staff members should comply. Nevertheless, there are only two internal auditors 
employed to oversee the performance of management. Thus only limited monitoring by the 
Executive Committee can be undertaken, whereas the IOC has emphasised the importance 
of monitoring a code of conduct and finance as a core responsibility of the Executive 
Committee.     
7.4 Transparency 
This section deals with two definitions and four operationalisations with respect to 
transparency as Table 7-4 shows below:  
 
Table 7-4 Definitions/Interpretations and operationalisations of transparency 
Definitions/interpretations Operationalisations 
Organisations should develop and provide 
written policies and procedures that promote 
the timely and balanced disclosure of all 
- Is an organisational progress report annually 
released? 
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material matters that concern them.   (If not, how often is it released?) 
- Are there clear rules and procedures on how to get 
‘material matters’ which are of concern on to the 
organisation’s agenda? 
- Is any information including all regulations required 
open to the public/stakeholders? 
- Is a financial report open to the public/ stake 
holders? 
Organisations should open the process of 
decision making to all stakeholder 
- Is the process of decision making open or 
monitored? 
  (If so, by whom and for what purposes?) 
 
The first definition is that ‘organisations should develop and provide written policies and 
procedures that promote the timely and balanced disclosure of all material matters that 
concern them’ and the second one is that ‘organisations should open the process of 
decision-making to all stakeholders’. The operationalisations of the first definition answers 
the question as to ‘whether or not an organisational progress report is released annually and, 
if not, how often it is released’ and ‘Are there clear rules and procedures on how to get 
‘material matters’ which are of concern on to the organisation’s agenda?’ In connection with 
this issue, Article 34 regarding ‘Transparent Information Disclosure’ of the Code of Conduct 
of the KOC (2007: 9) decrees that: 
 
Employees and Executive Board members, responsible for information disclosure, 
should sincerely and honestly respond to any request for management information 
disclosure by the media and by the public in order to secure management 
transparency and credibility. 
 
Thus, there is a ‘rule’ or policy relating to disclosures, but this does not deal with issues of 
agenda setting. Under this rule the KOC is obliged to disclose information that holds (i.e. 
what it has been ‘discussing’) but there is no indication of a ‘rule’ as to how items are 
formally considered as the Executive agenda. In other words, decision-making or information 
collection must be transparent, non-decisions about what will not be discussed are 
nevertheless not dealt with by this ‘rule’ 
 
Article 45 concerning ‘Disclosure’ of the Statutes of KOC (2009: 13) also adds:  
 
The KOC shall disclose its major business plans and performance to enhance the 
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transparency of the organisation. 
 
However despite the issue of non-decision making these two main documents regulating the 
KOC’s governance practices conveyed in general the importance of information disclosure 
for the enhancement of transparency. Moreover, Article 40 concerning ‘Budget Planning and 
Annual Report’ of the Statutes of KOC (2009: 12) adds: 
 
(3) The KOC shall prepare an annual report within two months from the end of each fiscal 
year and submit the report to the Minister of the relevant government ministry upon the 
Board’s and General Assembly’s approval. 
 
Apart from the documents, more specifically, the two KOC officers expressed their view that 
most management-related documents were open to the public on the KOC’s official web site. 
 
In these days, we open up documents concerning our management through an 
official site, which is entitled Gyeong Young Gong Shi. This is the site that opens up 
all management-related documents on the site of the KOC. The less important 
documents are also released, though. We try to provide access to most relevant 
documents.  
(a former senior KOC official) 
 
We provide access to most relevant documents on the site of Gyeong Young Gong 
Shi on the KOC’s official web site. All management-related documents are 
accessible on this site. (Do you mean all of them?) Well, I would say, most of them.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
The next respondent explained why the KOC should provide access to those documents to 
public scrutiny. 
 
It is necessary to open all management-related documents according to laws that all 
government umbrella organisations should follow.  
(a senior KSC officer) 
 
The first two informants simply deliver access the documents on the KOC’s website, while 
the last respondent added the phrase ‘according to laws’, which implies the force of stronger 
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regulations than the Statutes of KOC or the Code of Conduct. The last informant’s comment 
indicates that the KOC, as one of the government umbrella organisations, is obliged to 
improve the aspect of transparency in its management. Additional evidence in support of the 
claim that the KOC is an umbrella organisation is its appearance on the governmental 
Gyeong Young Gong Shi website. The Ministry of Strategy and Finance organises the Alio 
System (All Public Information In One) which annually provides a document entitled Gyeong 
Young Gong Shi. Under the provisions of this programme a wide range of relevant 
documents concerning all governmental organisations should be released to the public. 
Since the KOC is regarded as one of the governmental organisations, it is, thus, possible to 
obtain information on the KOC through the Internet site of the Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance, www.mosf.go.kr.  
 
The third operationalisation of the first definition supplies the answer to the question ‘whether 
or not any information including all regulations required is open to the public/stakeholders’. 
The interviewees above all declared that most management-related documents were open 
to the public. Nevertheless, some interviewees also admitted that some documents 
containing discussion of sensitive issues were not open to the public. 
 
Open to the public? We open most documents but I think there are some that we 
don’t open.  
(a middle-ranking KOC officer)   
 
There are documents that we usually open to the public, but there are some that we 
should not. (What kinds of documents are you talking about?) Something about 
diplomacy, I think. Well, I don’t know it well.  
(a junior female KOC staff member) 
 
As the KOC is a sporting organisation, I don’t think there are many documents on 
sensitive issues. However, we don’t open up documents on some issues about 
which a decision-making has not yet taken place.  
(a junior KSC staff member)  
 
These informants’ opinions are supported by Article 33 concerning ‘Prohibition against 
Information Leakage’ of the Code of Conduct (2007: 8) below: 
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Employees and Executive Board members should not disclose critical information 
acquired during the course of their work to a third party without any permission or 
approval of the organisation.   
  
The official document of the KOC also stipulates that critical information should not be 
publicised without the permission or approval of the KOC. Consequently, although the need 
for transparency is mainly encouraged and respected on the part of the KOC as a 
government-umbrella organisation, at the same time, documents on sensitive issues are 
also kept secure and confidential. This interpretation of the limits to transparency as 
witnessed in the Korean context is shared with the Olympic Movement in general. As 
discussed earlier in Chapter 4, the category entitled ‘Confidentiality’ in the IOC Code of 
Ethics (2010: 3) also states that the confidentiality of certain information should be protected: 
 
The Olympic parties shall not disclose information entrusted to them in confidence. 
The principle of confidentiality shall be strictly respected by the IOC Ethics 
Commission in all its activities. Disclosure of other information shall not be for 
personal gain or benefit, nor be undertaken maliciously to damage the reputation of 
any person or organisation. 
 
Moreover, Article 32 regarding ‘Transparent Accounting Management’ of the Code of 
Conduct of the KOC (2007: 8) adds:   
  
Accounting records or other financial management should be accurately, and 
transparently recorded and managed based on facts, according to laws and 
generally accepted accounting principles. 
 
This ensures the transparent and accurate financial management of the KOC and this 
aspect is in accordance with the last operationalisation, which relates to the question: ‘is a 
financial report open to the public/stakeholders?’ The KOC publishes a range of annual 
financial documents, for instance, Business lists of budget proposal, Business plan including 
aspects of its finances, and the Financial report. In addition, the KOC’s official site, 
www.sports.or.kr, also plays a role in disclosing most finance-related information including 
audited financial statements on 재무현황, or Jae Mu Hyun Hwang, which is translated into 
English as the Status of Finance. This site is a part of Gyeong Young Gong Shi and provides 
most financial information.  
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The aspect of transparency as it has been constructed in a western context is clearly 
reflected by the IOC. Overall, the IOC encourages the NOCs to live up to its 
recommendations, according to which the sporting organisations are required to release an 
annual report, a financial report and other related documents to their stakeholders and the 
public. In compliance with this IOC recommendation, the KOC also regularly releases most 
main documents and financial reports to the public and its stakeholders, except for some 
documents which need to be kept confidential. This implies that the aspect of transparency 
as practised in the IOC in a western context is also interpreted in the same way in the 
Korean context. 
 
The second definition of transparency by which ‘organisations should open the process of 
decision-making to all stakeholders’ should be operationalised in keeping with the following 
questions, as to ‘whether or not the process of decision-making is monitored? and if so, by 
whom and for what purposes?’ On the official website of the KOC, regular or annual 
meetings of the Executive Committee, the Commissions and the General Assembly of 
Representatives have been reported as a part of Gyeong Young Gong Shi. They are 
organised and managed by the Management Strategy Team in the KOC. Nevertheless, it is 
not clear whether the process of decision-making is monitored. As an example, the process 
of selecting the Chef de Mission is not monitored and it is only open to those who attend the 
presidential breakfast meeting as discussed in the previous chapter (See Chapter 6). More 
specially, the KOC’s Executive Committee is unlikely to be effectively monitored in such a 
way as to avoid an unequal distribution of power. Those members who are based in 
governmental bodies might be able to exert stronger power than any other members. In 
order to achieve a situation in which power is balanced evenly, it may be necessary to open 
the process of decision making to all stakeholders. Similarly, none of the documents of the 
IOC refer to this issue (see also Chapter 4)  
7.5 Democracy 
As shown Table 7-5, the sets of definition and operationalisation are as follows: 
 
Table 7-5 Definitions/Interpretations and operationalisations of democracy 
Definitions/interpretations Operationalisations 
It should be maintaining checks and balances 
by means of elections of high officials. 
- What kind of system exists for elections to the 
Executive Committee and the Presidency? 
  (If not, who nominates candidates for the 
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High officials in the organisation including 
President and Executive Committee 
members should maintain their independence 
from internal/external interests within the 
organisation. 
Presidency and the Executive Committee?) 
-Does NOC provide clear criteria on the electoral 
system? 
- Are high officials in NOCs independent from 
internal/external interests? 
No matter what structure the NOC follows, 
either centralisation or decentralisation, it 
should be actually decentralised in decision 
making. 
- Is power in decision-making decentralised or 
centralised at a managerial level, i.e. an Executive 
Committee? 
- To what extent are all members of each 
department able to be involved in decision-making 
process? 
- Are all departments independent in decision-
making? 
 
The operationalisations are related to questions arising from the first definition, such as: 
‘what kind of system exists for elections to the Executive Committee and the Presidency? 
and If not, who nominates candidates for the Presidency and Executive Committee?’; ‘does 
NOC provide clear criteria on the electoral system?; and ‘are high officials in NOCs 
independent from internal/external interests? First of all, the system of selection of the Executive 
Committee members and the KOC President are hinted at in Article 15 regarding ‘Composition and 
Functions’ in the Statues of KOC (2009: 4-5): 
 
(2) General Assembly shall deliberate and make decisions on the following: 
A. Dissolution of the KOC and any amendments of its Statutes; 
B. Membership admission and expulsion; 
C. Election and dismissal of KOC Officers; 
D. Review of KOC’s business performance, accounting, and, other activities; and 
E. Other matters of importance. 
 
It states that the General Assembly should deliberate and make decisions on the election 
and dismissal of KOC officers, which implies that the General Assembly should be 
responsible for elections within the KOC. The KOC officers here may be the President, 
Secretary General, and the Executive Committee members. The Statutes of the KOC 
indicate that the General Assembly of Representatives is the highest decision-making in that 
they elect the main officers of the KOC. Nevertheless, as witnessed by the officers in the 
previous chapter, the election of the KOC President is more likely to be affected by the 
invisible power of the Korean government. The presidential election, has, in fact been 
conducted as a ‘token’ exercise with the result that an, aide of the State President is usually 
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selected as the KOC President. Thus, the government has turned out to be the most 
powerful entity in the selection of the KOC President. Consequently, the electoral system 
inside the KOC has been in effect a ‘token’ exercise and the actual power is exerted by the 
government to manipulate the General Assembly.  
 
In the case of the Executive Committee Members and Secretary General, they are appointed 
by the KOC President without following a process of election, according to Article 44 which is 
concerned with the ‘Establishment and Operation’ of the Statutes of KOC (2009: 13): 
 
(1) The KOC shall establish a Secretariat, and the Secretary General and employees shall 
perform their duties in the Secretariat. 
(2) The Secretary General shall be appointed by the President with the Board’s consent and 
the approval of the Minister of the relevant government ministry. 
 
In addition, Article 27 regarding ‘Appointment of Vice-Presidents, Executive Board Members and 
Auditors’ of the Statutes of KOC (2009: 8-9) indicates the following: 
 
(1) Vice Presidents and Executive Board members shall be appointed in the General 
Assembly from among candidates nominated by the President. The number of Executive 
Board members representing sports included in the program of the Olympic Games hosted 
after a General Assembly called to elect the KOC Officers shall be the majority of the 
members with voting rights (the members with voting rights include the President and Vice-
Presidents). 
(2) The President may appoint one standing Vice-President among the Vice Presidents with 
the Board’s approval. 
(3) The Auditors shall be appointed in the General Assembly. One Auditor shall be 
appointed from among the General Assembly Members representing a sport included in the 
program of the Olympic Games, and the other Auditor shall be appointed from among the 
certified public accountants. 
 
The phrases ‘appointed by the General Assembly’ and ‘nominated by the President’ imply 
that the electoral system does not exist. The KOC President holds the power to appoint most 
major high-ranking officers, including the Secretary General and Executive Committee 
members. One thing that should be taken into consideration at this point is that the final 
approval is given by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism. On a closer reading of the 
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Articles, it may be seen that even any change of the Statutes should be approved by the 
Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, as Article 47 concerning ‘Amendments’ of the Statutes 
of KOC (2009: 14) indicates: 
 
Any amendments to the Statutes of the KOC shall be proposed with the Board’s approval or 
one-third vote of the members with voting rights and shall be approved with a two-thirds 
vote of the attending members and the approval of the Minister of the relevant government 
ministry. 
 
As a result, the Statutes of KOC also legally admit that the governmental body is the higher 
decision-making body. In fact, the membership list of 37th KOC Executive Committee (see 
also Table 7-1), which was the first Executive Committee, as released on 16 July, 2009 after 
the KOC/KSC merger, includes two members of governmental organisations such as the 
Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism and the Korea Sports Promotion Foundation. This 
element can also be elucidated by testimony gathered from the KOC staff members 
discussed in Chapter 6. As some interviewees revealed, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and 
Tourism decides the broad direction of sports policy in advance, which therefore affects the 
KOC’s decision-making structure. It is, thus, possible to say that the KOC’s high-ranking 
officers are not independent of its superordinate organisation, which is the Korean 
government. This can be an answer to the question posed about the operationalisation, 
namely ‘are high officials in NOCs independent from internal/external interests?’   
 
Ironically, the Code of Conduct (2007: 5) addresses the need for a prohibition of political 
intervention in Article 19.1 concerning ‘Prohibition against inappropriate political intervention’: 
 
1) Employees and Executive Board members should not illegally intervene in 
politics such as by joining in a specific party or politician-sponsor group. 
2) Employees and Executive Board members should be careful not to cause any 
misunderstanding that their personal and legally-allowed political activity is in line 
with the political activity that the KOC pursues. 
 
Article 19.2 of the Code of Conduct (2007: 5) regarding ‘Response to the unreasonable 
request by politicians’ also states that no member of the KOC, including at the working and 
managerial levels, should be allowed to be influenced by political parties. 
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1) When Employees and Executive Board members are influenced or bribed by 
political parties for party interests, they should report it to the President or 
counsel with the official guidance of the code of conduct in order to appropriately 
respond to it. 
 
Although the written statements provide regulations on the election of the president by 
emphasising the need for independence of decision-making in accordance with the 
operationalisation which is ‘whether or not the NOC provides clear criteria on the electoral 
system of high officers’, the KOC’s written statements on this matter do not seem to provide 
any clear criteria on that.  
 
Looking at the IOC’s concept of democracy in a western context, the IOC encourages NOCs 
to maintain harmonious relationship with their governments but to safeguard their 
independence from them by holding their own autonomous elections for high officials. In the 
Korean context, these rules and regulations are well covered in the Statutes of KOC and the 
Code of Conduct. Nevertheless, although the KOC provides criteria on the electoral system 
for the KOC Presidency, in the actual election it is more likely that the Korean government 
will be deeply involved and this can be explained as a consequence of the system of 
governance that emerges from the basis of the analysis of the election of the KOC president 
detailed in the previous chapter. Thus, although the interpretation of democracy in this sense 
is well implanted within the Korean context, its implementation cannot avoid the influence of 
Korean political circumstances. In fact, The KOC staff members shared the opinion that the 
government was the most powerful entity in the selection of the KOC President as the 
government sent a politically favourable person to be a candidate for the presidency and 
helped him/her to win the election.  
  
Moreover, in contrast to the IOC’s recommendations that the NOC should also provide the 
electoral system for the Executive Board members, the Statutes of the KOC indicate that the 
Executive Board members and Secretary General are all designated by the KOC President 
with the approval of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism. This also implies that the 
KOC is not independent from internal/external interests. At the same time, it shows that the 
strongest power has been with to the KOC President in the selection of most officers at the 
managerial level. 
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In accordance with the second definition, which is that ‘no matter what structure the NOC 
follows, either centralisation or decentralisation, it should be actually decentralised in 
decision-making’, there are three related operationalisations namely: ‘is power in decision-
making decentralised or centralised at the managerial level, i.e. the Executive Committee?’, 
‘to what extent are all members of each department able to be involved in decision-making 
process?’ and ‘are all departments independent in decision-making?’ 
 
The first operationalisation poses the question: ‘is power in decision-making decentralised or 
centralised at the managerial level?’ As already discovered in the previous chapter, the 
decision-making process within the KOC Executive Committee is not decentralised as there 
is a tendency for the Committee to be in a non-decision making situation on critical issues. 
More specifically, the KOC President is entitled to appoint the Executive Committee 
members and the Secretary General, which means that the KOC president can exert his/her 
power to lead the decision-making in connection with his/her preferences and that decision-
making is therefore centralised. 
 
The operationalisations regarding the degree to which individual departments are centralised 
or decentralised in their decision-making are as follows: ‘to what extent are all members of 
each department able to be involved in a decision-making process?’; and ‘are all 
departments independent in decision-making?’ At the departmental level, there are two 
perspectives among the KOC staff members. Some interviewees claimed that a centralised 
decision-making process did indeed exit, while some argued that there was partial 
decentralisation in decision-making. In the former case, two respondents conveyed their 
views that a higher level organisation conceptualises a broader and larger-scale direction of 
policy and, thus, the actual decision-making is dependent on the higher level organisation 
from the outset. 
 
At the departmental level we can’t make a decision but all decisions are made at the 
upper level. For example, in the case of the Department of International Affairs, 
when the IOC demands something, the KOC should comply with the IOC’s 
directions or plans, and the officers at the upper level in the KOC/KSC make a broad 
decision and then their decision will be delivered to the working level in each 
department.  
(a former senior KOC staff member)  
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In the case of the business or management of the organisation, it is quite free. The 
big framework is set by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST), but the 
department can handle the detailed policy such as that of implementation and 
management. Of course, it should be accepted by the Secretary General.  
(a KSC middle-ranking officer) 
 
The two interviewees expressed their view that the IOC and the MCST are the main decision 
makers. More specifically, the IOC is the highest decision making level for the KOC staff 
members, while the MCST performs the same role for the KSC staff members. Nevertheless, 
the informants also delivered their opinion that the highest level officers in the KOC/KSC are 
the final decision-makers inside the organisation, for example, the President and Secretary 
General. As demonstrated by the views expressed by the interviewees about the KOC/KSC 
merger, the President of the KSC automatically defers to the KOC President. Accordingly, 
the KSC and the KOC both needed to have their President’s final decision for them to be 
allowed to do their work. This perspective is supported by the next group of interviewees 
who demonstrated their common view of the power of the KOC President. 
 
When the KOC President or Secretary General makes a decision, all departments 
should follow it.  
(a former senior KOC staff member)  
 
The decisions made in a department are delivered to the President and he might 
accept or reject them. In any cases, everything depends on our President.  
(a former senior KSC staff member)  
 
Decisions made by a department? Some are possibly decided at a department level 
but others are not. Sometimes, the Secretary General can decide but if it is an 
important issue, the KOC President is the final decision maker.  
(a middle-ranking KOC officer) 
 
In this case, none of the staff members can give an opinion against the President’s or 
Secretary General’s decisions. So we just follow it in spite of holding different opinion.  
(a middle-ranking KOC officer) 
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Although the final decision-maker in the organisation is the KOC President, in some cases, 
the Secretary General also plays a role in deciding the overall policy. These interviewees are 
all senior or middle-ranking officers who are in working-level positions in which they are 
obliged to inform the KOC President of their decisions and, in turn, the final decision-making 
is done by the President. Their opinion is, thus, that the KOC President or the Secretary 
General holds the ultimate power in decision-making, which implies the existence of a 
centralised decision-making structure. 
 
The other group of respondents claims that the organisation of decision-making in the KOC 
is rather close to decentralisation. They put an emphasis on whether or not the members of 
each department may actually be involved in working in practice at a departmental level.  
 
Decisions are made by a department but the president is the last decision maker. If 
he accepts a proposal, we can continue with it.      
(a KSC staff member) 
 
Of course, what a department decides will be shown to a Director General or 
Secretary General. Then, the Executive Board will give us back their decision and 
thus, each department can work on that basis in practice.  
(a former senior KOC staff member) 
 
Each department is responsible for different tasks. So the tasks of which a 
department is in charge are all dependent on that department. Of course, we should 
inform the President of our decisions, though  
(a junior KOC staff member)  
 
Most of tasks are done by us at the working level. We are doing what we have done 
so far. If we pass our opinions to the upper level, we may need to discuss which way 
is better with the higher officers. Anyway, the President or the Secretary General 
does not know every single thing which is dealt with in a department.   
(a senior KSC staff member) 
 
The comment received from these informants focuses on the fact that each department is 
responsible for its actual work at the in practical level and, thus, the decision-making is partly 
decentralised. Although they can make decisions over detailed policy at the departmental 
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level, however, the higher level post-holders, for instance, the KOC President and the 
Secretary General should be informed about their decisions. Therefore, the decision-making 
process is neither fully centralised nor fully decentralised. One matter that should be 
considered is the extent to which the President has the power to accept or rejects 
departmental decision-making. If decision-making at the departmental level is only referred 
to the President or the Secretary General for their information, this can be seen as evidence 
of a more decentralised structure. On the other hand, in the case where the President or 
Secretary General is deeply involved in decision-making, this is more likely to come close to 
centralisation. Therefore, from the different perspectives the same structure of decision-
making can be interpreted in various ways.  
 
The next operationalisation asks: ‘to what extent are all members of each department able to 
be involved in decision-making process?’ This may be identified by examining the ways in 
which communications are conducted between senior and junior staff members in a 
department. More specifically, it is a matter of whether or not the junior staff members can 
openly discuss or suggest their opinions within a department. The first opinion below is that 
of a KSC staff member. 
 
When you consider the age gap between the senior and junior staff members, some 
of them have a 20-year age difference. There is at least a 10-year gap. Now, looking 
carefully within a department, when the junior staff members raise a question, the 
senior staff members might urge them just to follow the seniors.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
This officer’s comment implies that, due to the generation gap, the senior staff members of 
the KSC tend to force their junior staff members to follow their seniors. This gives rise to a 
centralised decision-making structure inside the department without a free and open 
environment. By contrast, the two interviewees from the KOC considered that the staff 
members were able to exchange their opinions freely:  
 
It can go either way… some should follow orders from the upper level but some can 
be decided in a department. So, either way…  
(a senior KOC staff member)  
 
We are acting at the working-level and we send our opinions to the higher level for 
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the final decision. Nevertheless, we are the ones who can give our opinions. I think 
that we have an open system to be able to suggest our opinions but this is 
dependent on a team leader’s style.  
(a junior KOC staff member)  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter (see Chapter 6), which concluded that the atmosphere 
of the KOC was more likely to be open than that of the KSC, the KOC staff members 
expressed approval of their relative degree of involvement in decision-making by means of 
free communication between junior and senior staff members 
 
Through the analysis of the documents released by the IOC it emerged that none of the 
written statements makes explicit recommendations regarding decentralisation in decision-
making. This implies that this concept of democracy may be a sensitive issue to deal with 
and the IOC recommendations are, thus, mostly related with the aspect of democracy in 
terms of the relationship with other stakeholders and, in particular, the government.  
7.6 Equity 
Equity consists of five categories as shown in Table 7-6.  
 
Table 7-6 Definitions/Interpretations and operationalisations of equity 
Definitions/interpretations Operationalisations 
In general 
Meanings are produced in the ways in which 
dominant groups produce common 
understandings through the processes and 
patterns of interactions. 
Practices are understood through obtaining 
insight into the ways in which members of 
dominant and subordinate groups negotiate 
meanings when a member of the subordinate 
group attempts to enter the dominant group. 
Sports organisations should establish a 
channel of policy implementation to deal with 
complaints about discrimination and 
harassment. 
 
-Is there any evidence in the ‘meanings’ showing 
how, in particular, high officials make sense of 
equity? 
 
-Is there any evidence of the ‘practices’? 
 
 
-Is there a written policy (laws and rules) on gender, 
disability, ethnicity, and resource allocations? (in 
general) 
-Is there a team or a monitoring system handling 
such matters? 
Gender 
Female involvement in decision making 
should reach a minimum of 20 per cent at 
 
-What percentage of women is involved in decision 
making? 
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both the managerial and non-managerial 
levels.  
 
-What is the ratio of females at the non-managerial 
level?  
-May male and female staff members benefit from 
the same treatment, salaries and access to the 
higher positions?  
Disability 
People with impairments should also be 
involved in decision making 
Organisations should demonstrate the 
integration of individual workers with 
disabilities through legislation, rules, and 
finance. 
 
-What percentage of people with disabilities take 
part as members of the decision-making bodies and 
in the non-decision making positions? 
-Does the NOC provide relevant rules and 
legislation on disability and disability sport? 
-Does the NOC provide a better working 
environment for staff members with disabilities? 
Ethnicity 
Irrespective of the ethnicity, anyone capable 
should be involved at the working and 
managerial levels 
 
-What percentage of people in different ethnic 
groups participates at both managerial and non-
managerial levels? 
Fair allocation of resources 
There should be a fair allocation of 
resources, programs and decision making in 
terms of gender, disability, the size of the 
organisation, and high- or low- profile athletes 
or NFs’ 
 
-How are resources to NFs and athletes distributed? 
 
Prior to undertaking a detailed discussion of equity in relation to gender, disability, ethnicity 
and resources, initially, it is necessary to examine the ways in which ‘meanings’ and 
‘practices’ feature: ‘meanings are produced in the ways in which dominant groups produce 
common understandings through the processes and patterns of interactions’, while ‘practices 
are understood through obtaining insight into the ways in which members of dominant and 
subordinate groups negotiate meanings when a member of the subordinate group attempts 
to enter the dominant group’. The operationalisation poses the question as to ‘whether or not 
there is evidence in the actions of high officials, in particular, of the ‘meanings’ and/or 
‘practices’ (see Table 4-19). In the case of the KOC this is discussed in the light of evidence 
concerning these ‘meanings’ and ‘practices’ in terms of gender and disability. For instance, 
how does the dominant group, in this case, the high-ranking male officers including the 
Executive Committee members, make sense of gender composition and how does that 
reflect the way in which they week to achieve gender equity? 
 
As revealed in Chapter 6, there was some inconsistency regarding the interpretation of 
gender equality in terms of the percentage of female staff members resulting from the new 
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process of staff recruitment. Some informants below stated that the policy on gender equity 
had been fulfilled because in the targets set for the recruitment of new staff members a 
certain percentage had been allocated to females. 
 
I don’t think there is any unfairness in recruitment. Above all, as far as I am 
concerned, for example, if 10 people are being recruited, a certain percentage of 
them at least ought to be women… as I know.  
(a middle-ranking KOC officer, female) 
 
The ratio was maintained and this difficult ratio of 30% women as recommended by 
the IOC was respected during the period of the KOC President Kim Jeong Gil, who 
took great efforts to do so. We surely satisfied the 30% requirement.  
(the former Secretary General , male) 
 
The middle-ranking female KOC officer who answered above joined the KOC during the 
tenure of the 25th KOC President Kim Jeong Gil. At that time, gender equity was being 
promoted within the KOC in order to reach the IOC’s recommended target ratio, which was 
interpreted as constituting 30 per cent female to 70 per cent male. Following the 
organisation’s promotion of this policy, the dominant groups, formed in this context by senior 
male officers and Executive Committee members, came to the common understanding that 
employing 30 per cent female staff complied with the gender equity requirement. In practice, 
therefore, the subordinate group, here the female staff members, were presented with the 
negotiating position that for the achievement of gender equity 30 per cent of staff recruitment 
should be of females.  
 
Meanwhile, evidence obtained from the interviews indicates that gender equity was being 
defined differently by some employees, who thought that it could be accomplished only when 
the ratio of female to male participation rose to 50:50. Two other junior female KOC staff 
members who joined during Kim Jeong Gil’s tenure expressed the opinion that gender equity 
was accomplished when half or a larger proportion of posts were allocated to female staff 
members.  
 
I don’t think there is any inequity. I don’t know if that applies to my generation only, or 
if it’s just me, but last year the newly recruited members consisted of 8 people and 
among them there were 3 men and 5 women.   
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(a junior KOC staff member, female) 
 
At the non-managerial level,.. err…I don’t feel that there’s any gender discrimination 
or anything like that.. hmm…there is also a tendency to employ more females or half 
males and half females…hmm…I don’t know.    
(a junior KOC staff member, female) 
 
This implies that practices may be also changed by the change of meanings. As mentioned 
earlier, the IOC did not make clear suggestions about the percentage of female involvement 
to be realised at all levels. However, the KOC’s dominant group interpreted it as ‘meaning’ 
30 per cent and this could thus become its ‘practice’. As time has gone by, the KOC has 
promoted this meaning of gender equity as a female to male ratio which approximates to half 
and half. Consequently, the members of the KOC/KSC have also constructed their 
knowledge of gender equity in accordance with the policy of the organisation.  
 
Another example is given by the employment of people with disabilities. The Executive 
Committee member of KOC below claimed that the KOC and the KSC did not purposely 
ignore the disabled.  
 
I don’t see it as inequity. If we didn’t employ any disabled people who were capable 
of working that would be a problem. However, we can’t just employ those who are 
unable to accomplish physical activities, can we? Also, there is the KOSAD and the 
KPC… in Korea… we have the KOSAD and the KPC.  
(a KOC Executive Committee member) 
 
His comment on the roles of people with physical impairments gives the impression that 
people with disabilities may be unable to fulfil appropriate roles within the organisation on 
account of their disabilities. In particular, when he said ‘I don’t see it as inequity’, this can be 
compared to the previous respondents’ similarly positive views of KOC/KSC compliance with 
the IOC’s recommendations concerning gender equity. He appears to have been seeking to 
justify the organisation’s negligence in its failure to comply with the governmental regulation 
on the employment of disabled people by denying that equal treatment was actually possible 
for them. This is a ‘meaning’ developed by a member of the dominant group, namely by an 
Executive Committee member who is involved in decision-making.  
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Other interviewees who are staff members at the working level also gave their opinion that 
physical impairment could be preventing disabled people from being involved in most 
activities offered by the KSC/KOC. All of those interviewees who gave negative responses 
also supported the point of view that the KOSAD/KPC should be responsible for absorbing 
people with disabilities. From their perspective, as the KOC/KSC has usually been engaged 
in working in the domain of physical activities, it would not be pertinent to employ people with 
disabilities. This point of view was supported by another member of KOC staff. 
 
Employing people with disabilities…. Well…most of the work in this organisation 
involves physical activity, so it wouldn’t be easy for them to work here, and they also 
have the KOSAD and the KPC  
(a middle-ranking KOC officer) 
 
Furthermore, the respondents whose replies are quoted below, including the KOC Executive 
Committee member, insisted that the KOSAD/KPC should be responsible for absorbing 
people with disabilities who seek to work in sporting organisations.   
 
The disabled usually work for the KOSAD and KPC. I don’t see that they have to 
deal with inequity. I’ve never heard of it.. never.. never…   
(a former senior KOC officer) 
  
As far as I know, the KOSAD and KPC hire a larger number of disabled than of able-
bodied people.  
(a junior KOC staff member) 
 
Fortunately, the KPC and KOSAD have absorbed disabled workers.  
(a former senior KOC official) 
 
Employing people with disabilities…. Well…most of the work in this organisation 
involves physical activity, so it wouldn’t be easy for them to work here  
(a middle-ranking KOC officer) 
 
The blind would be unable to work here as there are many events that require 
sighted people. Some people are handicapped in their mobility…  
(a senior KSC officer)  
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There is KOSAD and KPC in Korea…we have the KOSAD and KPC.  
(a KOC Executive Committee member) 
 
The KOC’s implementation of government policy on the employment of people with physical 
impairments has allegedly been insufficient for the reason that the KOC/KSC is involved, to 
a large extent in physical activities for the able-bodied. Most middle-ranking and junior staff 
members conveyed their belief that the organisation’s policy on the disabled lived up to the 
government’s recommendations, whereas most senior level officers admitted that the reality 
was different. Nevertheless, staff members sought to justify the KOC/KSC’s neglect in its 
policy on disability equity by alleging that the KOSAD/KPC are the organisations that bear 
the greatest responsibility for employing people with disabilities. This is further evidence of a 
‘meaning’, which has been constructed by the dominant, able-bodied, group. As regards the 
‘practice’ of disability equity, since employees with disabilities did not present themselves as 
members of a subordinate group, representatives of such a group were not available for 
interview in this context. This may imply that the subordinate groups also accepted the 
‘meanings’ of the dominant group and that people with disabilities therefore applied for 
positions in the KOSAD/KPC, which is the more conventional ‘practice’. 
 
Another general interpretation concerning equity is that ‘a sporting organisation should 
establish a channel of policy implementation to deal with complaints about discrimination 
and harassment’. Two of the relevant operationalisations answer the questions as to 
‘whether or not there is a written policy (laws and rules) on gender, disability, ethnicity and 
resource allocations’ and ‘whether or not there is a team or a monitoring system handling 
such matters’. The Code of Conduct (2007: 12-3) clearly states the KOC’s policy on violation 
in Chapter 10 concerning ‘Actions against Violation’. However, this does not mean that it 
specifically addresses cases of alleged discrimination or harassment. Thus, the KOC has 
established the Code of Conduct as the written policy to be followed in relation to the broad 
concept of disciplinary punishment:   
 
Article 50 (Consulting for judging violation) 
① When the breach of the code is not clear, “employees and the Board members” 
should consult with the responsible person before dealing it with. 
②  The President should take necessary measures for effective counselling in 
accordance with Clause ①, including establishing a hotline and counselling room. 
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Article 51 (Violation reporting and its processing) 
① If anyone finds out the code breach by “employees and the Board members”, he 
or she can report to the head or the instructor of the Code of Conduct in the 
organisation or report to the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission. 
② In the case of Clause 1, the reporter should state his/her own personal details 
and the violator’s personal information including the content of the breach. 
③  The official responsible for code compliance should confirm the violation, 
reported in accordance with Clause 1, before reporting it to the President by 
submitting relevant documents. 
 
Clause ① of Article 51 shows that there is a channel of reporting within the KOC and the 
monitoring is conducted by the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission. With regard to 
monitoring, the officer who is in charge should be chiefly responsible for it and recourse may 
be had to the KOC President as a final step, according to the series of actions prescribed in 
Article 51 ③ above and Article 51-2 ① below.      
 
Article 51-2 (Disciplinary Punishment) 
① The President should take necessary actions against the violator. 
② The type, process, and validity of the punishment stated in Clause ③ follows 
the punishment rules of the KOC. However, if the violator gives a disadvantage to 
the reporter, which is a breach of Article 51, the violator may be subjected to a more 
severe punishment. 
 
Article 52 (Protection of reporter) (13) 
① The President and the officials responsible for code compliance should make the 
reporter and the reported document confidential and ensure that the reporter is not 
exposed to any discrimination or disadvantage due to reporting. 
② Despite Clause ①  above, when the reporter is discriminated against or 
disadvantaged, the reporter can request protection measures and mediation from 
the head or supervisor. In this case, the head and supervisor should take action. 
③ If the reporting exposes any irregularity on the part of the reporter, the level of 
punishment can be reduced or exempted. 
④ Clauses ① and ③ are respected in commensurate with order non-compliance 
of Article 20 and other counselling regarding the Code of Conduct. 
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More specifically, there is no official document regarding the entitlement of people with 
disabilities to receive equitable treatment on employment issues within the KOC, as 
witnessed by several staff members. Moreover, in the case of resource allocations, 
resources may be allocated either to Local Branches and the NFs. The Business Plan, The 
Business Report and the Report on Business Activities deal with the measures for the 
allocation of resources to Local Branches and the NFs. Nevertheless, while the way in which 
money is allocated to Local Branches is clearly addressed, that is not the case where the 
NFs’ resources are concerned (this will be discussed in the section on resource allocation 
below). 
Gender equity 
The definition regarding gender equity (see Table 4-19) is that ‘female involvement in 
decision making should reach a minimum of 20 per cent at both the managerial and non-
managerial levels’. The focus in this study is on the ratio of female participation at both levels, 
which operationalises as ‘what is the ratio of males and females at decision-making and non-
managerial levels?’ Taking account, first of all, of female participation at the Executive 
Committee level in the KSC and the KOC, the figures have been separately recorded for 
each organisation before the KOC/KSC merger which took place on June 29, 2009. The 
officially published statistics on gender equality are provided in Table 7-7 below:  
 
Table 7-7 The ratio of gender participation in the Executive Committee  
(as of September, 2008) 
KSC Male Female Total  
number 
The ratio of 
male/female 
The Executive Committee level 
along with President, Secretary 
General, and auditors 
 
37 
 
8 
 
45 
 
87% : 13% 
KOC Male Female Total  
number 
The ratio of 
male/female 
The Executive Committee level 
along with President, Secretary 
General, and auditors 
 
83 
 
14 
 
97 
 
79% : 21% 
Source: the KSC and the KOC 
 
As discussed earlier, the KOC represents the Republic of Korea as its NOC within a global 
organisation of NOCs whose highest authority is the IOC. The ratios of female involvement 
shown in Table 7-7 indicate that the KOC tried harder than the KSC to live up to the IOC’s 
recommendations. Thus, female participation in the KOC is nearly 21%, which meets up with 
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the minimum level recommended by the IOC, while that of the KSC is just 13%. However, 
after the KOC/KSC merger, the new Executive Committee consisted of only one female 
member out of 21 members. With female participation having decreased so greatly in the 
new Executive Committee, the implementation of gender equity has evidently been moving 
in a negative direction since the KOC/KSC merger. 
 
Concerning the ratio of gender participation at the working level in the KSC and KOC, the 
data released by the KOC/KSC on the overall gender composition of its workforce as of May 
2009 showed that women workers accounted for 27.3 per cent and men 72.7 per cent of the 
total. The ratio per se is quite similar to that recommended by the IOC with regard to female 
participation. In the case of administrative posts, however, such positions were occupied by 
83 male workers versus only 16 female workers, whereas 20 male workers versus 24 female 
workers were engaged in clerical and technical support posts. Accordingly, although the ratio 
per se represents the figures as being very positive in terms of the overall numbers, most 
female workers are categorised as filling ‘clerical and technical support posts’, which 
conveys a situation of gender inequity with respect to administrative-level employment.  
 
In association with the operationalisation of gender equity the following question arises: ‘may 
male and female staff members benefit from the same treatment, salaries and access to the 
higher positions?’ With respect to salary, the 2009 Business Lists of Budget Proposal (2009: 
65) introduces the salary differences between ‘administrative’ and ‘clerical and technical 
support’ posts and shows that employees in these categories are not treated the same in 
terms of their salaries. As discussed earlier in Chapter 6, this is related to the gender issue 
as most female staff are usually appointed to clerical and technical support posts. 
 
Table 7-8 Salary differences between ‘administrative’ & ‘clerical and technical support’ posts  
  (unit: Korean Won) 
Administrative posts (101 employees) Salary Remark 
- First grade 3,380,000  
- Second grade 3,021,000  
- Third grade 2,905,000 Difference : 723,000 Won more 
- Fourth grade 2,657,000  
- Fifth grade 2,282,000  
- Sixth grade 1,725,000  
- Seventh grade 1,365,000  
Clerical and technical support posts 
(38 employees) 
  
- Third grade 2,182,000 Difference: 723,000 Won less 
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- Fourth grade 1,875,000  
- Fifth grade 1,718,000  
- Sixth grade 1,433,000  
- Seventh grade 974,000  
Source: KOC (2009: 65) 
 
In addition, one female staff member employed in a clerical and technical support role 
expressed her view that different treatment had been given to staff in ‘administrative’ and 
‘clerical and technical support’ posts. 
 
Workers in clerical and technical support posts receives lower salaries than the male 
staff in administrative posts. We also have little chance to go abroad for a business 
trip and we receive fewer benefits. For example, only employees in administrative 
posts may be supported to the extent of approximately 70% of the school fees for 
learning a foreign language.  
(a female KSC staff member) 
 
Apart from the issue of the salary differentials, staff members in clerical and technical 
support posts benefit from fewer opportunities to be involved in other business-related 
activities. Only the staff serving in administrative posts are responsible for carrying out 
projects within the KOC, while the holders of clerical and technical support posts are only 
responsible for fulfilling subsidiary helpers’ roles. In terms of access to the higher positions, 
staff in clerical and technical support posts remain at the lowest level. For example, the 
female interviewee in the clerical and technical support post has been working for the KOC 
for more than twenty years but she has not been entitled to receive a promotion. The clerical 
and technical support posts are mainly filled by female staff, which shows that the gender 
equity between the administrative and clerical and technical support posts has not been 
attainable. Nevertheless, gender equity is more likely to be achieved among the 
administrative posts at the non-managerial level, since female staff are appointed to such 
positions more frequently and thereby benefit from the same treatment and salaries as their 
male colleagues.  
 
In the Korean context, the situation regarding gender equality has been dramatically 
improved since efforts have been taken to achieve the IOC’s recommended target rate. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, female employees testified that equal numbers of women 
and men had been recruited at the non-managerial level. However, in view of our 
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examination of the KOC’s recent performance, the disparity in gender ratios at the 
managerial level has not been successfully resolved. Given that female staff members have 
mainly been allocated to clerical and technical support posts, this also implies that gender 
inequity still exists within the KOC.     
Equity on disabillity 
The first interpretation, which is that ‘people with impairments should also be involved in 
decision-making’, received a generally negative reaction from the KOC staff members. The 
operationalisation asks: ‘what percentage of people with disabilities take part as members of 
the decision-making bodies and in the non-decision making positions?’ According to their 
organisational structures, the KOC and the KOSAD/KPC are totally separated as two 
different sporting organisations. The interviewees from the KOC believed that, thus, the 
KOSAD and the KPC should be responsible for absorbing people with disabilities. From their 
perspective, as the KOC/KSC has usually been engaged in working in the domain of 
physical activities, it would not be pertinent for it to hire people with disabilities. 
 
The second interpretation is that ‘organisations should demonstrate their integration of 
individual workers with disabilities through their legislation, rules, and finance’ and its 
operationalisation answers the questions: ‘does the NOC provide relevant rules and 
legislation on the disability and disability sport?’ and ‘does the NOC provide a better working 
environment for staff members with disabilities?’ With respect to the second interpretation, it 
is unlikely that the KOC provides the prerequisite legislation, rules and finance. No written 
documents regarding disability have been found and one female officer who has been 
working for the KOC/KSC for more than 20 years confirmed that she was not aware of their 
existence. In terms of the working environment for the disabled, as demonstrated by the 
interviewees above, a physical impairment could be an obstacle preventing disabled people 
from being involved in most activities offered by the KSC/KOC. This implies that the 
organisation does not provide an adequate working environment for people with impairments, 
and the respondents did indeed express negative opinions of the possibilities for people with 
disabilities to become involved in the KOC.  
 
The interviewees from the KOC believed that the KPC (Korean Paralympic Committee) 
should be responsible for providing sport and working activities to people with disabilities as 
a result of the separat organisational structures of the KOC and the KPC. Similarly, since the 
IOC and IPC (International Paralympic Committee) are separated, there may be the 
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assumption that the IOC has deliberately excluded issues relating to disability from its 
recommendations. The phenomenon observed in the KOC can thus be explained on similar 
grounds in the case of the IOC.  
Equity on ethnicity 
The interpretation concerning ethinicity equity is that ‘irrespective of the ethnicity, anyone 
capable should be involved at the working and managerial levels’. Accordingly, the 
operationalisation poses the question: ‘what percentage of people in different ethnic groups 
participates at both managerial and non-managerial levels?. Article 31 of the Statutes of the 
KOC (2009: 10) concerning ‘Disqualification’ states that:  
 
(1) A foreign national and a person who is disqualified by any clause in Article 33 of 
the State Public Officials Act may not become an Officer of the KOC. 
(2) In case an Officer is disqualified according to Clause (1) of this Article, he or she 
shall be removed from the office. 
 
On this evidence, the KOC is seen to make appointments to its managerial-level posts 
conditional on the possession of Korean nationality. In July and August 2009 when the 
interviews were conducted, there were officially no foreign employees working for the KOC. 
The limited access of people from different ethnic groups to the KOC probably results from 
the Korean national context in which the Republic of Korea is seen as consisting of one 
ethnic nation. 
Fair resource allocation 
‘There should be a fair allocation of resources, programs and decision-making in terms of 
gender, disability, the size of organisation, and high or low profile athletes or NFs’: this is the 
interpretation of a fair allocation of resources within a sporting organisation, and its 
operationalisation is ‘how are resources to NFs and athletes distributed?’ According to the 
Report on Business Activities (The KOC, 2009: 9), the criteria on which the funding of the 56 
NFs and 16 Local Branches should be based are provided below: 
 
Table 7-9 Funding criteria for the 56 National Federations  
(unit: million Korean Won) 
Aims  Amounts Criteria 
Improvement of performance 12,046 5-level differences in support  
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Employees’ salaries 4,545 1 Director and 2 employees in each NF 
Administration  1,095 1,400,000 for each NF 
Total 17,686  
Source: The KOC (2009: 9) 
 
In the case of funding for the administrative and for employees’ salaries, all NFs are 
allocated the same undifferentiated amount of funding, as Table 7-4 shows. However, none 
of the reports directly states the criteria which allow NFs to qualify for five different levels of 
funding. Another example concerns the funding of Local Branches. As Table 7-5 illustrates, 
the same amount is allocated to each Branch for administration, while different levels of 
funding are available for training. 
  
Table 7-10 Funding criteria for the 16 Local Branches  
 (unit: million Korean Won) 
Aims Amounts Criteria 
Training 1,728 Different level application 
Administration 64 Same amount application 
total 1,792  
Source: The KOC (2009: 9) 
 
The KOC usually allocates funds to its Local Branches across Korea on the basis of 
performance and participation. As the KOC Business Report (2008: 41) notes, resources are 
allocated “depending on the performance and participation results from the previous year’s 
National Sports Competitions”. Nevertheless, the criteria by which performance and 
participation are judged are not made explicit. This issue will be discussed in association 
with the principle of efficiency.  
7.7 Effectiveness 
The interpretations of effectiveness are discussed in terms of the achievement of 
organisational goals and the formation of a strong organisational culture, as shown in Table 
7-11.  
 
Table 7-11 Definitions/Interpretations and operationalisations of effectiveness 
Definitions/interpretations Operationalisations 
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The achievement of official goals and 
operational goals. 
 
-What are the official goals of the NOC? 
-What are its operational goals?(objectives whose 
attainment is desired) 
-Does the organisation clearly set forth the 
organisation’s goals? 
-To what degree are the official and operational 
goals achieved? 
Organisational Culture: clear homogeneity of organisational values and highly 
transformational leaders are conducive to the formation of a strong, positive organisational culture, 
which is more effective. 
Organisational Values 
Integration: with a strong alignment between 
words and deeds, an organisation-wide 
consensus and consistency between 
organisational values and employee behaviour 
may be achieved. 
Differentiation: when there is a contradiction 
between words and deeds, inconsistencies and 
subcultures may arise due to unbalanced 
power relations  
Fragmentation: if uncertainty and temporality 
exist between words and deeds, ambiguity and 
complexity are the consequences 
 
-Do staff members clearly understand and share 
the organisation’s official and operational goals? 
-Are organisational values shared by all 
members? 
-Is there a sub-culture within the NOC? 
-Are organisational values differentiated along 
these lines: individual roles; age and gender; 
volunteer and professional paid staff?. 
-Is there an activity like an induction, or a social 
engagement to help staff to identify with the 
organisation?   
Leadership 
Transactional leadership: subordinates perform 
within a clearly outlined framework as tasked by 
their leaders in exchange for commensurate 
material or psychological compensation  
Transformational leadership: leaders  
emphasise task-related values and a strong 
commitment to a mission, and inspire their 
subordinates to reach higher levels of 
performance in their commitment and 
contribution  
Leaders should be professional, interactional 
and communicative in their conduct, and/or 
capable of dealing with a contingency 
 
-Does a leader elicit respect from his/her 
subordinates and stimulate their sense of pride? 
-Does a leader carry out effective two-way and 
horizontal communications and interactions with 
his/her subordinates? 
-Does a leader clearly communicate 
organisational values, purpose and mission? 
 
The first interpretation of effectiveness is that it consists in ‘the achievement of the official 
and operational goals’ and thus, it is necessary to identify ‘what the official and operational 
goals of the KOC are’ as an operationalisation. This is closely related with the KOC’s 
performance on the basis of the missions and roles that the KOC has promoted. ‘The 
missions and roles’ embodied in The Statutes of KOC are seen as the KOC’s official goals, 
while ‘the activities’ are considered as operational goals (see also Chapter 4). Article 9 of 
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The Code of Conduct concerning ‘Responsibility’ (2007: 3) declares that: 
   
Employees and Executive Board members should share the founding spirit of the 
KOC and understand its objectives and values in order completely to fulfil their 
responsibilities in accordance with the KOC’s steering rules, particularly with 
diligence and creativity.  
 
In other words, the KOC staff and Executive Board members should be responsible for 
working and cooperating to achieve the objectives of the organisation on the basis of sharing 
the same values. As Article 3 of The Statutes of KOC regarding ‘Mission and Role’ (2009: 1) 
indicates: 
 
(1) The KOC shall promote public health by encouraging school sports and sport-for-all and 
shall contribute to enhancing the national prestige by supporting the sports organizations 
under the KOC membership and encouraging the development of high performance sports. 
(2) The KOC shall have the exclusive authority over all matters pertaining to the 
representation of Korea at the Olympic Games and at the regional, continental or world 
multi-sports competitions patronized by the IOC and contribute to international cooperation 
and world peace by promoting the fundamental principles and values of Olympism through 
the Olympic Movement. 
(3) The KOC shall represent the Republic of Korea in international sports organizations such 
as the IOC, the Association of the National Olympic Committees (the “ANOC”), and the 
Olympic Council of Asia (the “OCA”). 
(4) The KOC shall comply with the civil laws and regulations on an incorporated body in 
accordance with Article 33(7) of the National Sports Promotion Act. 
 
As stipulated in Clause (1), the KOC should be responsible for school sports, sport for all 
and elite sports. Nevertheless, a part of clause (1) and clauses (2) and (3) highlight the 
official reason for the KOC’s existence as the national sporting organisation that represents 
the Republic of Korea through elite sports performance. This may imply that the KOC is 
skewed towards elite sport.  
 
The ‘operational goals’ are indicated in Article 7 of The Statutes of KOC regarding ‘Activities’ 
(2009: 2-3). 
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(1) In order to accomplish its mission and roles as stated in Article 3 of these 
statutes, the KOC shall perform the following activities: 
A. Promoting school sports and sports-for-all; 
B. Organizing, sending, and managing a delegation representing Korea to 
participate in the Olympic Games, Asian Games, regional, continental or world multi-
sports competitions patronized by the IOC, and other international multi-sports 
competitions; 
C. Designating a city which wishes to host a competition described in Clause (1)(B) 
of this Article in Korea and supervising overall management of the competition in the 
event of the candidate city being elected as the host city; 
D. Organizing activities on international sports cooperation, meetings of international 
sports organizations, the Olympic Movement, and educational and cultural programs; 
E. Organizing activities promoting continuous development of sports and the overall 
sports environment; 
F. Supporting KOC member organizations and Local Branches; 
G. Organizing various sports competitions such as a National Sports Festival and a 
National Junior Sports Festival; 
H. Promoting the scientific development of sports; supporting athletes and coaches; 
and encouraging research on sports; 
I. Improving the privileges and well-being of athletes; 
J. Implementing a marketing program to finance various KOC activities; and 
K. Any other activities that may be necessary for the fulfilment of the KOC’s mission. 
 
In the same way as the official goals, the operational goals are also mainly focused on and 
related to elite sport. The phrase ‘organising various national sports competitions’ that is 
indicated in G is a little vague. National sports competitions can be seen as an opportunity 
for promoting sport for all, however, and it also has a relationship with elite sport in the final 
analysis, since the medallists from these national sport competitions are subsequently 
selected and trained as elite athletes. Thus, the majority of operational goals are also likely 
to bear a strong relationship to elite sport, while organisational goals such as enhancing 
standards in school sport and encouraging sport for all receive some coverage. 
Consequently, the operationalisation ‘does the organisation clearly set forth its goals?’ can 
be answered affirmatively inasmuch as the official and operational goals of the KOC are 
clearly noted with more emphasis being placed on elite sport.  
The final measure of effectiveness depends on the answer to the question: ‘in what degree 
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are those official and operational goals achieved?’ Given that the results achieved in major 
international events are highly publicised, the attainments of elite sportspeople are 
conspicuous internationally. In the case of the summer Olympic Games, according to the 
Report on the 28th Athens Olympic Games (The KOC, 2004: 325), the Republic of Korea 
reached 9th place in the medal table by winning a total of 30 medals including nine gold, 
twelve silver and nine bronze medals. The Report on the 29th Beijing Olympic Games (The 
KOC, 2008: 343) lists Korea in 7th place in the overall medal table, having obtained 31 
medals including thirteen gold, ten silver and eight bronze medals. Korea thereby achieved 
the status of second most powerful nation in Asia for sport, following China, whose total of 
gold medals obtained was 51. In the winter Olympic Games, the Republic of Korea was also 
highly ranked in the medal table. The 21st Vancouver Olympic Games saw the Korean team 
recording its highest-ever position in the medal table with six gold, six silver and two bronze 
medals, as stated in the Results from major international games (KOC, n.d.). In terms, 
therefore, of its achievements in elite sport, Korea’s effectiveness can be rated highly. By 
contrast, sport for all and school sport in Korea do not receive comparable attention and their 
participants’ achievements are seldom highlighted.   
 
The analysis of the official and operational goals can be explained in relation to an 
investigation of organisational values, the aim of which is to determine whether KOC staff 
members share similar or different values and beliefs. Indeed, one of the operationalisations 
of organisational values asks ‘whether staff members clearly know and share the 
organisation’s official and operational goals’. In analysing the interviewees’ responses 
regarding the official goals of the KOC it becomes apparent that most interviewees 
concentrated on two themes, namely ‘developing sports in Korea’ and ‘elite sport 
development’. While the theme of ‘elite sport development’ has a bearing solely on elite 
sport, the theme ‘developing sports in Korea’ can also be interpreted as covering the subject 
of sport for all. With respect to the KOC’s official goals as seen from the KOC staff members’ 
perspective, the following group of respondents answered by saying that ‘elite sport 
development’ was the main official goal of the KOC. One interviewee answered directly by 
saying ‘the enhancement of elite sport’ whereas the other three interviewees responded in 
indirect ways by affirming the importance of, e.g. ‘participation in international sports events’.      
 
Enhancing elite sport  
(a junior KOC staff member)  
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The KOC is responsible for organising our teams to attend mega events such as the 
Olympic Games, Asian Games and the Universidad  
(an incumbent KOC Executive Committee member) 
 
As a NOC, we should participate in world sporting events  
(a junior KOC staff member)  
 
We are the NOC which represents the Republic of Korea internationally and 
participates in international sports activities.  
(a junior KSC staff member) 
 
On the other hand, two other interviewees who agreed with these four respondents about 
the importance of elite sport promotion also admitted that the KOC had a significant role to 
play in ‘developing sports in Korea’.  
 
As long as the IOC exists, the KOC exists too. At the same time, the KOC should 
represent and support our national sporting organisations at home. So our official 
aim is to develop sports at the national level.  
(a former senior KSC staff member)  
 
Fundamentally, developing and promoting elite sport but at the same time sport for 
all. 
(a junior KOC staff member) 
 
The two informants below claimed that the KOC should play an important role in ‘developing 
sport for all’ across Korea: 
 
Developing and promoting sports across Korea  
(a former KOC Executive Committee member) 
 
Promoting and developing sports nation-wide… well, the KOC provides the basis or 
foundation for continuing to realise this goal  
(a middle-ranking KOC officer) 
 
The three interviewees’ answers below are not directly related to ‘elite sports development’ 
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but more related to the effects of ‘elite sport development’, which are ‘the unification of the 
Korean people’ and ‘making athlete’s dreams come true’: 
 
We train national team players and their good performance enables the Korean 
people to be one.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
Through elite sport we unify the Korean people  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
I think we should play a role in making athletes’ dreams come true. 
(a former KOC Executive Committee member) 
 
As demonstrated above, the KOC staff members mainly understand the official goals of the 
KOC as being the enhancement of ‘sport for all’ and ‘elite sport’, as indicated in The Statutes 
of KOC. In spite of the mention given to school sport in this official written document, no-one 
raised the issue of school sport except one KSC staff member who claimed that the KOC 
should defend its autonomy as a decision-making sporting organisation within Korea.  
 
At a domestic level, the KOC should make decisions about overall sports policy, for 
example, sport for all, school sport… although our influence is slight.   
(a junior KSC staff member) 
 
The comment of this interviewee is likely to be a reflection of the KOC’s lack of authority as 
an independent organisation in sports policy making within the Korean context. Nevertheless, 
this informant at least considered ‘school sport’ to be worthy of inclusion as a potential 
beneficiary of sports policy for the KOC to take into consideration. The next interviewee also 
supported the junior KSC staff member above. 
 
In any country, there has to be a sporting organisation which synthesises the whole 
area of sport. The government cannot handle it directly so it needs a public 
organisation to deal with the government’s policy on sport  
(a senior KSC staff member)   
 
This interviewee also shared the view that as a public sporting organisation the KOC is 
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directed by the government to deal with sports policy. This implies that the government’s 
strongly elite-sport-centred policy also affects the main direction of KOC policy.  
 
The other element of the KOC’s perceived organisational aims is concerned with its 
operational goals. As before, the interviewees’ main answers may be divided into two 
categories: the promotion of a nation-wide policy of sports development, or sport for all and 
elite sport. Nevertheless, school sports were mentioned by respondents more frequently in 
this case. The first group of responses concerns the promotion of sport for all at the 
domestic level:  
 
Our task is to promote and develop sports domestically.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
A nation-wide policy of sports promotion is the one to aim for. Developing sport 
policy draws Korean people’s interest in sport. Also a good result leads people to 
feel a sense of patriotism and pride  
(a former senior KOC staff member) 
 
Sport for all and school sport should be promoted for a healthy life.  
(a former senior KSC official) 
 
According to the Statutes, we should make a greater effort to promote school sport, 
and sport for all  
(a senior KOC officer) 
 
In connection with the interviewees’ replies above, the following interviewee also suggested 
that an enhanced programme of public relations should be used to raise people’s awareness 
of the KOC. 
 
The KOC’s public relations should be reinforced. We should promote what we do. 
Our image to a lot of people is only as a sporting organisation that exists for the 
Olympic Games.   
(a junior KSC staff member) 
 
From this interviewee’s perspective, nevertheless, with its focus on elite sport and the KOC 
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has definitely played a significant role in representing the Republic of Korea as a NOC and, 
in turn, this role has strengthened the image of the KOC in the context of elite sport. The 
next response can be also seen as advocating the concept of sport for all:  
 
It is important to set up and operate academic and rational programmes which 
Korean people can share.  
(the former KSC & incumbent KOC Executive Committee member) 
 
Although the next two interviewees also admitted that the KOC’s operational goals should be 
orientated more towards school sport and sport for all in order to live up to The Statutes of 
KOC’ official goals, they concluded that the KOC should focus on elite sport rather than sport 
for all or school sport in spite of those pronouncements:  
 
As the Statutes state, we are supposed to focus on school sport and sport for all. 
However, there is the KOCOSA (Korea Council of Sport for All) [for promotion of 
sport for all] and we at the KOC put more emphasis on elite sport and training 
athletes  
(a senior KOC officer) 
 
Our goals are about the promotion of sport for all and national glory, aren’t they? 
Now, Olympism is our preference.  
(a middle-ranking officer) 
 
In association with the elite sport-focused operational goals, two interviewees below also 
mentioned that high performance sports could bring fame and a sense of unity to the people 
of Korea.  
 
Through elite sport a good performance brings Korea fame.  
(a KSC staff member) 
 
The better performance of our national team makes our people feel unified   
(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
 
Apart from the issues raised over discrepancies between official and operational goals, 
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however, when the question ‘which one does the KOC place more emphasis on, elite or 
mass sport?’ was directly given to them, thirteen out of fifteen respondents admitted their 
preference for high performance sports. Only two informants insisted that both elite sport 
and sport for all should be treated as being equally important.   
 
Elite sport and sport for all should both be considered important.  
(a former senior KOC officer)  
 
The KOC focuses on elite sport. However, according to our Statutes, our primary 
goals are developing elite sport, school sport, and sport for all. So, the KOC [should] 
put an emphasis on sport for all.  
(a KOC Executive Committee member)    
 
Accordingly, as the official and operational goals of the KOC cover elite sport, sport for all 
and school sport, the interviewees seem to acknowledge and share the same organisational 
values. Nevertheless, the de facto policy is likely to lean towards elite sport and the KOC 
staff members all share similar perspectives on the KOC’s ongoing policy. There is, however, 
a large difference between the KOC staff members’ perspectives what should constitute the 
organisation’s official and operational goals. The majority of interviewees put an emphasis 
on ‘elite sport’ as the official goal while ‘sport for all’ and ‘school sport’ were seen as being 
relatively minor operational goals. This can be seen as deriving from the fact that the KOC 
represents the Republic of Korea as a NOC internationally and should therefore focus on 
elite sport whereas the KOC is also the headquarters for sports in Korea, working 
domestically for the Korean people.  
 
The next element to be discussed in relation to organisational values is possible existence 
within the KOC of any sub-culture, which is a significant factor in the attempt to understand 
whether organisational values are integrated or differentiated. A sub-culture may be 
discussed in terms of gender, age and position. Regardless of gender, most junior staff 
members admitted that there was a wide gap between the senior and junior staff members. 
The following interviewees listed several elements of difference in terms of the generation 
gap, varieties of educational background, foreign language ability and the length of exposure 
to living in foreign countries:   
 
 
Of course, there is a sub-culture within the KOC. Most seniors were appointed 
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before and just after the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games and there was an interval of 
[about 18 years] till we were employed. There is a generation gap and young staff 
members can also utilise their English skills with the benefit of the experience of 
living abroad.  
(a junior KOC staff member) 
 
There is a big difference. (in what aspects?) most senior and some middle-ranking 
officers were employed pre- and post-Seoul Olympic Games and the number of 
these high- and middle-ranking officers is probably more than or similar to the 
number of junior staff members. The academic background of high-ranking officers 
is mainly related to public administration, which gives rise to a tendency to function 
as public servants, while junior and some middle-ranking staff members have 
experienced more time abroad and hold higher education qualifications. 
(a junior KOC staff member) 
 
The various differences claimed here are likely to result from the different backgrounds of 
senior and junior staff members. The testimony of other junior KSC and KOC staff members 
indicates that the organisation has tended to be quite conservative with a lack of 
opportunities for personal development, an organisational culture with which some junior 
staff members can cope only with difficulty.  
 
To be honest, our organisation is quite conservative and senior officers enjoy 
drinking rather a lot, while junior staff members prefer spending time developing 
themselves. The young staff members are probably more competent. Accordingly 
the culture is quite different between the older and the younger staff.  
(a junior KOC staff member) 
 
There is a difference for sure. The overall organisational culture is quite conservative 
but the young junior staff members are not so conservative. 
(a junior KSC staff member) 
 
The informants’ views above are also supported by the senior and middle-ranking staff 
members below. The younger staff tend to join in sports club activities and, thus, the junior 
and senior groups usually socialise separately. 
Yes, there is a club activity. The junior staff usually get together to enjoy sport club 
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activities.  
(a senior KOC officer) 
 
I have no idea how to express it, but probably yes, the senior and the junior staff 
gather separately.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
The issue of gender is seen as an important element in identifying the organisational culture 
in connection with socialising. Nevertheless, many staff members alluded to the willingness 
of staff to gather without being hindered by concerns of gender. 
 
Gathering has nothing to do with the gender issue. 
(the former KSC & incumbent KOC Board member)  
 
Men and women all get together. In the case of the Department of International 
Affairs, the number of female employees is higher. 
(a junior KOC staff member) 
 
Apart from the official gatherings, we usually get together irrespective of gender.  
 (a junior KOC staff member) 
 
We don’t care about gender. 
(a junior KOC staff member) 
 
The aspect of gender doesn’t affect that. 
(a middle-ranking KOC officer) 
 
It has nothing to do with gender 
(a junior KSC staff member)   
 
I think that young staff members get together without caring about gender. In my 
case, I do meet female staff for work but don’t meet them in person.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
Yes, I do get along with female staff, but I think the female staff’s participation is a bit 
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lower. 
(a middle-ranking KSC officer) 
 
The comments of interviewees quoted above can be explained in association with the issues 
of gender equity discussed earlier. As the junior staff members demonstrated in their 
responses previously, the problem over gender equity has been settled at the non-
managerial level and most junior staff members and some middle-ranking officers share the 
same perspective, namely that harmonious relationships exist between male and female 
staff members. Nevertheless, male and female staff members tend to prefer different types 
of social activity. Male staff members usually join in sports activities more commonly while 
female staff members have organised the Women’s Society. 
 
The Women’s Society is open to female staff members.  
(a junior KOC staff member) 
 
Yes, there is a Women’s Society.  
(a middle-ranking KOC officer) 
 
We have a women’s gathering, which is called the ‘Women’s Society’. This is not 
official but it is still recognised by the KOC.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer)  
 
There is a sports club activity. As I play basketball, most of my fellow members are 
men. 
(a junior KSC staff member) 
 
The operation of a gender-specific Women’s Society is unlikely to be interpreted as being 
symptomatic of gender inequity in the KOC. This activity is more likely to be recognised as 
having the features of a club association, like a sports club.  
 
The KOC interviewees may all, therefore, be said to share the same organisational values, 
which indicates that the official and operational organisational goals are well communicated 
within the organisation. In fact, the KOC actually places more emphasis on elite sport than 
its Statutes would imply and this is also well recognised by the staff members. Sub-cultures 
seem to differentiate senior from junior staff members within the organisation. The divisions 
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among them in this context do not seem to affect their ability to subscribe to the 
organisation’s official and operational goals; rather, they concern the ways in which staff 
members tend to socialise and interact due to the differences in their backgrounds.  
 
Along with the sharing of organisational values, the other element of organisational culture 
that should be evaluated is the leadership. The main focus here is on how the senior and 
junior staff members communicate and perform their tasks, which allows the style of 
leadership to be characterised as tending more towards transformational or transactional 
leadership. Three operationalisations are stated: ‘does a leader elicit respect from his/her 
subordinates and stimulate their sense of pride?’, ‘does a leader carry out effective two-way 
and horizontal communications and interactions with his/her subordinates?’ and ‘does a 
leader clearly communicate organisational values, purpose and mission?’ Six interviewees 
responded by saying that by encouraging their subordinates to contribute to decision-making 
senior staff members increased their feeling of motivation. A stronger sense of motivation 
may result from improved two-way communications and more lively interactions between 
seniors and juniors. 
 
There is a system by which we staff members can suggest our opinions to the 
Secretary General and the President. As a General Director, I also held meetings to 
hear the subordinate staff members’ ideas or opinions.  
(a former senior KOC staff member)  
 
Our internal communication system may affect our working environment. I think it is 
not too bad. I usually speak to my team leader often. Of course, it can be up to the 
team leader in a department and my team leader is willing to listen to us.  
(a junior KOC staff member) 
 
In the case of our department [of International Affairs], no matter what position we 
hold, each staff member should be responsible for each mega event. So because 
everyone cares for one event from the beginning to the end, there is an opportunity 
for me to offer my opinion  
(a junior KOC staff member) 
 
 
These days, our team leaders are quite young and our decision-making is quite 
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open to all staff members, so this leads to the participation of young staff members. 
Also, there is a newly established system by which all staff members can contribute 
their opinions.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer)  
 
There is a system by which staff members can suggest their opinions.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer)  
 
I can handle the task that I’m in charge with. When there is a different opinion, I 
should justify my own view. We are quite free to discuss our different ideas.  
(a senior KSC officer) 
 
As the KSC and the KOC have merged into one sporting organisation under the name of 
KOC, the evaluation of corporate governance of the KOC is analysed with reference to the 
organisation’s current title of ‘KOC’. However, in order to understand the organisational 
culture, the KSC and the KOC diverged from one another in several ways. According to the 
interviewees above, the KOC staff members seemed to enjoy a more flexible environment in 
which they were encouraged to express their opinions, since each KOC staff member was 
expected to deal with each international event individually. By contrast, the KSC staff 
members worked in a more fixed and conservative environment as their tasks were more 
related to administration and finance and were thus more likely to be related to the tasks that 
the KSC shared with the government. 
 
Nevertheless, two interviewees quoted below claimed that it was hard to see that there was 
room in either the KSC or the KOC for effective mutual communications:  
 
We don’t have such a system for sure. For several years the KOC has tried to be 
open and flexible in terms of its decision-making, but recently I haven’t been able to 
see any improvement.  
(a junior KOC staff member)   
 
If we suggest our opinions, the team leaders do not really listen to us. They do not 
actively listen to us.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer)  
In terms of a reward system, three KOC/KSC interviewees testified that such a system of 
 311 
 
incentives did not seem to be an influential element in the KOC’s performance because it did 
not give it any priority.  
 
I would say that our system is quite open to everyone to contribute through the 
reward system  
(a former senior KOC staff member) 
 
Those who have achieved their tasks will be rewarded each year. But it doesn’t 
affect much because it is not a big deal.  
(a former senior KSC official)  
 
 
It seems that the members of KOC staff do not benefit from a reward system. In fact, 
there is no system of rewards at the organisational level, although the government 
operates a reward system as we are a public organisation.  
(a middle-ranking KOC officer)  
 
To judge by these comments, the reward system is not very actively developed, which 
implies that the leadership does not consider a system of financial incentives to be effective. 
One of the principal characteristics of the KOC’s work, before the merger, was that its staff 
were more engaged in organising international events. Consequently, the senior officers 
within the KOC, which was formerly known as the Department of International Affairs, have 
tended to interact with their subordinates more than their counterparts in the KSC used to do. 
Thus, with respect to the style of leadership at the KOC when it was the as Department of 
International Affairs, there was more of a tendency towards transformational leadership than 
was the case with the KSC.  
 
Overall, the effective organisational culture may be defined as one in which there is ‘clear 
homogeneity of organisational values’ and one where ‘highly transformational leaders create 
a make strong positive organisational culture’. This is ‘more effective’ because the staff 
members all share the same values in terms of the official and the operational goals which 
the KOC has to pursue. In these circumstances an integration of organisational values takes 
place. However, the staff members also indicated that sub-cultures existed within the KOC in 
terms of a working differentiation of organisational values. Thus, organisational values within 
the KOC appear to be integrated in some aspects and differentiated in others. With regard to 
leadership, the Department of International Affairs, a title which defined the role of the KOC 
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before the merger, enjoyed better two-way communications among senior and junior staff 
members than those in the KSC and the senior officers encouraged their subordinates to 
contribute their opinions more and influence their decision-making. Thus, the leadership of 
the KOC was more likely to be of a transformational nature while that at the KSC tended 
toward the transactional style.  
7.8 Efficiency 
The definition of efficiency is ‘the amount of resources or funds (the input) to be used to 
improve or produce the desired output’ and the operationalisation is ‘how are the budget 
allocations decided?’  
 
Table 7-12 Definitions/Interpretations and operationalisations of efficiency 
Definitions/interpretations Operationalisations 
The amount of resources or funds (the input) 
to be used to improve or produce the desired 
output. 
Historic budgeting: budgeting on the basis of 
the previous financial year’s allocation 
Zero-based budgeting: no budget lines 
should be carried forward from one period to 
the next 
Priority-based budgeting: budgeting on the 
basis of priorities 
Performance-based budgeting: budgeting on 
the basis of performance 
Fixed budgeting: budgeting on the basis of 
the level of activity and service provision 
-How are the budget allocations decided?  
 
The budget allocation to the NFs is made by carefully considering what a ‘fair allocation of 
resources’ should be in terms of equity and efficiency, as mentioned earlier (see equity in 
Chapter 7). The allocation of resources is more likely to be recognised as having been ‘fair’ if 
the resource distribution is equitable, while an ‘efficient’ allocation may be identified where 
the input of resources is efficiently distributed in relation to the desired output. The KOC is 
responsible for distributing resources to the NFs and the Local Branches. In the Statutes of 
KOC (n.d., 2009: 2) Article 5, which is concerned with ‘Member Organisations and Local 
Branches’, states the following: 
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(1) Sports organisations may become affiliated members of the KOC. The KOC’s 
organisational membership is categorised as Full Member, Associate Member, 
and Recognised Member. 
 
(2) The definition of each organisational member category is as follows: 
 
A. “Full Member” classifies a member organisation which fully complies with the 
rights and obligations of KOC membership and is accepted by a majority vote of 
the General Assembly following an assessment of the Executive Board. 
 
B. “Associate Member” classifies a member organisation which is accepted as a 
KOC member by a majority vote of the Executive Board and has limited rights. 
 
C. “Recognised Member” classifies a member organisation which has no rights and 
obligations as a KOC member, and its affiliation as a sports organisation is 
recognised by the KOC only for a limited time.  
 
As of December, 2012, the National Federations comprise 58 sporting organisations in 
Korea that are affiliated members of the KOC (The KOC, n.d.). There are three types of 
membership: full member, associate member and recognised member. The representatives 
of the NFs constitute the highest decision making group in the KOC, namely the General 
Assembly of Representatives. These member organisations should comply with the Statutes 
of the KOC. According to the Statutes of KOC (n.d., 2009: 2) Article 5, concerning Member 
Organisations and Local Branches: 
 
(1) In order to accomplish its mission, the KOC may have local divisional offices in Seoul, 
metropolitan cities/provinces, and in Special Self-governing Provinces (termed as “Local 
Branches”). (2009: 2) 
 
Local branches are administered from 16 offices nation-wide under the auspices of the KOC and they 
deal with local sporting matters. Local branches should also comply with the Statutes of KOC and its 
detailed requirements and procedures, as stated in the regulations. According to the Report on 
Business Activities (KOC, 2009: 9), the criteria by which funding is provided to the 56 NFs 
and 16 Local Branches are set out below in Tables 7-13 and 7-14: 
 
Table 7-13 Criteria for the supply of funds to the 56 National Federations  
(unit: million Korean Won) 
Aims  Amounts Criteria 
Improvement of performance 12,046 5-level differences in support  
Employees’ salaries 4,545 1 Director and 2 employees at each NF 
Administration  1,095 1,400,000 for each NF 
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Total 17,686  
Source: the KOC (2009: 9) 
 
In the case of funds for the administration and for employees’ salaries, all NFs are allocated 
the same undifferentiated amount of funding, as Table 7-13 shows. However, none of the 
reports directly states what criteria should be applied to distinguish the five level differences 
in terms of funding. Another similar example is seen in the funding for Local Branches. As 
Table 7-14 illustrates, whereas funding for administration is allocated in the same amount for 
each Branch, different levels are applied for training. 
  
Table 7-14 Criteria for the supply of funds to the 16 Local Branches  
 (unit: million Korean Won) 
Aims Amounts Criteria 
Training 1,728 Different level application 
Administration 64 Same amount application 
Total 1,792  
Source: the KOC (2009: 9) 
 
In the case of the Local Branches, the KOC usually allocates funds to them across Korea on 
the basis of performance and participation, i.e. “depending on the performance and 
participation results from the previous year’s National Sports Competitions” (KOC Business 
Report, 2008: 41). A high-ranking KSC staff member explained how the resources are 
allocated in the following response: 
 
In terms of the improvement of performance, the NFs are divided into levels such as 
A, B, C…for example, A means the sports for the Olympic Games, B means the 
sports for the Asian Games… the main priorities should be attached to the sports for 
both the Olympic and Asian Games. It also depends on the number of medals 
obtained in international events, for instance, the Gold, Silver and Bronze medals. 
(a high-ranking KSC officer) 
  
According to this informant and the two Tables 7-13 and 7-14 above, the resources are 
allocated on the basis of the importance of international events and the athletes’ 
performance in previous sports events. This illustrates the KOC’s adherence to a 
performance-based system of budgeting with the aim of improving performance and training. 
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On the other hand, fixed budgeting is applied to the NFs and the Local Branches for the 
purpose of supporting their administration. This can also be seen as an example of historic 
budgeting as the budget is allocated on the basis of the previous year’s allocation. Overall, 
the KOC applied three different budgeting principles to the NFs and the Local Branches, 
namely historic, performance-based and fixed budgeting. It is difficult to evaluate the 
efficiency of output and input in each of the NFs and Local Branches since the document 
does not share the information in detail.  
7.9 Governance practices in a cultural aspect 
As discussed in Chapter Four, this section deals with three important sources of 
organisational culture suggested by Brown (1998), being national culture; the vision and 
leadership; and the nature of business environment. The analysis of the four major events 
that took place in the KOC (see Chapter 6) and the analysis of the corporate governance of 
the KOC (see Chapter 7) enabled the identification of a cultural aspect of South Korea. In 
addition, the typology of organisational culture developed by Harrison (1972) and modified 
by Handy (1978, 1985) is applied to the case of the KOC to picture South Korean distinctive 
cultural aspects. 
7.9.1 The vision and leadership 
Of the three sources, the vision and leadership have been identified in the section of 
effectiveness above. The official and operational goals of the KOC are clearly noted with 
more emphasis being placed on elite sport. In terms of official goals, it becomes apparent 
that the KOC concentrated on two themes, namely ‘developing sports in Korea’ and ‘elite 
sport development’. While the theme of ‘elite sport development’ has a bearing solely on 
elite sport, the theme ‘developing sports in Korea’ can also be interpreted as covering the 
subject of sport for all. School sport was merely mentioned by the KOC interviewees, 
however, it was appeared at the Statutes of the KOC. Thus, the KOC interviewees seem to 
acknowledge and share the same organisational values.  
 
Nevertheless, the de facto policy is likely to lean towards elite sport and the KOC staff 
members all share similar perspectives on the KOC’s ongoing policy. As mentioned earlier, 
the Korean government has placed elite sport as the most important section within the sport 
policy. The KOC also shared the view that as a public sporting organisation the KOC is 
directed by the government to deal with sports policy. This implies that the government’s 
strongly elite-sport-centred policy also affects the main direction of KOC policy. Therefore, 
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the KOC has set forth its goals of national glory by means of obtaining medals in 
international events. This appears to be consistent within the KOC as most interviewees of 
the KOC also agreed with that. 
  
With respect to the type of leadership, a close-aide of the Korean government is usually 
selected as the KOC President and, thus, the KOC President is likely to deliver the policy of 
the government without enough explanations and gathering opinions of the KOC staff 
members. Also, the KOC President becomes a single influential individual, in particular, the 
incumbent President occupies a powerful economic position. Such economic powers, 
Chaebeols, or conglomerates have contributed to the country’s economic development and 
have also been one of the most influential centres of power throughout Korean sporting 
history. The KOC/KSC incumbent President could exert his economic power to push ahead 
and persuade the government and political groups which formerly had a great chance to 
influencing the second KOC/KSC merger that took placed in 2009. 
 
In each department within the KOC, the interviewees agreed that power was highly 
concentrated to a handful of high-ranking officials and it caused more or less transactional 
leadership within the KOC. However, there was more of a tendency towards transformational 
leadership in the Department of International Affairs, of which tasks was highly closed to the 
IOC. Thus, this Department enjoyed better two-way communications among senior and 
junior staff members than those in the other Departments and the senior officers encouraged 
their subordinates to contribute their opinions more to influence decision-making. However, 
overall, transactional leadership was more prevailed throughout the KOC. 
7.9.2 The nature of business environment 
In relation with the vision and leadership of the KOC, the nature of business environment 
has been revealed throughout the analysis. As the KOC is a Korean Governmental umbrella 
body, it is more likely to evolve in a relatively slow-changing environment, which is unlikely to 
be highly competitive, changeable and innovative. The reliance on government funding 
prevented the KOC/KSC from becoming an independent policy-making organisation. The 
government’s influence was exercised more like a direct control, which means that the 
government was deeply involved in the policy making of the KSC/KOC. The organisation’s 
heavy financial dependence on the government resulted in governmental bodies such as the 
KSPO and the MSCT having long enjoyed superior positions to the KOC/KSC in sports 
policy decision-making by virtue of their ability to deliver financial resources to the KOC. 
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Therefore, the KOC-related governmental bodies are the most powerful stakeholders in 
sport policy in Korea. The study clarifies that position of the MCST as the most influential 
and powerful stakeholder. Also, public’s opinions have focused on the national glory by 
means of obtaining medals in international events and this has affected the Korean 
Government’s elite-centred sport policy. Consequently, the public’s opinions are also strongly 
reflected to the policy of the KOC. 
7.9.3 National culture 
The last of the three sources of organisational culture deals with national culture, comprising 
the five elements of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity/femininity, 
individualism/collectivism and long-term/short-term orientation (Confucian dynamism). This 
section employs the Korean governance practices in a cultural aspect in association with 
Hofstede’s (1997) survey data drawn from IBM worldwide.  
Power distance 
This element discusses not only power distance between internal stakeholders within the 
KOC but also that of external stakeholders of the KOC. The study identifies that government 
bodies are the most powerful stakeholders to the KOC. The State President, the MCST, the 
KSPO all take higher power than the KOC in the decision-making over sports policy. The 
NFs are positioned as the lower stakeholders than the KOC President as the KOC President 
is the Chairman of the General Assembly of Representatives and this may limit the extent to 
which the representatives of the NFs may be involved in decision-making. Therefore, power 
distance between major stakeholders of the KOC is in this order: The governmental bodies 
exercise direct power to the KOC while the KOC does the same way to the NFs and this 
shows that power distance between those major stakeholders is quite high. 
 
Within the KOC, the similar set of views on the distribution of de facto power within the 
Executive Committee appears throughout the analysis. Two members who came from the 
governmental body and the KSPO exert power. The Executive Committee provides long-
term strategic guidance for the organisation. As the Government push ahead to develop elite 
sport, the KOC is also following the government’s elite-sport-driven policy. In fact, the 
Statutes of KOC also legally admit that the governmental body is the higher decision-making 
body. The government’s strongly elite-sport-centred policy also affects the main direction of 
KOC policy.  
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The government has deeply involved in the election of the KOC President. The election of 
the KOC President is more likely to be affected by the power of the Korean government. The 
presidential election, has, in fact been conducted as a ‘token’ exercise with the result that an 
aide of the State President is usually selected as the KOC President. Although the KOC 
provides criteria on the electoral system for the KOC Presidency, in the actual election it is 
more likely that the Korean government will be deeply involved and this can be explained as 
a consequence of the system of governance that emerges from the basis of the analysis of 
the election of the KOC president. 
 
Regarding power distance among internal stakeholders, the KOC President or the Secretary 
General holds the ultimate power in decision-making, which implies the existence of a 
centralised decision-making structure. The KOC President holds the power to appoint most 
major high-ranking officers, including the Secretary General and Executive Committee 
members. Also, the President has the power to accept or rejects departmental decision-
making to some extent. If decision-making at the departmental level is only referred to the 
President or the Secretary General for their information, this can be seen as evidence of a 
more decentralised structure. On the other hand, in the case where the President or 
Secretary General is deeply involved in decision-making, this is more likely to come close to 
centralisation. The Department of International Affairs (the former KOC) staff members 
seemed to enjoy a more flexible environment in which they were encouraged to express 
their opinions, since each KOC staff member was expected to deal with each international 
event individually. By contrast, the former KSC staff members worked in a more fixed and 
conservative environment as their tasks were more related to administration and finance and 
were thus more likely to be related to the tasks that the KSC shared with the government. 
The president had the right to make the final decision in any case. 
 
In addition, the process of selecting the Chef de Mission is not monitored and it is only open 
those who attend the presidential breakfast meeting. The decision-making is made by the 
KOC President without any objections from those high-ranking officials who attend the 
meeting. Directors of each department who interviewed all agreed that the meeting was a 
ritual formality for the selection of Chef de Mission and that their involvement in decision-
making was almost none. Everything was done ‘according to the scenario’. The KOC 
President existed as the main actor in decision-making of CDM.  
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Internally, the KOC President is the most powerful stakeholder in decision-making and even 
senior staff members are expected to accept the KOC President’s decisions or opinions. 
Senior or middle-ranking officials in management positions along with expect junior staff 
members or subordinates are more likely to follow without questions. It features hierarchical 
structures which empower the top individual with limited participation for subordinates in 
decision making and, thus, staff members are unlikely to be equal across different power 
levels. Therefore, the high power distance is explicit in a Korean context. 
Uncertainty avoidance 
Uncertainty avoidance is very closely related with power distance. Most senior and junior 
staff members shared the opinion that junior officers usually had to obey their seniors’ 
instruction and orders in a Korean context. This is a big characteristic of high uncertainty 
avoidance that staff follows a strict structure with rules and expertise. As Brown (1998: 47) 
says, “Korean bosses are highly directive and make little attempt to explain their decisions to 
their employees”. This is also related to the leadership aspect within the KOC. The senior 
officials in a management level follow high transactional leadership. Additionally, as a public 
organisation, the KOC follows the government’s sport policy by resisting innovation of its 
own. Accordingly, the KOC shows high uncertainty avoidance. 
Feminism/Masculinity 
As the government has begun to put an emphasis on gender equity following the changes in 
our society that have raised people’s consciousness of the need to improve women’s rights 
around late 1980s. Against this backdrop, it was approximately in the early and/or mid-1990s 
when the tendency regarding recruitment inside the KOC/KSC became more favourable 
toward the employment of women. This is likely to reflect the linked phenomena of a more 
favourable attitude developing in society towards women’s active participation in society and 
of a change in the political conditions that led to the establishment of a governmental body 
for dealing with women’s affairs.  
 
However the study revealed the prevalence of a male-dominated organisational culture in 
the KOC. This has resulted in the phenomenon of a low level of female participation at the 
managerial level. Women in general quit their jobs after marriage in the context of traditional 
Korean accepted social practice and that the approach to gender equity issues at the 
KOC/KSC was unlikely to have become sufficiently mature for women employees to be able 
to continue working after marriage. Such a male-dominated organisational culture justified 
the description of the KOC/KSC as being ‘conservative’. However social practice was 
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involved shows that it is to be a very common aspect of Korean society rather than just 
limited to the KOC.  
 
More female workers are categorised as filling ‘clerical and technical support posts’, which 
conveys a situation of gender inequity with respect to administrative-level employment. Also, 
the salary differences between ‘administrative’ and ‘clerical and technical support’ posts and 
shows that employees in these categories are not treated the same in terms of their salaries. 
Only the staff serving in administrative posts are responsible for carrying out projects within 
the KOC, while the holders of clerical and technical support posts are only responsible for 
fulfilling subsidiary helpers’ roles. In terms of access to the higher position, staff in clerical 
and technical support posts remain at the lowest level. Nevertheless, gender equity is more 
likely to be achieved among the administrative posts at the non-managerial level, since 
female staff are appointed to such positions more frequently and thereby benefit from the 
same treatment and salaries as their male colleagues. Apparently, masculinity has strongly 
appeared in the Korean cultural context. 
Collectivism/individualism 
The organisation has tended to be quite conservative with a lack of opportunities for 
personal development and with a strong tendency of obeisance. This phenomenon brought 
an organisational culture with which some junior staff members have difficulty in coping. The 
divisions among them in this context do not seem to affect their ability to subscribe to the 
organisation’s official and operational goals; rather, they concern the ways in which staff 
members tend to socialise and interact due to the differences in their backgrounds. Most 
junior staff members admitted that there was a wide gap between the senior and junior staff 
members and listed several elements of difference in terms of the generation gap, varieties 
of educational background, foreign language ability and the length of exposure to living in 
foreign countries. Junior staff members are more likely to be exposed to the western 
individualistic culture as they have been educated by strong language-oriented studies, 
which gave more chances to live abroad. Thus, the younger individuals have a tendency of 
not disclosing details of their personal life rather than sharing it with others. 
 
The senior staff admitted that collectivism used to be much stronger. As the conservative 
organisational culture encourages junior staff members to follow the senior officers to move 
together, the senior naturally accepted such an organisational culture. The relationships and 
connections between people had been strongly important and this was extended into their 
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social life. Thus, it emphasised the tight connections between staff members. This leads to 
the existence of a sub-culture within the KOC. The junior and senior groups usually socialise 
separately, the younger staff tend to join in sports club activities. Nevertheless, many staff 
members alluded to the willingness of staff to gather without being hindered by concerns of 
gender. Thus, sub-cultures seem to differentiate senior from junior staff members within the 
organisation. However, collectivism has been still much stronger than individualism within 
the KOC. The conservative environment encouraged the junior officials to make a 
commitment to follow the tradition of the organisation, which collectivism is highly valued. 
Long-term/short-term orientation (Confucian dynamism) 
As identified in the section of collectivism/individualism, the KOC has encouraged new 
comers to adapt of traditions of collectivism with persistence despite their personal 
backgrounds and characteristics. Also, individual status is quite important in their 
relationships as senior staff holds higher status in the relationships with their subordinates 
within the KOC and also in their social life. Such relationships are very important. These are 
major features of long-term orientation and thus, the KOC shows a long termist according to 
its governance practices.   
7.9.4 Typology of organisational culture 
Overall, the KOC’s power and organisational structure is more likely to be close to power 
culture in terms of typologies of organisational cultures: power, task, role and person culture 
(see Figure 4-2). The characteristics of power culture are to “have a single source of power 
from which rays of influence spread throughout the organisation…thus, to be pictured as a 
web” (Brown: 1998: 66). Within the KOC, it is obvious that the sole power is located with the 
KOC President and/or the Secretary General, as the KOC President and/or the Secretary 
General is placed at the final stage of decision making. The selection of Chef de Mission is a 
good example of power culture within the KOC. Although those high-ranking officers are able 
to attend the meeting of selection of CDM, their opinions are not reflected to the final 
decision. Rather, they are expected to agree with the decision of the KOC President without 
questions.  
 
The next groups of power are the Executive Committee and a handful of high-ranking 
officers (directors) in the managerial level in each department. Under the power of the 
President, the Executive Committee also holds strong power in overall decision making. 
Under the system that the KOC President can nominate the members of the Executive 
Committee, the KOC President holds stronger power than the Executive Committee. 
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Nevertheless, some individuals who belong to the Korean government in the Executive 
Committee are likely to hold similar power to the KOC President. In fact, power in practice is 
exerted by a limited member of individuals. However, in general, the KOC President holds 
higher status than the members in the Executive Committee. 
  
The directors have the largest power in decision making in working-level position within each 
department. Nevertheless, they are obliged to inform the KOC President of their decisions 
and thus, the final decision-making is done by the President by accepting or rejecting 
departmental decision-making. Although the final decision-maker in the organisation is the 
KOC President, in some cases, the Secretary General also plays a role in deciding overall 
policy.  
 
The power culture is also appeared at the national level since the power concentration 
prevailed through the national governance practice in the Korean context. The Korean 
government is the top power including the relevant governmental bodies. As the State 
President has the sole power in decision making in sport policy, the KOC should follow what 
the Korean government requests and orders. Especially, the MCST and the KSPO are both 
powerful governmental bodies, influencing the KOC due to its receipt of governmental funds. 
Furthermore, the KOC has more powerful status as a headquarters of the sport in Korea 
than the National Federations which all belong to the KOC. Given that the President of the 
KOC is the Chairman of the General Assembly of Representatives which is the highest level 
decision-making body in the KOC, he has been able to exercise his decision-making 
authority over the representatives of each National Federation. 
 
Therefore, at both the KOC and national levels, power concentration is apparent and this 
implies the existence of a centralised decision-making structure. Thus, this structure can be 
seen as the power culture and illustrated as a web-type of power distribution. 
7.10 Conclusion  
The aim of this section was to examine the ways in which the key principles of corporate 
governance in the Olympic Movement, which were constructed in a western context, are 
applied at the KOC and to identify the similarities and differences in the ways in which they 
are interpreted in the Korean context. Some principles are interpreted as similar as their 
notions of the IOC’s without fulfilling their practices in reality, for instance, accountability, 
responsibility, transparency and democracy, while some principles are well-established in the 
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concepts and well-interpreted in the practices as the IOC’s recommendations indicate, for 
example, effectiveness and efficiency. However, effectiveness and efficiency are more likely 
to the evaluating system rather than if the KOC is ethically right.  
 
The auditing system, which is accountability, is not well-practiced within the KOC and a 
limited number of stakeholder hold power in terms of balancing power, which does not follow 
responsibility. The process of Chef de Mission is not transparent as it is only open to those 
who attend the presidential breakfast meeting. In fact, the Chef de Mission is selected by the 
KOC President and the election of the KOC President is more likely to be affected by the 
invisible power of the Korean government, which show that the KOC is against the notion of 
democracy in its practices. The KOC acknowledges well that a clear homogeneity of 
organisational values and highly transformational leaders can produce positive 
organisational culture, which is effective. The practice shows a homogeneity of 
organisational values with a sub-culture though and gradually towards transformational 
leadership. The resource allocation is on the basis of a performance-based and fixed system 
of budgeting. The notions of gender and disability equity are not clearly demonstrated by the 
IOC and are not clearly practiced in the Korean context either. However, IOC has focused on 
rather equality and the KOC has tried to meet up the expectations of the IOC by means of 
living up to higher percentage of female involvement. 
 
Although the KOC appears to try to live up to the IOC’s recommendations, it is located in 
different political, economic, social and historical contexts which gives rise to a peculiarly 
Korean way of interpreting and applying the principles of corporate governance. As the KOC 
is the government-umbrella organisation with appropriated funding, the Korean government 
is the most influential stakeholder in decision-making. Nevertheless, The KOC’s power 
structure and organisational culture is likely to be concentrated to the KOC President within 
the organisation. In general, power centralisation is apparent throughout the Korean cultural 
context. Thus, the corporate governance practices of the KOC are also largely affected by 
the power centralisation within the Korean society.  
 
With respect to national culture, the KOC features hierarchical structure which empowers the 
top individual and provides limited participation to subordinates in decision making and, thus, 
staff members are unlikely to be equally empowered across different levels. A high power 
distance is explicit in Korean context. Most senior and junior staff members shared the 
opinion that junior officers usually had to obey what their seniors’ instruction and orders in a 
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Korean context. This shows high uncertainty avoidance. As the conservative organisational 
culture led that junior staff members are encouraged to follow the senior officers to move 
together, the junior naturally accepted such an organisational culture. The conservative 
environment makes the junior officials to make a commitment to follow the tradition of the 
organisation, in which collectivism is highly valued. The KOC has encouraged new comers 
to adapt of traditions of collectivism with persistence despite their personal backgrounds and 
characteristics. Also, individual status is quite important in their relationships as senior staff 
holds higher status in the relationships with their subordinates within the KOC and also in 
their social life. Such relationships are very important. These are major features of long-term 
orientation. In addition, the study reveals the prevalence of a male-dominated organisational 
culture in the KOC. This has resulted in the phenomenon of a low level of female 
participation at the managerial level. More female workers are categorised as filling ‘clerical 
and technical support posts’, which conveys a situation of gender inequity with respect to 
administrative-level employment. Apparently, masculinity has strongly appeared in the 
Korean cultural context. 
 
Interestingly, the KOC manifests similar interpretations of the key principles to those of the 
IOC without putting them into practice in the interests of good governance to the same 
extent. In such circumstances, nevertheless, where the KOC is making an effort to align its 
practices with the IOC’s recommendations as much as possible, the indication is that the 
KOC is on course to accomplish the IOC’s governance practices.   
 
 
 325 
 
8 Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This study mainly deals with the key ethical principles of corporate governance, which have 
been developed in the business and the sport sectors and in the Olympic Movement in a 
western framework, and discusses the ways in which they have been adapted and 
interpreted in the non-western cultural context of the Korean NOC. It, therefore, seeks to 
address the following questions and objectives: 
 
 What characterises good/corporate governance in the literature and how have the 
principles of good governance been adapted to the specialist sporting context?  
 What principles of good governance (if any) are advocated by the IOC in relation to 
the governance of Olympic organisations? And how are these interpreted by the IOC 
body?  
 How is the KOC governed? Does it reflect/respect principles of good/corporate 
governance in general, and specifically those aspects recommended by the IOC? 
And how are these interpreted in the KOC context?  
 To what extent are practices of good/corporate governance developed in a western 
context applicable in a non-western context? 
8.2 Key principles in business and sports sectors and the Olympic Movement 
Following Chapter 2, which deals with the key ethical principles in the business sector where 
those principles originated and Chapter 4, which focuses on their application in the Olympic 
Movement, certain principles have been seen to emerge pre-eminently. Four ethical 
principles, namely accountability, responsibility, transparency and democracy, are the 
subjects of most discussion in the literature pertaining to corporate governance in both 
business and sports sectors. On the other hand, equity, effectiveness and efficiency figure 
less prominently than those four principles. Nevertheless, Chapter 3 which focuses on 
corporate governance in the sports sector shows that relevant journal articles devote much 
attention to equity and effectiveness. In specific, equity covers mainly a gender issue and a 
small number of articles deal with equity in relation to ethnicity (race) and disability. 
Effectiveness in sports organisations is found by means of identifying its leadership and/or 
organisational culture. Those articles found in Chapter 3 tend just to touch upon the 
principles of accountability, responsibility and financial dependence. 
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Conceptualisation in a Western frame of reference 
The three sections of literature review cover corporate/good governance in the business and 
sport sectors and in the Olympic Movement. The Cadbury Report (1992), which is the first 
report on corporate governance is the main source in the business sector. All the articles 
regarding corporate governance in the sport sector have been authored in western countries 
and operationalisations are developed based on the documents on corporate governance in 
the Olympic Movement. This demonstrates, therefore, that the notions of corporate 
governance are conceptualised in a western framework. It is important to identify the ways in 
which NOCs in non-western contexts interpret and practise ethical principles that are 
constructed in a western-context. The following analysis shows how governance practices 
have been interpreted in one particular national and culture context: that of the Republic of 
Korea.  
 
Features of key principles in the Olympic Movement 
The documents from the IOC highlight accountability, responsibility, transparency and 
democracy as being the most important ethical principles to be considered in sporting 
organisations affiliated to the Olympic Movement. Whereas equity and/or equality and 
effectiveness have been studied in depth in the literature in relation to sporting organisations, 
the IOC’s recommendations make only limited reference to them and pay still less attention 
to efficiency. However, several articles in the Copenhagen Congress Contributions give 
relatively more attention to the issues of equity, effectiveness and efficiency that have had 
such a low profile in the Olympic Movement. Furthermore, the Copenhagen Congress 
Contributions also give consideration to the specificity of the cultural and historical aspects of 
each NOC. It argues that the IOC should understand and admit that each nation in which a 
sporting organisation is situated has its own historical, political, economic and cultural 
background, and the relations between a sporting organisation and its government should 
thus be considered in a different way depending on the relevant national context.  
 
The importance of viewing NOCs from this perspective is especially evident when the 
governance practices of NOCs in non-western contexts are being examined as those 
governance practices can be interpreted differently in different political, cultural, social, and 
economic contexts. As discussed earlier, while the underlying concepts of corporate 
governance have been developed in a western context, individual NOCs’ different 
understandings of the fundamental ethical principles should be considered to some extent. 
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The concept of ‘autonomy’ in the Olympic Movement 
Since the term ‘autonomy’ has often been used in IOC documents, Chapter 4 discusses the 
principles that can be related to making or achieving ‘autonomy’. The Olympic Movement in 
Society (2009: 12) states that “a definition of autonomy of sport reflecting the principles of 
respect, responsibility and reliability should be adopted by all within the Olympic Movement”. 
The NOCs should guard their autonomy by observing clearly delineated rights and duties in 
compliance with the IOC’s recommendations. Their autonomy should be respected by their 
governments within the framework of a positive relationship. NOCs should comply with the 
rules and regulations of the Olympic Movement in order to establish their autonomy, therein, 
acknowledging the Movement’s autonomy.  
 
The interpretation of ‘autonomy’ given in The Olympic Movement in Society (2009: 12) is 
also relevant to the issue of democracy, as it emphasises the autonomy of sporting 
organisations in relation to any intergovernmental organisations and governments. It also 
states that “equality and fairness” are essential to the autonomy of the Olympic Movement. 
In addition, although NOCs should cooperate with their governments and/or governmental 
bodies, they should take a firm stance in that partnership, while the government should 
respect the autonomy of sport. This can be directly related to the call for democracy on the 
part of the NOC which ‘should be maintaining checks and balances by means of elections of 
high officials’. The clause of the Olympic Charter (2010: 62) stating that “the NOCs must 
preserve their autonomy” can be interpreted as a summons to NOCs to safeguard their 
independence and resist all external pressures by instituting their own independent decision-
making procedures. Thus, if the principles of good governance are not respected, then 
autonomy may be under threat. Summoning an organisation to exercise its autonomy does 
not necessarily imply the introduction of democratic, transparent, accountable etc. ways of 
working, so autonomy does not automatically lead to good governance, but governance 
failures might lead bodies such as national governments to reduce or threaten the autonomy 
of sporting bodies. 
8.3 Autonomy in association with institutional isomorphism 
In order to study autonomy, which was briefly mentioned in Chapter 4, in greater depth, this 
section examines the recognition given to the concept of autonomy in sport by (1) sports 
organisations and (2) public authorities. It also refers to a series of case studies concerning 
sports organisations’ autonomy. In the case of the IOC, “under Rule 25 of the charter of 1949, 
being ‘independent and autonomous’ became a requirement for recognition of the NOCs” 
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(Chappelet, 2010: 11). Since 1949 when the term ‘autonomy’ with regard to the NOCs was 
first used in the Olympic Movement, NOCs have been encouraged to safeguard their 
complete independence and autonomy from political, religious or commercial influences. The 
IOC also recognised the International Federations’ (IFs’) autonomy from it in Rule 26 of the 
2007 charter, but “the IOC exercises greater scrutiny over the autonomy of the NOCs than 
over that of the IFs” (Chappelet, 2010: 14). In terms of public authorities’ recognition of the 
autonomy of their national sports bodies, European intergovernmental organisations began 
referring to it in the late 1980s, notably the Council of Europe’s Committee for the 
Development of Sport (CDDS), 1992; the European Commission’s Report on Sport, 1999; 
the Nice Declaration of the European Commission, 2000; the European Commission’s White 
Paper on Sport, 2007; and the European Parliament White Paper, 2008 (Chappelet, 2010: 
16-7).  
 
With respect to a series of examples concerning sports organisations’ autonomy, several 
cases are introduced in which governmental interference has occurred in national sports 
organisations and (inter)governmental interference has affected the operations of 
international sports organisations. As a result of government interference in elections to their 
respective NOCs or NFs, or with the composition of the list of candidates, “the IOC 
suspended Iraq’s NOC in 2008 and Panama’s in 2007, and refused to recognise the election 
of new leaders of the Albanian NOC in 2009… and the IOC threatened to suspend the 
Kuwait’s NOC in August 2009” (Chappelet, 2010: 21). Other cases have occurred with 
relation to FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association), i.e., the suspension of 
the national football federations of Albania and Madagascar, the threat to suspend the 
Spanish federation in 2008 and the brief suspension of Greece’s football federation in 2006 
(Chappelet, 2010: 21). 
 
Several instances of intergovernmental interference in international sports organisations 
have been highlighted. “The United Nations resolutions on apartheid (the last of them in 
1985) caused international sports organisations gradually to suspend their relations with 
South Africa (until 1992) and Rhodesia (until 1980)” (Chappelet, 2010: 22). When a trade 
embargo was imposed on Yugoslavia by the UN in 1992, the Barcelona Olympics hosted by 
Spain in 1992 also applied this embargo but athletes from the former Yugoslavia were 
allowed to participate as “independent athletes” (Chappelet, 2010: 22).             
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In relation to the autonomy of sports organisations, the concept of institutional isomorphism 
is likely to be highly relevant (see Chapter 3 & 4). Augestad, Bergsgard and Hansen (2006: 
296) explain that “theorists of the neo-institutional school concentrate on how and to what 
degree organisations adapt to both formal and informal expectations in the institutional 
environment.” The question at issue is “the extent to which an organisation should be able to 
adapt to the institutional environment”. Isomorphism is defined as the process by which 
organisations base their legitimacy on the norms and values of the environment to which 
they are exposed. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) and Leiter (2005) refer to this as “institutional 
isomorphism”, and Leiter (2005) states, in particular, that it is a characteristic of non-profit 
organisations.  
 
Three types of isomorphism are proposed. Coercive isomorphism implies that ‘those who 
are the key suppliers of financial resources force organisations to adapt to their structures 
and regulations in the area’. In this study, the key suppliers comprise a broader range of 
entities than those which act simply as sources of finance. Secondly, according to mimetic 
isomorphism, ‘organisations tend to imitate other organisations which appear to have been 
the most successful and/or legitimate when confronting various changes and uncertainties. 
Lastly, based on the increasing professionalisation of management, normative isomorphism 
suggests that ‘a member of an organisation is likely to recruit people with the same 
understanding of how an organisation ought to be managed, or professionally trained 
managers, and/or to obtain expert advice.’ This study poses the question as to whether or 
not there is any evidence of the presence of isomorphism within sporting organisations.   
 
In compliance with its summons to the NOCs to protect their autonomy, the IOC has also 
allowed them to generate their own funds so as to be better able to safeguard their full 
independence against possible pressures from the government. In 1989 the provision (“bye-
law”) concerning Rule 24 recommended that NOCs should “raise funds to enable them to 
maintain their full independence, in particular from the government of their country or from 
any other organisation that controls sport in the country” (cited in Chappelet, 2010: 12). This 
was revised in the 2010 Charter as a Bye-law to Rules 28 and 29, 3.4 so as to state that “it is 
recommended that NOCs seek sources of financing in a manner compatible with the 
fundamental principles of Olympism” (2010: 67). In this way, the NOCs may avoid the 
adverse consequences of coercive isomorphism. Since the KOC has had to rely heavily on 
financial resources provided by the Korean government, the government has been able to 
interfere to a great extent in most aspects of sports policy. This is in spite of that fact that the 
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KOC is recognised as the headquarters of sport in Korea and can, therefore, fairly claim its 
entitlement to be independent in its decision making. The interviewees from the KOC have 
indeed borne witness to the KOC’s inability to be truly autonomous due to its financial 
dependency on the government. Thus, the government’s power to regulate the 
organisation’s financial resources has been an effective means for it to manipulate the 
KOC/KSC in ways that are favourable to its own ends. Accordingly, since the KOC/KSC 
lacks any real financial independence, the respondents assert that it is not able to defend its 
autonomy in decision-making. 
 
In terms of organisational similarity, mimetic isomorphism indicates that ‘organisations tend 
to imitate the organisations which have seemed to be the most successful and/or legitimate 
when they are faced with various factors of changes and uncertainties’. Following the 
examples set by the more advanced NOCs, decision makers should take contingent factors, 
such as policies and programs that already exist nationally and internationally, into account 
in accordance with Institutional isomorphism. According to the Report on a sporting 
organisation’s structure modification released by the KOC in 2007, the KOC conducted 
research on advanced sporting organisations in other countries in 2003, for which the 
chosen models were provided by New Zealand, Australia, Japan, Hong Kong, Italy, France, 
Germany and Switzerland. Apart from Japan, the NOCs in these countries are combined 
with their respective Sport Councils, for example, the German and French Olympic 
Committees. As discussed in relation to the KOC/KSC merger, the staff members from both 
the KSC and the KOC believed that merging the two organisations would improve efficiency. 
According to the senior KOC officer quoted below, another international mimetic 
isomorphism concerns the number of Executive Committee members and the number of 
Commissions:  
 
In the case of the US, there were the US Olympic Committee and the US Sports 
Council separately until 1978 when the USOC became the leading sporting 
organisation in combination with the US Sports Council. In 2006, the number of 
Executive Committee members was reduced from approximately 125 to 11 in total. 
Those eleven members all have decision-making powers. The number of 
Commissions was also reduced from 24 to 4. It was a very dramatic reform and we 
also went through the same process.  
(a senior KOC officer) 
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In conformity with international trends, the KOC and the KSC believe that such reductions 
improve the efficiency of the organisation. The newly-merged KOC achieved the aim of 
reducing the number of Executive Committee members from 125 members in both 
organisations to “fifteen or more but twenty or less for the number of Executive Committee 
members with no more than five Vice-Presidents included” (the Statutes of KOC, 2009: 7) 
Also, the number of Commissions was reduced from 23 to 11 (the Statutes of KOC, 2009: 
10-1). With respect to the issue of how the Chef de Mission should be selected, a former 
senior KOC officer conveyed his view that the KOC should adopt the advanced system used 
in France, expressing the view that this could improve the national team’s performance: 
 
The best model is France. The Chef de Mission for the coming Olympic Games is 
usually appointed when the President is elected. He or she can train and organise 
the national team till the Olympic Games. This can help to improve the national 
team’s performance.  
(a former senior KOC staff member)  
 
Three examples of mimetic isomorphism may thus be adduced in connection with the KOC’s 
efforts to improve its autonomy: the merger of the Sports Council and the NOC; the 
reduction in the number of Executive Committee members; and a reduced number of 
Commissions.   
 
The last isomorphism, normative isomorphism, suggests that ‘a member of an organisation 
is likely to recruit people with the same understanding of how an organisation ought to be 
managed and/or professionally trained managers and/or to obtain expert advice’. An 
interviewee from the KOC explains that most new staff members who were employed 5 or 6 
years ago could not continue their work and even decided to quit the KOC as they had not 
come from a sporting background. On account of that experience, the KOC established a 
policy that only those who were from a sports background should be employed because they 
were more likely to share the same understanding of the KOC’s values and goals and could 
therefore be assimilated into the organisation: 
 
There were many cases of newly appointed employees quitting after three to six 
months. This made us rethink the criteria for recruitment and, thus, we tried to find 
people who could be assimilated into our organisation, which resulted in a tendency 
to recruit new employees who had received a degree in sports. Before the 2000s 
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most employees were selected in terms of their language skills but recently in most 
cases it has depended both on the degree and the language skills. We believe that 
there is a duty to give a higher allocation of posts to those who received a degree in 
sports.  
(a KSC staff member) 
 
In keeping with the interpretation/definition given earlier of institutional isomorphism as “how 
and to what degree organisations adapt to both formal and informal expectations in the 
institutional environment”, the application of the concept of isomorphism to sporting 
organisations world-wide is appropriate because it pertains to a common characteristic. The 
analysis of three cases of isomorphism concludes that the KOC as a NOC has obviously 
adapted its institutional environment to the Korean context. In summary, thus, isomorphism 
may be said to characterise the relationship between universalism of the IOC and the 
government and the particularism of the NOC.  
8.4 Methodological reflections 
This study adopted critical realist assumptions, following a retroductive strategy that 
hypotheses the regularities of the Korean society and its unobservable social structures, 
which impact the corporate governance of the KOC. As critical realism accepts an 
interpretivist epistemological assumption, it also used critical discourse analysis following an 
abductive strategy to understand how knowledge is socially structured through the members 
of the KOC staff’s language. In order to identify the power relations among the KOC’s 
stakeholders and to find similarities or differences between the IOC in its western context 
and the KOC in the Korean context in the ways in which they conceive of, and put into 
practice the principles of corporate governance, the review of discursive events includes 
interviews and documentary analysis with the purpose of identifying ‘regularities’ which 
represent social practices. The analysis, which mainly discusses social practices in relation 
to four events or processes in order to discover patterns of explanation or description, 
permitted ‘hypothesise’ on the real structures and mechanisms underlying or embedded in 
organisations. This entails the need to consider the (organisational) cultural elements of 
structures and the power structures bound up in the organisational structures ‘per se’ and 
thereby to identify the ways in which corporate governance is undertaken differently (or 
similarly) in Korea.  
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On the basis of the literature review covering corporate governance in the business and 
sport sectors and in the Olympic Movement, this study identifies the 
definitions/interpretations and operationalisations of the key principles, following a top-down 
approach. A bottom-up approach was also adopted, whereby an interviewee-led discussion 
enabled the question to be raised as to how certain policy actions came about. Thus, not 
only did this twofold approach allow aspects of the interviewees’ understanding of corporate 
governance to be identified but it also clarified the situation regarding the interviewees’ 
perspectives on western norms including the IOC’s norms as recommendations for 
governance, and whether their views were similar or different. 
 
Validity and Reliability 
Establishing the internal validity and demonstrating the credibility of the findings obtained by 
discourse analysis is regarded largely as a matter of coherence, or ‘warrantability’, in terms 
of which “an analysis is warrantable to the extent that it is both trustworthy and sound” 
(Wood & Kroger, 2000: 167). This study identifies certain discourses on behaviours of 
governance practices and formal/informal practices related to governance, which reveals the 
nature of social practices involving social structure and power relations. In terms of the 
external validity, the case study approach adopted is one which is driven by the theoretical 
generalisation which was being tested, namely the claim that although (a) governance 
principles are generally derived from a western perspective, (b) those principles are 
culturally relative. In effect, the case study of the KOC/KSC is one of ‘pattern matching’. In 
other words the research question relates to whether or not the governance principles 
advocated in the discourse of the KOC/KSC match the pattern of governance principles 
prescribed in western accounts, constituted by the universal principles of governance for 
international sporting bodies prescribed by the IOC. The CDA enables identification of 
different perspectives in governance practices and the example cited above of the ‘discourse 
of ignorance’ allows drawing up of warrantable conclusions about a principle of governance. 
Thus, there is interest in both the interviewees’ perspectives and in the real structures or 
processes. 
 
The KOC/KSC was chosen as a single case as this sporting organisation fully meets the 
conditions for “the critical test” of “a well-formulated theory”, which is that governance 
practices are western-constructed and culturally relative (Yin, 1994: 38). The KOC/KSC 
represents a sporting organisation that functions in a non-western context where the cultural 
background is expected to differ from that of sporting organisations in the west, which thus 
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allows us to make generalisations about ways in which governance practices are exercised. 
Concerning reliability in discourse analysis, the concepts or meanings of key principles of 
governance developed and used by the IOC, which have been constructed in a western 
society, may be interpreted differently in a particular social context, for example, the non-
western social milieu of the KOC. Therefore, the meaning given to the principles of 
governance in the context of the KOC is always likely to be in some respects similar to that 
of the IOC (it is part of the wider milieu of sport) and in some respects different, i.e. in ways 
specific to the Korean context. In addition, the concepts of governance can be newly 
interpreted over time, as the Korean context is always changing. 
8.5 Research study contribution 
This section reviews the contribution to knowledge made by this thesis and macro- and 
meso-level theoretical insights developed here in the light of its analysis of the KOC’s 
governance practices as illustrations of the Korean historical, political, economic and social 
contexts. In Chapter 6, four major events that took place in the KOC were discussed, 
including the merger of the KOC/KSC, its budget planning, the recruitment of new staff and 
the processes by which the KOC President and Chef de Mission were selected. Against this 
background and taking into consideration the Korean context, the governance practices 
employed by the KOC can be evaluated.    
8.5.1 Macro-level theoretical insight 
The KOC case study identified the decision-making processes that reflected the power 
relations between the major stakeholders. From the theories of state perspective, Marxism, 
elitism and neo-corporatism are all accommodated. The first KOC/KSC merger was 
accomplished on the orders of the State President, Park Jung Hee, who was one of the most 
powerful presidents in Korean political history. This shows that Korean society used to have 
a Marxist tendency because, without any protest from the masses, the ruling class alone, 
here the government, was involved in decision-making and the majority of people, in 
particular, those who were engaged in the sporting field, accepted the state President’s 
decision-making without question. This relationship between the state and the people in the 
sporting field reflects in influence of Marxism.  
.  
The second KOC/KSC merger that took place in June, 2009 shows the aspect of elitism in 
Korean society. The KOC President Park Yong Sung, who is at the pinnacle of the business 
elite in the Korean context, has contributed to the KOC/KSC merger. He also possesses 
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considerable social status in sport as a former IOC member. When Park Yong Sung was 
designated as the KOC/KSC President, he secured his stance in the process of decision-
making over the KOC/KSC merger and the government also accepted it despite its history of 
opposition to that development. His influence reflects the power of the elite in Korean society. 
He uses his economic, social and political resources to overcome government resistance, in 
particular, in the sporting field. Such an elite-driven practice may be seen to represent a 
significant difference from a western conceptualisation relating to good governance practice, 
since Park’s political position (reflected in government support) and his economic and social 
position appear to have been conclusive in allowing him to achieve his ends. 
 
In connection with the budgetary process, this may be viewed as evidence of the existence 
of a neo-corporatist structure in which the state plays a central role and acts in a unitary way 
with the involvement of a limited number of actors in order to integrate liberal parliamentary 
democracy, the market economy and a number of organised groups. The decision-making 
about the allocation of a budget to the KOC/KSC is mainly dependent on the MCST and not 
the National Assembly. Nevertheless, the National Assembly still plays a minor ‘rubber 
stamping’ role in inspecting the government bodies. The KSPO is also involved in the 
decision-making of the KOC/KSC as a supplier of funds but the organisation itself is also 
supervised by the MCST as one of the governmental sporting organisations that falls 
beneath its umbrella. The Korean government, thus, plays a central role through the 
involvement of the National Assembly and the KSPO. Accordingly, the KOC has a low 
degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the State government. 
8.5.2 Meso-level theoretical insight 
In connection with the theories of states discussed in macro-level theoretical analysis, the 
aspect of clientelism is exhibited in the context of the KOC since the government habitually 
appoints its political aides to be the heads of various sporting organisations such as the 
KOC/KSC and the KSPO. In the case of the KSPO, it is observable that the chairman of the 
KSPO is directly appointed by the State President. However, the KOC/KSC holds a meeting 
of the General Assembly of Representatives to elect a president and, thus, it seems that the 
government’s power does not affect the presidential election. Nevertheless, according to the 
staff members of the KOC/KSC interviewed, the government does in fact impact on the 
decision-making of the Representatives of NFs and, as a result, the candidate who has been 
patronised by the government has regularly been elected president. This shows that the 
government’s manipulation of the KOC/KSC election is conducted behind the scenes, in an 
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indirect and largely ‘unobservable’ way. 
 
Concerning political governance, from the discussion of the KOC/KSC budgetary planning it 
becomes obvious that the government has direct control over KOC/KSC policy. This ‘direct 
control’ contrasts markedly with political governance in the ‘western’ sense, as rehearsed by 
Henry and Lee (2004), by which governments seek to ‘steer’ policy. The government seeks 
to exercise its direct control by supplying major resources and, in turn, it has become a main 
stakeholder in sports policy making. In connection with the KOC/KSC merger, for example, 
while the KSC and the KOC were pursuing their merger unsuccessfully for a decade, the 
government acted as the main obstacle in the process.  
 
As a major financial supplier, the government has exerted its power over discourse, with the 
result that the KOC/KSC is almost excluded from the decision-making about the size of the 
budget. Governmental bodies such as the MCST and sporting organisations under the 
control of governmental bodies like the KSPO have long enjoyed superior positions to the 
KOC/KSC in sports policy decision-making by virtue of their ability to deliver financial 
resources to the KOC. The result for the organisation has been its huge financial 
dependence on the government and, in turn, the KOC’s lack of power. Accordingly, since the 
KOC/KSC lacks any financial independence, the interviewees assert that it is not able to 
defend its autonomy in decision-making. In addition, the government has exercised its power 
over sporting organisations by placing a close aide of the State President in the 
organisations’ presidency.  
 
Budgetary planning is also influenced by the internal power relations that existed between 
the KSC and the KOC before their integration. Before their merger, an examination of the 
internal power relations between the KSC and the KOC shows that the KSC used to 
exercise wider powers than the KOC in that the budgetary planning was solely managed by 
the budget team which belonged to the KSC. This resulted from the fact that the KSC rather 
than the KOC had pre-eminent power and more privileged access to decision-making over 
sports policy. The KSC was established during the Japanese occupation under “the spiritual 
power of the entire nation” (KOC in Fifty Years, 1997: 32) and people regarded the KSC as 
the real centre of all sports organisations in Korea which, in turn, established the legitimacy 
of the KSC’s dominance at home. 
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Another external power relation appears between the KOC/KSC and the NFs. Given that the 
President of the KOC/KSC is the Chairman of the General Assembly of Representatives, he 
has been able to exercise his decision-making authority over the representatives of each 
National Federation, although the General Assembly of Representatives which was the 
highest-level decision-making body in the KSC, is the body which approves the final report 
and settlement. This is also a good illustration of the opportunities afforded by the 
possession of power over discourse in that the KOC/KSC President has more chance to 
influence decision-making than the Representatives of the NFs because he can exclude 
their preferred items from the agenda. Likewise, the process of selection of the Chef de 
Mission is a good illustration of power over discourse in that the KOC President has been 
the main actor in the decision-making over the choice of the CDM. Even though the Director 
Generals are invited to the meeting, they are excluded from the actual decision-making. The 
Director Generals also obviously share the belief that the selection of the CDM is a 
president’s absolute prerogative and these high-ranking officers do not present any 
opposition on that point.  
 
Moreover, there is evidence of the effect of power over discourse in the way in which the 
concept of gender equity (here, the term equality is more suitable) is discursively constructed 
by KOC/KSC by promoting a target of 30 per cent female recruitment for the achievement of 
gender equity. This reflects the opinion of the dominant male decision-making group that 
such a level of female employment could be said to imply that gender equity had been 
realised, an opinion that the middle-ranking officer subscribed to without questioning. 
 
With reference to Lukes (1974)’ second dimensional power can be explained in the context 
of the non-decision making roles of women and the disabled. In the KOC/KSC men 
constituted the power group and women could not access this higher administrative posts 
due to the social phenomenon in Korea whereby women were expected to leave their jobs 
after marriage. Also, the claim that the KOC/KSC deals with physical activity and thus that 
the disabled would not be able to work effectively in such organisations seems irrational 
since the tasks required of administrators do not involve participation in sports per se. The 
decision not to consider people with disabilities for such posts may be considered as an 
example of Lukes’ second dimensional power too.  
 
In terms of systemic governance, the relations among the domestic stakeholders of the KOC 
are more likely to follow a hierarchical type of governance. As in the case of the KOC/KSC 
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merger, the hierarchical nature of the organisation’s systemic governance serves to explain 
the relations among domestic stakeholders. As the government has adopted the highest 
position in relation to the national sports organisations, it can exercise power in such a way 
as to control the KOC directly. As it regulate the supply of financial resources, the 
government’s higher position enables it to be deeply involved in decision-making, to such an 
extent that the KOC/KSC is virtually obliged to follow its orders. The NFs, in their turn, are 
under the ‘control’ of the KOC/KSC, so they can exert less power. Their subordinate position 
is evidence of the hierarchical systemic governance.  
 
In relation to the KOC/KSC merger that took place in 2009, the KOC/KSC’s incumbent 
President was able to exert his economic power to push ahead and persuade the 
government and those political groups, which had formerly had a greater chance of 
influencing the KOC/KSC merger. The KOC/KSC decided to revise its Statutes in order to 
avoid entering into a conflict with the government that had continuously insisted on the 
separation of the KOC/KSC. This gambit was successful since the new President Park Yong 
Sung could take advantage of his economic power. This implies that the possession of 
economic power is an essential feature shared by powerful decision makers in sports policy 
in Korea. Therefore, KOC President Park was the most influential stakeholder in the 
KOC/KSC merger. 
 
The analysis of the KOC’s practices shows examples of the power of discourse, evidence of 
which is given by the use of the word ‘merger’ to characterise the strategic policy devised by 
the incumbent KOC/KSC President in the process of restructuring the KOC/KSC. In spite of 
the fact that the President pursued a KOC-centred policy, agencies at all levels, for instance, 
the government, the KOC/KSC and other related sporting organisations in Korea, all 
expressed the view that ‘merger’ was the appropriate term, although the organisational 
structure was still obviously KSC-centred. The term ‘absorption’, therefore, suited the 
situation more accurately. The power of discourse influences individual and collective 
consciousness to such an extent that people’s actions are constructed by discourses that 
transfer knowledge, and in turn, discourses inform the creation of reality at the individual 
and/or collective levels. 
 
There is a widely held belief among male staff members of the KOC/KSC that women are 
not capable of working as well as men, with the implication that women should quit their jobs 
after marriage, which is a factor that contributes to male dominance in the managerial 
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positions. The persistent and widespread nature of this kind of discourse (with a strong 
assertion of its accuracy, notwithstanding the lack of supporting evidence) demonstrates the 
power of the discourse of hegemonic masculinity. A further consequence is that clerical and 
technical support posts are mainly allocated to women with limited prospects of promotion. 
Moreover, salary differences in the public sector are disadvantageous to female employees 
although the recent policy change on gender equity has brought about greater participation 
by female staff members at the non-managerial level. Nevertheless, women are seriously 
under-represented at the managerial and Executive Committee levels, which can be seen as 
limiting their ability to influence decision making. 
 
The power of discourse is also apparent in respect of the organisation’s policy regarding the 
employment of people with impairments. A ‘discourse of incapability’ and of horizontal 
segregation is manifest in the way in which the employment of people with disabilities is 
treated by some respondents as being primarily or solely the responsibility of organisations 
dealing with disability sport. With regard to the achievement of equitable employment 
opportunities for people with impairments, most members of KOC/KSC staff interviewed 
presume that people with disabilities are employed in sufficient numbers for the organisation 
to be in compliance with the regulations set by the government (though they were unable to 
say what the proportion required by the government was). 
8.6 Organisational culture of the KOC in association with National culture  
This study adopted Hofstede’s approach to determining the relationship between 
organisational values and culture and, furthermore, national culture as being of relevance to 
the analysis of the KOC’s governance practices.  
The KOC  
As the Korean interviewees illustrate Korean attributes my concern has been to engage with 
the Korean national culture.  
 
Table 8-1 National culture of the Republic of Korea 
Five dimensions Score  
of Korea 
Features of dimensions of Korea 
Power Distance PDI 60  - Hierarchy in organisations reflects the existential inequality 
between higher-ups and lower-downs. 
- Subordinates expect to be told what to do. 
- Centralisation is popular. 
Individualism/ 
Collectivism 
IDI 18 - Management is management of groups. 
- The relationship of employer-employee is perceived in 
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moral terms, like a family link. 
- Hiring and promotion decisions take employees’ ingroup 
into account. 
Masculinity/ 
Femininity 
MAS 39  
(likely to 
be closer 
to 
femininity) 
- A relatively small number of women in elected political 
positions (masculinity); a relatively large number of women 
in elected political positions (femininity) 
- Women’s liberation means that women will be admitted to 
positions hitherto only occupied by men (masculinity); 
women’s liberation means that men and women should take 
equal shares both at home and at work (femininity) 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
UAI 85 - Emotional need to be busy; inner urge to work hard 
- Motivation by security and esteem or belongingness 
- Suppression of deviant ideas and behaviour; resistance to 
innovation 
Confucian dynamism 
(Long-term 
orientation) 
LTO 75 -Adaptation of traditions to a modern context 
-Respect for social and status obligations within limits 
- 
Source: Hofstede (1997) 
 
According to Brown’s (1998: 47) assessment of the chaebol, they “are liable to co-ordination 
by state agencies and political alliances”, and this case study of the KOC does indeed reveal 
the existence of such an alliance between the chaebol and state agencies and politicians. 
The incumbent KOC President, who is one of the leading member of the chaebol, exercised 
his economic, political and social power to merge the KSC and the KOC. 
 
In connection with the results of this study, the KOC’s governance practices, which are 
integral to its organisational culture, can be seen to typify the broader national culture with 
respect to Hofstede’s five dimensions. In terms of power distance and uncertainty avoidance, 
a hierarchical principle has been seen to prevail in the KOC, accompanied by a centralising 
tendency. The situation of a lack of communication between senior and junior staff members 
within the organisation is one consequence of this as well as the barriers set up by the 
organisation’s hierarchical structure of which the junior staff members were conscious. In 
this connection, Brown (1998: 47) comments that “Korean bosses are highly directive and 
make little attempt to explain their decisions to their employees”. Similarly, Korea recorded a 
high level of uncertainty avoidance in Hofstede’s study (1997) and the KOC’s organisational 
culture is seen to conform to that same pattern. Although a few senior staff members 
responded by saying that they listened to the junior staff members’ suggestion, most senior 
and junior staff members shared the opinion that junior officers usually have to obey what 
their seniors’ instruction and orders. 
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Some interesting points arose from the research in terms of Individualism/collectivism and 
Confucian dynamism, showing differences in the views of the organisation held by the senior 
and junior interviewees in the KOC. The research told us that collectivism also seemed to 
feature strongly within the KOC which is consistent with Hofstede’s (1997) findings in that 
most KOC interviewees said they socialised often as a group within the organisation. 
However, junior staff members confessed that sub-cultures existed in this regard, as the 
senior and the junior staff shared sometimes different views on the matter of socialising with 
their colleagues. This aspect may also be interpreted in terms of Confucian dynamism. 
Whereas the senior staff tended to put an emphasis on the adaptation of the organisation’s 
traditions to a modern context, the junior staff members expressed their curiosity about their 
seniors’ attitude rather than following it without question. Thus, some interesting points 
emerged in terms of collectivism and Confucian dynamism. The KOC’s senior staff members 
were more likely to express their affinity with collectivism and were more comfortable with a 
long-termist perspective while the junior staff members were evidently less comfortable with 
collectivism and may have been less influenced by long-termism.  
  
Although Hofstede concluded that Korea was situated more or less in a midway position on 
the scale of masculinity/femininity, this study has found that Korean society was likely to 
have been closer to the ‘masculinity’ end of the scale when Hofstede’s research was 
conducted about 40 years ago. Since 1990, though, Korean society has changed with 
respect to the advancement of women’s liberation as promoted by the Korean government, 
so the concepts of equity or equality have spread out within Korean society, with the result 
that a higher number of female staff members have been appointed. However, the case 
study of KOC shows that female employees still enjoy fewer chances to be involved at the 
decision-making level within the Korean context.  
8.7 Limitations 
As the concept of applying seven ethical principles to the evaluation of corporate 
governance was first developed in a western context, when those principles are applied in a 
non-western context such as that of Korea, there is a language barrier, as some terms are 
unfamiliar to those from a non-English-speaking background. In particular, the use of a 
bottom-up approach should lead the interviewees freely to express their own ideas on the 
seven principles. The core concepts of the key principles need to translated but it was found 
that there were no exactly equivalent terms in Korean. In order to enable the interviewees to 
understand these terms fully, it is sometimes necessary to provide explanations that may 
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more readily elicit their responses. For instance, the term ‘accountability’ is an especially 
difficult term to translate into Korean and it has to be well explained. However, it is possible 
for ‘accountability’ and ‘responsibility’ to be translated using the same Korean term. When 
they were asked about accountability, the respondents’ answers were biased towards the 
sense borne by the English word ‘responsibility’. In addition, ‘equity’ and ‘equality’ are also 
translated by using the same word in the Korean language. When the definition of the 
English term was explained to the participants, there was the risk that the explanation itself 
would lead them to fix their ideas about the principle concerned. In this case, while I had to 
explain the English words to the interviewees in the hope that they would understand well 
enough to answer my question. I feared that this might have biased them towards giving a 
particular answer. 
 
In the course of the interviews, an issue arose over the definitions of the terms ‘equity’ and 
‘equality’ (see Chapter Two). On analysing the interviewees’ responses, they were all found 
to have used a Korean word which incorporates the meanings of both ‘equity’ and ‘equality’ 
as defined above, that is ‘평등’, or ‘Pyung Deung’ in the Korean language. Accordingly, when 
the respondents argued about gender equity in terms of the percentage of females in 
employment, the sense of this Korean word is rather close to that of the English term 
‘equality’. On the other hand, some interviewees raised the issue of whether different posts 
could be created which would only be available to women, which covers the meaning of 
‘equity’. In fact, the Korean government also used the term ‘Pyung Deung’ in the sense of 
‘equality’ in relation to this matter in designating the Ministry established for this purpose as 
the ‘Ministry of Gender Equality’. 
 
With respect to aspects of the four events at the KOC that were examined in interviews, 
some events could only be well explained by a certain level of staff. The selection of Chef de 
Mission, especially, could only be described by high level members of the KOC/KSC staff 
who were actually involved in the meeting or the selection process. The budget planning is a 
similar case. Only those interviewees who were actually involved in the budgetary team or 
decision-making could account for the actual process or give their opinion on this matter.  
8.8 Implications to Future Research 
As this study is devoted to one case study, that of the KOC, it would be interesting to 
develop comparative research focussing on the KOC and some other NOCs in a non-
western context. In particular, NOCs could be chosen from similar geo-political areas, and 
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with similar sizes and/or levels of sporting power. In this way evidence could be produced of 
the extent to which each different NOC interprets the IOC’s notions of corporate governance 
and the similarities and/or differences between them could be assessed.   
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Appendix 1 Questions for interviews 
 
First section: personal background. 
Please provide your personal information: 
1. How long have you worked for the KOC or the KSC?  
2. Would you please tell me your position and the history of your position so far?   
3. For what lengths of time did you hold each position?  
4. Have you ever been a member of any other sports-related organisations?  
4-1. If so, for what lengths of time and what position have you served on that 
organisation?  
5. Do you mind telling me how old you were when you completed your last education?  
Field of education (what is the highest level of education?)  what kind of high 
education?   
6. Are you a volunteer or a paid-staff?  
 
Second section: decision-making.  
1. Would you please list the most influential stakeholder(s) in decision making in sport 
policy in Korea? (in general) 
2. Would you please identify the most influential person(s) in decision making inside 
KOC? (in general) 
3. Would you please identify the most influential person(s) in decision making inside 
KSC? (in general) 
 
 I’d like to consider policy decision-making in five specific cases:  
1. The KOC/KSC merger. 
2. Budgetary planning  
3. Recruitment of new staff 
4. Selection of Chef de Mission & the KOC President  
 
4. Would you please identify the most influential internal and external stakeholder in 
decision-making?  
5. Does any stakeholder seek your advice or assistance on each issues mentioned 
above? 
5-1. If so, what kinds of issues do they raise? 
6. Were you involved in policy decision? 
7. Who did you consult when you were involved? 
8. Whose interest is predominated? 
9. Was there any group which is not considered? 
10. How would you personally evaluate the relative importance of each of these policies? 
 
Additional questions for budgetary planning:  
1. Can you tell me how and who the overall size of budget was decided? and who? 
2. What was the process gone through in allocating budget internally? 
 
Additional questions for Chef de Mission:  
1. Would you please tell me how to choose the Chef de Mission in each games ?  
2. What is the process gone through of choosing the Chef de Mission? 
3. Whose view were thought or not thought in terms of choosing the team manager? 
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Third Section: main principles  
1. To whom are you accountable when you make a decision?  
2. What do you think is the most important activity of committee?  
3. What do you think is the most important activity of the Executive Committees of both 
the KSC & the KOC?  
4. Do you think each member of committee or board share equal power and authority? 
5. Are all relevant documents opened to be accountable to stakeholders?  
6. Is each department free to organise their own policy? 
7. In broad terms, what do you personally feel the KOC should be doing to combat the 
causes and consequences of?  
1) Inequity of male/female employment, participation in sport, leadership 
(management position in sport), activity of the KOC itself  
2) Lack of employment of disability  
8. What does the KOC promote equity in decision making role in Korean sports?  
9. What is the reason of the KOC existence? (official goals) 
10. What is the primary task of the KOC? (operational goals) 
 
Fourth section: other elements which affect key principles of corporate governance   
1. Did you have induction when you were just joined the KOC or the KSC?  
2. Are you socialised with other members of the KOC regardless of position? 
3. Are you socialised with other members of the KOC regardless of sex? 
4. Is there any special culture of female employees? Or male employees? 
5. Do you have sub-culture in your org?   
6. To what extent that you have been encouraged to develop your career or academic 
background since you entered the KOC or the KSC?  
7. What are the most important features of your role?  
8. Are you encouraged to contribute to decision making? 
9. If so, is there a system which each member of the KOC is able to contribute his/her 
opinion?  
10. Does the KOC put an emphasis on elite or mass sport?  
11. In which areas of the KOC work would you say are the sharpest differences in 
opinion between high officials and members in department? (value) 
12. Do you concentrate your own efforts as a KOC staff member on a limited amount of 
work or do you try to spread your time equally across all aspects of work? If you do 
specialise what do you specialise in and why? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 358 
 
Appendix 2 List of Included Papers 
No. Paper Database 
 
1 
 
Aitchison, C., Jordan, F., & Brackenridge, C. (1999). Women in leisure management: A survey of 
gender equity. Women in Management Review, 14(4), 121. 
ABI Research 
(scholarly journal) 
2 Amara, M., Henry, I., Liang, J., & Uchiumi, K. (2005). The governance of professional soccer: Five 
case studies - algeria, china, england, france and japan. European Journal of Sport Science, 5(4), 
189-206.  
Article First 
3 Amis, J., Slack, T., & Hinings, C. R. (2004). Strategic change and the role of interests, power, and 
organizational capacity. Journal of Sport Management, 18(2), 158-198. 
Web of Science 
4 Augestad, P., Bergsgard, N. A., & Hansen, A. O. (2006). The institutionalization of an elite sport 
organization in norway: The case of "olympiatoppen". Sociology of Sport Journal, 23(3), 293-313. 
Sociological 
Abstract 
(peer-reviewed) 
5 Auld, C. J., & Godbey, G. (1998). Influence in Canadian National Sport Organizations: Perceptions of 
professionals and volunteers. Journal of Sport Management, 12(1), 20-38. 
Web of Science 
6 Babiak, K. (2007). Determinants of interorganizational relationships: The case of a Canadian 
Nonprofit Sport Organization. Journal of Sport Management, 21(3), 338-376. 
Web of Science 
7 Bairner, A. (2004). Creating a soccer strategy for northern ireland: Reflections on football governance 
in small european countries. Soccer & Society, 5(1), 27-42. 
SPORTDiscus 
(peer-reviewed) 
8 Bairner, A., & Darby, P. (2001). The swedish model and international sport: Lennart johannson and 
the governance of world football. International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 36(3), 337-359. 
Sociological 
Abstract  
(peer-reviewed) 
9 Barros, C. P. (2003). Incentive regulation and efficiency in sport organisational training activities. 
Sport Management Review, 6(1), 33-52. 
SPORT 
Discus 
10 Bergsgard, N. A., & Rommetvedt, H. (2006). Sport and politics: The case of norway. International 
Review for the Sociology of Sport, 41(1), 7-27.  
PsycINFO(peer-
reviewed) 
11 Booth, B. F., & Hassen, C. (1990). Volunteers in national sport organisations: A canadian histography. 
Physical Education Review, 13(1), 5-11.  
SPORTDiscus 
12 Booth, D., (1999) Gifts of Corruption? Ambiguities of Obligation in the Olympic Movement, 
OLYMPIKA: The International Journal of Olympic Studies Volume VIII - 1999, pp. 43-68 
LA84 
13 Brackenridge, C. (2004). Women and children first? child abuse and child protection in sport. Sport in 
Society, 7(3), 322-337. 
Sociological 
Abstracts 
(peer-reviewed) 
14 Brackenridge, C. H. (1994). Fair play or fair game? child sexual abuse in sport organisations. 
International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 29(3), 287-299. 
Sociological 
Abstracts 
(peer-reviewed) 
15 Brackenridge, C. H., Pawlaczek, Z., Bringer, J. D., Cockburn, C., Nutt, G., Pitchford, A., et al. (2005). 
Measuring the impact of child protection through activation states. Sport, Education and Society, 
10(2), 239-256. 
PsycINFO(peer-
reviewed) 
16 Brackenridge, C., Bringer, J. D., & Bishopp, D. (2005). Managing cases of abuse in sport. Child 
Abuse Review, 14(4), 259-274. 
Sociological 
Abstracts 
(peer-reviewed) 
17 Bradbury, S., & Williams, J. (2006). New labour, racism and 'new' football in england. Patterns of 
Prejudice, 40(1), 61-82. 
Assia (peer 
reviewed) 
18 Brady, C & Reavill, L., (1999) Football,business, and government-can studies of high-level teams 
across disciplines produce generic principles for systems and management? Systemic Practice and 
Action Research, Vol. 12, No. 5, pp.533-553 
Sociological 
Abstracts 
(peer-reviewed) 
19 Caudwell, J. (2003). Sporting gender: Women's footballing bodies as Sites/Sights for the (re) 
articulation of sex, gender, and desire. Sociology of Sport Journal, 20(4), 371-386. 
PsycINFO(peer-
reviewed) 
20 Caza, A. (2000). Context receptivity: Innovation in an amateur sport organization. Journal of Sport 
Management, 14(3), 227-242. 
Web of Science 
21 Chalip, L. (1995). POLICY ANALYSIS IN SPORT MANAGEMENT. Journal of Sport Management, 
9(1), 1-13. 
Web of Science 
22 Chang, K., & Chelladurai, P. (2003). Comparison of part-time workers and full-time workers: 
Commitment and citizenship behaviors in Korean sport organizations. Journal of Sport Management, 
17(4), 394-416. 
Web of Science 
23 Chapple, W., & Moon, J. (2005). Corporate social responsibility (CSR) in asia: A seven-country study 
of SCR web site reporting. Business & Society, 44(4), 415-441. 
Sociological 
Abstract 
(peer-reviewed) 
24 Chelladurai, P., & Haggerty, T. R. (1991). Measures of organizational effectiveness of canadian 
national sports organizations. Canadian Journal of Sport Sciences, 16(2), 126-133. 
PsycINFO(peer-
reviewed) 
25 Chelladurai, P., Szyszlo, M., & Haggerty, T. R. (1987). SYSTEMS-BASED DIMENSIONS OF 
EFFECTIVENESS - THE CASE OF NATIONAL SPORT ORGANIZATIONS. Canadian Journal of 
Web of Science 
 359 
 
Sport Sciences-Revue Canadienne Des Sciences Du Sport, 12(2), 111-119. 
26 Claringbould, I., & Knoppers, A. (2007). Finding a 'normal' woman: Selection processes for board 
membership. Sex Roles: A Journal of Research, 56(7-8), 495-507. 
Assia (peer- 
reviewed) 
27 Claringbould, I., & Knoppers, A. (2008). Doing and undoing gender in sport governance. Sex Roles, 
58(1-2), 81-92. 
Article First 
28 Colyer, S. (2000). Organizational culture in selected Western Australian sport organizations. Journal 
of Sport Management, 14(4), 321-341. 
Web of Science 
29 Cousens, L., & Slack, T. (2005). Field-level change: The case of North American major league 
professional sport. Journal of Sport Management, 19(1), 13-42. 
Web of Science 
30 Cunningham, G. B. (2008). Creating and sustaining gender diversity in sport organizations. Sex 
Roles, 58(1-2), 136-145. 
Web of Science 
31 Cunningham, G. B., & Sagas, M. (2004). Racial differences in occupational turnover intent among 
NCAA division IA assistant football coaches. Sociology of Sport Journal, 21(1), 84-92.  
PsycINFO(peer-
reviewed) 
32 Cunningham, G. B., & Sagas, M. (2005). Access discrimination in intercollegiate athletics. Journal of 
Sport and Social Issues, 29(2), 148-163. 
Sociological 
Abstracts 
(peer-reviewed) 
33 Danisman, A., Hinings, C. R., & Slack, T. (2006). Integration and differentiation in institutional values: 
An empirical investigation in the field of Canadian National Sport Organizations. Canadian Journal of 
Administrative Sciences-Revue Canadienne Des Sciences De L Administration, 23(4), 301-317. 
Web of Science 
34 Darby, P. (2003). Africa, the FIFA presidency, and the governance of world football: 1974, 1998, and 
2002. Africa Today, 50(1), 3-24. 
Sociological 
Abstract 
(peer-reviewed) 
35 Davies, J., & Mabin, V. (2000). Assessing the relative effectiveness of sports organizations: A case 
study reviewing an application of MCDA in sport. European Journal for Sport Management, 7(1), 56-
81. 
SPORTDiscus 
36 de Barros, C., Barros, C. P., & Correia, A. (2007). Governance in sports clubs: Evidence for the island 
of madeira. European Sport Management Quarterly, 7(2), 123-139. 
PsycINFO 
(peer-reviewed) 
37 Dietl, H., & Franck, E. (2007). Governance failure and financial crisis in german football. Journal of 
Sports Economics, 8(6), 662-669. 
Article First 
38 Doherty, A. J., & Carron, A. V. (2003). Cohesion in volunteer sport executive committees. Journal of 
Sport Management, 17(2), 116-141. 
Web of Science 
39 Doherty, A. J., & Chelladurai, P. (1999). Managing cultural diversity in sport organizations: A 
theoretical perspective. Journal of Sport Management, 13(4), 280-297. 
Web of Science 
40 Dunsire, A. (1996). Tipping the balance: Autopoiesis and governance. Administration & Society, 
28(3), 299-334. 
 
Sociological 
Abstract 
(peer-reviewed) 
41 Eagly, A. H. (2007). Female leadership advantage and disadvantage: Resolving the contradictions. 
Psychology of Women Quarterly, 31(1), 1-12. 
PsycINFO 
(peer-reviewed) 
42 Eagly, A. H., Johannesen-Schmidt, M. C., & van Engen, M. L. (2003). Transformational, transactional, 
and laissez-faire leadership styles: A meta-analysis comparing women and men. Psychological 
Bulletin, 129(4), 569-591. 
PsycINFO 
(peer-reviewed) 
43 Enjolras, B. (2002). The commercialization of voluntary sport organizations in norway. Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 31(3), 352. 
ABI Research 
(scholarly journal) 
44 Enjolras, B., & Waldahl, R. H. (2007). Policy-making in sport: The norwegian case. International 
Review for the Sociology of Sport, 42(2), 201-216. 
PsycINFO 
(peer-reviewed) 
45 Fenton, N. E., & Inglis, S. (2007). A critical perspective on organizational values. Nonprofit 
Management and Leadership, 17(3), 335-347. 
PsycINFO(peer-
reviewed) 
46 Ferrand, A., & Pages, M. (1999). Image management in sport organisations: The creation of value. 
European Journal of Marketing, 33(3-4), 387-402. 
PsycINFO 
(peer-reviewed) 
47 Fink, J. S., & Pastore, D. L. (1999). Diversity in sport? Utilizing the business literature to devise a 
comprehensive framework of diversity initiatives. Quest, 51, 310-327. 
Web of Science 
48 Forster, J. (2006). Global sports organisations and their governance. Corporate Governance, 6(1), 
72-83. 
Article First 
49 Frisby, W. (1986). MEASURING THE ORGANIZATIONAL-EFFECTIVENESS OF NATIONAL SPORT 
GOVERNING BODIES. Canadian Journal of Applied Sport Sciences-Journal Canadien Des 
Sciences Appliquees Au Sport, 11(2), 94-99. 
Web of Science 
50 Frisby, W. (2005). The good, the bad, and the ugly: Critical sport management research. Journal of 
Sport Management, 19(1), 1-12. 
Web of Science 
51 Gilmore, S., & Gilson, C. (2007). Finding form: elite sports and the business of change. Journal of 
Organizational Change Management, 20(3), 409-428. 
Web of Science 
52 Girginov, V. (2006). Creating a corporate anti-doping culture: The role of bulgarian sports governing 
bodies. Sport in Society, 9(2), 252-268.  
 
Sociological 
Abstract(peer-
reviewed) 
53 Green, M. (2007). Governing under advanced liberalism: sport policy and the social investment state. 
Policy Sciences, 40(1), 55-71. 
Web of Science 
 360 
 
54 Green, M., & Houlihan, B. (2004). Advocacy coalitions and elite sport policy change in canada and 
the united kingdom. International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 39(4), 387-403.  
 
Sociological 
Abstract(peer-
reviewed) 
55 Green, M., & Houlihan, B. (2006). Governmentality, modernization, and the "disciplining" of national 
sporting organizations: Athletics in australia and the united kingdom. Sociology of Sport Journal, 
23(1), 47-71. 
 
Sociological 
Abstract 
(peer-reviewed) 
56 Greve, H. R., & Mitsuhashi, H. (2007). Power and glory: Concentrated power in top management 
teams. Organization Studies, 28(8), 1197-1221. 
PsycINFO 
(peer-reviewed) 
57 Hall, M. A., Cullen, D., & Slack, T. (1989). ORGANIZATIONAL ELITES RECREATING THEMSELVES 
- THE GENDER STRUCTURE OF NATIONAL SPORT ORGANIZATIONS. Quest, 41(1), 28-45. 
Web of Science 
58 Hare, A. P. (2003). Roles, relationships, and groups in organizations: Some conclusions and 
recommendations. Small Group Research, 34(2), 123-154.  
PsycINFO(peer-
reviewed) 
59 Hargreaves, J. (1999). The 'women's international sports movement': Local-global strategies and 
empowerment. Womens Studies International Forum, 22(5), 461-471. 
Web of Science 
60 Hartill, M., & Prescott, P. (2007). Serious business or 'any other business'? safeguarding and child 
protection policy in british rugby league. Child Abuse Review, 16(4), 237-251.  
PsycINFO 
(peer-reviewed) 
61 Henry, I. P. (1999). Globalisation and the governance of leisure: The roles of the nation-state, the 
european union and the city in leisure policy in britain. Loisir Et Societe/Society and Leisure, 22(2), 
355-379. 
Sociological 
Abstract 
(peer-reviewed) 
62 Hinings, C. R., Thibault, L., Slack, T., & Kikulis, L. M. (1996). Values and organizational structure. 
Human Relations, 49(7), 885-916.  
Assia (peer-
reviewed) 
63 Hoeber, L. (2007). Exploring the gaps between meanings and practices of gender equity in a sport 
organization. Gender, Work and Organization, 14(3), 259-280. 
Sociological 
Abstract(peer-
reviewed) 
64 Hoeber, L. (2008). Gender equity for athletes: Multiple understandings of an organizational value. 
Sex Roles, 58(1-2), 58-71. 
Web of Science 
65 Hovden, J. (2000). Gender and leadership selection processes in norwegian sporting organizations. 
International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 35(1), 75-82. 
 
Sociological 
Abstract(peer-
reviewed) 
66 Hovden, J. (2000). 'Heavyweight' men and younger women? the gendering of selection processes in 
norwegian sport organizations. NORA: Nordic Journal of Women's Studies, 8(1), 17-32.  
Assia (peer-
reviewed) 
67 Hoye, R. & Stewart, B., (2002) Power and Organisational Change: The Case of the Melbourne 
Women's Hockey Association, 1995-1998 Sporting Traditions • vol. 18 no. 2 • May 2002 
LA84 
68 Hoye, R. (2006). Leadership within australian voluntary sport organization boards. Nonprofit 
Management and Leadership, 16(3), 297-313. 
PsycINFO 
(peer-reviewed) 
69 Hoye, R., & Inglis, S. (2003). Governance of nonprofit leisure organizations. Loisir Et Societe/Society 
and Leisure, 26(2), 369-387. 
Sociological 
Abstract 
(peer-reviewed) 
70 Hult, J. S. (1989). Women's struggle for governance in U.S. amateur athletics. / la lutte des femmes 
pour le pouvoir dans le monde de l ' athletisme amateur americain. International Review for the 
Sociology of Sport, 24(3), 249-263. 
Sociological 
Abstract 
(peer-reviewed) 
71 Hums, M. A., Moorman, A. M., & Wolff, E. A. (2003). The inclusion of the paralympics in the olympic 
and amateur sports act. legal and policy implications for integration of athletes with disabilities into 
the united states olympic committee and national governing bodies. Journal of Sport & Social Issues, 
27(3), 261-275. 
Assia (peer 
reviewed) 
72 Joiner, T. A. (2001). The influence of national culture and organizational culture alignment on job 
stress and performance: Evidence from greece. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 16(3-4), 229-242. 
PsycINFO 
(peer-reviewed) 
73 Karkatsoulis, P., Michalopoulos, N., & Moustakatou, V. (2005). The national identity as a motivational 
factor for better performance in the public sector: The case of the volunteers of the athens 2004 
olympic games. International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management, 54(7), 579-594. 
PsycINFO 
(peer-reviewed) 
74 Karteroliotis, K., & Papadimitriou, D. (2004). Confirmatory factor analysis of the spot organizational 
effectiveness scale. Psychological Reports, 95(1), 366-370. 
PsycINFO 
(peer-reviewed) 
75 Kent, A., & Weese, W. J. (2000). Do effective organizations have better executive leaders and/or 
organizational cultures? A study of selected sport organizations in canada. European Journal for 
Sport Management, 7(2), 4-21. 
SPORTDiscus 
76 Kikulis, L. M. (2000). Continuity and change in governance and decision making in national sport 
organizations: Institutional explanations. Journal of Sport Management, 14(4), 293-320. 
Web of Science 
77 Kikulis, L. M., Slack, T., & Hinings, C. R. (1995). Sector-specific patterns of organizational design 
change. The Journal of Management Studies, 32(1), 67. 
ABI Research 
(scholarly journal) 
78 Kjeldsen, E. (1992). The manager's role in the development and maintenance of ethical behavior in 
the sport organization. Journal of Sport Management, 6(2), 99-113. 
SPORT 
Discus 
79 Knoppers, A., & Anthonissen, A. (2001). Meanings given to performance in Dutch sport 
organizations: Gender and racial/ethnic subtexts. Sociology of Sport Journal, 18(3), 302-316. 
Web of Science 
80 Knoppers, A., & Anthonissen, A. (2005). Male athletic and managerial masculinities: Congruencies in 
discursive practices? Journal of Gender Studies, 14(2), 123-135. 
PsycINFO 
(peer-reviewed) 
 361 
 
81 Kuga, D. J. (1996). Governance of intercollegiate athletics: Perceptions of faculty members. Journal 
of Sport Management, 10(2), 149-168. 
Web of Science 
82 Leiter, J. (2005). Structural isomorphism in australian nonprofit organizations. Voluntas: International 
Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 16(1), 1-31. 
 
Sociological 
Abstract 
(peer-reviewed) 
83 Letkemann, P. G. (2002). The office workplace: Communitas and hierarchical social structures. 
Anthropologica, 44(2), 257-269. 
PsycINFO(peer-
reviewed) 
84 Levermore, R., & Millward, P. (2007). Official policies and informal transversal networks: Creating 
'pan-european identifications' through sport? The Sociological Review, 55(1), 144-164. 
 
Sociological 
Abstracts 
(peer-reviewed) 
85 Long, J., Robinson, P., & Spracklen, K. (2005). Promoting racial equality within sports organizations. 
Journal of Sport and Social Issues, 29(1), pp.41-59.  
Assia (journal) 
86 Mahony, D. F., Riemer, H. A., Breeding, J. L., & Hums, M. A. (2006). Organizational justice in sport 
organizations: Perceptions of college athletes and other college students. Journal of Sport 
Management, 20(2), 159-188. 
Web of Science 
87 Malloy, D. C., & Agarwal, J. (2001). Differential association and role-set configuration: The impact of 
significant others upon the perception of ethical climate in a sports organization. Journal of Sport 
Management, 15(3), 195-218. 
Web of Science 
88 Malloy, D. C., & Zakus, D. H. (1995). Ethical decision making in sport administration: A theoretical 
inquiry into substance and form. Journal of Sport Management, 9(1), 36-58. 
SPORTDiscus 
89 Mason, D. S., Thibault, L., & Misener, L. (2006). An agency theory perspective on corruption in sport: 
The case of the international olympic committee. Journal of Sport Management, 20(1), 1. 
ABI Research 
(peer-reviewed) 
90 McDonald, I. (2005). Theorising partnerships: Governance, communicative action and sport policy. 
Journal of Social Policy, 34(4), 579-600. 
Assia (peer 
reviewed) 
91 McNamee, M., & Fleming, S. (2007). Ethics audits and corporate governance: The case of public 
sector sports organizations. Journal of Business Ethics, 73(4), 425-437. 
Article First 
92 Newman, P. (2007). “BACK THE BID”: THE 2012 SUMMER OLYMPICS AND THE GOVERNANCE 
OF LONDON. Journal of Urban Affairs, 29(3), 255-267. 
Article First 
93 Nier, O., & Sheard, K. (1999). Managing change: The 'economic', 'social' and 'symbolic' dimensions 
of professionalisation in five elite european rugby clubs. European Journal for Sport Management, 
6(2), 5-33. 
SPORTDiscus 
94 Nixon, H. L. (1993). SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF SPORT - EMPHASIZING SOCIAL-
STRUCTURE IN SPORT SOCIOLOGY. Sociology of Sport Journal, 10(3), 315-321. 
Web of Science 
95 Papadimitriou, D. (1999). Voluntary boards of directors in greek sport governing bodies. European 
Journal for Sport Management, 6, 78-103. 
SPORTDiscus 
96 Papadimitriou, D. (2002). Amateur structures and their effect on performance: The case of greek 
voluntary sports clubs. Managing Leisure, 7(4), 205-219. 
SPORTDiscus 
97 Parent, M. M., & Séguin, B. (2007). Factors that led to the drowning of a world championship 
organizing committee: A stakeholder approach. European Sport Management Quarterly, 7(2), 187-
212. 
PsycINFO(peer-
reviewed) 
98 Pfister, G., & Reese, D. (1995). GENDER, BODY CULTURE, AND BODY POLITICS IN NATIONAL-
SOCIALISM. Sport Science Review, 4(1), 91-121. 
Web of Science 
99 Pitsis, T. S., Clegg, S. R., Marosszeky, M., & Rura-Polley, T. (2003). Constructing the Olympic dream: 
A future perfect strategy of project management. Organization Science, 14(5), 574-590. 
Web of Science 
100 Pitter, R. (1990). Power and control in an amateur sport organization. International Review for the 
Sociology of Sport, 25(4), 309-322.  
 
Sociological 
Abstract(peer-
reviewed) 
101 Pittinsky, T. L., & Simon, S. (2007). Intergroup leadership. Leadership Quarterly, 18(6), 586-605. 
 
PsycINFO 
(peer-reviewed) 
102 Preuss, H., (2000) Electing an Olympic Host City: A multidimensional decision, Fifth International 
Symposium for Olympic Research, Bridging Three Centuries, September, 89-104  
LA84 
103 Pugh, C., & Wood, E. H. (2004). The strategic use of events within local government: A study of 
london borough councils. Event Management, 9(1-2), 64-71. 
PsycINFO(peer-
reviewed) 
104 Riiskjaer, S., & Nielsen, K. (1987). Financial dependence and organizational autonomy: The 
economy of voluntary sport in denmark. International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 22(3), 193-
208. 
Sociological 
Abstract(peer-
reviewed) 
105 Rintala, J. & Bischoff, J.A., (1997) Persistent Resistance: Leadership Positions for Women in 
Olympic Sport Governing Bodies, OLYMPIKA: The International Journal of Olympic Studies Volume 
VI - 1997, pp. 1-24 
LA84 
106 Rowold, J. (2006). Transformational and transactional leadership in martial arts. Journal of Applied 
Sport Psychology, 18(4), 312-325.  
PsycINFO(peer-
reviewed) 
107 Saeki, T. (1990). The characteristics of sociological research on sport organization in japan. / 
caracteristiques des recherches sociologiques concernant les organisations sportives au japon. 
International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 25(2), 109-123. 
SPORTDiscus 
108 Sam, M. P. (2005). The AMakers of sport policy: A (task)force to be reckoned with. Sociology of Sport 
Journal, 22(1), 78-99. 
Sociological 
Abstract 
 362 
 
 (peer-reviewed) 
109 Sam, M. P., & Jackson, S. J. (2004). Sport policy development in new zealand: Paradoxes of an 
integrative paradigm. International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 39(2), 205-222. 
 
Sociological 
Abstract 
(peer-reviewed) 
110 Sartore, M. L., & Cunningham, G. B. (2007). Explaining the under-representation of women in 
leadership positions of sport organizations: A symbolic interactionist perspective. Quest, 59(2), 244-
265. 
Web of Science 
111  Schaffer, B. S. (2002). Board assessments of managerial performance: An analysis of attribution 
processes. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 17(2), 95-115. 
PsycINFO 
(peer-reviewed) 
112 Schneider, A.J., (2000) Olympic reform, are we there yet? Bridging Three Centuries Fifth 
International Symposium for Olympic Research, pp. 225-232 
LA84 
113 Scott, D. K. (1997). Managing organizational culture in intercollegiate athletic organizations. Quest, 
49(4), 403-415. 
Web of Science 
114 Scott, D. K. (1999). A multiframe perspective of leadership and organizational climate in 
intercollegiate athletics. Journal of Sport Management, 13(4), 298-316. 
Web of Science 
115 Seitanidi, M. M., & Ryan, A. (2007). A critical review of forms of corporate community involvement: 
From philanthropy to partnerships. International Journal of Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector 
Marketing.Special Issue: New Perspectives on Arts and Nonprofit Marketing, 12(3), 247-266. 
PsycINFO 
(peer-reviewed) 
116 Sharpe, E. K. (2006). Resources at the grassroots of recreation: Organizational capacity and quality 
of experience in a community sport organization. Leisure Sciences, 28(4), 385-401.  
PsycINFO(peer-
reviewed) 
117 Shaw, S., & Frisby, W. (2006). Can gender equity be more equitable?: Promoting an alternative frame 
for sport management research, education, and practice. Journal of Sport Management, 20(4), 483-
509. 
Web of Science 
118 Sherry, E., Shilbury, D., & Wood, G. (2007). Wrestling with "conflict of interest" in sport management. 
Corporate Governance, 7(3), 267-277. 
Article First 
119 Shilbury, D., & Moore, K. A. (2006). A study of organizational effectiveness for national Olympic 
sporting organizations. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 35(1), 5-38. 
Web of Science 
120 Slack, T., & Thibault, L. (1988). Values and beliefs: Their role in the structuring of national sport 
organizations. ARENA Review, 12(2), 140-155. 
 
Sociological 
Abstracts 
(peer-reviewed) 
121 Slack, T., Berrett, T., & Mistry, K. (1994). Rational planning systems as a source of organizational 
conflict. International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 29(3), 317-328. 
 
Sociological 
Abstracts 
(peer-reviewed) 
122 Sorensen, M., & Kahrs, N. (2006). Integration of disability sport in the Norwegian sport organizations: 
Lessons learned. Adapted Physical Activity Quarterly, 23(2), 184-202. 
Web of Science 
123 Sotiriadou, K., & Quick, S. P. (2002). Management processes, organisational structures and contexts 
in greek yachting organisations. International Journal of Sport Management, 3(4), 290-307.  
SPORTDiscus 
124 Spracklen, K., Hylton, K., & Long, J. (2006). Managing and monitoring equality and diversity in UK 
sport - An evaluation of the sporting equals racial equality standard and its impact on organizational 
change. Journal of Sport & Social Issues, 30(3), 289-305. 
Web of Science 
125 Sugden, J., & Tomlinson, A. (1998). Power and resistance in the governance of world football: 
Theorizing FIFA's transnational impact. Journal of Sport and Social Issues, 22(3), 299-316. 
Assia (journal) 
126 Taylor, T., Darcy, S., Hoye, R., & Cuskelly, G. (2006). Using psychological contract theory to explore 
issues in effective volunteer management. European Sport Management Quarterly, 6(2), 123-147.  
PsycINFO(peer-
reviewed) 
127 Theberge, N. (1984). Some evidence on the existence of a sexual double standard in mobility to 
leadership positions in sport. International Review for the Sociology of Sport (Munich) 19(2), 1984, 
185-197, 
SPORTDiscus 
128 Theodoraki, E. I., & Henry, I. P. (1994). Organisational structures and contexts in british national 
governing bodies of sport. International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 29(3), 243-268.  
 
Sociological 
Abstract(peer-
reviewed) 
129 Thibault, L., & Harvey, J. (1997). Fostering interorganizational linkages in the Canadian sport delivery 
system. Journal of Sport Management, 11(1), 45-68. 
Web of Science 
130 Toriola, O. M. (2003). Women in sport leadership in Botswana. Journal of Human Movement Studies, 
44(5), 365-371. 
Web of Science 
131 Verhoeven, M., Laporte, W., De Knop, P., Bollaert, L., Taks, M., & Vincke, J. (1999). In search of 
macro-, meso-, and micro sociology antecedents of conflict in voluntary sports federations and clubs 
with the flemish situation as case study. European Journal for Sport Management, 6, 62-77.  
SPORTDiscus 
132 Warren, I. (2002). Governance, protest and sport: An australian perspective. Entertainment Law, 1(1), 
67-94. 
SPORTDiscus 
(peer-reviewed) 
133 Washington, M., & Ventresca, M. J. (2008). Institutional contradictions and struggles in the formation 
of US collegiate basketball, 1880-1938. Journal of Sport Management, 22(1), 30-49. 
Web of Science 
134 Weaver, M. A., & Chelladurai, P. (1999). A mentoring model for management in sport and physical 
education. Quest, 51(1), 24-38. 
Web of Science 
135 Weinberg, R., & McDermott, M. (2002). A comparative analysis of sport and business organizations: 
Factors perceived critical for organizational success. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 14(4), 
282-298. 
Web of Science 
 363 
 
136 Wells, D. (2007). Too weak for the job: Corporate codes of conduct, non-governmental organizations 
and the regulation of international labour standards. Global Social Policy, 7(1), 51-74. 
 
Sociological 
Abstract 
(peer-reviewed) 
137 West, M. D. (1997). Legal rules and social norms in japan's secret world of sumo. The Journal of 
Legal Studies, 26(1), 165-201.  
 
Sociological 
Abstract(peer-
reviewed) 
138 Whisenant, W. A. (2003). How women have fared as interscholastic athletic administrators since the 
passage of title IX. Sex Roles, 49(3-4), 179-184.  
PsycINFO(peer-
reviewed) 
139 Whisenant, W. A., Pedersen, P. M., & Obenour, B. L. (2002). Success and gender: Determining the 
rate of advancement for intercollegiate athletic directors. Sex Roles, 47(9-10), 485-491.  
PsycINFO(peer-
reviewed) 
140 White Morrow, W., & Chelladurai, P. (1992). The structure and processes of synchro canada. Journal 
of Sport Management, 6(2), 133-152. 
SPORTDiscus 
141 White, M., & Kay, J. (2006). Who rules sport now? white and brackenridge revisited. International 
Review for the Sociology of Sport, 41(3-4), 465-473. 
 
Sociological 
Abstract 
(peer-reviewed) 
142 Wilkesmann, U., & Blutner, D. (2002). Going public: The organizational restructuriing of german 
football clubs. Soccer & Society, 3(2), 19-37. 
SPORTDiscus 
143 Wu, Y (1999) Early NCAA Attempts At The Governance Of Women’s Intercollegiate Athletics, 1968-
1973 JOURNAL OF SPORT HISTORY  Fall 1999 Volume 26, Number 3, 585  
Article First 
144 Yusof, A. (1987). Planning and decision making in sport administration. Physical Educator, 44(1), 
264-268. 
SPORTDiscus 
145 Zakus, D.H., (2000) Change and Development of the International Olympic Committee, Bridging 
Three Centuries Fifth International Symposium for Olympic Research, September pp. 165-176 
LA84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 364 
 
Appendix 3 Definitions and Operationalisations of key ethical principles 
Principles Definitions/interpretations Operationalisations 
Accountability 
 
A member of the Executive Committee should comply 
with rules and regulations as well as its stakeholders’ 
needs 
 
 
-To whom is the NOC accountable? 
- To what extent are stakeholders included in the decision-making?  
- Does the NOC indicate rules and regulations that an Executive 
Committee member should comply with? 
- How often is the General Assembly meeting held? 
- Is an annual report open to scrutiny by the General Assembly? 
- Is the election of officers & members undertaken by the General 
Assembly?  
A group of auditors should be independent and scrutinise 
the behaviour of the Executive Committee 
- Is there an independent audit? & how often is an audit held? 
- Does the NOC have an effective programme for managing the 
auditing? 
An organisation should provide accurate financial 
statements to audit. 
-Does the NOC produce and provide enough references which 
encompass all of the financial statements? 
Responsibility 
 
 
 
 
 
The Executive Committee members should also balance 
diverging interests, power and authority.  
-Does the organisation justify its behaviours/actions by reference to 
ensuring an appropriate balance of power? 
The Executive Committee should provide the strategic 
guidance of the organisation to ensure the long-term 
viability of the organisation. 
- Does the Executive Committee clearly provide the vision and overall 
goals in the context of the long term viability of the organisation? 
The Executive Committee should provide the effective 
monitoring of management.  
- Does it establish and evaluate the execution of clear, adequate rules 
and regulations by which management should conduct its activities? 
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- Does it monitor a code of conduct and finance within the organisation?  
Transparency 
 
Organisations should develop and provide written policies 
and procedures that promote the timely and balanced 
disclosure of all material matters that concern them. 
- Is an organisational progress report annually released? 
  (If not, how often is it released?) 
- Are there clear rules and procedures on how to get ‘material matters’ 
which are of concern on to the organisation’s agenda? 
- Is any information including all regulations required open to the 
public/stakeholders? 
- Is a financial report open to the public/ stake holders? 
Organisations should open the process of decision 
making to all stakeholder 
- Is the process of decision making open or monitored? 
  (If so, by whom and for what purposes?) 
Democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It should be maintaining checks and balances by means 
of elections of high officials. 
 
High officials in the organisation including President and 
Executive Committee members should maintain their 
independence from internal/external interests within the 
organisation. 
- What kind of system exists for elections to the Executive Committee 
and the Presidency? 
  (If not, who nominates candidates for the Presidency and the 
Executive Committee?) 
-Does NOC provide clear criteria on the electoral system? 
- Are high officials in NOCs independent from internal/external 
interests? 
No matter what structure the NOC follows, either 
centralisation or decentralisation, it should be actually 
decentralised in decision making. 
- Is power in decision-making decentralised or centralised at a 
managerial level, i.e. an Executive Committee? 
- To what extent are all members of each department able to be 
involved in decision-making process? 
- Are all departments independent in decision-making? 
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Equity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In general 
Meanings are produced in the ways in which dominant 
groups produce common understandings through the 
processes and patterns of interactions. 
Practices are understood through obtaining insight into 
the ways in which members of dominant and subordinate 
groups negotiate meanings when a member of the 
subordinate group attempts to enter the dominant group. 
Sports organisations should establish a channel of policy 
implementation to deal with complaints about 
discrimination and harassment. 
 
-Is there any evidence in the ‘meanings’ showing how, in particular, high 
officials make sense of equity? 
 
-Is there any evidence of the ‘practices’? 
 
 
-Is there a written policy (laws and rules) on gender, disability, ethnicity, 
and resource allocations? (in general) 
-Is there a team or a monitoring system handling such matters? 
Gender 
Female involvement in decision making should reach a 
minimum of 20 per cent at both the managerial.  
 
 
-What percentage of women is involved in decision making? 
-What is the ratio of females at the non-managerial level?  
-May male and female staff members benefit from the same treatment, 
salaries and access to the higher positions?  
Disability 
People with impairments should also be involved in 
decision making 
Organisations should demonstrate the integration of 
individual workers with disabilities through legislation, 
rules, and finance. 
 
 
-What percentage of people with disabilities take part as members of 
the decision-making bodies and in the non-decision making positions? 
-Does the NOC provide relevant rules and legislation on disability and 
disability sport? 
-Does the NOC provide a better working environment for disability staff 
members? 
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Equity 
(continued) 
  
Ethnicity 
Irrespective of the ethnicity, anyone capable should be 
involved at the working and managerial levels 
 
-What percentage of people in different ethnic groups participates at 
both managerial and non-managerial levels? 
Fair allocation of resources 
Fair allocation of resources, programs and decision 
making in terms of gender, disability, the size of the 
organisation, and high- or low- profile athletes or NFs’ 
 
-How are resources to NFs and athletes distributed? 
Effectiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The achievement of official goals and operational goals. 
 
-What are the official goals of the NOC? 
-What are its operational goals?(objectives whose attainment is 
desired) 
-Does the organisation clearly set forth the organisation’s goals? 
-In what degree are the official and operational goals achieved? 
Organisational Culture: clear homogeneity of organisational values and highly transformational leaders are conducive to the 
formation of a strong, positive organisational culture, which is more effective. 
Organisational Values 
Integration: with a strong alignment between words and 
deeds, an organisation-wide consensus and consistency 
between organisational values and employee behaviour may 
be achieved. 
Differentiation: when there is a contradiction between words 
and deeds, inconsistencies and subcultures may arise due to 
unbalanced power relations. 
Fragmentation: if uncertainty and temporality exist between 
words and deeds, ambiguity and complexity are the 
consequences.  
 
-Do staff members clearly understand and share the organisation’s 
official and operational goals? 
-Are organisational values shared by all members? 
-Is there a sub-culture within the NOC? 
-are organisational values differentiated along these lines: individual 
roles; age and gender; volunteer and professional paid staff?. 
-Is there an activity like an induction, or a social engagement to help 
staff to identify with the organisation?  
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Effectiveness 
(continued) 
Leadership 
Transactional leadership: subordinates perform within a 
clearly outlined framework as tasked by their leaders in 
exchange for commensurate material or psychological 
compensation  
Transformational leadership: leaders  emphasise task-
related values and a strong commitment to a mission, and 
inspire their subordinates to reach higher levels of 
performance in their commitment and contribution  
Leaders should be professional, interactional and 
communicative in their conduct, and/or capable of dealing 
with a contingency 
 
-Does a leader elicit respect and from his/her subordinates and 
stimulate their sense of pride? 
-Does a leader carry out effective two-way and horizontal 
communications and interactions with his/her subordinates? 
-Does a leader clearly communicate organisational values, purpose 
and mission? 
Efficiency 
 
The amount of resources or funds (the input) to be used to 
improve or produce the desired output. 
Historic budgeting: on the basis of the previous financial 
year’s allocation 
Zero-based budgeting: no budget lines should be carried 
forward from one period to the next 
Priority-based budgeting: on the basis of priorities 
Performance-based budgeting: on the basis of performance 
Fixed budgeting: on the basis of the level of activity and 
service provision. 
-How is the budget decided to be allocated?  
 
 
 
